Human Rights Organizations Warn of an Escalation in Ethnic Cleansing in the West Bank Under the cover of Israel's Election Campaign
A Call to Establish a Joint Early Warning and Rapid Response Mechanism Among Palestinian Communities, Field Activists, Human Rights Organizations, and Diplomatic Missions
Executive Summary
This paper seeks to warn of the growing risk of the forcible displacement of Palestinian communities in the occupied West Bank during the months preceding Israel's parliamentary elections, scheduled to take place on 27 October 2026. The paper focuses on communities living under full or partial Israeli control in Area C, as well as communities located in Areas A and B that have, in recent years, increasingly been exposed to violence perpetrated by Israeli settlers, settlement outposts, and Israeli security forces.
One of the clearest warning signs of an accelerating policy of creating irreversible facts on the ground is the government's approach to Palestinian refugee camps in the northern West Bank. Residents of three refugee camps in the north of the west bank (Jenin, Noor a-Shams and Tulkarem), already face prolonged displacement, one that risks becoming permanent and irreversible. Displaced from their homes in January 2025 and have still not been allowed to return. The Israeli government is now threatening the repeated displacement and forcible transfer of additional refugee communities.
For the purposes of this paper, the term "displacement" does not refer solely to direct physical eviction. Displacement may also occur where a cumulative pattern of violence, movement restrictions, denial of access to grazing land and agricultural areas, demolitions, confiscation of property, damage to water sources, and the absence of effective protection renders life in a community untenable, leaving its residents with no genuine choice but to leave. Under international law, such coercive circumstances may amount to forcible transfer of protected persons. Where implemented as a matter of policy, they may constitute war crimes. The cumulative measures implemented by the State of Israel are clearly intended to advance exclusionary nationalist and extremist objectives.
Israel's parliamentary elections are expected to take place at the end of October 2026. The remaining months leading up to the elections may constitute a period of heightened risk for protected Palestinian communities throughout the occupied West Bank, particularly pastoral communities, farming communities, and small villages that are under Israeli control or exposed to the activities of the Israeli military, Israeli authorities, settlers, and settlement outposts.
The election campaign does not itself create the mechanisms of displacement. It may, however, accelerate them. The necessary infrastructure is already in place: settler violence on an unprecedented scale carried out with the backing of the Israeli military; the establishment of settlement outposts, including expulsion outposts, which are not intended to serve as permanent residential communities but rather to facilitate the displacement of nearby Palestinian communities; the expansion of settlements; demolitions and confiscations; denial of access to land and water resources; movement restrictions; arbitrary arrests; discriminatory law enforcement; and the increasing involvement of Israeli security forces in practices that undermine the ability of Palestinian communities to remain on their land.
here are reasonable grounds for concern that a government seeking to entrench its policies, while facing the possibility of electoral defeat, may accelerate irreversible measures during the election period in order to create further facts on the ground, as described above. Such measures may take the form of expanding Israeli control over land and completing the process of pushing Palestinian communities to the margins of urban areas. Years of violence and deprivation have already severely weakened many of these communities, leaving them in an advanced state of disintegration. This concern is reinforced by the documented acceleration in settlement expansion, government decisions retroactively legalizing settlement outposts and allocating unprecedented public funding for the development of new settlements, as well as by repeated public statements portraying these measures as a means of creating irreversible realities on the ground. At the same time, this paper presents a risk assessment, not a definitive conclusion that every future government action will necessarily be motivated by electoral considerations.
The risk is not theoretical. According to an OCHA report published in June 2026, approximately 6,200 Palestinians have been displaced across the occupied West Bank since January 2023 as a result of settler violence and access restrictions. More than one-third of these displacements occurred during the first half of 2026, indicating a marked acceleration in the pace of displacement. In April 2026, OCHA further reported that, since the beginning of 2023, 45 Palestinian communities had been entirely displaced as a result of settler attacks and related access restrictions, including nine communities during 2026 alone.
House demolitions remain one of the principal tools used to bring about forcible displacement. Over the past three years, demolitions carried out on the grounds of the absence of building permits have affected an average of approximately 17 people per day. This represents a doubling of the average daily number of persons displaced compared with previous years.
At the same time, there has been a growing number of reports documenting violent incursions, the establishment of settlement outposts, and attempts to seize land on a significant scale not only in Area C, but also in Areas A and B. This development undermines the assumption that communities or families displaced from Area C can find relative safety in areas formally under Palestinian civil administration. In several documented cases, secondary displacement has occurred: families displaced from Area C who rebuilt their homes in Area B were once again exposed—and, in the case of Bedouin communities north of the Dead Sea, to an even greater extent—to the establishment of nearby settlement outposts, livestock theft, invasive grazing on their land, destruction of property, violence, and military support for settler activity.
The election period also coincides with the summer months, school and yeshiva holidays, the Jewish holiday season, and the beginning of the olive harvest. During this period, pastoral and farming communities are particularly dependent on access to land and water resources, while there is a well-documented history of heightened tensions and attacks. At the same time, human rights defenders, members of the Knesset, lawyers, and media organizations are likely to be heavily engaged in the election campaign, reducing their ability to respond simultaneously to multiple emergencies across the occupied West Bank.
The purpose of this warning paper is not to predict with certainty where or when the next incident of displacement will occur. Rather, it seeks to propose, at this stage, an operational mechanism that could reduce the risk: the establishment of a permanent and rapid communication channel linking affected communities, field activists, human rights organizations, and diplomatic missions. Such a mechanism would facilitate the prompt verification of reports and enable timely diplomatic and public engagement before the displacement of a community—or irreversible harm to it—becomes a fait accompli.
Displacement Trends: Increasing Scale and Accelerating Pace
Data from 2026 point to a significant escalation in the displacement of Palestinian residents and communities throughout the occupied West Bank. According to United Nations data, approximately 6,200 Palestinians have been displaced across the West Bank since January 2023 as a result of settler violence and access restrictions. More than one-third of these displacements occurred during the first half of 2026, indicating that the pace of displacement of protected persons is continuing to accelerate.
When this figure is considered together with the number of Palestinians displaced following the demolition of their homes on the grounds that they lacked building permits—permits that have remained effectively unattainable for Palestinians for decades—the total number of displaced persons during the first half of 2026 reaches approximately 2,300 people. This represents an average of approximately 17 people displaced each day, twice the daily average recorded during the preceding three years.
As of 23 April 2026, at least 64 Palestinian communities had been entirely displaced since January 2023 as a result of settler attacks and related access restrictions. Nine of those communities were displaced during the first four months of 2026 alone. At the same time, the United Nations documented 925 movement obstacles across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem—the highest number recorded in the past twenty years, representing a 43 percent increase over the twenty-year average.
By mid-June 2026, more than 1,000 settler attacks resulting in casualties or damage to property had been documented across more than 230 Palestinian communities. During this period, the average stood at approximately six attacks per day. More than 100 incidents involving either demolitions or settler violence caused damage to over 190 water and sanitation structures.
The overall trend is clear: displacement is taking place on an exceptional scale, across multiple areas of the occupied West Bank, and at an accelerating pace.
These figures demonstrate that the displacement of Palestinian communities is not an exceptional consequence of a limited number of incidents. Rather, it reflects a cumulative process that is advancing rapidly and progressively expanding the areas in which Palestinian communities are no longer able to live, move freely, cultivate their land, sustain their livelihoods, or maintain their traditional way of life.
A central component of the mechanism driving the forcible displacement of Palestinian communities is what this paper refers to as the settlement outpost and shepherding outpost enterprise. Its objectives are no longer concealed; they are openly articulated. The purpose of this enterprise is to establish territorial continuity, consolidate Jewish control over extensive areas of the West Bank, alter the demographic composition of those areas to the greatest extent possible, and undermine the prospects for a future political settlement.
Senior Israeli government officials, including the Prime Minister, have repeatedly denied or downplayed the phenomenon of settler violence, characterizing it as a sporadic phenomenon carried out by a small number of rogue youths and addressed through ordinary police enforcement. The available evidence, however, indicates that the Israeli military is, at a minimum, aware of the establishment of settlement outposts; that state authorities allocate land to such outposts through administrative procedures that operate in a discriminatory and non-transparent manner; and that the government provides them with direct budgetary support, including by supplying what are officially described as "security equipment"—such as all-terrain vehicles, drones, firearms, and other equipment—that is used to impose fear and control over surrounding Palestinian communities. Settlement outposts are connected to public infrastructure and operate in continuous coordination with the Israeli security authorities. Extensive documentation further demonstrates that the Israeli police have systematically failed to protect Palestinians from settler violence.
Government involvement extends beyond support for private acts of violence. In parallel with the policies described above, the government, through its various branches, has advanced legislation and administrative measures designed to facilitate the transfer of as much land and property as possible into settler control and to enable the irreversible expansion of the settlement enterprise through the relocation of additional Israeli civilians into occupied territory.
Among the measures adopted during the past year are government decisions authorizing the Military Commander to initiate land registration procedures in the West Bank; legislation permitting Israeli citizens to acquire land in occupied territory without meaningful oversight; decisions retroactively legalizing numerous settlement outposts and allocating public funds for their planning despite their unlawful establishment; and the transfer of extensive enforcement powers to the Civil Administration, including with respect to Areas A and B and the area of Hebron that remains under Palestinian administration.
At the same time, there is a clear trend toward the increased discriminatory use of administrative powers to undermine the ability of the Palestinian population to remain on its land. These measures include the increasingly expansive use of powers to demolish homes and infrastructure; the imposition of movement restrictions that apply exclusively to Palestinians; the enforcement of prohibitions on entering military firing zones, even where no military training is taking place; and other administrative measures that substantially impair the ability of Palestinian communities to survive and remain in place.
Alongside measures directed against Palestinian communities, Israeli authorities have increasingly restricted the access of human rights defenders and protective presence activists through various administrative orders. As a result, even communities that have traditionally benefited from a regular protective presence are increasingly left without accompaniment or assistance.
The Cumulative Mechanism of Forcible Displacement
In many cases, the displacement of a Palestinian community does not begin with a formal eviction order. Rather, it results from a cumulative sequence of mutually reinforcing measures. Some of these measures constitute criminal acts, or conduct that borders on criminality, carried out by private individuals acting with state support. Others are implemented directly by official state authorities, in violation of the law of occupation and through the application of a manifestly discriminatory enforcement regime.
This cumulative mechanism commonly includes:
• The establishment of settlement outposts or other permanent settler presence in close proximity to Palestinian communities, on land seized by the State and, in some cases, allocated to settlers without consideration;
• Repeated incursions by settlers onto grazing areas and privately-owned agricultural land;
• The systematic failure of the Israeli police and military to provide protection or enforce the law;
• Threats, physical assaults, and damage to livestock, crops, and agricultural equipment;
• Widespread theft of livestock, vehicles, and other property;
• Damage to water sources or the obstruction of access routes leading to them;
• The fencing-off of land or the creation of areas that residents no longer dare to enter;
• The routine involvement of the Israeli military in enforcing unlawful or discriminatory restrictions on Palestinian residents;
• The detention or arrest of residents—often without explanation—as well as the confiscation of vehicles and other equipment essential to their livelihoods;
• The progressive collapse of pastoralism, agriculture, and other traditional means of livelihood;
• The demolition of homes, livestock shelters, and essential infrastructure; and ultimately,
• The departure of families who no longer have any practical possibility of continuing to live in their communities.
According to data compiled by Israeli human rights organizations, 93.6 per cent of investigations opened since 2005 into ideologically motivated offences committed by Israeli civilians against Palestinians have been closed without an indictment. Investigative failures were identified in 82 per cent of these cases, while only 3 per cent resulted in a full or partial conviction.
These figures indicate that settler violence operates within a climate of near-total impunity. When violent attacks, obstruction of access to land, or the seizure of property do not result in effective law enforcement, they produce lasting consequences: residents gradually cease accessing their land, lose their sources of livelihood, and ultimately are compelled to leave.
Refugee Camps: A Blueprint for Permanent Displacement
The mass displacement of refugee camp residents in the northern West Bank is no longer merely a humanitarian consequence of military operations—it has become a blueprint for the prolonged forcible transfer of civilian populations and the creation of irreversible facts on the ground. Since January 2025, approximately 40,000 Palestinians have been forcibly displaced from the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps. More than a year and a half later, residents remain barred from returning to their homes. During this period, large parts of the camps have been demolished, civilian infrastructure has been extensively destroyed, roads have been widened and redesigned to facilitate long-term military operations, and entire neighbourhoods have been fundamentally transformed. Developments over the past eighteen months indicate an emerging policy of prolonged displacement, denial of return, and the physical re-engineering of refugee camps, fundamentally altering the demographic and physical landscape of the northern West Bank.
Recent statements by Defence Minister Israel Katz suggest that this model may now be expanded. Following the recent attack near Nablus, Katz instructed the military to prepare to take control of an additional refugee camp, explicitly referring to the "model" implemented in Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams. These remarks indicate that the prolonged emptying of refugee camps, the prevention of residents' return, and the physical transformation of these areas are no longer being treated as exceptional security measures, but as a template for future operations elsewhere in the West Bank.
The significance of these statements lies not only in the threat to another refugee camp, but in the apparent institutionalisation of a new model: depopulating refugee camps, preventing residents from returning, and reshaping these areas in ways that make displacement effectively permanent. If replicated, this model would represent a profound escalation towards irreversible demographic and territorial change in the occupied West Bank, creating new facts on the ground that will become increasingly difficult to reverse.
The international community should not view these developments as isolated responses to specific security incidents. Rather, they point to the emergence of a broader policy aimed at reshaping parts of the occupied West Bank through prolonged displacement, denial of return, and the physical transformation of Palestinian communities. Preventing the replication of this model elsewhere requires early and decisive diplomatic engagement, before additional refugee camps are emptied and further irreversible facts are created on the ground.
Accelerated Settlement Expansion and the Creation of Facts on the Ground
In March 2026, the Government of Israel decided to establish 34 additional settlements in the occupied West Bank. Together with previous government decisions, the current government has now approved the establishment or retroactive legalization of 102 settlements and settlement outposts—an increase equivalent to approximately 80 per cent of the number of officially recognized settlements that existed prior to the formation of the current government. Some of these decisions concern the retroactive legalization of existing settlement outposts, while others provide for the establishment of entirely new settlements.
During 2025, Israeli planning authorities advanced plans for 27,941 housing units in settlements—the highest annual figure recorded to date. By early June 2026, plans for at least 6,232 additional housing units had already been advanced. Changes to planning procedures, including the increasingly frequent convening of the Higher Planning Council, now enable settlement plans to be approved every one or two weeks, rather than through a limited number of planning sessions each year.
In February 2023, the Security Cabinet approved the legalization of nine settlement outposts and the establishment of new settlements. This was followed by decisions of 22 March 2025 approving the legalization of 13 additional outposts, 29 May 2025 approving 22 more, December 2025 approving the establishment of 19 new settlements, and March 2026 approving the legalization or establishment of 34 additional settlements. In June 2026, reports indicated that the Government was considering allocating approximately NIS 1 billion for infrastructure and construction in settlements and newly established outposts, including caravans, roads, land preparation, water infrastructure, and sewage systems.
At least ten of these decisions concern the retroactive legalization of existing unauthorized settlement outposts. In three of those cases, nearby Palestinian communities had already been displaced following the establishment of the outposts. Several additional decisions concern entirely new settlements to be established as enclaves within predominantly Palestinian areas, between Areas A and B and in close proximity to Palestinian towns and villages. Five of the planned settlements in the northern West Bank are expected to be established in areas where no permanent Israeli civilian presence previously existed.
Alongside the emptying of refugee camps, the Israeli government is advancing far-reaching plans to reshape the geography of the northern West Bank. The construction of a new separation barrier across the northern Jordan Valley would sever Palestinian towns and villages from one another, isolate agricultural and grazing lands, and further fragment Palestinian territorial continuity. At the same time, the government is promoting plans that would facilitate the re-establishment and expansion of isolated Israeli settlements in the northern West Bank, reversing one of the central territorial arrangements established following Israel's 2005 disengagement and further eroding the framework created under the Oslo Accords.
Needless to say, these measures are likely to intensify violence against Palestinian residents, further undermine their property rights, and exacerbate existing restrictions on movement, access to land, and other military and planning constraints imposed upon them. According to the published maps of the proposed settlements, a significant proportion are planned on privately owned Palestinian land. Others are to be established on land designated by Israel as "state land"—a public resource that, under the law of occupation, should be administered for the benefit of the protected population but is now allocated almost exclusively to Israeli settlement purposes. At least three of the planned settlements are to be established within areas designated as military firing zones, despite the fact that Palestinian communities residing in those same areas have been expelled—or continue to face the threat of expulsion—on the grounds that the land is required for military training.
Under international humanitarian law, the Military Commander derives his authority solely from the law of occupation. International criminal law further recognizes that the deliberate demographic transformation of occupied territory, the persecution of a protected population, and the systematic denial of the protections afforded to that population may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. These obligations are reinforced by Israel's duties under international human rights law in its treatment of the protected Palestinian population.
Taken together, these measures all adopted during the final year of the current government's term of office, indicate a politicization of decision-making concerning the occupied Palestinian territory and the rights of its protected population. They are based on impermissible considerations and pursued in disregard of international law, in an apparent effort to secure political "achievements" consistent with the ideological agenda of extremist elements within the Government.
Why Is the Risk Heightened During the Election Period?
The principal risk scenarios include an acceleration in demolitions and confiscations, as well as the sudden denial of access to water and other essential resources. There is also a heightened risk of an accelerated establishment of settlement outposts, including "expulsion outposts," in particularly sensitive areas. The placement of a tent, shack, caravan, herd of livestock, or even a flag may initially appear to be a temporary act posing little immediate risk. In practice, however, such actions can rapidly evolve into a permanent foothold, leading to repeated incursions, the appropriation of grazing land, the obstruction of access roads, and the intimidation of neighboring Palestinian communities. Out of concern for their safety, residents frequently avoid approaching these sites even when they are not permanently occupied.
There is also an increased risk of coordinated violent attacks occurring simultaneously at multiple locations. Attacks carried out across several areas at the same time may significantly impede the ability of field activists, journalists, legal teams, and diplomatic representatives to respond in real time, leaving affected communities particularly vulnerable. This scenario poses an especially acute risk for small and isolated communities, where only a limited number of families remain. There is also a risk that such violence will expand into areas where the settlement outpost movement has not yet established a significant presence, with the aim of creating precedents, including in areas deep within Areas A and B.
Political polarization and incentives to create irreversible facts on the ground further exacerbate these risks. Political uncertainty may create incentives to complete measures before the elections that would be difficult to reverse thereafter, including the establishment of settlement outposts, the legalization of settlements, road construction, demolitions, land seizure, and changes to patterns of access and control. Moreover, in an election campaign in which political parties and elected officials compete for the support of right-wing and settler constituencies, there is reason for concern that this dynamic may encourage increasingly coercive measures or the deliberate withholding of effective law enforcement. It should also be noted that years of ineffective enforcement have contributed to the normalization of violence and lawlessness among extremist groups operating in the West Bank and within Israel, making efforts to restrain such conduct increasingly difficult over time. This paper presents these developments as a risk scenario to be assessed against unfolding events, and not as an assertion regarding the motives of any particular political actor.
Public and media attention is also likely to become increasingly focused on the election campaign. As a result, developments in the occupied West Bank may receive reduced coverage, particularly where multiple incidents occur simultaneously or are portrayed as isolated local confrontations rather than manifestations of a broader process of displacement. Human rights defenders, lawyers, Members of the Knesset, and civil society organizations may themselves be heavily engaged in election-related activities. Their work may also be restricted under security or other pretexts, limiting—or in some cases entirely preventing—their ability to reach communities at risk. In any event, they are unlikely to have the capacity to respond simultaneously across multiple locations. Even at present, concerns have been raised regarding the shortage of protective presence volunteers, the reduced availability of Members of the Knesset and lawyers, and distress calls from areas that cannot be reached in a timely manner. At the same time, settler groups increasingly promote the narrative that violent activity originating from settlement outposts constitutes legitimate security activity undertaken in self-defence against Palestinians.
The pre-election period also coincides with the peak of the summer season, the seasonal migration of some pastoral communities, school holidays, the Jewish High Holidays, and the beginning of the olive harvest. During this period, access to water, grazing land, and agricultural areas becomes particularly critical. At the same time, the availability of field activists may decline, while the temporary absence of residents from some communities may further increase their vulnerability.
Key Recommendations
1. Establish a dedicated communication channel linking human rights organizations, field activists, Palestinian community representatives and activists, and diplomatic missions, to facilitate rapid information-sharing and coordinated responses to developments on the ground.
2. Develop a coordinated package of diplomatic measures designed to maximize timely influence on Israeli decision-makers as events unfold.
3. Conduct proactive visits to communities at heightened risk before emergency incidents occur, and regularly report on the risks facing these communities during the election period through routine diplomatic reporting to capitals.
4. Ensure the capacity for a rapid diplomatic presence in response to home demolitions, the establishment of settlement outposts, road closures, or large-scale attacks.
5. Exercise proactive diplomatic pressure on the Israeli authorities to refrain from taking unilateral and irreversible measures during the election period, including through effective diplomatic engagement and clear public statements.
6. Call for prompt investigations and immediate measures to halt the forcible transfer of protected persons, including by dismantling newly established settlement outposts, restoring Palestinian access to land, and facilitating the immediate return of residents following incidents of displacement in order to prevent the consolidation of their consequences.