Last winter, every weekend saw Bar-Ilan Street in northern
Jerusalem converted into a battlefield. On one side were the
ultra-Orthodox, known in Hebrew as the Haredim, or God-fearing, who
demand the closure of the street on the Sabbath and on Jewish
festivals. They would gather to demonstrate and throw stones at
passing cars and at police officers sent to keep order. Garbage
bins would be overturned to block the road. On the other hand,
secular members of Meretz or the Labor party would travel in
convoys along the controversial street, putting themselves at
considerable personal risk in order to keep the street open.
However, as everything in Jerusalem is more complex than it
appears, the struggle over Bar-Ilan Street is far more than a mere
controversy over opening or closing the road on the Sabbath. Three
thousand years of histo¬ry, sacred principles, mystic beliefs
- and yes, also political interests, can be read between the lines
of every poster calling on the ultra-Orthodox public to protest
against this open "desecration of the Sabbath."
Test Case
In the eyes of all those involved, the struggle over Bar-Ilan
Street is a test case for numerous issues affecting the future of
the city: the results of the clash will symbolize the new relation
of political forces in Jerusalem. First and foremost, this struggle
is a test for the new municipal coalition between the
ultra-Orthodox and the right (Likud) - a coalition which in the
last elections enabled the Likud's Ehud Olmert to defeat Labor's
Teddy Kollek who had been mayor for the last 27 years.
The ultra-Orthodox are already enjoying considerable financial
alloca¬tions for their educational institutions, but they must
also show achieve¬ments in larger religious (and not only
educational) affairs. The bottom line is clear to all - that the
road will be closed. The only question is when.
Perhaps after the Knesset elections. The Likud candidate for prime
min¬ister, MK Benjamin Netanyahu, hopes to reconstruct
Olmert's alliance with the ultra-Orthodox and thus to beat Yitzhak
Rabin. So even if the street is not closed by then, there can be
little doubt that this will happen if Netanyahu gets into
power.
The Territorial Question
There is also a test case here for the question: Should the
ultra-Orthodox participate in running the city, and is it worth
their while? The extreme and anti-Zionist factions like the
Haredi community and the Neturei Karta (Guardians of
the City) oppose the present participation of ultra-Orthodox
parties in elections to the municipality, and receiving funds from
it. The extremists are out to embarrass the coalition through
criticism on religious matters, especially on the subject of
Bar-Ilan Street.
The battle for this street will also be a test case for an
important territo¬rial question. In the last 20 years, most of
the northern section of the city has become ultra-Orthodox. Most
roads in that area have been closed to Sabbath traffic; closing
this one will constitute official recognition that the city is no
longer divided into the traditional two sections (eastern and
western Jerusalem) but into three: Palestinian eastern Jerusalem,
northern ultra-Orthodox Jerusalem and southern secular
Jerusalem.
The Last Barrier
From the secular point of view, too, however vital the opening of
the road, it is also a symbol. Bypassing Bar-Ban is very
inconvenient for Saturday traffic but it is possible. However, for
many years Bar-Ilan Street has been considered the last barrier,
which must not be abandoned. For the secular public in Jerusalem,
closing the street would be a painful manifestation of the growing
strength of the ultra-Orthodox in the city.
The political strength of the Haredim has indeed been
growing for many years, and there is an (incorrect) impression that
they are dominat¬ing the life of secular Jerusalemites.
Actually, it is the secular who have won most of the battles over
religion in the city, especially those over the Sabbath. Fifteen
years ago, Jerusalem didn't have a single cinema, and only very few
restaurants and bars, that were open on Saturday. Today 15 cinema
halls and dozens of restaurants are open on the Sabbath (Friday
evenings and Saturday).
The opening of the soccer stadium in Malha where the main matches
are played on a Saturday was another secular victory. The general
rule seems to be that the Haredim win only when their
struggle is connected to their own territory, while they regularly
lose every battle where they try to inter¬fere with what is
going on among the secular people.
The Demographic Factor
In spite of all the secular achievements, the victory of the
rightist-Haredi coalition in the last municipal elections
provided hard proof of Jerusalem's demographic landscape. In
demographic terms, the ultra-Orthodox are way ahead. Experts
estimate that the Haredim today constitute 27 to 30 percent
of the Jewish population of Jerusalem. In the City Council, they
have nine out of 31 places, or 29 percent. The secularists fear the
Haredim primarily because of their high birthrate (which is
greater than that of Palestinians in East Jerusalem). Even today,
Haredim account for 41 per¬cent of Jewish-school pupils
in the city (excluding those educational insti¬tutions which
refuse to take money from the municipality). In kinder¬gartens
they are already 60 percent of Jewish children.
On the basis of this data, the Jerusalem Institute for Israeli
Studies con¬cludes that in 2010, 40 percent of Jerusalem's
residents will be Haredim. This forecast raises important
questions about the future of the city.
Not So Certain
The director of the Israel Lands Authority, Uzi Wexler, says that
the demo¬graphic forecast of the Jerusalem Institute starts
from the assumption that what was, will be: in other words, the
Haredi population will continue to grow at the present rate.
Wexler, like Prof. Menachem Friedman who has conducted important
research on the ultra-Orthodox population, foresees an upset in
demographic processes to be caused by a large wave of ultra¬
Orthodox giving up religion and adopting other values.
Friedman explains that the acute economic crisis of the
Haredi population will compel many of them to go into the
army and to find work, thus opening themselves up to secular
influences. (The Haredim are traditional¬ly allowed to
avoid military service.)
He also points out that in Israel, it is impossible to forecast
demographic developments. As he sees it, much depends on the
question of whether the government will provide cheap apartments
for Haredim outside Jerusalem, thus drawing them out of the
city. Friedman doesn't discount the possibil¬ity that the
Haredim will break forth from their own areas, buy up
apart¬ments in secular areas and thus conquer new
neighborhoods. This process will be assisted by the trend among
part of the stronger elements in the sec¬ular population to
move out of the city into suburban neighborhoods such as Mevasseret
Zion.
Friedman warns of a situation in which Jerusalem, like Washington,
will be transformed into a capital city whose residents
(Haredim and poor neighborhoods) will be economically weak,
with the socioeconomic "elite" living outside the city, driven out
by the Haredim.
More Religious Coercion?
Contrary to the accepted myth, the sense of strangulation felt by
secularists as a result of religious coercion is a secondary
motivation in their departure from the city. The main reasons are
the astronomical housing prices and the lack of suitable places of
employment, particularly in industry. The campaign now being
conducted by the ultra-Orthodox against the extension of the
important hi-tech Intel industry (which they claim pollutes a
Haredi neighborhood) might contribute to more secular
Jerusalemites leaving the city.
The growing political strength of the ultra-Orthodox naturally
causes the secularists increasing concern over the prospects for
increased reli¬gious coercion and the erosion of the many
achievements won by the sec¬ular sector in recent years,
particularly as regards Sabbath opening. However, the general view
of both Haredim and secularists is that there will be no
such erosion. Prof. Friedman says that "there will be a sort of
status quo. The ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods will be more
ultra¬ Orthodox and the secular neighborhoods will be totally
secular." So, the Haredim can be expected to concentrate on
more schools and syna¬gogues, building new neighborhoods, and
so on.
The municipal coalition, with an absolute religious majority,
continues to allocate budgets to Conservative and Reform Jewish
institutions, to sports clubs which play on Sabbath and to cultural
centers like the Cinematheque and the Khan Theater which are open
on Friday nights and Saturdays. So secular Jerusalem's way of life
is assured for at least another decade.
A Haredi Mayor?
Of course, all this will change if and when there is an
ultra-Orthodox mayor. When will this come about? Only when the
Haredim constitute an absolute majority, or something near
this, in the city; this will certainly not be for the next 10
years. The alliance between the Likud and the Haredim is
built on the assumption that the Haredim vote for the Likud
candidate, and not the other way round. It is certainly possible
that in the future, the Likud will run a religious or at least a
traditional candidate so as to satisfy the ultra-Orthodox.
It is generally assumed that the first ultra-Orthodox mayor will be
one of the outstanding younger Haredi politicians, such as
Meir Porush, who is now serving as deputy mayor. He says he doesn't
think that a Haredi municipality would close secular
entertainment centers on Saturday, but he would certainly prevent
the opening of new ones. One can assume, however, that under a
Haredi municipality, with an ultra-Orthodox mayor, this will
be the least of the worries of the secular population. First will
be the flight of masses of economically well-established
secularists either to the suburbs or even further, to the coastal
plain. It is hard to imagine an Israeli government permitting such
an exodus from the capital city.
Beware Bnei Brak
How will Haredi rule in Jerusalem look? The only existing
example of a Haredi city in Israel is Bnei Brak, which is a
bankrupt suburb of Tel Aviv. The ultra-Orthodox population there,
with its many children, pays rela¬tively low rates. In a city
where the main occupation is religious study, there are naturally
insufficient industries and businesses to pay proper taxes. But
there are many tax-exempt religious institutions.
Porush says that "here in Jerusalem everything is done legally and
pro¬fessionally and in accordance with the proper
regulations," and Haredi Knesset Member Rabbi Avraham Ravitz
is sure that "Jerusalem will never be like Bnei Brak. I don't know
any Haredim in Jerusalem who don't pay taxes."
Nevertheless, contrary to Porush's assurance on the immunity from
cor¬ruption of the administration in Jerusalem, his colleagues
in the munici¬pality and in the government have proven that
orderly administration can quickly be undone. Many of the local and
national ultra-Orthodox officials think that the aim of securing
budgets for the institutions that they repre¬sent is far more
important than norms of fair allocation of funds or the accepted
rules of fair administration. If the ultra-Orthodox run the
munic¬ipality with the same methods they have been using
elsewhere in local government, they will have no difficulty in
undermining orderly administration in the course of a few
months.
The political map of Jerusalem would of course change completely
were the Palestinians to participate in local elections, and run
their own list. This seems to be only a theoretical possibility as
things stand, since the Palestinians would see it as recognition of
Israeli rule over the eastern section of the city. At first sight
there seems to be a good basis for cooperation between the
Haredim and the Arabs. Even the moderates among the
ultra-Orthodox have reservations about Zionism, though not fighting
against it. Ultra Orthodox ideology forbids provocation against
gentiles and supports com¬promise over matters involving the
saving of endangered Jewish lives (Pikuah nefesh).
All this, however, is an abstraction for there is a vast gap
between such moderate political ideology and the actual extremist
sentiments of the Haredim. This is largely a very
nationalistically-inclined population and therefore very rightist.
They are generally suspicious of people from a dif¬ferent
religion and of the PLO, which, for them, consists not only of
terror¬ists but also murderers of Jews. While Meir Porush
claims that the ultra ¬Orthodox are less nationalistic than
the secularists, he does not rule out political cooperation with a
Palestinian faction in the municipality. "Rabin depends in the
Knesset on Arab support, why shouldn't I?" he says.
With the background of Haredi nationalism, Prof. Friedman
has good rea¬son to believe that there is no real possibility
of any alliance between the Haredim and the Palestinians. He
points out that even so, it is very convenient for the
ultra-Orthodox to brandish the threat of Arab participation in
munic¬ipal elections as this strengthens the Likud's
dependence on the Haredim.