The Geneva Accord, which was officially signed in December 2003,
represents the first full scale nongovernmental Israeli-Palestinian
agreement on the details of peace and future relations between the
State of Palestine and the State of Israel. Although the Abu
Mazen-Beilin document of 1995 sought to do exactly that, in reality
it left open the final resolution of the Jerusalem and refugee
questions. The heart of the Geneva initiative is a document
outlining the details of a Palestinian-Israeli permanent status
agreement addressing all the issues of the conflict, including the
end of all future claims and affirming that the only viable
solution is a two-state solution.
Building on progress achieved in previous documents and negotiating
forums, such as Camp David II of July 2000, the Clinton Parameters
of December 2000, and the Taba talks of January 2001, the Geneva
document sought to bring to a close all the issues. It has 17
articles and a preamble. The longest and most important articles
are #4, on territory, #5, on security, #6, on Jerusalem, and #7, on
refugees. Three are yet to be written: #12, on water, #13, on
economic relations, and #14, on legal cooperation. Article 1 deals
with end of conflict; #2 with relations between the two states; #3
with implementation and verification; #8 with Israeli-Palestinian
cooperation; #9 with Israeli civilian use of three selected roads
in the Palestinian state; #10 with religious sites; #11 with an
Israeli-Palestinian border regime; #15 with prisoners; and #16 with
dispute settlement mechanisms. Two maps have been produced showing
the territorial division, one for the Palestinian state (showing
its newly acquired territories along the eastern borders of the
Gaza Strip and the west of the Hebron region and the areas annexed
to Israel) and one for the Old City of Jerusalem. An annex is
referred to in the text but has not been written yet. The following
review examines the ways in which the Geneva document dealt with
five main issues of the permanent status, the significance of the
initiative to Palestinian-Israeli peace making, and how the
Palestinian public has responded to it. But before doing that, we
examine the ways in which the document dealt with three
non-substantive, and at times controversial, issues: The Jewish
nature of the state, third party role, and end of conflict.
Non-substantive Issues
The Jewish Nature of the State: Although the basic contours of a
Palestinian-Israeli permanent status agreement have been known
since the end of the 2000, this document is not without surprises.
For example, the Palestinians, who for a long time resisted Israeli
pressure to acknowledge the Jewish nature of the state and Jewish
links to Palestine, agreed in the preamble to affirm that the
agreement marks the recognition of the right of the Jewish people
to statehood. Article 2(4) goes on to say that Israel is the
homeland of its people. Although this formulation may not
necessarily please all those Israelis who consider Palestinian
recognition of the Jewishness of the State of Israel as a test of
the true intentions of Palestinians, it does represent Palestinian
willingness to seriously meet one of Israel's most symbolic needs,
despite their concerns about the implications of such recognition
on the status of Israeli Arabs and other non-Jewish citizens of the
State of Israel. The Palestinians do more: The Jerusalem article
refers to Al Haram Al Sharif also as the Temple Mount. The Arabic
translation of the document does the same, referring to Al Haram as
Jabal al Haykal. The article further recognizes the historic,
religious, spiritual, and cultural significance of Jerusalem and
"its holiness" for Judaism.
Third Party Role: The extensive role assigned to a third party is
also surprising and indeed unprecedented in Arab-Israeli
negotiations. The initiative (article 3) establishes an
implementation and verification group (IVG) whose responsibility is
to "assist in, guarantee, monitor, and resolve disputes relating to
the implementation of this Agreement." The IVG is to be made up of
the Quartet members and others acceptable to both sides. It would
have under its command a multinational force (MF) that would be
deployed in the Palestinian state and would be charged with the
task of protecting the territorial integrity of the State of
Palestine, a task not assigned to the state itself. The MF would
also serve as a deterrent against external attacks that could
threaten either of the parties, deploy observers to monitor the
territorial and maritime borders of the state of Palestine, and
perform a few additional tasks at the Palestinian international
border crossings and the early warning stations. It would also help
in the training of the Palestinian security services, but not with
the building of a Palestinian army. The MF would only be withdrawn
or have its mandate changed by agreement of the parties.
Furthermore, the IVG is to establish a dispute settlement
mechanism.
Moreover, the initiative calls for the establishment of an
international group (IG), composed of the IVG and other parties to
be agreed upon by the parties, including members of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which would have the
mandate of monitoring, verifying, and assisting in the
implementation of the arrangement regarding Jerusalem. The IG would
establish a "multinational presence" on Al Haram compound. While
the Palestinians have always sought an international/multinational
role in resolving the conflict, the Geneva initiative goes far
beyond expectations in inviting a third party role almost turning
the Palestinian state into an international protectorate. The
document imposes no time limit for the functioning of the IVG, the
MF or the IG unless agreed otherwise by the two sides.
End of Conflict: Another issue, important in this case to the
Israelis, is the way the initiative dealt with the "end of
conflict." The document states clearly that the full implementation
of the agreement will constitute the full implementation of
previous UN-related resolutions and the settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in all its aspects. The first article
in the document states that the agreement "ends the era of
conflict" and settles all claims. No further claims can be raised,
the document affirms. When the issue of refugees is addressed in
article 7, the document states that the agreement "provides for the
permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee
problem," and that "no claims may be raised except for those
related to the implementation of this agreement." It specifically
gives the refugees two years to submit applications for their
permanent place of residence or lose their refugee status. The
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) would cease to exist
five years after an international commission that would manage the
process of the refugee settlement starts operating. Finally, the
documents assert that all refugee rights, as contained in documents
such as UN resolution 194, are considered fulfilled "according to
article 7" of the document. To strengthen the drive toward the end
of conflict, and unlike the Egyptian and Jordanian peace agreements
with Israel, this document talks about reconciliation between the
Arab world and Israel and the establishment of normal, peaceful
relations between the Arab states and Israel.
Five Core Issues
Five substantial issues of final status negotiations; territories,
security, Jerusalem, refugees, and Palestinian sovereignty,
received the document's greatest attention:
Territories: Article 4 detailed the steps for an Israeli withdrawal
from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements
and the withdrawal from almost all of the West Bank while allowing
Israel to annex some settlement areas in less than 3 percent of the
West Bank, which would be exchanged with an equal amount of
territory from Israel. The Israeli army is to complete its
withdrawal in 30 months from the signing of the agreement but the
first phase (details of what and how much area to be determined) is
to be completed in nine months. A small Israeli military presence
is to remain in the Jordan Valley, under the authority of the MF,
for an additional 36 months after withdrawal. Areas annexed to
Israel can be grouped into four:
1) Settlements inside East Jerusalem (including the Jewish Quarter
in the Old City) and on the outskirts of the city in Gush Etzion,
Ma'aleh Adumim, and Giv'at Ze'ev;
2) Modi'in settlements to the north of Jerusalem along the Green
Line;
3) Alfei Menashe and few other settlements to the south of
Qalqiliya;
4) A strip of land stretching from south of Qalqiliya down to the
Latrun to the east of the Ben-Gurion airport.
Areas annexed to Israel do not include the settlements of Ariel or
Efrat. The Palestinians receive an equal amount of territory from
Israel in two areas: west of the Hebron region and along the
eastern borders of the Gaza Strip. Evacuated settlements will be
kept intact and will be placed under Palestinian control. The value
of the settlements would be used as part of Israel's obligations to
compensate refugees for their property left behind in Israel.
A permanently open corridor linking the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip would be established by Israel and Palestine. The corridor
will be under Israeli sovereignty and Palestinian administration
with Palestinian law applying to people using it and procedures
pertaining to it. The nature of the corridor (a bridge, tunnel,
road, or a combination) is not described. However, conditions
pertaining to its construction indicate that it must allow for the
establishment of infrastructure facilities such as pipelines,
electrical and communications cables, etc. But it must not "disrupt
Israeli transportation and other infrastructural networks, or
endanger the environment, public safety or public health."
Engineering solutions are to be devised to avoid such
disruptions.
Three Palestinian roads (Road 443 linking Tel Aviv to Jerusalem via
Modi'in, the Jordan Valley road linking Jerusalem to Tiberias, and
the Jerusalem - Ein Gedi road, will have special arrangements
permitting Israeli civilian use with permits issued by the
Palestinian state. These roads will be patrolled by the MF at all
times. Israelis will not be able to use the designated roads as a
means of entering Palestine without the relevant documentation and
authorization. The document does not specify how Israelis using
these roads would be prevented from entering the Palestinian state
since exits leading to other Palestinian roads would presumably
remain open.
Security: Article 5 states that the Palestinian state will be a
"nonmilitarized state." The Palestinian state will have no army,
but it will have a strong security force. The mandate of the
security force will be to maintain border control and law and order
and perform police functions. No reference is made to external
security but it is clear the defense of the Palestinian state will
be in the hands of the MF. While the state will have sovereignty
over its airspace, Israel will be allowed to use that airspace for
training purposes. Israel will also be allowed to maintain two
early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A small
Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley, under the authority
of the MF, would be allowed for an additional 36 months after the
Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian state. The document seeks
the establishment of "robust modalities for security cooperation,"
including the establishment of a high level joint security
committee that will meet on at least a monthly basis. It talks
about engaging in "a comprehensive and uninterrupted effort to end
terrorism and violence." It affirms that the parties will settle
all disputes between them by peaceful means and will refrain from
joining, assisting, promoting or co-operating with any coalition,
organization or alliance of a military or security character, the
objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or
other acts of hostility against the other.
Jerusalem: Israel would recognize East Jerusalem as the capital of
the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under
Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under
Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including Al Haram Al Sharif)
would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the
Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall, which will come under Israeli
sovereignty. But the Old City will remain unified and open to all
Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians are not allowed to carry
out any digging, excavation, or construction on the compound of Al
Haram, unless approved by Israel. Jewish visitors to Al Haram would
be allowed access to the site. The Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of
Olives would come under Israeli administration but Palestinian
sovereignty
Refugees: Both sides agree the solution of the refugee problem
would be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace
initiative of the Beirut Arab League meeting of March 28, 2002. The
refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency: The
Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the
Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above (no
restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two
areas); host countries; third countries; and Israel. Residency in
the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and
Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those
areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel would be the
average number of refugees admitted to third countries like
Australia, Canada, European countries, etc.
All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their
"refugeehood" and loss of property. An international commission is
to be established to manage and ensure the implementation of every
aspect of the refugee settlement. The commission is to appoint a
panel of experts to estimate the value of Palestinian property at
the time of displacement. The value of the Israeli fixed assets
that will remain intact in former settlements and be transferred to
the state of Palestine would be estimated by an international fund
and would be deducted from Israel's contribution to the fund. UNRWA
would be phased out in each country in which it operates, then
cease to exist five years after the start of the international
commission's operations.
While the document pays lip service to the Road Map and the Bush
speech of June 2002, which calls for the early creation of a
Palestinian state with provisional borders that then negotiates a
permanent status deal, the working assumption of the initiative is
that when signing the agreement there would be no Palestinian state
and the agreement itself would lead to the creation of the
Palestinian state. It also envisages an agreement between the State
of Israel and the PLO, not the Palestinian state as the Road Map
would have it. Article 2 affirms that the State of Palestine shall
be the successor to the PLO with all its rights and obligations.
The implicit assumption is that the PLO would either disappear or
would no longer be relevant to Israeli-Palestinian relations.
Palestinian Sovereignty: According to the agreement, the
Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water and
airspace. But there are serious limitations. For example, the state
will have no army, leaving the responsibility for external security
in the hands of the MF. The MF will have additional roles at
crossing points and elsewhere (such as Al Haram Al Sharif) and
cannot be removed without Israeli approval. The MF will have the
right to prevent the entry into Palestine of any weapons, materials
or equipment in contravention of the provisions of the agreement.
Israel too continues to have an independent unseen role at crossing
points for a limited period of time after withdrawal. Israel will
have two early warning stations in the WB for 15 years, and will
continue to have a military presence in the Jordan Valley (under MF
control) for three years after the full withdrawal. For an
indefinite period Israel will continue to use Palestinian airspace
for training purposes without any quid pro quo. Moreover, the
Palestinian state is obligated to put in place special arrangements
to guarantee access to three agreed sites of religious significance
to Jews: The Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, Rachel's Tomb in
Bethlehem, and Nabi Samuel, north of Jerusalem.
Two more issues are addressed in the document: The release of
Palestinian prisoners and the creation of a dispute settlement
mechanism. Prisoners are to be released either immediately upon the
signing of the agreement or, in some (undefined) exceptional cases,
within 30 months from the date of the Israeli withdrawal from the
Palestinian state. The document provides for a four-stage dispute
settlement mechanism. Starting with a bilateral framework, it moves
to a mechanism set by the IVG, followed by a mechanism of
conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties. Finally, disputes
can be submitted by either party to a three-member arbitration
panel.
The Significance of the Initiative to Palestinian-Israeli Peace
Making
The Geneva initiative is a virtual agreement that may or may not
have a direct impact on negotiations when and if they resume in the
future. This is a document that is associated with a segment of the
Israeli opposition and a small group of Palestinian officials and
members of the mainstream nationalist movement Fateh who
represented themselves only. Some of those negotiators have little
credibility in the eyes of their respective publics, which may in
turn negatively affect the way the document is received. Even if
the public is willing to support the basic compromises in the
initiative, it may be reluctant to approve a document associated
with such individuals.
What is the value of the initiative? It has certainly managed to
counter the argument of those Palestinians and Israelis who, after
the collapse of the permanent status negotiations, believed a
fundamental clash of interests existed between the two sides and
that negotiations would not bridge the existing gaps in positions.
It also demonstrated that a partner existed on each side. One of
the immediate consequences of the release of the initiative may
have been to force Sharon to come up with his own initiative of
unilateral steps, lest the Geneva initiative gain sufficient
momentum locally and internationally thereby forcing his government
to consider dealing with it.
The initiative makes the basic trade-offs already recognized by
Palestinian and Israeli negotiators. The territorial issue and
sovereignty over Jerusalem's holy places have been the most
important points for the Palestinians. For that, they have been
willing to recognize the Jewish nature of the state and its links
to Jerusalem and the holy places, to accept the end of conflict and
renounce any further claims, to accept security-related limitations
on state sovereignty, to forgo explicit Israeli recognition of the
right of return and to accept refugee absorption modalities that
would allow the actual return to Israel of a very small number of
refugees. For the Israelis, the Jewish nature of Israel and the end
of conflict have been the two most vital needs. For that they were
willing to withdraw from almost the entire West Bank and accept a
territory swap.
But is the initiative implementable? In addition to opposition from
ideological and religious groups, Jewish settlers and Palestinian
refugees are the two groups most likely to feel victimized by the
agreement. They stand to lose the most and their opposition may
make it difficult for political leaders to embrace it. For example,
despite the fact that the Palestinian leadership was consulted
during the different stages of the negotiations, Yasser Arafat has
not officially accepted the document and some of his close advisers
have strongly attacked it. The Israeli Labor party leadership has
also refrained from endorsing it. Some in Labor, such as former
prime minister Ehud Barak, have condemned it. The ability of Sharon
to remove the initiative from public focus by turning public
attention to his unilateral separation steps and a Gaza evacuation
illustrates the difficulties the nongovernmental initiative is
likely to face from a government determined to oppose it.
Palestinian Public Attitudes
Would the Palestinian public accept the Geneva initiative? While
some surveys, such as the one conducted by the International Crisis
Group and the Baker Institute, have shown that a majority of
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are in favor of
compromises similar to those in the Geneva document, another survey
has shown a majority opposes the document. A survey conducted by
the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between
December 4 and 9, 2003 sought to examine public attitudes toward
the Geneva document and its components. The sample size of the
survey was 1,319 and the margin of error was three percent. The
survey asked respondents to express their attitudes toward the
Geneva document based on what they had heard or read about it so
far. It then provided them with a summary of seven core elements of
the document and asked them to express their attitudes regarding
each element. It finally asked for their opinion on the document as
a whole. The poll showed significant opposition to the document
among those Palestinians familiar with it. But it also showed that
only a very small minority was fully aware of its content and that
when respondents became aware of its main components, both support
and opposition increased significantly. A majority of the
Palestinians saw red lines in two components: The refugee solution
and the limits imposed on sovereignty. On the other hand, a
majority welcomed the proposed deployment of a multinational force
in the Palestinian state and the Israeli withdrawal from the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip on the basis of the 1967 lines, with equal
territorial exchange.
The poll found that 73 percent of the public have heard of or read
about the Geneva document, but only 4 percent of the public have
full knowledge of it and only 17 percent have general knowledge of
some of its articles. Among those who have heard of or read about
it, support reaches 25 percent and opposition 61 percent. Among the
whole public these figures translate into 19 percent support and 44
percent opposition while the percentage of the undecided and those
who have not read, or heard of it, is 37 percent. After informing
the respondents of seven core elements of the document, support
increased from 19 percent to 39 percent, opposition from 44 percent
to 58 percent, and the undecided (and those who did not read or
hear of it) decreased from 37 percent to 3 percent. The surprising
result was in the fact that of those who strongly supported the
initiative based on what they had heard or read so far, only 36
percent continued to support it strongly after being informed of
its core components, with 46 percent shifting to support and 16
percent to opposition or strong opposition.
From the seven components read to respondents, only two were
supported: One dealing with the deployment of a multinational force
(58 percent) and one dealing with an Israeli withdrawal based on
the 1967 borders with an equal territorial exchange (57 percent).
Two components received the biggest opposition: One dealing with
refugees (72 percent), and one dealing with limitations on
Palestinian sovereignty (76 percent). Support for the other three
components varied, with Jerusalem receiving 46 percent, end of
conflict 42 percent, and the demilitarization of the Palestinian
state 36 percent. It is worth noting that an April 2003 PSR survey
found a majority in favor of a similar refugee solution, described
in the survey as a Taba-based solution in reference to
Palestinian-Israeli January 2001 negotiations in Taba, Egypt. The
only difference between PSR's April (Taba-based) and December
(Geneva-based) formulation for the refugee settlement was the
reference in the April survey to Israeli recognition of the right
of return, which was omitted in the December survey. One additional
reason for the strong opposition to the Geneva-based solution is
the fact that Palestinian opposition groups have managed in the
meantime to frame the whole Geneva document as a sell-out for
refugee rights. Among those who had previously heard of or read the
document (i.e. 73 percent of the public), support increases among
Fateh supporters (36 percent) compared to Hamas supporters (26
percent). Support for the Geneva document as a package after being
informed about its main components increases among women (42
percent) compared to men (35 percent), among non-refugees (41
percent) compared to refugees (36 percent), among those with
preparatory education (47 percent) compared to those holding a BA
degree (29 percent), among housewives (44 percent) and farmers (40
percent) compared to students (32 percent), among supporters of
Arafat (54 percent) compared to supporters of Hamas leader, the
late Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (26 percent), and among Fateh supporters
(55 percent) compared to Hamas supporters (33 percent). Support for
the Geneva initiative is also significantly higher (60 percent)
among those who were optimistic about what will happen next in
Palestinian-Israeli relations, expecting to see a return to
negotiations and cessation of violence, compared to those who were
pessimistic, expecting continuation of the violence and no return
to negotiations (25 percent). Similarly, those who believed that
armed confrontations in the Intifada have definitely not helped the
Palestinians to achieve national interests in ways that
negotiations could, were more supportive of the initiative (51
percent) than those who believed that the armed confrontations have
definitively been more helpful (30 percent).