Trying to figure out the future of Hamas is no easy task; it is somewhat like gazing into a crystal ball. The organization is complex and has many different sides, making it hard to predict what will happen next. As the war on Gaza continues, people around the world—analysts, policymakers, and everyday observers—are all trying to guess what Hamas might do in the coming months and years. Hamas has always called itself a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation, while others call it a terrorist group, it is now at a crucial point, trying to balance being both the government in Gaza and a militant group focused on armed resistance.
On Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas launched a massive, well-coordinated attack on Israel, marking a major escalation in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This unprecedented move, which included a barrage of rockets and ground infiltrations, led to many Israeli casualties and hostages, including both Israelis and foreign nationals (many with dual nationality). Some see this October 7th attack as a strategic attempt by Hamas to disrupt the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia and to assert itself as a key force in Palestinian resistance. The scale and coordination of the attack caught many by surprise, escalating the conflict and prompting a prolonged and intense military response from Israel. This response has since been labeled in various ways, such as “genocide,” a “disproportionate response,” and a “war of retaliation,” with the Israeli Government saying its goal is to “wipe out Hamas.”
The Current State of Hamas
Hamas’s role in Gaza is not just about its militant activities—it also involves political, social, and religious roles. Since winning the Palestinian elections in 2006, and following the coup against Fateh in 2007, Hamas has governed Gaza under a tight Israeli blockade and with periodic military confrontations. Fouad Alkhatib, an analyst and resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, points out that Hamas’s dilemma comes from trying to be both a governing body and a resistance movement. “Hamas struggled with being in government after it won the elections in 2006,” Alkhatib notes. “Its raison d'être as a resistance group was somewhat undermined by its administrative responsibilities.”
Alkhatib goes deeper into the internal workings of Hamas, highlighting the ideological and strategic divides within the organization. “The internal structure of Hamas is not monolithic. It comprises several factions with varying degrees of influence, ranging from hardline military leaders to political figures who may favor different strategies, including negotiations or truces with Israel,” Alkhatib explains. This internal diversity makes Hamas flexible, but it also brings big challenges in keeping the group united and focused on a clear, long-term strategy.
Alkhatib also highlights how the recent actions on October 7th, described by some as a “military coup” by hardliners within Hamas against the moderates, have made the group’s future even more uncertain. “Strategically, the reason why Hamas is there has not been removed,” he warns. “The perception and issue of continued dispossession, occupation, and settlements remain.” This suggests that despite any military setbacks Hamas might face, the underlying issues that fuel its support haven’t been resolved. “Israel risks replacing a tactical victory with strategic defeat,” Alkhatib adds, pointing out the dangers of relying solely on military force to solve the conflict.
The Structure of Hamas
The Hamas organization is quite complicated, reflecting its multiple roles as a government, a social movement, and a militant group. Generally, Hamas is divided into several key branches: the political wing, the military wing (Ezz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades), and the social services network. These branches work together in a way that allows Hamas to adapt to changing situations while still pushing its broader goals.
Omri Brinner, a CTF consultant and Middle East team lead at ITSS (International Team for the Study of Security)-Verona, gives more insight into how Hamas operates. “Hamas will not disarm,” Brinner asserts, emphasizing that the group’s identity is closely tied to its resistance narrative. He suggests that Hamas might move toward a model similar to Hezbollah, where it keeps a strong military wing while also maintaining political influence in Gaza. “Hamas’s identity is deeply rooted in its role as a resistance movement,” he explains. “Any shift toward a purely political role would require a fundamental transformation that seems unlikely in the near future.”
Brinner also talks about the possibility of Hamas becoming more decentralized and having a global reach. “Hamas has extensive international networks and cells,” he notes. “These networks facilitate fundraising, arms smuggling, and international outreach, further complicating efforts to counter the organization.” As the pressure on Hamas increases in Gaza, he suggests the group might lean more on these international networks to keep itself afloat and relevant.
Internal Fragmentation and Leadership Crisis
Hamas is currently dealing with a major internal leadership crisis after the assassination of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Iran and Mohammed Deif, military wing commander, and as a result of recent military failures and strategic mistakes. Sources that are close to Hamas but want to remain anonymous claim that there are signs of growing frustration within the group – and new leader Yahya Sinwar – especially among its political leaders who are questioning whether continuing the conflict at its current intensity is wise. This internal discord has sparked talks about possible leadership changes or even the rise of new factions that could challenge the current leadership.
Michele Groppi, a senior lecturer in defense studies at King’s College, London, and president and founder of the ITSS - Verona, stresses that no matter the military outcome, Hamas can’t stay the same organization it has been. “This war has highlighted many of its 'ugly' traits, which are now way harder to either conceal or conceptualize within resistance narratives,” Groppi states. “Any future leadership cannot just parrot what Sinwar said in terms of civilian casualties ('the more, the better, it’s a sacrifice we need'), as Gaza will arguably never be the same after this bloody war.”
Groppi also talks about the bigger geopolitical picture, saying that the conflict in Gaza is part of a broader regional proxy war between Tel Aviv and Tehran. “The normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab states under the Abraham Accords has reshaped regional alliances,” he observes. “Countries like the UAE and Bahrain, which once viewed Hamas with some degree of sympathy, now see their interests more aligned with Israel’s. This shift isolates Hamas further and limits its ability to garner support from the broader Arab world.”
He goes on to discuss how Hamas might need to adapt in this changing geopolitical landscape or risk becoming irrelevant. This suggests that Hamas could either continue its path of armed resistance or look for new ways to stay relevant in the shifting dynamics of the Middle East.
Another possibility is that Hamas could become more international in its operations. Noor Dahri, a counterterrorism expert and executive director of the Islamic Theology of Counter-Terrorism think tank based in The Hague, believes that “Hamas’s future is not as dark as it looks, and they can easily regroup.” Dahri points out that Hamas has a lot of financial resources, with more than a billion dollars invested in real estate and other businesses worldwide. “Whatever a strong terrorist organization needs to establish and remain active, Hamas still has all such tools to sustain and survive,” Dahri explains. “It just needs the capability in Gaza to rule and strike again.”
Dahri also suggests that even if Hamas’s older leaders are taken out, the group has the financial and network resources to keep going, possibly becoming more like other international jihadist groups. “Hamas can sustain, survive, and nurture among Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank,” he asserts. “Time will tell when they would regain the capability to strike again in a different mode or phase.”
The Complexity of Predicting Hamas’s Future
Predicting what Hamas will do next is nearly impossible as the organization is so complex and operates on multiple levels. It acts as a political entity, a social welfare organization, and a militant force. This mix means its actions are influenced by many factors, including internal leadership dynamics, regional geopolitics, financial networks, and the broader sociopolitical context in the Palestinian territories. On top of that, Hamas’s ability to adapt and bounce back makes it a particularly unpredictable player.
Alkhatib notes that while military efforts can weaken Hamas’s capabilities, they can’t eliminate the core issues that keep its support base strong. “Israel risks replacing a tactical victory with strategic defeat,” Alkhatib warns, emphasizing the need for a more comprehensive approach that addresses the deeper causes of the conflict, such as occupation, settlement expansion, and broader Israeli-Palestinian relations. “You can weaken Hamas tactically,” he explains, “but as long as the perception of continued dispossession and occupation persists, the conditions for resistance remain.”
He highlights that Hamas’s strength lies in its ability to tap into local grievances. “Hamas has proven time and again that it can leverage local grievances for recruitment and support.”
“As long as there are unresolved issues and perceived injustices, there will always be fertile ground for Hamas to maintain its relevance.” This ability to adapt makes Hamas a particularly challenging group to counter, as it can change strategies and tactics depending on the situation on the ground.
Brinner claims that the organization might “go regional.” “The goal will still be to establish a Palestinian state, a Palestinian Islamic state on the State of Israel, but it will not be operating solely from the Gaza Strip. Its leadership will be scattered, and its financial operations will be scattered, and also it will carry out terror attacks outside of current borders – so it’s not only in Gaza and in Israel, but they will carry out attacks between Bulgaria where they have weapons caches against Jewish targets, against Israeli targets. They’ll probably have a base somewhere in the Sahel region of Africa.”
Financial Sustainability and International Support
One of the key factors that will shape Hamas’s future is whether it can keep itself financially afloat. The group has a wide range of financial networks, including support from countries like Iran and Qatar, as well as various international charities and sympathizers. This financial base has helped Hamas maintain its operations and support its role as a governing entity in Gaza, even under heavy pressure.
However, keeping this financial support going in the face of international sanctions and increased scrutiny will be tough. Omri Brinner discusses the complexities involved in cutting off Hamas’s financial flows, noting that international cooperation is key but often difficult to achieve. “Targeting Hamas’s financing on the international level” could be a significant strategy, he suggests, but admits that getting different governments and private sectors to work together is a big challenge. “Governments and private sectors often have conflicting interests, and this lack of cooperation can make it difficult to effectively cut off funding to Hamas,” Brinner explains.
Ideology has always been a key driver behind Hamas’s actions and strategies. The group’s charter, which calls for the establishment of an Islamic state in all of historical Palestine, is central to its identity. However, the harsh realities on the ground might force Hamas to rethink its ideological stance, at least partially, as it did when it revised its charter in 2017. The destruction caused by the recent conflict has made it harder for Hamas to justify its resistance narrative to the people of Gaza, who have suffered greatly.
Groppi points out that “Hamas will have to come to terms with what they do not want to come to terms with; they need to talk with Israel.” Public perception, both within Gaza and in the broader Palestinian territories, is crucial. If Hamas is seen as the cause of the destruction and suffering of the people it claims to defend, its support base could weaken. On the other hand, if Hamas is seen as successfully standing up to Israel and surviving the attacks, it could maintain or even increase its support among Palestinians who see resistance as the only way to achieve their national goals.
Groppi further discusses the delicate balance Hamas’s leadership needs to maintain between staying true to its ideological roots and addressing the practical needs of governance and survival. “Hamas’s leaders know that they cannot continue to live comfortably in Qatar or elsewhere while their home country is in ruins,” he argues. “This may create a deep credibility gap that could force them to reconsider their strategies and possibly even engage in more pragmatic negotiations.”
Geopolitical Implications and Regional Proxy Dynamics
Understanding the future of Hamas also requires looking at the broader geopolitical context of the Middle East. Groppi explains that the conflict in Gaza is part of a larger regional proxy war between Israel and Iran. “The geopolitical rivalry between Israel and Iran, with Hamas caught in the middle, complicates any resolution to the conflict,” he says. Iran’s support for Hamas is part of its broader strategy to project power and influence in the region, challenging the dominance of Israel and Saudi Arabia.
This dynamic means that Hamas’s future isn’t just up to the organization itself; it’s heavily influenced by the decisions of its backers. If Iran decides to cut back its support or focus on other areas, Hamas could find itself increasingly isolated. On the other hand, if Iran decides to ramp up its support for Hamas to put more pressure on Israel, the conflict could escalate even more, potentially involving other regional players and leading to a larger regional conflict.
The role of external players, particularly Qatar and Iran, is significant. Both countries have historically provided financial and logistical support to Hamas, and this support is likely to continue, albeit in a potentially modified form. Qatar, for example, has played a dual role, both funding Hamas and positioning itself as a mediator in various negotiations. This dual approach presents both opportunities and challenges for Hamas as it looks to the future.
So, What are the Scenarios?
Given the current trajectory and the various internal and external pressures facing Hamas, there are several potential scenarios that could unfold. One possibility is that Hamas continues to position itself as the leading force of armed resistance against Israel. In this scenario, Hamas would likely engage in ongoing military confrontations with Israel, including sporadic rocket attacks, and make efforts to rebuild its military capabilities within Gaza. However, this path would also likely lead to continued Israeli military operations aimed at further degrading Hamas’s capabilities.
Another potential scenario involves a shift toward a more political role for Hamas, similar to the transformation of Hezbollah in Lebanon. In this situation, Hamas would retain its military capabilities while also engaging more fully in the governance of Gaza, and possibly seeking a role in the West Bank as well. This path could involve some level of negotiation with Israel, particularly if Hamas believes it could achieve political gains through diplomatic efforts.
Alternatively, Hamas could evolve into a more dispersed, international organization, conducting operations outside of Gaza and the West Bank. This scenario would involve Hamas adopting a more transnational jihadist approach, potentially transforming into a network of loosely affiliated cells operating across various countries. Such a transformation would make Hamas more unpredictable and harder to counter, since it would no longer be confined to a single geographic area. However, this path might also dilute Hamas’s identity and mission, potentially alienating some of its core supporters who are primarily focused on the Palestinian cause.
There is also the possibility of internal collapse and splintering within Hamas due to leadership struggles, military defeats, or the emergence of competing factions within Gaza. In this case, the organization could break into smaller, more radical groups, each pursuing its own agenda. This fragmentation could lead to increased violence within Gaza and create a more chaotic security environment, making it even more difficult for any single group to establish control.
Lastly, some analysts consider the possibility of the partial rehabilitation of Hamas as a political entity within a broader Palestinian governance framework. Drawing parallels to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was once seen as a terrorist organization but later became a legitimate political entity, there is a belief that elements of Hamas, especially those not directly involved in militancy, could be integrated into a new Palestinian government. This path would require substantial internal reforms within Hamas and a fundamental shift in its approach toward Israel and the international community.
Conclusion: Navigating an Uncertain Future
The future of Hamas is full of uncertainties, shaped by a mix of internal struggles, regional geopolitics, and international pressures. As the group deals with the fallout from recent events, it faces several crucial decisions that will determine its path in the years to come. Whether Hamas becomes more politically focused, continues its armed resistance, or breaks into smaller factions, its future will have significant impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wider Middle Eastern landscape.
Groppi sums up this uncertainty well: “Hamas may have dodged the bullet now, but it will have to come to terms with the fact that the region is changing, and they must change with it if they truly care for the Palestinian people.”
In the end, how Hamas navigates these challenges will determine if it can stay relevant and continue to play a key role in the Palestinian national movement or if it will fade away, replaced by new actors and new strategies in the ever-changing landscape of the Middle East. As the saying goes, “time will tell,” and the next months and years will be crucial in shaping not just the future of Hamas, but also the future of the entire region.