Since the day it occupied East Jerusalem in June 1967, Israel had
one overriding goal: to secure Israeli sovereignty over the entire
city. The euphoria of a swift victory and the massive popular
support were galvanizing factors; still, the Israeli leadership had
a number of issues to contend with before they could fully
implement the annexation process. First, they had to garner the
consent of the international community, or, at least, to minimize
the possibility of a rejection. Second, they had to intensify
Israeli presence in the eastern part of the city in the economic,
demographic and political fields.1 The third task was to find an
expeditious solution to the religious issue, especially with
regards to the Muslim shrines. The long-term strategy was the
ultimate Judaization of the whole of Jerusalem.
On June 27, 1967, the Knesset passed the Law and Administration
Ordinance (Amendment) Law, which stated: "the law, jurisdiction and
administration of the State shall extend to any area of Eretz
Israel designated by the government by order." The following day
the Israeli government proclaimed new municipal boundaries for the
city of Jerusalem, incorporating within the limits of the unified
city, inter alia, those parts of Jerusalem that had been under
Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967, including the Old City.
Crystallizing the Policy
The Israeli cabinet held its first post-war meeting on June 11,
1967. High on the agenda was the issue of Jerusalem. The
deliberations centered on whether to annex the eastern part of the
city or not; whether this should be a gradual process or not; and
whether to apply Israeli law to Jerusalem or military orders, as
had been done in the rest of the occupied territories. The justice
minister at the time, Yaakov Shimshon Shapira, was in favor of
applying military rule to East Jerusalem for as long as possible,
even if the government decided on the immediate annexation of the
city. His view was that a military government was important in
legal and administrative terms.2
The ministers were, on the whole, reticent to use the term
"annexation," preferring instead a different terminology to address
the legal implication of the new situation. Eliyahu Sasson pointed
to a potential source of friction with the vast Christian world
should East Jerusalem - with all its holy sites - be annexed to the
State of Israel.3 Menachem Begin, who had joined the emergency
government on the eve of the war, and who had played a central role
in taking the decision to occupy the eastern part of the city, did
not like the use of the word "annexation" either, but for a totally
different reason. For him the implication would have been "annexing
land without having a right to do it." His solution was to pass a
law called "The Law of Jerusalem, the Capital of the State," and to
include in it that "the whole of Jerusalem is the capital of
Israel."4
Another issue that was brought up was the diplomatic impact of any
annexationist move. Then-Foreign Minister Abba Eban took a decisive
step by declaring Israel would not "recognize the consulates in the
eastern part of the city." For him, the element of time was of the
essence, and Israel had "to create facts."5
Manifestly, the Israeli government was bent on drawing a clear
distinction between the steps taken in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip and those taken in East Jerusalem. For instance, for Minister
Israel Galili, "the conquest of Jerusalem must be clear, without
question marks. We have to decide that the unification is a target
that we are going to fight for until the end." Minister Israel
Yeshayahu suggested putting up a banner saying "The City That Was
Reunited." Minister Moshe Kol, while in full support of annexation,
brought in a cautionary note: "I support the unification of the
city but we have to do that gradually. We have to avoid public and
dramatic declarations."6
The only one to voice dissent was then-Education Minister Zalman
Aran, who raised doubts about the wisdom of the steps to be taken.
He feared that buckling under international pressure to reverse the
annexation decision would deal a crushing blow to Israel. Instead,
he preferred looking for "alternatives," for instance, "to secure
free access for the Jewish people to the sacred places, and to
Mount Scopus."7
Levy Eshkol, the prime minister at the time, was, from the outset,
in favor of separating the issue of Jerusalem from that of the rest
of the occupied territories. He was also ready to risk
international political pressure that was likely to arise in the
wake of any Israeli decision pertaining to Jerusalem: "We have to
distinguish between Jerusalem and the other places. Regarding
Jerusalem we will keep it with all its Arab residents."8
This first meeting ended with a decision tilting strongly towards
annexing East Jerusalem to the Israeli state and taking the
historic opportunity to control the whole city with all its holy
places. It was also decided to appoint a special ministerial
committee to prepare a draft regarding the special legal and
administrative status of Jerusalem. Despite their confidence and
willingness to press ahead with the annexation project, but due to
international pressure - and mainly because of a request by Eban
from New York - it was decided to delay the cabinet meeting that
had been originally scheduled for June 20. Eban had pressed his
government not to take any decision before the UN General Assembly
had had the chance to convene. In spite of the delay, and some
concerns on the part of Eshkol about the international community's
reaction, the ministerial committee continued to work day and night
in order to come up with proposed solutions to the legal issues,
the question of borders and the question of the holy places in
Jerusalem. But it had become fairly obvious that the process of
annexing Jerusalem was to become an irreversible fact, regardless
of regional or international consequences.
The Meeting of June 26, 1967
This meeting was convened as the culmination in a series of
discussions among senior officials and experts on the question of
Jerusalem. It was a crucial meeting as the purpose was to approve
the recommendations of the ministerial committee and to actually
decide the fate and the future of Jerusalem.
The plan for the actual annexation of Jerusalem, which had been
suggested by the committee, was taken two weeks later and was
supported by most of the cabinet. Only four ministers opposed:
Yisrael Barzilai, Mordechai Bentov, Zalman Aran and Eliyahu Sasson.
They reiterated the reservations they had expressed during the June
11 meeting. Therefore, the main debate centered on the
rectification of the map of Jerusalem. Although Moshe Dayan
initially opposed the plan of Rehavam Ze'evi - the only officer
representing the military in the ministerial committee - that
called for the inclusion of Qalandiya in the annexed area, he
changed his mind the following day and Qalandiya and its airport
became part of the annexed area of East Jerusalem.
Meanwhile, the government's approval of the plan paved the way, two
days later, for the endorsement by the Knesset of the annexation of
71,000 dunams [1dunam = ¼ acre] to the Israeli Jerusalem. Only
6,000 of these dunams were within Palestinian Jerusalem. The rest
of the territory was confiscated from some 28 villages in the
Jerusalem periphery. With this the area of Jerusalem was tripled.
Eventually, 24,500 additional dunams were to be confiscated in East
Jerusalem.9
The architect of the post-1967 enlarged Jerusalem was Dayan. He
ordered the Israeli Army to demarcate the new borders of the city
according to the following principles: to annex to Jerusalem large
swathes of land in order to ensure the development of the city; to
include the area of Qalandiya [renamed Atarot] Airport and the
water factory in Ein-Fara; and to exclude refugee camps and crowded
Arab villages. He also insisted on leaving Rachel's Tomb (near
Bethlehem) outside the new borders of the city. The rationale
behind it was to leave the way open for Israelis to and from the
Palestinian territory. He wanted the Israelis to cross the borders
on their way to the Tomb. This way he satisfied the moderates who
were against the annexation of more Palestinian land; while, at the
same time, this left the door open for those who demanded free
access to this sacred Jewish site.10 Nonetheless, before his final
approval of the maps, Dayan had some misgivings and recognized that
the proposal would "sever the West Bank into two parts."11 Yaakov
Salman, who was the deputy military governor of Jerusalem during
the first days after the 1967 War, said that the decision was taken
on an emotional basis and without careful consideration. He
believed that Israel annexed too much, too fast, and without
profound thought:
This was a policy of reaction, a policy that was formulated under
the pressure of the political party environment, the supportive
atmosphere in public opinion and the enthusiastic spirit of the
media. The long-term implications were not taken into account. This
burst out from impulses of a Zionism of 2,000 years of
Diaspora.12
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