Almost 15 years after the Oslo agreements and seven years after the
outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, the idea of separation between
Israel and Palestine and the partition of the country into two
independent states is looking impossible. Such a solution is
unlikely to lead to a just and comprehensive end to the century-old
conflict. Any line drawn to divide the country would be artificial
and would leave militant elements on both sides dissatisfied - and
therefore willing to continue the struggle and jeopardize signed
agreements. Partition would also leave over 1 million Palestinians
under Israeli sovereignty and citizenship, and hundreds of
thousands of Israeli citizens in Palestinian territory.
Security restrictions, Israeli settlements and widespread
opposition from both sides would prevent the creation of a
Palestinian state with territorial contiguity. The result would be
a non-viable state divided into "cantons" with no geographical link
between them. Dealing with issues such as water, ecology, the
environment, the economy, transportation, communication and many
others requires centralization and coordination. Two separate
states and administrations would not be able to cope with these
essential matters in an efficient and effective way.
On the emotional level it is important to note that the vast
majority of both peoples regard the whole country as their sole
respective homeland. Both believe in their natural right to rule
over the entire territory of Eretz Israel/Filastin. A just and
lasting solution to the conflict, then, would have to alleviate the
hostility and deep alienation and mistrust between the two nations,
satisfy the greatest percentage of the populations and bring
stability and prosperity to all the residents of the land.
The past decade has seen various peace plans fail due to a variety
of reasons, but mainly because they were predicated on the
assumption that the ideal solution would be a partition of the
territory of Mandatory Palestine into two separate states. It is an
assumption with many flaws that has led to a stalemate and despair
for both peoples. Hence, it has become vital to broaden the scope
of the discussion, to raise new and innovative ideas and to
investigate their feasibility and present them to the public - even
if they are not popular yet.
The Relevance of the Current Israeli and Palestinian Internal
Crises
Both political systems - in Israel and the Palestinian Authority
(PA) - have been passing through a deep crisis during the past few
years. This crisis has intensified in recent months and has become
a deeply rooted and crucial element in blocking any serious
progress on either the internal or external levels.
The behavior of Israelis indicates that their political system is
not as stable as it is touted to be. It is subject to wild
oscillations, without ever stabilizing on a middle course. It is an
indication of a deep division among Israeli society, so that group
identities and interests tend to dictate patterns of political
behavior and the course of the political system. In practice the
various groups in Israel have developed behavioral patterns that
are motivated by a power struggle between them and by mutual
alienation. The political instability has domestic significance
within Israeli society with regard to internal solidarity, the
goals of Zionism and the achievement of a constructive politics for
the future.
Clearly, in my view, the main project of Zionism - the creation of
a Jewish Israeli nation in the country - has failed. Instead, we
are witnessing the emergence of groups that pursue their own
interests while damaging those of others. This instability has
profound significance for Israel's relations with the Palestinian
people. The essence of this lies in the fact that, under the threat
of the interest groups and their representatives in the Knesset, it
has become impossible to achieve the stability that would allow for
far-reaching decisions concerning the future of the conflict and an
arrangement acceptable to the Palestinians. Only an accord that is
viewed by the major groups in Israeli society as not endangering
the interests of the Israelis and the Jews, including groups such
as the Russians, the settlers and the religious, will be welcomed
by these groups. This means that a peace settlement that coincides
with the Palestinian parameters for an agreement is impossible in
the context of Israeli politics.
On the Palestinian side, the latest developments indicate, in my
opinion, that more than 80 years after the revival of the
Palestinian national movement in the mid-1920s, this movement
peaked in the 1970s and 1980s and is now disintegrating. It has
become a failed national movement, because it has been unable to
achieve the objectives it set for itself. This is reflected in the
absence of a political platform accepted by all factions and of a
broad internal mobilization around defined national goals. Fateh
and Hamas, and the other smaller organizations affiliated with one
or the other, have reached a fateful juncture of deep disagreement.
The Palestinian national movement's ability to change Israel is
limited and may even be negative. The argument that the Israelis
have adopted a solution in recent years that is close to the
Palestinians' demands is only superficially true. The vast majority
of Israelis envision a solution that is far from what the
Palestinians demand, even within a two-state compromise.
There has also been a significant deterioration in the status
accorded the Palestinian national movement by societies and states
that have traditionally been supportive of the Palestinian cause;
namely, the Arab states, Europe and the former Communist bloc. In
addition, the Palestinian national movement has not recorded any
substantial achievement in terms of issues it pursued during the
second half of the 20th century. The establishment of a Palestinian
state, even on part of Mandatory Palestine, the return of the
refugees and the rallying of all Palestinians around defined goals
have not materialized, and today seem even more elusive than a few
decades ago.
This situation is the result of a variety of factors, including the
internal state of the Palestinian national movement, the conflict
among the various factions, Arafat's leadership style, the
antagonism displayed by some Arab states and regimes and, above
all, Israeli policy, which has sought to torpedo the Palestinians'
ability to function as a national group. The change that took place
in Israel in the early 1990s through its recognition of the PLO did
not bring about a practical willingness on the part of Israeli
officials to resolve the Palestinian problem in accordance with
international resolutions. The fact that Israel itself is split
between two different approaches to the Palestinian problem renders
progress toward its solution difficult.
At the same time, the Israeli right, which has been intermittently
in power for most of the past decade, gained control of the
process, or at least the capacity to threaten the stability of the
Israeli government, thereby blocking any Israeli commitment to an
acceptable resolution of the issues associated with the Palestinian
problem, such as the return of refugees, the partition of
Jerusalem, the dismantling of settlements and a return to the June
1967 borders.
In the post-Arafat era, the Palestinians and their national
movement are facing a serious crisis, evidenced by a deep internal
schism and an inability to function as a national group with
national aspirations and a consensual vision of self-expression.
This crisis has been exacerbated by the January 2006 elections for
the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), which gave Hamas more
than two-thirds of the seats and produced a new government under
Ismail Haniyeh in place of the former Fateh-led government. Since
then, the rivalry and tension between the two organizations have
degenerated into street battles between their militias, the burning
down of party headquarters and government ministries, and the use
of live fire to disperse Fateh demonstrators. Waves of anarchy have
taken the form of mutual recriminations and violent confrontations
between Hamas and Fateh members.
This absence of stability on the Israeli and Palestinian internal
political scenes is one of the main factors preventing the two
sides from reaching and implementing an agreement. Under the
current situation, any "two-states" agreement will depend on the
leaders who will sign it - who enjoy the support of a minority of
their peoples - and not as a result of the commitment of the
political systems on both sides for peace and reconciliation.
Towards the Fulfillment of the "Fourth Option"
The future solution to the conflict is impossible to envision now,
as we are almost as far from the two-state solution as we were
before the Oslo Accords. However, as we distance ourselves from the
two-state solution, the possibility of a solution based on a joint,
or bi-national, entity should not be ruled out.
There is no doubt that both the Israeli public and the government
are in agreement in their opposition to the bi-national state
solution. The overwhelming majority of the Israeli public agrees
with their political leaders, as well as with most writers,
journalists and academics in rejecting any solution other than that
of keeping Israel a Jewish state that is the embodiment of the
Jewish right to self-determination. A sort of consensus emerged
during the 17th Knesset elections, held on March 28, 2006, that the
majority of Israeli leaders and public prefers to keep Israel an
ethnic Jewish state, even at the cost of withdrawing from parts of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Very few contemplate having a future
bi-national state with the Palestinians.
That is not to say that there are no Israeli politicians or
scholars who are prepared to consider, and even support, the
eventuality of a bi-national state - although they may entertain an
entirely different notion of the bi-national option. Such an option
had attracted great attention among Jews before the birth of Israel
and was put forward by Jewish leftists as a solution to the
individual and collective existence of the Jews in the country.
Today, some Jewish intellectuals are beginning to view it as a
possibility for resolving the violent conflict with the
Palestinians. Among the Palestinians, too, there has been
increasing support for the idea that this could be the only option
for their future collective existence in the country.
For six years now, the conflict between the Palestinians and
Israelis has been waged between two antithetical and belligerent
options, with an Israeli apartheid on one side, and a Palestinian
Islamic state on the other. The Israeli government hopes to cause
the Palestinians to despair of the possibility of establishing a
sovereign Palestinian state. It is working towards total victory in
the conflict-ridden land and unilateral domination of the entire
country, perhaps tempered by a willingness to permit the
Palestinians to live with some sort of autonomy (quasi-state) under
overall Israeli supervision and control.
On the other side, the radical Islamic movements, Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad, are pushing for the establishment of an Islamic
Palestinian state in place of Israel, perhaps with a willingness to
allow Jews to live in that state as a vanquished minority. To
advance towards the realization of the Islamic option, these
movements employ ruthless methods against the Jews, the harshest
manifestation of which are attacks on Israeli citizens in the
hearts of Israeli cities.
The options already mentioned are neither realistic nor
sustainable. Separation is not relevant, because Israel is now no
longer willing to withdraw to the 1967 borders and implement United
Nations Resolution 242. Even if the Israeli left were to return to
power in the foreseeable future, it would be unwilling to risk a
civil war. The option of Israeli control might be possible and, in
fact, already exists on the ground, but it cannot endure for long.
The Palestinians constitute 50% of the total population of the
country; they are fighting against Israeli control and are willing
to pay a very high price. Therefore the Israeli apartheid regime
will never be stable and will endanger the Israelis as much as it
harms the Palestinians. An Islamic state has no prospects, either
due to the current balance of power in the country, or to its sure
rejection by the Jews and a large segment of the Palestinian
population. It would certainly encounter vigorous opposition on the
part of the neighboring Arab countries. What this means, in effect,
is that we must explore the possibility of the fourth option - a
bi-national state.
Description of the Option
The population of Eretz Israel/Filastin is estimated today at
approximately 5 million Jews and 5 million Palestinian Arabs. The
bi-national state set up on this territory would be based on this
ethnic split, which would contribute to the distribution of power
and governmental control. The arrangement would be predicated on
five main elements of consociation:
* A broad coalition between the Jewish and Palestinian political
representatives;
* Mutual veto rights to the representatives of the two groups on
questions vital to them;
* Proportional distribution of power in political and public
institutions, and of resources for social good;
* A high level of autonomy for each group in the management of its
internal affairs and collective rights to each group; and
* Mutual agreement on matters of immigration and repatriation of
both Palestinian refugees and Jewish immigrants.
The idea could be implemented through various configurations, with
varying levels of cooperation and autonomy. Generally, this could
entail shared rule/self-rule arrangements through the establishment
of joint institutions such as a parliament, a government, security
services and a judicial system, with equal representation for the
two groups. The state could form a single, decentralized
administrative entity, or control of the territory could be divided
into federal units, managing their internal affairs autonomously. A
central government, whose seat would be in Jerusalem, could have
different designs and relevancies, while every national group would
be recognized as autonomous in dealing with its specific
concerns.
During the advanced stages of implementation and the potential
development of a bi-national regime similar to that in Belgium, for
example, it would be necessary to concentrate on achieving
stability by setting up a strong coalition between large sectors of
the elites and leading groups of both communities. This could be
accomplished by agreements on rotation or the doubling of prominent
functions such as those of president, prime minister and ministers.
Both groups would agree on the type and scope of the internal
autonomy each would have, and on whether it would be territorial,
personal or combined.
Those on either side who consider this option are willing to accept
the other, the Jew or the Palestinian, as a partner in a shared
state in which the rights of individuals to equality and a life of
dignity are recognized, as are the collective rights of both the
Palestinians and the Jews to express their national aspirations and
desires in a shared state. Only in this way can there be true
concord between the two national movements, the Palestinian and the
Zionist. In my opinion, international and Arab parties that wish to
be relevant to resolving the conflict must examine this option,
too, and adapt their positions in the direction of its
implementation. Otherwise, they will continue to be irrelevant, and
the conflict will continue to take its toll in terms of human lives
and material and other resources, without any realistic solution on
the horizon.
The implementation of this solution calls for a fundamental change
in the relationship between the two nations and in the nature of
both national movements, including their relationship with their
diaspora. The Jewish group should give up its dominant position and
the resources would be re-divided in a proportional and equitable
way. While the Palestinians should internalize their distance from
the Arab world and develop unique elements as part of their
nationalism that meet the need to live in a bi-national state,
rather than an Arab one. In order to reach these goals, both
communities would need to undergo fundamental changes in their
educational, social and political approach.
View of Anata village from the Pisgat Ze'ev settlement. (Photo by
Nir Landau/ www.activestills.org)