Two factors have influenced the development of Palestinian
identity: Palestinian Diaspora after the 1948 war, coupled with
Jordanian and Egyptian rule over the West Bank and Gaza. The
dispersion of the larger part of the Palestinian population and
the
presence of almost three million Palestinians in occupied
territories today have created different conditions for the
evolution of identities.
These identities remain somewhat distinct despite the Oslo
Agreement that brought the PLO leadership from exile to the
Occupied Palestinian Territories and the establishment of the
Palestinian National Authority (PNA). It was believed that this
step would lead to the reconciliation between "interior" and
"exterior" political cultures. However, the post¬Oslo period
has witnessed competition between various strains of Palestinian
political culture, such as that between the mainstream national
movement and the Islamic fundamentalist movement.
This article attempts to unfold the historical and ideological
forces molding Palestinian national identity, thus outlining its
transformation into its current state during the Palestinian
national uprising, AI-Aqsa Intifada. In light of the historical
context that has shaped the current conception of Palestinian
national identity, I argue against the allegations by Israel that
the Palestinian nationalist movement and struggle is supportive of
terrorism.
Concepts of Nationalism
The origins of nationalism as a phenomenon have produced a vast
mass of literature, with diverse definitions, arguments and
hypotheses on the inception of the concepts of nation and
nationalism.
Those who argue that nationalism is an old primordial phenomenon
make the claim that humanity needs social solidarity for its
survival and that it is nationalism that provides communities with
the social cohesion needed for survival. However, it is claimed by
other schools of thought that nationalism is a modern phenomenon,
which appeared as an ideology in response to or as a product of
certain social and political developments in modern societies.
Ernest Gellner's conceptualization of nationalism is premised on
the argument that capitalism, science and technology,
industrialization, mass communication and other features of
modernization helped disintegrate traditional groups and introduce
a challenging mobile lifestyle. The disintegration is thought to
have induced chaos and conflict, and so nationalism was adopted as
a unifying factor that restores order and legitimates the modern
state. According to theorists like Benedict Anderson (Imagined
Communities, 1983), print-capitalism, another modern production, is
thought to have contributed to the invention of nationalism as a
"cultural artefact" that would secure social cohesion.
The concept of having a national identity is, therefore,
constructed, as opposed to being a given. In fact, the process of
constructing national identity is shaped by real political and
intellectual forces which, in turn, grapple with the formation of
new social classes, the expansion of modern communications, the
spread of education, and the introduction of mass politics.
The Arab Nation as an Intellectual and Political Force
To discuss Palestinian national identity, it is vital to trace the
spread of nationalism to the Arab world, since "nationalism" is
believed to be originally a Western concept. Western perception of
nation and nationalism was introduced and accepted in the Levant by
Arab Christian intellectuals like Ibrahim Al-Yazigi and ]urji
Zeidan, whose sectarian axis helped foreign intervention under the
pretext of protecting Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire.
The contact of Arab societies with the West nourished a
liberationist tradition, highlighted in wanting to build
nationalism on shared destiny and civic culture and to achieve
social and economic justice, as well as to acquire the techniques
of modern science and its application. This was to be done in a
process that also revives Arab heritage.
Education was perceived as the best means to accomplish such an
awakening, accompanied by Western values and ideas. Arab Christians
were the first to receive
Western education at the missionary schools, which were established
in Syria and in most of the Fertile Crescent by the French,
British, Americans and Russians. Thus, contact between East and
West increased interest in
academic education apart from religious education. Secular
education grew in the second half of the 19th century in Egypt and
India. This educational development was followed by Islamic
reformists headed by Rifa'at Tahtawi, Jamal Al-Dein Afghani and
Mohammad Abduh, who succumbed to sociopolitical realities and
encouraged Muslims to join missionary schools like the Syrian
Protestant College, later known as the American University of
Beirut, and the Jesuit School in Lebanon.
Consequently, the Arab Muslim World gained from Western experience
of social and intellectual change, and added it to traditional
culture. Arabs became more aware of their national historical
homogeneity, and began a process of separating between civil and
religious authority. Thus hardly had the 20th century begun when
the idea of the Arab nation began to translate itself from the
pages of magazines and books to societies and conferences. It
became a force in the intellectual world and on the political
arena. The fact is that since the establishment of Al-Arabiyya
al-Fatat Society, strong and clear objectives began to appear
within the principles of Arab nationalism. The Arab struggle for
liberation and national independence culminated in the Great Arab
Revolt of 1916. This revolt liberated Arab countries from slavery
to the Ottoman State but only into a state of quasi
independence.
The Genesis of Palestinian Nationalism
To trace the genesis of Palestinian nationalism requires an
in-depth look at Arab nationalism, which was shaped during the
Ottoman period, especially during the latter part of the nineteenth
century. As argued by some, including Rashid Khalidi (Palestinian
Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, 1997),
the awakening of Arab consciousness in modern times and the
consequent rise of Arab nationalism can be attributed, inter alia,
to the impact of the First World War and the activities of Zionism.
The Palestinians were part of the Arab World sharing with it many
of its internal developments as wel1 as some of its external
influences. Zionism was particularly influential in shaping their
current politics and in determining their political destiny.
Historically, the Palestine question can be related to the problem
of Western intervention - cultural penetration in the form of ideas
of nationalism and political penetration in the form of colonial
rule. However, while Jewish nationalism originated from the
intel1ectual and emotional responses to the pogroms of Eastern
Europe and Russia, Arab nationalism was a direct reaction to
Ottoman (Turkish) oppression and European colonialism.
Along its historic continuum, Palestine became the object of
conflicting political claims and intense religious attachments. In
time, these played an important part in the development of two
separate but conflicting nationalisms: Arab nationalism and
Zionism. Both forms of nationalism strove to gain control of
Palestine.
The two opposing nationalist movements appeared around the same
time, toward the end of the nineteenth century, and reached the
peak of their political strength later in the twentieth century. In
the meantime, although their aspirations centered on Palestine,
their fortunes and misfortunes depended heavily on European
politics, particularly those of
the great powers.
The awakening interest of Arabs in their cultural heritage and
traditions gave birth to Arab nationalism in the key cities of the
Fertile Crescent. The political organization and strength of the
nascent Arab national movement was in Syria, particularly in
Damascus. However, Western colonial rule and the threat of Zionism
caused Arab nationalism to splinter, thus the political elite of
Syria, Iraq, and Palestine were propelled towards local priorities
and concerns. In particular, the Palestinian a' ayan (notables)
were disenchanted with the fragmentation of the Arab nationalist
movement, which contradicted their aspiration of national
self¬determination and political independence.
Hence, Palestinian nationalism developed its own ideology and
institutional framework because of two important developments after
World War I. According to Muhammad Muslih, a noted political
scientist "one internal (development), pertained to the
fragmentation of the Arab nationalist movement, and the other,
external, pertained to the dismemberment of Syria at the hands of
Britain and France." Zionism, then, was one of the catalysts that
instigated Palestinian nationalism but never contributed to its
creation. It provided the Palestinians with a centralized focus for
their national struggle. However, regardless of its unique
characteristics, Palestinian nationalism incorporated the ideals of
pan-Arabism revolving around Arab unity and independence.
Unfortunately, the Palestinians could not escape their own
traditional rivalries, and their national movement fell victim to
internal divisions and political fragmentation.
A National Movement, National Interests
It is evident that Palestinian national identity in the 1930s and
1940s was in a state of flux, revolving around factionalist
politics based on tribalism and parochialism. Yet, nationalism was
the mobilizing and driving force behind the Palestinian revolt
against the British Mandate (1922-1948) and political Zionism. The
British policy of "divide and rule" succeeded, and the rivalry
between the leading Palestinian families took a sharp turn during
the first decade of the British mandate. The families manipulated
all the ties of kin, class, and patronage to win over new
supporters. Unfortunately, the traditional leadership did not
realize in the late 1930s that their factionalism would help lead
to the loss of part of Palestine in 1948. A Jewish state would be
established in most of the country, and the rest would be placed
under Jordanian and Egyptian rule.
Since the 1948 war, Palestinian society has been dominated by the
fact of expulsion from the land. The population was fragmented and
dispersed, and after fifty years of dispossession there is a
growing heterogeneity in the economic and political spheres. The
diasporized Palestinians today, almost four million, are alienated
from their homeland. They are dependent largely on the goodwill of
their hosts to be able to remain and provide themselves with the
basics of life. Although "the homeland" stands as the major
"objectification" of Palestinian identity, being physically absent
from it, for the majority, makes it an abstraction. In the midst of
social, economic and political alienation, we find that
Palestinians have retained a strong sense of selfhood and national
identity.
However, the Palestinian national movement was not monolithic and
lacked a consensual mass-based political entity. Following the 1948
war, nationalism re-emerged in a different context, in refugee
camps, schools and universities, where many organizations were
formed including members and cadres from different social
backgrounds. A shift from the politics of a'ayan (notables) to
mass-based organizations, recruiting members from the lower strata
of Palestinian society, became visible and distinctive.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, Palestinian national identity was
concretized in pan-Arab ideology. Palestinians were incorporated
into the Arab World and became pro-active in local Arab politics
dominated by Arab sloganeering of unity, freedom and socialism.
Consequently, the Palestinian question was Arabized, losing the
quintessential dominance of its Palestinian character and identity.
Of course, Palestinians were eventually frustrated and disappointed
with Nasser's pan-Arabism that failed to liberate Palestine, and
brought nothing but the nakba (eclipse/ disaster) to the
Palestinian and entire Arab nation. This situation prompted the
Palestinian elite and intelligentsia to explore their inner
potentials through rejuvenating their nationalism and reviving
their culture and identity through literary publications and the
establishment of a new wave of mass-based and grassroots
organizations at all levels.
Nonetheless, continuous debate takes place among Palestinians
regarding their national interests. As mentioned earlier,
Palestinian national identity and the process of nation building
have become a concrete reality. Between 1982 and 1987, Palestinians
in occupied territories started to build an infrastructure
that challenged Israeli occupation. The 1987 Intifada played a
crucial role in sparking a synchronized effort by the Palestinian
Diaspora to discover the potential
of its new empowerment. The mass organizations and the grassroots
networks, along with the popular committees, formed the
organizational nucleus of the uprising. At the same time, the
Intifada managed to create a national debate among the various
political groups within the PLO, between the "interior" and
"exterior" and between the "nationalist" and "religious"
camps.
It is not surprising that the dislocation and alienation of the
Palestinians has strengthened their conceptualization of their
national identity and intensified their sense of Palestinian
nationalism. Literature, especially poetry, plays a crucial role in
defining Palestinian nationalism as yearning to return to the
homeland and to achieving independence. Through literature,
scattered Palestinian communities have been able to unite, to
identify with one another and consequently to establish a sense of
a unified national identity, embodied in their collective struggle
for self¬determination.
The PLO and Palestinian Identity in the Making
With a new leadership in the early sixties, the Palestinian
national movement took up the challenge of pursuing an independent
Palestinian state. This heavy burden was shouldered by the PLO -
officially created in 1964 by the Arab League. Nasser's Egypt
initially backed the idea in order to co-opt the new organization
and control it. The PLO was headed by Ahmad AI-Shuqayri known for
his affiliation with Nasser, and the Palestinian Liberation Army
was directly under unified Arab command and headed by an
Egyptian.
From its inception, the PLO was embroiled in factional bickering.
Its existence and decision-making processes were affected by
inter-Arab rivalries especially those between Syria and Egypt, and
to a certain degree Jordan. Fatah, a leading organization within
the PLO, emphasized military action against Israel and removed
itself from the inter-Arab feud.
Irrespective of Fatah's predominance in the PLO, the June 1967 war
was a disaster for the Arab states and the Palestinians. Many
Palestinians suffered another exodus to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon
and were denied return to their homes, while others were destined
to stay on their native soil under Israeli occupation.
In spite of this cataclysmic event that exacerbated the plight of
the Palestinians, new orientations to Palestinian nationalism were
brought to the fore by political organizations. Palestinian leaders
became disenchanted with the Arab regimes despite their support and
began to call for the establishment of Palestinian organizations
independent of outside Arab control. Here, again, Palestinians were
diverted from the cause of pan-Arabism and Arab unity in favor of
Palestinian nationalism and the struggle for independence.
After the 1967 Naksa, there appeared a crushing need for the
reconstruction of Palestinian life. Ideology, armed struggle, and
diplomatic posturing became secondary to the building of an
organization that could advocate the Palestinian cause and take
action on behalf of all Palestinians. The task of this new
leadership entailed activities such as purchasing arms, raising
funds, and developing a territorial base that could facilitate
closer ties to the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza, as well
as launching military activities against Israel.
Tolerance of division and diversity has characterized the
Palestinian nationalist movement, and the sense of pluralism became
almost a tradition. The PLO succeeded in reconstituting a shattered
Palestinian society under difficult conditions and in a difficult
environment. It managed to make operational a remarkable
infrastructure against great odds, thus addressing the political
and material needs of the dispersed Palestinians. Despite the
militant elements in its organizational structure,
the PLO succeeded in building a civilian-institutional
infrastructure that catered to the needs of the Palestinian nation
in exile. There is no doubt that the PLO contrived to create a
mass-based society in Lebanon during the 1970s. The political
implications of building a myriad of social institutions were
crucial to the development of a framework in which to deal with the
internal political process and strategy formulations.
Palestinian National Identity and the Islamic Movement in the
AI-Aqsa Intifada
Islamic forces have influenced the politics of Palestinian
nationalism throughout its struggle for independence largely by
giving it impetus and direction, in confrontation with the
Zionists. To cite some examples: the incidents of 1920, the Wailing
Wall Incident of 1929, the 1936 Arab Revolt and the role of Izzedin
AI-Qassam, the 1948 war, the 1987 Intifada and the role of Hamas
and Islamic Jihad in the current AI-Aqsa Intifada.
Regardless of secular tendencies within the Palestinian national
movement, the Islamic dimension has been a potent factor in the
struggle for independence. It is no wonder then that the religious
aspect, i.e. Islam, has always been a focal point in the
Palestinian political debate and discourse, and has acted as the
source 0 checks and balances within the Palestinian polity. The
complexity of the conditions which triggered the formation of the
Islamic movement led Hamas founders to create an equally complex
strategy based on pragmatism and realism in adaptation to the
political climate.
Today, the faltering political peace process gives wider support to
the Islamic movement spearheaded by Hamas. It is apparent that a
worsening state of affairs arms Hamas with more power, extended
from the Palestinian public, to advance its own political agenda
within overarching Islamic ideology.
During the current Intifada, Hamas garners the support of 30
percent of the Palestinian population.
Hamas plays an imperative role in catering to Palestinian
socioeconomic and medical needs, let alone the fact that it has a
noted presence through its military operations against Israel. In
fact, Hamas appeals
to sectors of Palestinian youth, women and some of the intellectual
elite. Growing popularity of Hamas in the Paletinian street has
prompted many Palestinians to shift from the nationalist bloc to
the Islamic bloc, believing that Hamas will meet Palestinian
national aspirations. But it is worth mentioning that Hamas's
political agenda is to seek a Palestinian Islamic state, whereas
the nationalist movement continues to espouse the attainment of a
secular Palestinian state within the borders of 1967. Therefore, it
is important to keep such a distinction in mind in understanding
the underlying forces of the Palestinian national discourse in the
current Intifada. Thus, occupation and dire socioeconomic
conditions, along with the perceived failure of the PNA, have all
boosted the popularity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Conclusion
Palestinian national identity has been shaped by the historical
realities faced in the region, starting from colonialism until the
eruption of the current Intifada. Many political ideologies of the
century, such as Zionism, Nasserism and currently Islamic
fundamentalism, have dramatically impacted the structure and
substance of the Palestinian conception of their national
identity.
It is worth mentioning that the Palestinian national identity has
been greatly affected by the Islamic religious dimension, as
highlighted above, which makes it today distinctive from previous
forms of Palestinian national identity in earlier epochs of
Palestinian history.
Unfortunately today, the Palestinian national struggle for
self¬determination is portrayed by the Israeli government and
media as "terrorism." Israel now intentionally confuses the
political agenda of the Palestinian National Authority with that of
Islamic Hamas, depicting both as terrorist organizations. Thus,
Israel is taking advantage of the changing political dynamics after
September 11 to distort the image of the Palestinian cause and the
Palestinian National Authority so as to win the support of world
public opinion. The aim is to perpetuate occupation and reinforce
Israeli right-wing political interests. It is a political and
intellectual blunder to incorporate the just cause of the
Palestinians and their conflict against occupation into the
"ideological" conflict between terrorism and the Western values of
freedom and democracy. This "ideological" discourse is causing the
recent change in global politics.