The Palestinian political landscape is changing. Shifts in public
attitudes between September and December 2004 show significant
changes in outlook regarding major domestic, as well as
Israeli-Palestinian, issues. The passing of Palestinian President
Yasser Arafat may have been responsible. This piece examines these
changes, focusing in particular on four areas: signs of optimism,
shifts in the domestic balance of power, level of support for the
peace process and, finally, Palestinian public perception of the
role of violence. (1)
A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research (PSR) in Ramallah between December 1-5, 2004, shows an
emerging new reality in the Palestinian territories compared to the
situation that had prevailed three and six months earlier, when PSR
conducted polls in September and June [2004].The December poll was
the first comprehensive PSR survey since the Arafat's death and it
was designed to measure changes in public attitudes regarding major
issues of the day. Poll findings indicated a more optimistic
atmosphere, a significant drop in the level of support for Hamas
and a big increase in the level of support for Fateh, and a higher
level of support for peace-related issues. The survey however
registered only minor changes in the public's perception regarding
the role of violence.
The smooth transition of power after the death of Arafat, the
election of a pro-peace member of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) Executive Committee, Mahmoud Abbas, as chairman
of that committee, the virtual absence of violence despite the
gloomy expectations, and the quick preparations for elections may
have all been responsible for the new optimism. The welcoming
manner in which the U.S. and Israel responded to Abbas' appointment
and his probable election may have increased positive expectations
regarding a return to negotiations and the chances for reaching a
peace agreement. The new optimism and expectations may have, in
turn, generated the increased support for the peace process.
Previous surveys have shown a significant correlation between
optimistic expectations and willingness to compromise in the peace
process. Hamas' loss of support, which started a few months before
Arafat's death, may have been due to the reduced level of violence
in the second half of 2004. The inability of Hamas to respond to
several successful Israeli assassinations against its top
leadership, and the fact that the Islamist movement had decided to
boycott the upcoming presidential elections, may have also
contributed to a loss of support for Hamas. Increased support for
Fateh might be explained by the appreciation people had for the way
Fateh dealt with the post-Arafat succession issue. The expectation
that differences within that faction would lead to a violent
struggle for power never materialized. A bandwagon factor may have
also helped Fateh, as new supporters might have expected big gains
from backing the faction that was most likely to win the upcoming
presidential elections.
More Optimism
Optimism is best illustrated in the way the public responded to
four questions: (1) the way Arafat's death would affect the chances
for a peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis; (2) the
possibility of reaching a compromise with the current Israeli
leadership of Ariel Sharon; (3) if a comprise is reached, the
capacity of the current Israeli leadership to convince a majority
of Israelis to support it; and, finally, (4) the capacity of the
current Palestinian leadership (after Arafat) to be able to
convince the Palestinians to accept it. As Chart number.1
indicates, a majority responded that Arafat's death would lead to a
greater chance for a peace agreement. Similarly, a majority
responded in the affirmative to the other three questions. For
example, 53 percent believed that compromise was indeed possible
with the current Israeli leadership and only 34 percent believed
that it was impossible. It is worth noting that in July 2001, 10
months after the start of the current intifada, 46 percent said
this was the end of the peace process. It is also worth noting that
belief in the possibility to reach a compromise settlement with the
current Israeli leadership was higher among Fateh supporters 61
percent, compared with 38 percent among supporters of Hamas.
Optimism is also evident in the way public attitudes changed before
and after Arafat's death with regard to three important issues: (1)
expectations regarding a return to negotiations and an end to
violence; (2) belief regarding the chances for the implementation
of the Road Map; and (3) belief regarding the chances of
reconciliation between the two peoples, the Israelis and the
Palestinians. As Table No. 1 shows, the expectations that the two
sides will soon return to negotiations almost doubled to 30 percent
in three months. The expectations that the two sides will not
return to negotiations and violence will increase dropped
dramatically to 12 percent. The belief that the Road Map can still
be implemented increased by almost two-thirds to 46 percent. The
percentage of those believing that reconciliation is never possible
dropped from about half to one-third and the percentage of those
believing it can be achieved in the timeframe of a few years to one
generation increased by a third to 39 percent.
Increased Support for the Peace Process
Poll findings show a high level of support for four aspects of the
peace process: (1) immediate return to negotiations; (2) support
for a cease-fire; (3) support for reconciliation; and (4) support
for the Road Map. Support for a cease-fire and for an immediate
return to negotiations is very high, reaching 80 percent for each.
The level of support for reconciliation has never been higher,
reaching 81 percent. With regard to the plan known as the Road Map,
findings show that 59 percent support the plan and 38 percent
oppose it. In July 2003, when optimism was very high (with Mahmoud
Abbas appointed prime minister) support for the Road Map reached 56
percent and opposition 41 percent.
Shifts in the Domestic Balance of Power
The post-Arafat era witnessed a significant increase in the
popularity of Fateh from 29 percent in September 2004 to 40 percent
in December, and a significant decrease in the popularity of the
Islamists (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and independent Islamists) from 32
percent to 24 percent. The increase in support for Fateh was higher
in the Gaza Strip, from 24 percent to 38 percent, and the decrease
in support for the Islamists was also greater in the Gaza Strip,
from 38 percent to 26 percent. With this change, the differences in
the popularity of the Islamists and Fateh between the West Bank, on
one hand, and the Gaza Strip, on the other, has now narrowed to
negligible proportion. As Chart Number 3 below shows, September
2004 saw the greatest gap between the two Palestinian areas in
terms of political affiliation, with the Gaza Strip gradually
becoming a stronghold of Islamists. The popularity of Hamas alone
dropped in the whole of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 22
percent in September to 18 percent in December. In the Gaza Strip,
Hamas' popularity dropped from 30 percent to 22 percent.
But as the chart indicates, the decrease in support for the
Islamists started in June 2004, long before Arafat's death. As
mentioned earlier, it is possible that support for the Islamists,
particularly Hamas, dropped in June due to the inability of that
faction to respond to the Israeli assassinations of its top
leaders, and that the acceleration in the decline of its support
between September and December may have been caused by the
faction's decision to boycott the presidential elections. The
decrease in the level of violence during the second half of 2004
may have also contributed to a reduction in the level of threat
perception. Higher threat perception is usually associated with an
increased level of support for Islamists. An election environment,
in which Fateh was certain to win, may have also contributed to the
rise of support for Fateh. It is worth remembering that a similar
trend of increased support for Fateh and decreased support for
Islamists was observed in December 1995, one month before the first
Palestinian elections in January 1996.
The Role of Violence
Palestinian attitudes regarding the role of violence has been
measured in the post-Arafat era in four ways: (1) the level of
support for violence against Israeli civilians inside Israel; (2)
the belief that armed confrontations have helped achieve national
rights in ways that negotiations could not; (3) the perception of
disengagement as a victory for armed struggle; and (4) the belief
regarding who came out a winner in the continued armed
confrontations. While data show that the post-Arafat period has
witnessed some decrease in the level of support for violence and in
the belief that Palestinians, rather than Israelis, came out
winners in the armed confrontations, and despite the great support
for mutual cessation ofviolence (mentioned above), support for
armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel remains
relatively high at 49 percent (December 2004). As Chart Number 4
indicates, this percentage represents a drop of 5 percentage points
compared to the finding of September 2004, and a drop of 8
percentage points compared to the findings early in the year.
Opposition to such attacks increased from 44 percent to 48 percent
during the same period. A similar trend is evident with regard to
future attacks from the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal.
Two-thirds (compared to 54 percent in September 2004) oppose the
continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after a complete
withdrawal.
Despite the modest drop in support for attacks on Israeli
civilians, the majority continued to view armed confrontations as
helping the Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that
negotiations could not. December 2004 saw no change in public
perception regarding this matter, as can be seen in Chart Number
5.
Moreover, three-quarters of the Palestinians continued to believe
in December that Sharon's plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip is
a victory for Palestinian armed resistance against Israel, and only
23 percent did not see it as victory. In fact, as Chart Number 6
shows, the December findings indicate an increase (from 71 to 78)
in the percentage of those who believe the prevailing public
attitude among the majority of the Palestinians is that Sharon's
plan is a victory for armed struggle.
Finally, the December 2004 findings indicate that more than
one-third (35 percent compared to 40 percent three months earlier)
believe that Palestinians have come out winners in the ongoing
armed conflict that started in September 2000, and 14 percent
(compared to 16 percent three months earlier) believe Israel came
out a winner. But the highest percentage (44 percent) is for those
who believe neither side came out a winner. In the Gaza Strip, the
percentage of those believing the Palestinians came out winners
reached 46 percent compared to 28 percent in the West Bank. Belief
that no one, so far, has come out a winner has increased in the
West Bank (48 percent) compared to the Gaza Strip (37 percent).Yet,
43 percent of all Palestinians (compared to 48 percent in June
2004) believe that most Palestinians think they came out winners,
and 59 percent (compared to 51 percent) believe the Israelis think
Palestinians came out winners.
Conclusion
The PSR December survey conducted after the Arafat's death reveals
a highly positive environment, with rising optimism, increased
support for the peace process, and significant shifts in the
domestic balance of power favoring the mainstream nationalist
forces. The findings also show changes in the way Palestinians view
violence in the ongoing armed confrontations between Palestinians
and Israelis. But the change regarding the role of violence is
limited and tentative and can be easily reversed with a major
eruption of violence. In other words, the changes introduced by
Arafat's death are significant and do provide a window of
opportunity if capitalized on, but they remain highly
fragile.
(1) Data used in this piece was taken from polls conducted by the
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) during
2004. These surveys were carried out among Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. Average sample size in each survey is about
1,300 and the margin of error is 3 percent. The questionnaires for
some of the surveys used in this piece were designed by Yaacov
Shamir, professor of communication and journalism at the Hebrew
University and currently at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and by
Khalil Shikaki the surveys were conducted jointly with the Truman
Institute at the Hebrew University.
