The Barcelona and Madrid reports1 proposed that the European Union
(EU) adopt a human security doctrine to guide its defense and
foreign policy. Because the EU is not a nation-state, but a new
kind of supra-national organization, it requires a security policy
that is distinct from traditional national security policies. Human
security, according to these reports, refers to:
* The security of the individual and the community in which he or
she lives, as opposed to, or in addition to, the security of the
state.
* Both freedom from fear and freedom from want. The Barcelona and
Madrid reports emphasized the threat of political and criminal
violence, but also argued that these threats cannot be disentangled
from suffering as a consequence of material deprivation and
environmental degradation.
* The sort of security that individuals enjoy within legitimate
law-governed states. The concept of human security blurs the
classic distinction between internal security (based on law
enforcement) and external security (where the primary instrument is
military force).
By doctrine, the reports referred to implementation of human
security, that is to say, how human security might be realized in
practice. Instead of a classic army, the report proposed that the
EU should have a human security force composed of both military and
civilian elements. The latter would include the police, legal
experts, aid workers, etc. Both military and civilian elements
would be guided by a set of principles which would distinguish the
way these forces operated from traditional military approaches.
Essentially, the forces would operate more like law enforcement
agencies than war-fighting agencies. These principles include:
human rights, legitimate political authority, multilateralism, a
bottom-up approach, and a regional focus.
What would it mean for the EU to apply this doctrine to the Middle
East? My argument is that a lot of what the EU does already has
elements of a human security approach. But the case of the Middle
East demonstrates that human security cannot be implemented
partially. It requires a holistic approach involving the
application of all the principles. In developing this argument, I
will start by describing what the EU already does and the
shortcomings of what it does. And I will then point to what is
required for all the human security principles to be applied.
What the EU Does
First, Israel is probably the EU countries' closest partner outside
the EU. It is an important trading partner. It has signed an
association agreement which covers mainly trade arrangements and
political dialogue. Israel is included in many EU initiatives; in
particular, it is part of the European research area, and Israeli
universities and research centers are eligible for EU funding.
Israel is treated as a European country ─ for instance, its
inclusion in the Eurovision song contest. The close ties between
Israel and the EU represent an example of the EU's integrative
bottom-up method, which was originally designed to prevent future
wars on European territory.
Second, the EU is probably the single biggest donor to the
Palestinian Authority (PA). Aid committed so far in 2008 amounts to
€361.5 million. This compares with €554 million in 2007
and €342 million in 2006. The aid covers recurrent costs of
the PA (the largest amount), development projects and humanitarian
aid, including substantial aid to the UN Refugee Works Agency
(UNRWA). After the Hamas win in the Palestinian elections and the
boycott imposed on it, the EU introduced the Temporary
International Mechanism (TIM), which allowed the EU to continue
providing aid while avoiding the Hamas-controlled PA. Thus the EU
actually increased aid in 2006 and 2007, but it was all paid either
directly into the accounts of beneficiaries (teachers, health
workers, pensioners ─ some 4,000 altogether), or into a
presidential account controlled by President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen). The PA was already divided as a result of the polarization
between Hamas and Fateh, and as a result of the proliferation of
security services after the PA was established, each financed and
equipped by different donors supporting different Palestinian
factions. The consequence of the TIM was to undermine the PA and
speed up further its fragmentation, particularly the fragmentation
of the security services.
Since the Hamas takeover of Gaza, the TIM has been replaced by
PEGASE (European-Palestinian Mechanism for Management of
Socio-Economic Aid) launched in February 2008. PEGASE covers both
recurrent costs and development projects in the West Bank, intended
to contribute to Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's Palestinian Reform
and Development Plan. The problem with plans for Palestinian
economic development is that they are blocked by Israeli
restrictions on movement and communication. Periodic pressure on
Israel by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Quartet
Envoy Tony Blair to ease these restrictions sometimes results in
agreements that are either piecemeal or not implemented. Moreover,
since the Plan only applies to the West Bank, even though
humanitarian aid and some PA recurrent costs still go to Gaza, the
aid contributes to the further polarization between the PA and
Hamas.
Third, the EU has a mission, EU COPPS (EU Coordinating Office for
Palestinian Police Support), to help the Palestinian civil police.
The mission was established in January 2005, but was hit by the
Hamas boycott, since the interior minister was a Hamas member. The
Palestinian civil police are the only security service that is
widely considered to be relatively impartial. Unlike the other
security services established after the Oslo agreement, the civil
police have a long professional tradition going back to the 1920s.
The force was initially set up by officers of the Royal Irish
Constabulary and later received training from Egypt, Jordan and
Israel during 1967-88. The police have a wide range of capabilities
and active participation by women, but they have been greatly
weakened by Israeli attacks, which destroyed equipment and offices,
and by the boycott.
During the boycott, other forces such as the National Security
Forces or the Presidential Guard or the Hamas-created Executive
Force were built up with aid from the United States and from Iran
and Syria for the latter. Also, during that period the various
militias and armed gangs were strengthened. Since the Hamas
takeover of Gaza, the PA has placed great emphasis on law and order
in a bid to contain Hamas and the various militias; to build up
both the civil police and the National Security Forces, and to
establish a unified presence in places like Nablus and Jenin. The
EU has supported this effort, helping to train the police,
providing equipment for new police offices and, recently,
organizing a donors' conference in Berlin to support civil society
and the rule of law in Palestine. However, frequent Israeli
incursions and arrests not only undermine the sense of security
this policy aims to create, but greatly weakens the credibility and
authority of the Palestinian security services.
Fourth, the EU has a border assistance mission, EU BAM, which
originated in an agreement between Israel and the PA to keep open
the Rafah crossing from Gaza into Egypt, provided it was monitored
by the EU. After the kidnapping of Private Gilad Shalit, the
Israelis closed the Rafah crossing for most of the time and the EU
mission sat in the Israeli city of Ashkelon. The mandate of EU BAM
was renewed in May 2008 in the hopes that it could be used for
future agreements. However, since the truce with Hamas in June
2008, the crossing has been controlled by Egypt and Hamas and still
remains closed for most of the time. Perhaps EU BAM could have done
more by basing itself in Rafah where a compound was available;
nevertheless, there was never much that the mission could have
achieved without Israeli agreement.
Finally, the EU is, of course, part of the Quartet (the U.S., the
EU, Russia and the UN), responsible for high-level negotiations
about the political future of Israel and Palestine. Unlike the
other activities in which the EU is engaged, the Quartet largely
operates from a top-down statist perspective. Specifically, the
conflict between Israel and Palestine tends to be viewed through
the prism of the "global war on terror," in which the primary goal
is the defeat of terrorists rather than the protection of
individuals. The biggest problem is seen to be the threat to
Israel's state security as a result of terrorist actions, i.e.,
violence by non-state actors directed against civilians. Rockets
and suicide bombers are seen as the primary impediment to peace;
the human security of Palestinians is considered secondary to state
security.
Implementing a Human Security Doctrine
The EU tries through aid, police support and border monitoring to
alleviate the suffering of individuals in the West Bank and Gaza.
In other words, it tries to observe the principle of human rights,
but it is continually thwarted because there is no legitimate
authority in the Palestinian territories. Before the Oslo
agreement, Israel had to assume responsibility for the Palestinian
territories in its capacity as the occupying power, and as defined
within the legal framework of occupation law. After Oslo, the
situation is characterized by partial occupation and partial
Palestinian authority. Israel claims that occupation law no longer
applies and that the relevant framework is the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations drawn up by the British in 1945, which means it does
not have to observe the human rights conventions. The PA cannot
establish a legitimate political authority because it does not
control the territory of Palestine ? both because of the continued
Israeli occupation and because of Hamas' control of Gaza. The
principle of human rights can be observed in a sustained way only
within the framework of the rule of law that is guaranteed by a
political authority that people can trust. While an enforcement
mechanism is needed, in the end, human rights are respected because
people believe and have confidence in laws.
If the EU were to try and implement a human security doctrine, it
would need to be consistent and to adopt human security as a
political perspective within the framework of the Quartet. Indeed,
it could even be argued that EU aid and partnership is actually
helping to perpetuate the current impasse between Israel and
Palestine, and leading to the slow destruction of Palestinian
society. I am not suggesting that the EU should give up its efforts
to make everyday life a little more bearable for the Palestinians.
But I am suggesting that the EU should use its relationship with
Israel and its unique role as donor to press for an alternative
political solution that would make possible the human security of
both Israelis and Palestinians. Such a solution would establish a
legitimate political authority over the whole area and develop a
meaningful partnership with both Israelis and Palestinians.
The optimum solution would, of course, be one state for Israelis
and Palestinians that allows both the right of return and the right
of settlement. This option, proposed some years ago by Edward Said,
is not politically on the table, but the EU should have the courage
to start a debate about this possibility. Other options would be to
hasten an agreement on a two-state solution; to dissolve the PA and
return to full Israeli occupation; or to establish an international
mandate over the West Bank and Gaza, with substantial enforcement
capabilities.
Other Principles to Consider
The emphasis on the construction of a legitimate political
authority would also need to take into account the other principles
of a human security doctrine. One is the bottom-up approach, which
would mean mobilizing civil society in Israel and Palestine as well
as in Europe to push for a new political solution. The polls show
that both Israelis and Palestinians long for peace and security.
The principle of legitimate political authority depends on those
who have the power to grant legitimacy ─ civil society. So,
ordinary people need to be involved in the search for a political
solution.
Another principle is the regional approach. The roles played by
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and the Arab League have become
increasingly important. It is crucial to avoid a polarization
between Iran and Syria on one side, and pro-Western regimes on the
other. The EU could take the initiative to put in place a regional
security process, rather like the Helsinki process in Europe in the
1970s and 1980s that would deal not only with the
Israeli-Palestinian issue and other conflicts, but also with
related questions, such as economic and social cooperation and
human rights.
On a political level, the EU is, of course, an expression of the
discussions among its members. At present, the members often
disagree about the conflict in the Middle East ─ some put
more emphasis on Israel's state security and the need to defeat
terror, and some take a human security perspective. The EU needs to
adopt the concept of human security as a new narrative underpinning
its foreign policy, as well as an organizing framework guiding its
security capabilities and the tools and instruments of foreign
policy. Paradoxically, as the case of the Middle East shows, the EU
is developing an array of instruments that could support human
security in different parts of the world. However, its lack of
political will prevents it from capitalizing on those instruments
and becoming a force for peace in the world in the way that it has
been inside Europe.
*New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (2006) is now
in its second edition and has been translated into 12
languages.
