The Palestinian refugee problem began in 1948 when about 750,000
Palestinians were expelled from and/or fled their country as a
result of the establishment of the State of Israel on an area of
over more than 70 percent of Palestine. Registered refugees and
their dependants today number around three million, one-third of
whom are still living in harsh physical conditions in camps (UNRWA
Report, 1996).
International Attempts at a Solution
The first attempt to solve the Palestinian refugee problem was
General Assembly Resolution 194(11) of 1948, which states
that:
... The refugees willing to return to their homes and live in peace
with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the
property of those choosing not to return, and for loss of or damage
to property which, under principles of international law or in
equity, should be made good by the Government or authorities
responsible.
This resolution was never implemented, as it was rejected by the
Israeli government.
In 1959, the General Assembly sent Secretary General Dag
Hammarskjold to the Middle East to seek a solution to the
Palestinian refugee problem. Realizing that the Israelis would not
permit the return of refugees, he offered a second approach to the
solution of their problem. In his report (mid-1959), he recommended
that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees (UNRWA) concentrate on rehabilitating the refugees, and
help them integrate and resettle in the Arab countries where they
had sought refuge. This proposal also failed because, as Adelman
(1988) states, UNRWA neglected the political dimension of the
refugee problem according to Resolution 302 of 1949 which states
that:
Continued assistance for the relief of the Palestinian refugees is
necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among
them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that
constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date with a
view to the termination of international assistance for
relief.
Naturally, the proposal did not satisfy the refugees' political
aspirations.
A comparison of resolutions 194(11) and 302 in 1949 point to a
clear retreat by the international community regarding the solution
of the Palestinian refugee problem. The first (Resolution 194)
demanded that the refugees be allowed to return or be compensated
for lost property should they choose not to return. The second
resolution (302) ignores those two recommendations (return and
compensation) and, instead, asks for continued material assistance
"to prevent conditions of starvation and to further conditions of
peace." The material aid was not able to eliminate the harsh
economic conditions in the camps, nor was it able to prepare the
area for peace.
In the wake of the 1967 war, there was a third attempt at a
solution by the international community. That year the Security
Council approved Resolution 242 which affirmed the need to achieve
a "just settlement of the refugee problem." This resolution became
the cornerstone of almost every subsequent peace initiative in the
Middle East (McDowall, 1989: pp. 48-53). It was reiterated after
the 1973 war, when the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 338,
calling for the immediate implementation of the requirements of
Resolution 242.
Although resolutions 242 and 338 were used in subsequent peace
talks as the basis for the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, the Camp David Accords in 1978 called for self-rule for
the Palestinians, without any mention of the Palestinian refugee
problem. Later, in 1991, the Madrid Conference reaffirmed the
concept of Palestinian self-rule as stated in the invitation
statement of the United States and the former U.S.S.R. (the
cosponsors of that conference).
The retreat in dealing with the Palestinian refugee issue has
become increasingly pronounced over the years. For example, the
earlier resolutions - 194 and 302 in 1949 - affirmed the need to
achieve a just solution to the refugee problem, albeit without
specifying the nature of the solution or defining the identity of
the refugees. The retreat was more apparent in the Camp David
summit and the Madrid peace conference as neither mentions the
refugee problem, but, instead, recommends self-rule for the
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Finally, in the Declaration of Principles (OOP) between Israel and
the PLO in 1993, the refugee issue was taken up in articles V(3)
and 12 of which deal with the refugees of 1948 and the displaced of
the 1967 war, respectively. In the first instance, Article V(3)
states that the refugee issue, together with other sensitive
issues, such as the status of Jerusalem and the settlements, would
be discussed during permanent-status negotiations, originally
scheduled to begin in mid-1996. Article 12 stipulates that a
committee consisting of Palestinian, Israeli, Jordanian and
Egyptian delegations should be formed to discuss the methods and
ways by which those who fled during the 1967 war would be allowed
to return. It should be noted that the committee has not yet
reached a consensus on the definition of those refugees.
To the minds of Palestinians, the deferral of the refugee issue to
the last stage of the Middle East peace negotiations begs the
question whether such a delay stems from the significance and
complexity of the issue, or whether it is an attempt to relegate it
to oblivion. So far, evidence points to the fact that solutions by
the international community, as well as Israeli policy, seek to
deny the refugees their right of return or compensation. For the
refugees themselves, their problem is still alive. How do they
conceptualize its solution and how far do they trust in the peace
process that started with the Oslo agreement in 1993?
For this purpose, research was carried out in 1996 in the refugee
camps of Balata and Fara'a, both in Nablus in the West Bank and
considered representative of other refugee camps in the occupied
territories. Two methods were used for the collection of data:
in-depth interviews and survey questionnaires. This strategy
enabled the researcher to rely on such data to obtain a certain
uniformity of the refugees' feelings, thoughts, and behavior. The
in-depth interviews used key interviewees from different age
groups: from the older generation (60+), i.e., those who have
experienced both the 1948 and 1967 wars; and the younger
generations (20-30), i.e., those who were born in refugee camps
after those two wars. The older generation was made up of
traditionalist elements and the younger belonged to factions from
across the political spectrum categorizing the refugee camp
population: mainstream (Fateh); religious (Hamas, Islamic Jihad);
and the leftist (PFLP, communists). The survey questionnaire used a
sample of five percent of heads of households in the two
camps.
The Traditionalists and the Peace Process
Two traditionalist interviewees from Fara'a camp, both 70 years
old, who came originally from villages inside Israel, Dawayima and
al-Teeneh respectively, held conflicting views. The first expressed
readiness to accept compensation for his 100 dunums of land because
"the peace process will be imposed in this area, and I cannot stand
miserable conditions anymore. Do you think I am happy to accept
compensation? It breaks my heart. I would prefer to live in a tent
in my place of origin than to live in a castle anywhere else." The
second believed selling land to foreigners went against Islamic
beliefs: "The Crusaders stayed on this land more than 100 years,
but, in the end, they were defeated."
The third traditionalist is Abu Sabri from Balata camp. He comes
originally from Arab al-Sawalma inside Israel. His was a more
cynical assessment of the situation: "The refugees will get nothing
from the peace process because the main aim of the process is to
accomplish stability in the region for the benefit of the great
imperialist powers. Our rights are neglected. The Palestinian
Authority will never achieve full authority because it lacks the
necessary power."
Abu Sabri trusts neither the peace process as a method for
obtaining his rights or improving his living conditions, nor the
Palestinian Authority because he believes it would always be
dependent on external powers. He was highly critical of
compensation as a method for solving the refugee problem:
Those who are going to accept compensation have no property in
Palestine, so their acceptance will not solve the problem. Land
owners fall into two categories: landlords who owned large expanses
of land will never be compensated by Israel or the international
body, because of the huge sums of money that would be involved; the
second category, owners of 100-500 dunums, will face two
difficulties should they accept compensation; namely, an
underestimation of their properties which will not enable them to
rebuild their future and that of their families, and the risk of
having to pay refunds to their respective Arab host
countries.
Abu Sabri's painful conclusion can be summarized in his statement:
"Those who raised the olive branch had no land in Palestine, while
those who own land will raise the olive branch only when they
return to their own lands and homes."
The Youth and the Peace Process
The youth represent second- or even third- generation refugees who
were born in camps. One religious key respondent, a member of Hamas
who wished to remain anonymous, believes that "the peace process
has become a reality in the region, so we have to live with it even
though we do not agree with it. Until now, the economic benefits of
the peace process, since the Palestinian Authority entered Gaza and
the West Bank, have been negative. In fact, the peace process has
had no positive effect on the refugee issue."
In spite of the bitterness, this interviewee shows clear political
awareness in his acceptance of the peace process as a reality and
in his role as a member of an opposition faction. Nonetheless,
given the harsh conditions in refugee camps, an important question
arises about the nature of the role the opposition will play. How
peaceful will it be if the peace process did not satisfy the
minimal demands of some refugees?
Indeed, this was the view of the leftist interviewee for whom all
the peace agreements did not satisfy the basic needs of the
Palestinian people.
Politically, the Palestinians cannot achieve the freedom and
sovereignty to which they aspire. Economically, conditions are
deteriorating ... The only realistic solution to the refugee
problem is fair compensation, but how can I forget our 300 dunums?
I accept compensation as a transitional stage because our housing
and economic conditions are very bad. The final solution should
deal with the question of land and it is going to be difficult to
forget it.
This interviewee disapproved of the methods used in the peace
process and expected an uprising against the Palestinian Authority
if the living conditions of the refugees did not improve.
Compensation is only a transitional stage along the road to a
negotiated solution. Such pessimism could be a clear indication of
his despair stemming from the bad economic conditions and the
perception that the peace process neglected the refugee problem.
The important fact is his belief that "land is difficult to
forget." The refugees may have become reconciled to the peace
process, hoping that it would be instrumental in alleviating their
harsh economic conditions as a first step; however, they show
serious concern regarding their right of return, which Israel still
denies them.
The Fateh key respondent, Abdul Mun'im, is the leader of Fateh in
the camp. Although a member of the Palestinian Authority, he was
quite vocal in his criticism because the refugees' living
conditions have not improved, nor have their aspirations been met,
in spite of their active participation and sacrifices in the
struggle against Israel and the occupation, especially during the
Intifada.
Abdul Mu'nim proposes a two-stage solution: the improvement of the
refugees' untenable economic and housing conditions and then the
return of land, which he views as the fulfillment of the will of
God.
The same note of despair was echoed by another key respondent from
the "control branch" of Fateh, Marshud, for whom
the peace process has not achieved anything for the refugees. They
are restless and anxious. They feel that their problem has been
neglected. Those who are ready to accept compensation are the most
economically depressed people who also despair of a peaceful
solution. The refugees are waiting in silence, but inside there is
anger and an eruption could occur any time once they realize that a
just solution to their problem is unreachable.
The interviews above are but a sample of the responses obtained,
but through them run certain commonalities: nostalgia for home is
strong in all cases, in addition to other dimensions, mainly
religious beliefs, economic factors, mistrust of Arab leaders and,
of course, the land. Clearly, irrespective of their political
affiliation or age, the refugees share feelings of skepticism,
despair and suspicion of the peace process which they viewed as
catering to U.S. interests in the region and that they will not
benefit from it. As for the question of return, although religious
respondents rejected any compromise, leftists and non-religious
were willing to contemplate a staged solution: compensation for the
improvement of living conditions and an immediate relief of misery,
then the return to their places of origin. So far, the peace
process has not achieved any benefits for the refugees on any
level. It is expected that their predicament will unite them, in
spite of their different political allegiances (Gellner, 1983, p.
73).
The following two tables attempt to quantify the refugees'
attitudes toward the peace process.
Generally, it was felt that outside powers determined the
circumstances of the refugees' lives. The refugees see the
Palestinian role as negligible. It is U.S. support for Israel in
the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council and
Israeli intransigence which the refugees feel played a significant
role in preventing a solution to their predicament from being
reached.
The above findings coincide with those of the in-depth interviews,
which reveal that the refugees have no real faith that the peace
process will accomplish any satisfactory results for them; yet, at
the same time, a significant trend of readiness for finding a
realistic solution emerged through the responses. Around one-fourth
of those refugees claimed they were ready to accept compensation
and, interestingly, nearly one-half were ready to return home under
Israeli rule. The door, of course, remains open for conjecture
about the number of refugees who would be willing to choose
compensation as an immediate relief to their poverty over the
satisfaction of high political or moral demands. Nonetheless, any
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, will have to take the
rights of the refugees and their national aspirations very
seriously if it is to be solid and lasting.
References
1. Adelman, Howard (1988). "Palestinian Refugees, Economic
Immigration and Durable Solution." Refugees in the Age of Total
War, ed. A. Bramwell. London: Unwin Heineman.
2. Gellner, Ernest (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Oxford:
Blackwell.
3. Lauer, Robert H. and Warren H. Handel (1977). Social Psychology:
The Theory and Application of Symbolic Inter-Actionism. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company.
4. McDowall, David (1994). The Palestinians: The Road to
Nationhood. London: Minority Rights Publications.
5. Secord, Paul and Carl Backman (1964). Social Psychology. New
York: McGraw-Hill. United Nations (1996). Report of the
Commissioner General, A/51/13. New York: United Nations.