A year after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, the
Palestinian fedayeen (commandos) became engaged in an ongoing
process of reformulating policy and restructuring PLO institutions.
The organization was alternating then between militant and moderate
strategies, both of which were shaped by ideology, goals, past
experience and external influences. The early strategy, which the
PLO adopted following its radicalization by the fedayeen, was quite
militant and was based on a type of guerrilla warfare, sometimes
referred to as a "peoples? war." It was predicated on the
assumption that the Israeli enemy had superior military power, but
could be beaten by continual open warfare. It was also perceived as
the only means of achieving the "total liberation" of Palestine and
the return of all displaced Palestinians to their homes in the
territories occupied by Israel. Military as opposed to political
means, then, constituted the most important part of the PLO's early
"all-or-nothing" policy, as stated in Article 10 of the 1964 PLO
National Covenant, as well as in its 1968 Charter.
In 1974, however, a year after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war,
resolutions were taken during the 12th Palestine National Council
(PNC) meeting to modify certain aspects of the "all-or-nothing
policy." This came as the realization grew within the PLO of the
need to utilize political means to achieve its goals without
excluding military options. Diplomacy became an alternative to
militancy, as long as it offered hope of success.
The Secular Democratic State
On a general level, PLO military strategy and political thought can
be divided into three phases: the total liberation phase
(1964-1968); the secular democratic state phase (1969-1974); and
the two-state solution (1974-1990s). This last one suggested two
alternatives or forms: the sulta wataniyeh (national authority)
from 1974 to 1977, and the dawla wataniyeh (national state) from
1977 onwards. This article will
focus on the PLO evolution within the last two phases.
During its 1971 PNC meeting and at the behest of Fatah's
leadership, the creation of a democratic state in Palestine became
official policy. The PLO's adoption of the democratic state
proposal was significant because the organization recognized the
Jewish reality in Palestine and accepted the concept of sharing the
country. The proposal called for the creation of a non-sectarian
secular state in which all Jewish residents who had come to
Palestine prior to 1947 would become citizens. By making this
albeit- unrealistic concession, the PLO was able to dissociate
itself from the popular policies of the traditional Palestinian and
Pan-Arab elites of the early 1960s.
The absence of a more fundamental or drastic change in PLO strategy
at this point was due to the organization's fear that such a change
in its revolutionary image might lead to instability and division
within its ranks, and might also create problems with the
Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, especially those who came
from inside Israel. Nonetheless, the proposal laid the foundation
for the rise of a new realistic trend within the PLO's mainstream
leadership that recognized the need for political accommodations
and compromises in dealing with Israel. On the other hand, the
proposal continued the PLO's old radical stance because, in effect,
it rejected the fact that Israel existed as a Jewish entity.
Impact of the Occupied Territories on PLO Strategy
Up to the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the dominant elite in
the occupied territories included traditionalists and pro-Jordanian
notables whose positions contradicted PLO policies and goals. They
called, for instance, for a political settlement based on the
concept of a Palestinian political entity or state coexisting with
Israel. Later, such views were to gradually influence the PLO to
pursue a program that would appeal to people in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip.
In the wake of the October 1973 war, pro-PLO elements, as well as
the Communists, became active in West Bank politics, presenting a
serious challenge to the pro-Jordanian and traditional elite.
Indeed, the creation of the Palestine National Front (PNF) in
August 1973, within a well-defined pro-PLO platform, played a
crucial role in increasing PLO influence in the occupied
territories and served as a means by which Palestinians there could
organize themselves against Israeli occupation. Specifically, its
platform promised that its activities would be "inseparable" from
those of the "Palestine National Movement [as] represented by the
Palestine Liberation Organization." More importantly, the PNF
helped reconcile the conflicting viewpoints of the PLO leadership
outside the occupied territories with the non-traditional local
elite in the West Bank and Gaza. Eventually, some PLO leaders, as
well as many inhabitants of the occupied territories, recognized
the need to "adjust" their policies and to adopt new ones which
would lead to a political settlement with Israel.
Impact of Arab Policy on PLO Strategy
The 1973 October war also led to a new phase of political
compromises which began shaping the agendas of both the PLO and the
Arab states. Recognizing the centrality of the Palestinian cause in
the Arab-Israeli conflict, most Arab leaders, including Jordan,
wanted the Palestinians, represented by the PLO, to set aside their
differences and to "march" with them in the pursuit of a diplomatic
settlement that would erase Israel's record of aggression in
previous wars.
The PLO had, of course, to redefine its strategy and tactics to
meet regional and other international changes. It also realized the
need to formulate policies to deal with Henry Kissinger's
diplomatic activities and the anticipated Geneva Convention of
December 1973. It will be remembered that Kissinger had proposed a
bilateral step-by-step plan that presented the PLO leadership with
the dilemma of having to choose between maintaining its commitment
to its traditional revolutionary policy, or working together with
the Arab states in order not to be "shut out" of a settlement that
would ignore Palestinian claims.
As a result, the PLO grew "dangerously dependent" on the Arab
states, particularly during the Arab feeling of euphoria after the
1973 war. In 1974, the PLO made its first gesture toward a
two-state solution at its 12th PNC meeting in Cairo. Its new
program called for the creation of a sulta wataniyeh (national
authority) in any part of Palestine to be liberated by armed
struggle. It was the direct result of both the 1973 war and the
1974 Rabat Arab Summit Conference which recognized the PLO as "the
sole and only representative" of the Palestinian people, in
exchange for which the PLO accepted the moderating influence of the
Arab states.
The Sulta Wataniyeh
By introducing, in 1974, the concept of sulta wataniyeh as an
interim solution, the PLO indirectly accepted diplomacy as a means
for achieving its goals. Its ten-point program viewed the sulta
wataniyeh as the new objective by which the organization could
create a "people's national, independent and fighting sovereignty
on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated from Israel's
control." The proposal's importance lies in the implicit
relinquishment by the PLO of its previous goal of creating a
democratic state on the whole of Palestine.
The revolutionaries, led by the Palestinian Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), decided to establish a Rejectionist
Front and to continue the policy of militancy and armed struggle as
the only method of dealing with Israel. While Fatah aligned itself
more closely with the moderate Arab states, the opposition aligned
itself with the more radical ones. Undeterred by the Rejectionists,
Fatah and its allies in the PLO accepted the principle of
participating in the Geneva Conference, if invited as an
independent party.
To enhance its regional and international prestige, the PLO sent
out signals expressing readiness to accept compromise as a means of
achieving a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. With
the adoption of this moderate stance, the PLO was transforming
itself into a new [political] force in the Middle East, that could
not be ignored. It had succeeded to consolidate its position with
the Arab states, especially after the Rabat Conference; to improve
its image internationally, especially after Yasser Arafat's speech
at the United Nations General Assembly in November 1974;
and to improve its relations with the Palestinians, both in the
diaspora and in the occupied territories. In the longer term,
however, the PLO became caught between a struggle for "a
liberationist strategy," on the one hand, and "a territorial search
for statehood," on the other. The latter forced the PLO to shift
its attention from the diaspora to the occupied territories.
The 13th PNC and Its Aftermath
The change in policy introduced by the PLO after the 12th PNC
session of 1974 was pursued and accelerated in subsequent PNC
meetings. Unlike the 12th PNC, which called vaguely for an
"independent and fighting national authority on every part of
Palestinian land to be liberated," the 13th PNC called more clearly
and explicitly for the creation of a dawla wataniyeh (a national
state) "on soil of the [Palestinian] homeland." The abandonment of
the idea of "national authority" in favor of a "national state" in
1977 underscored the organization?s willingness to accept a
two-state solution. The PLO's main focus became centered on
securing the creation of an
independent Palestinian state "in any part of Palestine," which was
understood to mean the West Bank and Gaza.
Again, for tactical reasons, the 1977 proposal was considered to be
only an intermediate solution to the conflict. Obviously, the PLO
leadership was still concerned about the problem of unity and its
desire to continue supporting the Palestinians, both in the
diaspora and the occupied territories. But it was understood the
PLO would accept the two-state solution and would be willing to
participate in the Geneva Conference, on condition it be accepted
on an equal footing with Israel.
The victory of Menachem Begin and his Likud coalition in the
Israeli elections of 1977 was a setback, for, as long as the Likud
was in power in Israel, the Palestinian issue of the Arab-Israeli
conflict remained on hold. The PLO was either ignored or was
actively opposed by Israel and its allies, especially the United
States, and Israeli strategy, at the time, was to break up the Arab
alliance against it.
Pragmatism in the 1980s and 1990s
The Likud's official policy of repression and colonization of the
occupied territories, the 1975 Lebanese civil war, the 1979 Camp
David Accords and the subsequent expulsion of the PLO from Beirut
in 1982 all had a profound impact on PLO strategy and future
planning. These developments deprived the PLO of its military
option in dealing with Israel, shifted its interest to diplomacy,
and refocused its attention on the occupied territories rather than
on the whole of Palestine. Following its expulsion from Beirut, the
PLO was forced to seek defensive policies that would preserve its
political status as representative and spokesman of the Palestinian
people.
Furthermore, the PLO leadership had something else to worry about
during this period. In the 1980s, for instance, several peace plans
were proposed, calling for the formulation of new policies on the
part of the PLO. Among these were the 1980 Brezhnev peace plan, the
1981 Fahad plan, the 1982 Fez plan, and the 1982 Ronald Reagan
peace plan. The PLO particularly favored the Fez plan. This was an
advanced version of the Saudi one, presented at the 16th PNC
meeting in 1983 which, in short, sought the creation of a
Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO leadership was
considering options that would give it a role in future peace
negotiations with Israel. Naturally, the opposition of both the
Likud government in Israel and that of the United States to PLO
involvement in any future negotiations made the search for a
political solution untimely.
However, in the late 1980s, while the PLO was trying to survive
politically, the unfolding of events in the occupied territories
was to rescue it from a growing paralysis and a desperate
situation. It was the Intifada that would ultimately succeed in
changing the political picture of the Palestinian conflict with
Israel and would make other changes possible. For instance, in July
1988, Jordan made the decision to formally relinquish its claim to
the West Bank. This decision strengthened the PLO?s relationship
with its people there and made it the uncontested representative of
the Palestinians. This new legitimacy enabled the PLO to act
independently and ultimately influence Israel?s attitude towards
it. Moreover, the Intifada increased
the popular appeal of the Islamic fundamentalists in the occupied
territories. By contrast, the PLO appeared to Israeli and Western
eyes as more moderate, certainly less extreme.
In response to these new developments, in November 1988, the PLO
presented its peace strategy and declared the establishment of the
independent State of Palestine. It accepted UN resolutions 181, 242
and 338 as the bases for negotiating a political settlement with
Israel. On December 13, 1988, Arafat renounced terrorism and
accepted the right of Israel to exist alongside Palestine. In so
doing, the PLO totally renounced its previous goals and strategies
and was, therefore, considered a candidate in peace
negotiations.
Other changes on the international and regional scenes helped
accelerate the process of peace in the region. Most important was
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War which
forced many in the Arab world to conclude that they no longer had a
patron to support their opposition to Israel. Concomitantly, US
influence in the region was enhanced, as it felt comfortable
pressing for peace in the Middle East, especially following the
Gulf War against Iraq.
In October 1991, a Middle East peace conference was convened in
Madrid, Spain, where issues pertaining to the status of the PLO
were discussed. Subsequent developments revealed a general
awareness of the necessity of PLO participation in future
negotiations. Almost two years later, on September 13, 1993, an
agreement between the PLO and Israel was signed. Undoubtedly, the
coming to power of Israel's Labor party in 1992 was an important
development making such an agreement possible. However, with the
coming to power in June 1996 of the right-wing Netanyahu
government, the possibility of a lasting peace has become much more
elusive. The PLO, for its part, is still committed to peace and
coexistence with Israel within the context of a negotiated
settlement that will lead to the creation of a Palestinian state
alongside Israel.
Bibliography
Abdul-Hamid, Issa. "Al-taharuk al-siyassi al-urduni iza?a
mustaqbal
al-daffah al- gharbiyyah" (Arabic), Shu'un Filastiniyah 37
(September 1974), p. 64.
Allin, Erika and Abdul Aziz Said. "Arabs and Israelis: Changing
Perceptions and Political Attitudes." In Y. Lukacs and A. Battah
(eds.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change. Colorado:
Westview Press, 1988.
Aruri, Nasser. "Palestinian Nationalism since 1967: An Overview."
In Y. Lukacs and A. Battah (eds.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two
Decades of Change. Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.
Flores, Alexander. The Palestinian in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.
Bonn: Forschungsinstitute der Deutschen Gesellschaft, August
1983.
Hassassian, Manuel. "The Democratization Process in the PLO:
Ideology, Structure and Strategy." In Edy Kaufman, Shukri Abed and
Robert Rothstein (eds), Democracy, Peace and the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1993.
Jawad, Said. "Al-muqawama al-filastiniyah wa-el-muhimat
al-wataniyah
al-kifahiyah al-rahinah" (Arabic). Shu'un Filastiniyah 33 (May
1974), p. 51.
Al-Kitab al-sanawi le'am 1974 (Arabic). Beirut: PLO Research
Center.
Lesch, Ann. Political Perceptions of the Palestinians on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. Washington, D.C.: The Middle East
Institute, 1980.
Lewis, Bernard. "The Palestinians and the PLO: A Historical
Approach."
Commentary (January 1975), p. 44.
Ma'oz, Moshe. "Democratization among West Bank Palestinians and
Palestinian- Israeli Relations." In Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein
(eds.), Democracy, Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.
-. "New Attitudes of the PLO Regarding Palestine and Israel." In
Ben-Dor (ed.), The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict.
Haifa: Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 1976.
Miller, Aaron. The PLO and the Politics of Survival. Washington,
D.C.: Washington Papers, No. 91, 1983.
Muslih, Muhammad. Toward Coexistence: An Analysis of the
Resolutions of the Palestine National Council. Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990.
Neff, Donald. Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and
Israel since 1945. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1995.
Rashid, Muhammad. Toward a Democratic State in Palestine. Beirut:
PLO Research Center, November 1970.
Shemesh, Moshe. "The West Bank: Rise and Decline of Traditional
Leadership."
Middle Eastern Studies, July 1984, p. 290.
Stanley, Bruce. "Fragmentation and National Liberation Movements:
the PLO." ORBIS, Winter 1979, p. 1051.
Tamari, Salim. "The Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical
Reversals
and the Uprising." In Rex Brynen (ed.), Echoes of the Intifada:
Regional
Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Boulder:
Westview, 1991.
Vitalis, Robert. "The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Options and
Scenarios for Peace." In Fernea and Hocking (eds.), The Struggle
for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians. Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1992.
Al-watha'iq al-filastiniyah (Arabic). Beirut: PLO Research Center,
1971, pp. 8--12.