In the almost century-old conflict between Palestinian Arabs and
Israeli Jews, there is no ultimate winner or loser. Despite the
enormous human and material losses, Israel cannot celebrate
victory; nor do the Palestinians entertain defeat. They have both
been losing. It is unfortunate that neither side has seriously
considered the option of winning together.
It is possible to destroy and defeat the enemy's army. Israel did
so in 1967. It is also possible to defeat a regime (corrupt or
otherwise) or to crush armed resistance against occupation. It is
less clear, however, how to defeat a nation struggling for freedom
or independence. In its attempts to defeat the Palestinians, Israel
has resorted to a variety of methods: displacement and
dispossession in 1948, the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip since 1967, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and
discrimination against its own Palestinian citizens for over 55
years. Yet ultimate victory still eludes it.
During "Operation Defensive Shield" in April 2002, the Palestinians
in the West Bank were placed under curfew for weeks. Israeli tanks
and armored vehicles rolled into every city, village and refugee
camp, and Yasser Arafat's compound was besieged and almost totally
destroyed. Israel's superior military power was plainly visible -
it sowed fear and devastation - but the white flags were nowhere to
be seen. It seems there is a mysterious power in powerlessness that
even the best-equipped army cannot crush. The moral: It takes more
than military power to achieve ultimate victory. This "more" has to
do with breaking the will of the weaker party. That you are more
powerful does not mean that your adversary is less determined to
resist and continue the fight. This inability of either side to
achieve a conclusive victory constitutes, in my view, the
singularity of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Singularity of the Conflict
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict's singularity is the result of the
special interplay of politics, religion, history, culture,
morality, nationalism and attachment to the land - although,
fundamentally, it is a conflict over land and sovereignty over it.
To be sure, the conflict shares many important features with other
conflict situations. First, it exhibits many characteristics of
generic conflicts between immigrants and natives, where the former
have created and sustained states. Secondly, it shares obvious
features with the conflict in Northern Ireland and with the former
apartheid regime in South Africa. Thirdly, it is similar in many
respects to the more typical conflict between colonizers and
colonized. Fourthly, it is said to share some elements with the
encounter between the Muslims and the Crusaders. Finally, it shows
most of the main characteristics of relationships between occupiers
and occupied. In spite of these many similarities, the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains one with a unique
characteristic. It is no accident that it has been depicted as an
existential conflict between two national groups, two religions,
two cultures, two moral arguments and two irreconcilable historical
narratives.
The uniqueness of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict springs
primarily from the singularity of the Jewish people - their
religion; their attachment and historical claims to Jerusalem, in
particular, and Palestine in general; their experience in Europe,
culminating with the Holocaust; and their disproportionate
influence in the United States. This singularity also stems from
the fact that the majority of Palestinians still reside inside or
close to historical Palestine, with the moral, political and
material support of over a billion Arabs and Muslims.
With this analysis of the conflict, it becomes easier to explain
two major elements: 1) that it has been related to or contaminated
by the major world conflicts for many decades; and 2) that it has
resisted the many attempts at a peaceful resolution. Compromise is
not an answer when it comes to addressing a singular conflict
understood in existential terms. When the contending parties
perceive their conflict in existential terms, they either engage in
war or prepare for one. Until the late 1970s or early 1980s, the
majority of Palestinians and Israeli Jews had subscribed to some
version of the existential conflict; some believers in
reconciliation were discredited and, in extreme cases,
assassinated. It is only during the past decade that such notions
as "fair compromise" or "historic reconciliation" have become
fashionable.
A Moral, Religious or Political Conflict?
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is essentially neither a moral nor
a religious conflict, although it has strong components of both. In
essence, it is a political conflict - a conflict between two
distinct national groups over the ownership and control of the same
piece of land. The Zionists have always wanted to establish and
sustain an independent state on this land, with a clear Jewish
majority. The Palestinians have always resisted, not because of an
innate resentment of the Jews or their religion, but because they
grasped from the outset that the realization of the Zionist project
would come at their expense.
The founders of the Zionist movement and the Israeli state were the
secular Jews of Central and Eastern Europe, and settlement activity
in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 was initiated and
encouraged by a secular Labor-led government. Similarly, those
Palestinians who initiated and led the resistance against the
Zionist project were the nationalists, not the religious
fundamentalists. There is no doubt that religious sentiments on
both sides have fed the conflict; nevertheless, it is not the
presumed clash between Islam and Judaism, or the clash of
civilizations, that is to blame for the creation or the
perpetuation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Nor is the conflict a moral one. It is not a conflict between two
perspectives on justice or what is right, or a conflict between two
peoples who have equally valid moral claims to the same piece of
land. That said, moral considerations are relevant to the nature
and the ultimate resolution of the conflict. In fact, both sides
have been raising moral questions and arguments, voicing complaints
based on moral considerations and appealing to the sense of justice
of their respective constituencies and the international community
at large. However, it is evident that they have been doing so not
only to score moral points, but mainly to advance political claims
and schemes.
Concerning the relevance of morality, there are three sets of
questions to reflect on:
a) Who has a moral right to what in Palestine/Israel? How can one
argue that the two parties have equally valid moral claims to the
same land? And to what extent are these rights commensurable? What
does moral philosophy have to say about the issue of the Jews'
"historical rights" in Palestine?
b) Who wronged whom in this conflict and, therefore, who is to be
held morally responsible? Is it really possible to restore a moral
balance when so many people have been personally affected over an
extended period of time? And what about the rights of the innocent
people who lost their lives, property and dignity in the course of
this protracted and bloody conflict?
c) Is a just solution to the conflict possible? What theory of
justice can generate the relevant principles for a fair solution to
the major problems?
These and many other questions have been raised and debated over
the years. The fact remains that neither Zionism nor Palestinian
nationalism originated as movements dedicated to moral reform.
Neither is dedicated to the pursuit of moral truths or to the
search for moral solutions. They are simply two national and
political movements with two conflicting sets of goals. Moral
considerations, important as they are, are only part of political
concerns.
In the case of Zionism, morality served political acts in two ways:
first, in providing justification for the creation of the State of
Israel; and second, in justifying those practices, policies and
plans that manifestly give priority to Jews over non-Jews.
Similarly, morality was invoked to serve the Palestinian cause in
at least two ways: first, to show that the creation of Israel came
at the expense of the Palestinian people; and second, to justify
acts and means of resistance to the Zionist project. For the
Palestinians, their moral superiority as the indigenous victims of
the immigrant state is not in question, but they are struggling to
achieve chiefly political, not moral, goals.
The Proposed Political Configuration
Three major Arab-Israeli wars and a series of Palestinian intifadas
- the first of which dates back to the late 1920s - have not led to
a clear-cut victory for either side, but to continued strife and
mounting weariness and frustration. As a result, Palestinians and
Israeli Jews are slowly coming to the realization that a political
compromise is both possible and desirable, and that it should
seriously take into account the following:
1) The determination of the vast majority of Israeli Jews to
continue to live in an independent democratic state with a clear
Jewish majority;
2) The determination of the Palestinians to rid themselves of the
occupation and to establish an independent democratic state that
can accommodate the majority of the displaced Palestinians and
refugees;
3) Compensation for lost property and for undeserved
suffering;
4) Respect for the attachment of both Palestinians and Israeli Jews
to the whole land or to specific parts of it;
5) Respect for the commitment and attachment of non-Israeli Jews
and non-Palestinian Arabs and Muslims to the city of Jerusalem and
its holy shrines;
6) Non-discrimination or equality of citizenship in either state;
and
7) The inherent inability of either side to win.
The question remains: What is the most reasonable and feasible
political configuration that can accommodate the above-listed
elements? It is my firm conviction that the most reasonable
configuration is one that creatively combines: a) political
separation, b) equal, non-discriminatory citizenship, c) sharing
what cannot or should not be divided, and d) compensation for any
private property that cannot be restored to its rightful owners.
Put succinctly, it is a configuration that combines the two
seemingly incompatible components of political separation and
far-reaching sharing or partnership. It means one land or country
shared by both peoples, but politically divided into two
independent states. The element of sharing assumes special
significance here for a variety of reasons, the most important
being the strong attachment of both peoples to the whole country or
to specific places in it, and the demographic reality in the city
of Jerusalem - which should remain open and shared, though
politically divided.
Sharing one country involves much more than the free passage of
people, vehicles and commodities; i.e., it is much richer than the
creation and enjoyment of a common market. It is the partnership
that makes it possible for me to feel that the whole country is
mine, although I am a citizen of one of the two component states.
In the other state, I am much more than a tourist, a passerby or a
guest worker. On one level, there are things that the two states
can or should manage jointly, such as airports, seaports,
historical sites, natural reserves, the Dead Sea resorts and other
tourist attractions, the environment and water resources,
transportation, communication, electricity and the health systems.
On another level, there are privileges that should be enjoyed
separately by the respective citizens of each state, such as
residency rights, social security, property rights and labor
rights. On a third level, possibilities for dual citizenship and
even some form of autonomy or self-rule for certain groups on both
sides of the political divide should be seriously explored. One
thing is clear, however: Physical separation between the two
states, whether by a fence, a wall or any other barrier is
inconsistent with the core idea of sharing. It goes without saying
that discrimination on the basis of religious or national
affiliation is also incompatible with the sharing
configuration.
Sharing is the idea that best addresses the challenges posed by the
competing attachment and moral and historical claims of both sides
to the whole country. Narrow nationalism and the notion of state
sovereignty are clearly not conducive to the realization of the
dual concept of separation and sharing. The implementation of the
proposed vision requires a political configuration that steers a
middle way between the concept of two sovereign states, on the one
hand, and one bi-national or federated state on the other. It
creates a new situation and a new reality which entitles every
Israeli Jew and every Palestinian to say: This is the state of
which I am a citizen, but the whole country of Israel/Palestine is
mine.
Accordingly, political separation is expected to be less difficult
to achieve or accept. This is mainly because the proposed vision
entails a shift in attitudes and a revision of positions and
priorities, from the obsessive concern with the acquisition of and
control over territory to the emphasis on respect for individual
and collective rights and personal attachments. And because
political separation is only one part of the deal, the quarrel over
every inch of land would lose much of its significance and
steam.
Finally, the proposed political configuration is a kind of Hegelian
synthesis. The unitary state for both Palestinians and Israeli Jews
(thesis) has been dismissed by the majority on both sides. The
Israeli Jews reject the "secular democratic state" originally
proposed by the PLO; the Palestinians refuse any version of
exclusive Israeli sovereignty over the whole land. The two-state
solution (antithesis) still faces formidable difficulties. It is
being challenged by the majority of Palestinian refugees, the
majority of Jewish settlers and their supporters and the
emotionally loaded issue of Jerusalem with its holy places. The
proposed synthesis of political separation and far-reaching sharing
implies a modified version of the 1947 United Nations Partition
Plan. One could argue that it is a reasonable and feasible
solution. Whether it is the truly just solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not easy to judge.