There are at least two factors which distinguish Palestinian youth
experience in the Intifada from youth experience with politically
violent conditions in other parts of the world. The first is the
prominent role that they performed in the generation and the
maintenance of the uprising. It has not been common historically
far children and adolescents to be such active and leading
participants in political conflict. Instead, children have
typically been considered mare as passive recipients of the trauma
of war.2 Second, it has not been common far children and
adolescents to be so heavily engaged in conflict of the intensity
and duration that occurred during the Intifada. This is
particularly the case in the many very densely populated areas of
the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, especially the refugee
camps, where the stress and trauma of conflict continued an a
frequent, often daily basis, far aver five years.
There are several possible explanations far the heavy involvement
of the young sectors of Palestinian society during the Intifada.8,
12, 13, 27 Demographically, half of the population of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip was under 14 years old or younger during the
Intifada. Further, these youth were barn during the Israeli
occupation and had personal experiences with same of the mast
hostile and intrusive elements of the occupation. Also, much of the
conflict, particularly in the camps, occurred around the schools
which necessarily involved children, and through the direct
recruitment of young people into the resistance by the Islamic
groups, as well as by the deteriorating economic conditions.
Patterns of Intifada Involvement
Statistical reports of Palestinian youth experience in the Intifada
have concentrated typically on the incidents of death and injuries.
Estimates vary, but there is a consensus that hundreds of youth
lost their lives and that scores of thousands were injured during
the conflict. Although there have been anecdotal accounts and
findings from small research samples relative to rates of youth
participation in the uprising, there has not been a comprehensive
assessment of youth participation or forms of victimization. Our
interest'" was to assess the degree to which youth were involved in
the uprising, both in terms of how many engaged themselves in the
struggle and how prevalent was the trauma they experienced in the
struggle.6
As Table 1 indicates, the four most common experiences were
participating in demonstrations, throwing stones, being harassed by
soldiers, and being beaten by soldiers. A clear majority of
9th-grade and university male students reported experiencing each
of these four events. Participation was less common among females,
but a substantial portion of females had also experienced the four
major events. Being shot at or arrested by Israeli authorities were
the least common, even though between one-fifth and one-half of
9th-grade and university males reported these two events.
The prevalence of involvement in the uprising among children and
adolescents is underscored by the finding that over 90 percent of
the male respondents and 70 percent of the female respondents
reported experiencing at least one event. Those with most
experiences were from the Gaza refugee camps, with their
overcrowding and poverty, but the findings nevertheless reveal no
differences in patterns of Intifada experience based on social
class standing within this population.
Intifada Involvement and Social and Psychological
Well-Being
As to the strength or long-term nature of consequences to children
and adolescents from their participation in the Intifada, the clear
trend across a number of studies is that participation in the
struggle had some negative consequences, particularly on
psychological and emotional functioning.3, 10, 16, 22, 24, 25Our
study adds to this understanding by providing an assessment of
whether or not these and other consequences maintained themselves
in the one to two years following the formal end of the
Intifada.
Consistent with past work on psychosocial consequences of
involvement, we found higher levels of depression and social
withdrawal (9th-grade girls), higher levels of antisocial behavior
(all groups), and higher levels of self-esteem and lower levels of
depression (university males) associated with Intifada experience.
We also found lower levels of educational aspirations and time
spent on homework (university males), decreased religiosity
(university males and females), and greater association with
deviant peers (university females). Finally, there was evidence of
effects of Intifada experience on some aspects of the parenting
relationship: lower-quality communication (university males), less
supervision (university females), and higher intrusive
(psychological) control by parents (university males and females).
Some patterns in these findings are worth noting. First, most of
the significant correlations were found in the data from the
university samples (adolescents during the movement). This could
reflect their greater overall involvement in the struggle, their
higher level of maturity, compared to children, in understanding
the meaning of the struggle, and their current experience as young
adults with the disappointments and difficulties associated with
conditions since the Intifada.
Second, although there were a number of significant correlations
between Intifada experience and social and psychological
functioning, there were no effects of involvement on personal and
traditional values for education, marriage, and family, or on the
overall quality of relationships with peers, teachers and parents.
The growing research literature on children who experience
political violence reveals a variety of resilient mechanisms. A
general absence of expected effects of trauma can be explained by
such factors as children habituating to conflict, the psychological
meanings attached to the conflict, social support from family and
community, and the degree of ideological commitment to the
conflict.7, 21
In sum, the survey data show some evidence of deterioration in
child and adolescent experience in the years immediately following
the Intifada. The tendency to engage in minor forms of antisocial
behavior (using tobacco and alcohol, stealing, and running away
from home) was consistently related to Intifada experience for all
sex and age groups. It is likely that the more the youth
participated in the struggle, the stronger their sense of
development of personal autonomy, which may have resulted in a
determination not to conform to some societal norms. The heightened
levels of internalized problems in 9th-grade girls (depression,
social withdrawal) may reflect the tension experienced by young
girls who felt the freedom to express their defiance against the
occupation during the Intifada, but now have no real option for
continued expression, given their continuing secluded status in the
patriarchal family system.9 The older females (now college
students) may find such expression through their participation in
higher education.14 Otherwise, correlations between Intifada
involvement and youth characteristics and behaviors were neither
strong nor consistent across the age and sex groups, and it is
noteworthy that the tendency to antisocial behavior did not extend
to overall relationships with peers, teachers, and parents.
Had our survey indexed other forms of trauma - such as curfews;
house raids and demolitions; torture; and witnessing harassment,
killing, or deportation of family members26 - and had we surveyed
youth who had been hospitalized for severe physicaP7 or emotional
problems, we may well have found more pervasive negative
psychological and social effects. But as for the general population
who attend school, experience in the conflict does not appear to
have had generalized negative consequences one to two years
following the end of the Intifada.
The Buffering Effect of Family, School, and
Religion
Our next analysis was designed to extend the research on the
sources of resilience in youth who experience political violence by
focusing on the one consistent negative effect of Intifada
involvement: antisocial behavior (e.g., smoking, drinking alcohol,
stealing, and running away from home).16, 21, 22, 24, 25 We
explored the extent to which integration in three social
institutions that are particularly salient to Palestinian culture
¬family, religion, and education - buffered the effects of
experience with political violence.4 In every case, the strength of
the association between Intifada involvement and antisocial
behavior was significantly contingent on integration in these
social institutions. For example, for university females who
reported high-quality relationships with their mothers, there was
no correlation between involvement and antisocial behavior. For
9th-grade and university students reporting high levels of
responsive parenting (e.g., acceptance, monitoring) and low levels
of negative parenting (psychological control), there was no
correlation between Intifada involvement and antisocial behavior.
Yet for those reporting low levels of responsive parenting (and
high levels of negative parenting), the correlations between
involvement and antisocial behavior were significantly
positive.
For university males and females, enjoying school significantly
reduces the risk of antisocial behavior. For university students,
religious observance (thinking about Allah, praying, and attending
mosque) buffers the negative effects of the trauma associated with
the Intifada. Apparently, integration into the value-rich social
institutions of family, religion, and education have served to
protect youth from some of the hazards of involvement in and
exposure to political violence.
Ideological Commitment
Responses to the opening interview question to "tell what the
Intifada was" included an unequivocal identification with the
national struggle for relief from the perceived abuses of the
occupation as the guiding motivation for the movement as a whole,
and as the motivation for individual involvement in the face of
personalized trauma. Naturally, the articulation of these
motivations has benefited from maturation and hindsight as these
individuals have progressed into young adulthood in the three years
between the interviews and the end of the Intifada. Yet, the same
passion and commitment are clearly evident in present-day
adolescents' expressed sentiments and actions as the struggle
continues.
The narratives from the interviews focused on the historical,
political, cultural, and psychological implications of the
occupation, and the insistence of the young people on assisting to
remove these. One young man said, "The Intifada was a public
reaction against the Israeli hardness and inhuman actions against
Palestinians, especially killing, harsh circumstances, bad economic
situations, and other actions. I can't describe them exactly [the
actions]. To them we were subhuman."l1
In addition to the historical consciousness of antagonism toward
the occupation, individual involvement seemed also to be
crystallized by specific traumatic events. This included frequent
experiences with house raids in which various family members were
terrorized by beatings, the witnessing of beatings of women and
children or, often, it was when someone known to the subject had
been killed. For two of the young men it was a mutual friend who
had been "martyred." One recalled, "He left big gaps in my life and
also in the lives of my friends. I will never forget him, because
he was my close friend."18 A young women said that the Intifada was
essential because "we were suffering more and more under the
occupation."15
Defiance and Deference
An interesting paradox became evident in my observations and
interviews in Gaza having to do with divergent responses to
distinct forms of authority. On the one hand, it was very clear in
the interviews that these adolescents acted with deliberation,
contempt, and disrespect in offensive and defensive fighting
against what they determined was an illegitimate authority. As
blatant and as frequent as this defiance was, however, adolescent
behavior, particularly during the first two years of the Intifada,
does not appear to have been chaotic, uncontrolled behavior fueled
simply by unchecked passion. Instead, paradoxically, the defiance
appeared to occur simultaneously with substantial deference to
recognized, legitimate authority, such as Intifada leaders,
teachers, and parents. Most described their participation in
faction-specific organizational systems characterized by clear
hierarchies of authority. One young man described, "There was an
official. When we get a message from him we should carry out this
message without any kind of objection."20 Although most of those
interviewed described some situational tension between themselves
and their parents relative to their involvement, none described
serious or sustained conflict.
This observation that Intifada youth have maintained culturally
prescribed deference to perceived legitimate authority - coupled
with the survey findings of a lack of general decline in
parent-child and teacher-child relations as a function of Intifada
involvement - runs counter to one prevailing interpretation that
the Intifada undermined adult authority in Palestinian society.23,
28 Some comments may help clarify this discrepancy. When we heard
the observation, during our experience in the West Bank and Gaza
over the past three years, that the Intifada disturbed authority
boundaries between adults and youth, it was almost always expressed
by adults, ¬parents or teachers. Youth have rarely identified
a meaningful disruption in their respectful orientation to adults
in their communities. This discrepancy in perspectives may in part
be attributable therefore to differing views on the issue between
the generations. It is a very common finding in social science
research that members of the same family - whether it be husbands
compared to wives, or parents compared to children - have very
different opinions on the nature and quality of their relationships
with each other.
This question of authority patterns and boundaries between adults
and youth is a very important issue, not only for social science
researchers interested in the effects of political activity and
violence on youth and family development, but because family
relationships are a central and vital component of Palestinian
culture.
For the moment, the data we have collected and our experience
through frequent and often-extended visits to four Palestinian
universities and 88 secondary schools in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip do not support the interpretation that there has been a
fundamental alteration in the level of respect and deference shown
to adults by Palestinian youth. Instead, the extent to which these
bonds have been maintained through years of intense conflict and
trauma is one of our most remarkable findings, one that appears to
underscore the strength and resilience of the personal, familial
and religious values of Palestinian culture.
A Note of Caution for the Future
Politicized identity was probably never stronger than among
Intifada youth, for during the formative stages of the development
of their psychological and social identity, fighting for freedom
from the occupation seemed, for many, to be life itself. Even for
those who may not have participated physically in the
confrontations as often as others, there was no escaping the
reality that life consisted mainly of the struggle. Those
interviewed in Gaza (most of whom were very active during the
movement) uniformly expressed satisfaction that their efforts had
been successful in significantly enhancing recognition and concern
for them as Palestinians from the world at large. Many expressed a
yearning for the days of the Intifada because it was a time when
they felt they were central players in the great social cohesion
that existed among all segments of their society (particularly
during the first two years of the movement). Clearly, their
involvement in the political fight taught them that they,
individual young Palestinians, could make a difference.
Nevertheless, as impressive as it may be that children and
adolescents can immerse themselves in social and political
concerns, and derive so much personal validation from their
efforts, one must wonder about the stability of an identity that is
so strongly informed by political realities. How much of their
personal strength of character and resilience to the trauma they
experienced is now dependent on the long-term success of their
efforts? This is a question that can only be answered over time.
But, at least for those who still have exceptionally limited access
to economic, educational, and social opportunities, such as in the
refugee camps, there is already reason for concern. I have visited
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip approximately every four months
over the past three years, staying for weeks or months at a time.
Although I continue to be impressed with the resilience I see, I
have also noticed a clear decline in the overall sense of
well-being of the youth and an increase in frustration, confusion,
and pessimism about the future.
Not surprisingly, this trend appears to be related directly to the
current political realities. On the one hand, as time goes by,
evidence mounts that although the Intifada may have been successful
at drawing attention to the plight of the Palestinians, it has not
been successful in any real shift in the balance of power between
Israel and Palestine. On the other hand, there is a rapidly growing
sense of disappointment and of feeling betrayed by their own
leaders. Whereas a year ago, many youtl1 would express patience and
optimism about the future, they now express bitterness. Young
adults from extremist groups have told me that if the Israeli
occupation were to return they "would not oppose it"19 and would
even "throw flowers at their feet." l Even more telling are those
who, a year ago, aligned themselves clearly with Fatah but are now
expressing disgust with what they perceive to be human-rights
violations, corruption, and opulence by some members of the
Palestinian Authority.
Summary
In summary, the research discussed here indicates that children and
adolescents manifested unprecedented political involvement during
the Intifada, and had unusually high exposure to stress and trauma.
Now, some years after the formal end of the struggle, negative
consequences can still be observed, mostly in heightened
participation in some forms of deviant behavior. For those who are
well integrated into the value-rich social institutions of family,
education, and religion, this effect was not apparent. Further,
there was no evidence of a general decline in quality of
relationships with adults. Resilience to more widespread negative
consequences might be attributable to the high levels of
ideological commitment to the necessity and justice of the uprising
and to the strength of cultural values. However, it remains to be
seen how durable these and other buffers are in maintaining
psychological and social competence in this generation of youth
whose personal identities were formed in the trenches of a fight
for a national identity that still seems to be conflicted and
elusive .
• Based on three sources: an extensive 1994-1995 survey of
Palestinian families in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip conducted
by five social science researchers from Brigham Young University
(Utah), among them is this writer. Seven-thousand 9th-grade
students, who were seven when the Intifada started, and their
families answered questionnaires. Second, the same questionnaires
were given to 635 students, aged 20, from four West bank and Gaza
Strip universities. They were 13 when the Intifada began. Third,
hour-long interviews by the writer with 30 young adults-who were
adolescents during the Intifada-in Gaza Strip refugee camps in 1996
and 1997.
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