Is it already too late for the two-state solution, as some analysts
have been arguing for some years, and is a one-state solution -
promoted by the "new realists" - the alluring alternative to which
we should now be investing our commitment?
These questions have a particular resonance for me as, way back in
the summer of 1972, I explored these very options in a pamphlet
that concluded that the two-state framework was the only logical
and sustainable basis for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict in the interests of both peoples. So certain was I of its
desirability and inevitability that I admonished my publisher, the
London-based Fabian Society, for delaying publication until January
1973, by which time, I cautioned, this solution may already have
been put into effect!
As it turned out, I was a little hasty both with that prognosis and
with my warnings over the next few years that time was about to run
out. Now, however, it is different. Today, we really are in the
last chance saloon, for reasons that are daily becoming more
evident. But why should this concern us, when waiting in the wings
is the increasingly fashionable one-state alternative? The simple
answer, as argued below, is that this option is not just a fantasy
but a dangerous fantasy, for it invites us to imagine that the real
alternative to two states is not perpetual conflict but some sort
of harmonious, egalitarian utopia which miraculously bypasses a
complex of intractable problems. While we engage in fanciful
debate, the clock keeps ticking and the precipice gets
closer.
Two Viable States - It Can Be Done
The pressing need at this point in time is for a serious,
concerted, global effort to resolve this quintessentially
previous-century conflict once and for all, based on two viable
states and a comprehensive regional settlement. While this would
call for uncharted political will and creative mindsets on the part
of the principal regional actors and resolute leadership at the
international level, it can be done - to borrow a phrase from U.S.
Senator Barack Obama. It will depend, above all, on the
determination of the incoming president of the United States and on
his motivational and inspirational powers, for it is he who holds
the master keys to the last chance saloon.
Over the past four decades, we have witnessed two powerful,
conflicting trends. On the one hand, the intellectual and political
argument for two states has effectively been won at virtually every
level. From a handful of advocates some 40 years ago, there now
exists worldwide support for this outcome. Even Hamas has indicated
its preparedness to do a deal based on the 1967 borders. This would
be a strange time indeed to abandon the whole idea.
On the other hand, even as the Israeli government firms up its
rhetorical commitment to two states, the feasibility of an
authentic Palestinian state has been constantly chiseled away by
the changing facts on the ground - the maze of settlements, bypass
roads, military posts, forbidding barriers and the progressive
isolation of Arab East Jerusalem from its Palestinian hinterland.
There were around 5,000 settlers in the West Bank in the early
1970s; nowadays the figure is in the region of 250,000, or roughly
double that number if East Jerusalem and environs are included.
Already, according to UN figures, some 38% of West Bank land is
controlled by the settlements and other Israeli
infrastructure.
Sometimes "Realities" Can Be Reversed
Yet not all "realities" are permanent. Sometimes they can be
reversed, at least up to a point. It wouldn't be the first time in
history such a thing has happened. Indeed, it was said after the
1967 war that severing the West Bank from the East Bank was
unimaginable! More ominously, what may soon be irreversible is the
impact these changes are slowly but surely having at a deeper level
- on the Palestinian psyche.
After years of agonized internal debate, Palestinian opinion in the
West Bank and Gaza, for the past two decades, has regarded the
two-state formula as the pragmatic solution to the conflict. More
recently, however, a new mood is gathering - if only at the margins
for now - that pragmatism is starting to favor one state for both
peoples, even if it means engaging in a bitter long-term struggle
with uncertain consequences and reaching for an objective the
Palestinians themselves don't necessarily favor or truly believe is
attainable. In short, there is a growing sense that they have no
alternative. So we need to be respectfully cautious in deeming one
state a "fantasy" or an "illusion." Yet it warrants these tags for
more than one compelling reason.
A "Democratic Secular" State?
First, there is a profound lack of visceral enthusiasm, currently
and historically, among Palestinians and Israelis for one combined
state for both peoples. On the contrary, such a prospect is widely
viewed as deeply threatening. Their respective struggles -
reflecting their respective histories - have been for national
independence and self-determination in their own states.
Although in the past, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
charter envisaged one "democratic secular" state of Palestine, it
was explicitly to be "Arab" in character and would include only
those Jews - defined exclusively in religious terms - who arrived
before the "Zionist invasion" (variously interpreted as 1917 or
1948). In other words, it would include very few of them. There is
little evidence or reason to suppose that Palestinians today are
any more ready to drop their demands for national independence and
self-determination and share common statehood, instead, with
another people in a combined non-Arab - and non-Muslim- state. Is
it even reasonable to expect this of them? What they desperately
need and yearn for - and for which they are entitled to receive
full support - is an end to occupation and Palestinian sovereignty
over the evacuated territories. One state profoundly deflects from
this vital goal.
In parallel, an attempt to eradicate the Israeli state and its
predominantly Jewish character is liable to revive the Jewish fear
of genocide, or minimally of discrimination and persecution, and
meet with fierce resistance. It is hard to imagine Israeli Jews
voluntarily sacrificing their hard-won national independence to
become a minority again in someone else's land.
Israel/Palestine Is Not South Africa or Ireland
To put it another way, Israel/Palestine is not South Africa. Nor is
it Northern Ireland. Nor is it directly analogous to a host of
other international or historical trouble spots. Each conflict has
its own peculiar features and, for a solution to work, it needs to
spring from the inside-out rather than be imported from the
outside-in. South Africa and Northern Ireland, each in its own way,
were essentially civil-rights struggles. Israel/Palestine is
primarily a clash of two national movements - even if there is a
heavy-duty civil rights dimension as well - and any proposal that
disregards either national imperative - let alone both of them - is
incongruous and bound to fail.
The second reason to consider one state unrealistic is that there
have been numerous unsuccessful attempts in the region over the
past 50 years to merge separate entities in which Iraq, Jordan,
Egypt, Syria, North Yemen, Sudan, Libya and Tunisia have all
featured at various times. If such attempts failed abysmally among
peoples who in some way perceived themselves as sharing a common
language, culture, religion and a sense of history and destiny, on
what ground would we anticipate a different outcome between two
peoples who share none of the above traits and who have been bitter
foes for the best part of a century? It may be a nice dream to
believe it would somehow work, but a dangerous sentiment on which
to build the future of millions of people and possibly the peace of
the world.
Which One-State Solution?
Thirdly, there is not just one but many versions of a united state
and very little effort has been made to put flesh on the skeletons
of any of them. It is one thing to obtain agreement on - and
attract superficial support for - the high-flying rhetoric, but a
lot of it falls away once it comes down to the substance. Depending
on the proponent, "one state" could be unitary, federal,
confederal, bi-national, democratic, secular, cantonal
(Switzerland), multi-confessional (Lebanon), Islamic (Hamas), Arab
(PLO Charter) or Jewish (Greater Israel). Some of these terms are
frequently used interchangeably even though many of them are
mutually inconsistent, even fiercely contradictory. So it is up to
the supporters of each option to take up the challenge of
elaborating on the details of their particular proposal if they
wish it to be taken seriously as an authentic alternative to two
states. This is no time to hide behind clichés.
In particular, the proponents of a "secular democratic" state will
need to show how in practice its version will not be tantamount to
the continuation of occupation under another name, will not
perpetuate and exacerbate the existing economic and social
imbalances, will not lead to the political domination of either
people over the other, will not foster an "apartheid-style" entity
and will not be treated with deep suspicion by other states in the
region who may view authentic democracy and secularity - if this is
what is meant - as alien and threatening. Crucially, they will need
to explain how the national imperatives of both peoples will, hey
presto, melt away. These are serious questions that cannot be
glossed over.
Towards a Bi-national Confederal State?
A genuine bi-national confederal state - by giving expression to
the collective identities - could in important respects be closer
to a two-state model than to a unitary "secular democratic" state,
but its supporters would need to show why it will be more robust
than, say, Belgium and Canada, the two bi-national examples often
cited in favorable comparison, but which are both fragile entities,
periodically in danger of dissolving into their national
constituent parts. The fate of the multi-national constructs of the
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are not encouraging in
this respect, either.
This discussion points to a conclusion with an ironic twist in its
tail. On the one hand, an imposed unitary-state scenario that fails
to reflect the wishes or accommodate the needs of both peoples
could provoke a Palestinian secessionist movement and thus act as
the unintended midwife of two separate, hostile states further down
the line. On the other hand, a negotiated two-state agreement that
puts Israeli and Palestinian societies on a more equitable
constitutional footing could give rise to closer horizontal
relations and structural ties and to a gradual pooling of
sovereignties where this is viewed as advancing their common
interests.
Two States - An Essential Step in the Process
In the past, we did not speak of two states as a "solution" but as
an essential step in the quest for solutions to the many
outstanding problems between Israelis and Palestinians. The
Israelis already had their state. Palestinian statehood was the
vital missing parameter. Similarly, we did not necessarily see two
states as the end of the process. It would be up to the two peoples
to determine, democratically and non-coercively, how they would
want to shape their future constitutional relations. There have
been many changes over the past few decades, but these two
imperatives are no less valid today than they were 40 years
ago.
How the future will pan out is of course yet to be seen, although
no doubt it will all have been obvious in retrospect. Perhaps the
most likely distant scenario for these two embattled peoples is
some form of voluntary bi-national confederal - or conceivably
federal arrangement, possibly including Jordan and, later, maybe
other states, too - with each constituent element retaining its
national identity and essential zone of sovereignty. One route to
this eventual destination will cost countless lives and create ever
more rancor. The other path will skip that stage by allowing
developments between neighboring Israeli and Palestinian states to
evolve peacefully and take their natural course. If we fail to
seize this opportunity while the opportunity still - just - exists,
future generations will justifiably look back at us with the
contempt we will so richly have deserved for the nefarious legacy
we will have passed on to them.
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