The possibility of the Israelis and the Palestinians returning to
the negotiating table based on Road Map acceptance requires an
in-depth analysis of the reasons for the failure of the previous
permanent status talks. Such an analysis could turn over a new leaf
for the talks, which came to a standstill in January 2001.
The complexity involved in bridging both peoples' clashing national
narratives has existed since 1948, and is the basis of the profound
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to the Palestinian national
narrative, 1948 symbolizes an historic injustice - deportation and
loss of native land - whose solution will be brought about only by
restoring this land to its rightful owners. In the Israeli-Zionist
narrative, 1948 affirms the resurrection of the Jewish people in
their homeland. Each of these narratives engenders an "Either Us or
Them" approach, thus turning the conflict into a "zero sum game".
The 1993 Oslo Accords provided both sides with a first significant
attempt at solving the conflict on the political, rather than on
the national narrative basis, thereby trying to reach a "win-win"
result.
Ever since the negotiations for a permanent agreement ceased, one
basic question remains: What actually brought the two sides, which
had made such great advances in the negotiations, to instead
deviate from political negotiation and deal with the
impossible-to-bridge national narratives, thus leading to a result
contrary to the one they appeared to aspire to? It is clear that
when trying to analyze the entire picture, there are many
components, some exposed, some hidden. Some must be understood,
apparently, by psychological and cultural analysis, and some by
analyzing the leaders of both sides concerning their political
situation, their ability to make historic decisions, their
personalities and their very motivation to arrive at an agreement.
All these components have meaning in relation to the public
positions that each side presents in the course of negotiations,
though they also reflect hidden elements that have tactical and
even manipulative significance.
The interesting fact is that, following the great effort that both
sides invested in the negotiations to arrive at a solution of "two
states for two peoples", they found themselves, quite surprisingly,
taking more extreme positions. They returned to the difficult
questions raised in the beginning of the conflict in 1948 that
related to the fixed national narratives of each side. This
analysis deals with two aspects of the problem:
l. The nature of the strategic decision taken by the leaders of
both sides in relation to arriving at an agreement;
2. The assumption that behind the tough positions they presented
following the negotiations - when they had previously been more
flexible - lies in not an overt but a hidden content.
The Palestinian Position: A Viable State within the 1967
Borders
The Palestinian leadership believes that the difficult political
decisions in the conflict with Israel were already taken at the
Palestinian National Council meeting in 1988. At that meeting the
PLO accepted UN Resolution 242, relating to the ban on acquiring
territory through war, after rejecting it for years, because it
ignored the basic questions connected to the 1948 war. Despite
this, the resolution was accepted, along with other UN resolutions
on the question of Palestine, and the PLO formulated a political
position that made a clear distinction between the question of a
state within the 1967 borders, the refugee problem and the
"historical injustice of 1948":
* Two states based on the 1947 UN Partition Plan.
* A state within the 1967 borders, including Arab Jerusalem, based
on UN Resolution 242 and upon the evacuation of settlements and the
return of those Palestinians who were uprooted from the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.
* A closing of the 1948 file based on UN Resolution 194 concerning
the return of refugees or resettlement, with financial compensation
for their property.
The main significance of the 1988 resolutions lies in the fact
that, for the first time, the PLO accepted UN Resolution 242,
indicating its recognition of the State of Israel, thus
differentiating between "Homeland" (al-Wattan, Palestine) and
"State" (Dowla, within the 1967 borders). The practical
significance was that by accepting UN Resolution 242, the 1967
problems would be solved, an historic national decision to accept a
relatively small area of Palestine (about 22 percent) in comparison
to what they were offered in the 1947 UN Partition Plan. These
decisions were, and still are, under attack by the Palestinian
national and religious oppositions.
These decisions have been considered binding since 1988, and will
remain so as long as the PLO institutions do not change them. The
Palestinians presented them during the Madrid Conference (1991),
the Oslo negotiations (1993) and again during the negotiations for
a permanent status agreement (1999-2001). They continue to obligate
Arafat and the Palestinian leadership, and apparently will not
change when both sides reach the third stage of the Road Map.
Before the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian leadership assumed it
would be possible to reach an agreement with Israel concerning the
first two components - a state and the 1967 borders. They were
aware that there was no possibility that Israel would agree to
accept the right of return. After the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian
position towards a permanent agreement was defined as follows: the
establishment of a sovereign state within the 1967 borders based on
Resolution 242; sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem, including the
Haram Al Sharif/Temple Mount; "a satisfactory answer" to the
refugee problem - including recognition of the "right of return"
principle, with only a limited application, with Israel's
agreement. The Beilin-Abu-Mazen Document (1995) reinforced this
position and it remained unchanged until the advanced stages of
negotiations for a permanent agreement. This created a feeling, or
an illusion, on the Israeli side that it would be possible to
arrive at a comprehensive solution to the 1967 problems without
having to deal with a solution for the 1948 problems.
"International Legitimacy" or "Fair Compromise"
When the permanent agreement negotiations began, it soon became
clear that an agreed-upon basis for the negotiations was lacking.
Were the UN resolutions the sole basis for the negotiations, as the
Palestinians demanded, or would compromise and "a fair solution" -
based on the existing situation and on security and settlement
interests - be the negotiations' starting point, as Israel
proposed? The Palestinian approach showed that the negotiations
were meant to lead towards a realization of rights objectively
stemming from what is called "international legitimacy", not a
product of the asymmetry that exists vis-à-vis Israel. On the
other hand, the Israeli approach was based on the creation of a
balance of interests that would make acceptance of the agreement
worthwhile to both sides.
These were two opposing approaches, which created a "communications
failure" and a substantive difficulty in the negotiations. This, in
turn, prevented a bridging of the remaining gaps - even though
progress had been made. For example: it was never understood why
the Palestinians never accepted proposals that were considered
"fair" or "generous" by Israel, and why they never made any
proposals of their own. The explanation is simple: from the
Palestinian point of view, a "good proposal" could only be one that
corresponds with Palestinian rights based on the UN resolutions.
This position also explains why they had rejected the idea of
formulating a framework agreement, since, from their point of view,
the UN resolutions themselves provide such a framework agreement.
Nonetheless, they were willing to make adjustments stemming from
current reality; for example: 1967 border corrections, including
settlement blocs; agreeing to the division of Jerusalem on a
demographic - not a geographic - basis; willingness to become a
demilitarized state; flexibility in assessing and solving the
refugee problem.
The Quality of the Strategic Decisions made by the Leaders
towards a Final Agreement
The inherent meaning in the leaders' strategic choice concerning
each side's basis for the negotiations ("international legitimacy"
vs. "fair compromise") was a conscious ignoring of the 1978 Camp
David Summit source-of-reference as the basis for resolving
Israeli-Arab conflicts: UN Resolutions 242, 338 and the principle
of "land for peace". This choice expressed the lack of a
fundamental decision on the part of both sides concerning a basic
question: Do they really intend to arrive at an agreement that will
deal with the results of the Six Day War and pay the price demanded
of each of them? From the Palestinians - to forego the 1948
problems, and from Israel - to give up the 1967 territories; from
both - not to demand a national narrative victory over the opposite
side.
This lack of decision on the part of both sides was expressed in
various failures and actions during both the interim period and the
negotiations on the permanent agreement, in a manner that generated
a lack of trust and led to difficulties in all issue-related
negotiations. As a result, the motivation to pay the necessary
price decreased even further. At a crucial point in the 2000 Camp
David Summit, the negotiations shifted from the political to the
narrative level, thus altering the balance and changing the
emphasis once again from the 1967 issues back to the 1948 ones.
Examples of this lie in the territorial and refugee questions, but
the same analysis can be applied to the other issues as well.
The Territorial Question
Israel did not respond favorably to the Palestinian position to
recognize in advance their full right to the complete territory of
the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, it tried to arrive at an agreement
based upon a "fair compromise", while settlement construction
continued to an extent that the Palestinians perceived it as a lack
of ability or readiness on the part of Israel to make a decision on
the matter. The third phase of the withdrawal that had been set by
the interim agreement was not carried out. And in the negotiations
for a permanent agreement, Israel presented the position that UN
Resolution 242 could not be applied in the same manner as it had
been vis-à-vis the Arab states, based on the argument that the
resolution was relevant only for states that had mutual borders.
The inherent meaning of this position was a clear lack of decision
by Israel to depart from the territories.
The Refugee Question
During the discussions preceding the Camp David Summit it appeared
that the general direction of the solution to the refugee problem
would be provided by an alternative to the "right of return" and
/or compensation, while a small number of refugees would be allowed
to return to Israel under certain definitions. Both sides also
understood that the "right of return" narrative should be revised
in such a manner that would be acceptable to both sides. But Israel
viewed the Camp David Summit as a summit of decision, and its
message to Arafat was clear-cut: "It's now or never". It pushed him
towards accepting the end of the conflict and essentially foregoing
the "right of return" - something that the PLO institutions never
confirmed in the past and never authorized Arafat to accept. This
demand, if accepted by the Palestinians, would signify their
agreement to giving up their national narrative, which of course
was inconceivable.
Israel interpreted this position as stemming from Arafat's
unwillingness to make an historic decision to forfeit the "right of
return". Formal Israeli explanation presented Arafat's position as
intending to undermine Israel's existence, and abandoning the "two
states for two peoples" solution.
The resulting impression was that the hardening of the positions in
the decisive stage of the negotiations, concerning the "right of
return" and "the end of the conflict" (and other matters), was
mainly a tactical expression of the difficult process both sides
had undergone, in which they were exposed to concepts and
approaches contradictory to their own. In the final analysis, they
understood that it apparently would not be possible to reach an
agreement, due to the lack of mutual trust which had ensued. Each
side concluded that the other side had reached the point of
inability to make a decision on the issues remaining under dispute,
as a result of each side's internal political situations. Both
sides had reached a dead end that reflected a "closed circle"
between Israel's wish for an "end of the conflict", and the "source
of the conflict" linked by the Palestinians only by removing 1948's
unjust results and an acceptance of the "right of return", and
which, from Israel's point of view, contradicted its very existence
as a Jewish state. At this stage each side wanted to relieve itself
of the responsibility for the failure. They each presented
substantial positions that were impossible to resolve, and in
actuality contained the hidden tactics of placing the
responsibility for the anticipated failure of the negotiations on
the other side.
A straight line can be drawn between: a) the mutual attempt of each
side to place responsibility for failure on the other side as the
negotiations were about to end, and b) their failure in the
beginning of the negotiations to agree that the peace treaty would
deal only with the results of the Six Day War, including paying the
necessary price. From this point of view, the process was doomed to
failure from the very beginning.
The second Intifada, which broke out in September 2000, and the
anger that was aroused against Israel, were expressions of
frustration within the Palestinian society about both its political
and social leadership policies. However, Arafat, in a mistaken
judgment, believed that a limited confrontation might work in his
favor by pressuring Israel to continue the negotiations. As time
went on, he refrained from applying his full weight to end the
confrontation, due to a desire to bring about an
internationalization of the conflict, with the objective of
creating an alternative to the political process that had come to a
halt. It is worth contemplating how things might have developed if
both sides had accepted the 1978 Camp David guidelines, and had not
become trapped in the questions of 1948 at the Camp David 2000
summit.
Looking Towards the Future
As in a game of chess, both sides have reached a stalemate. But
unlike in chess, they must take a step backwards, and from there
move forward again. The "closed circle" that has been created
between the beginning and the end of the conflict, will open only
when both sides recognize that a lack of an agreement is a
worst-case alternative for them. This is not only due to the harsh
results of the violent conflict between them - which cannot bring
about a fundamental change in the basic positions of either side -
but also because it severely limits their ability to work towards
an agreement in the foreseeable future. The Intifada leaves behind
it many long-term scars, and the Palestinian leadership will have
to justify the large number of victims on their side. Therefore, it
will obstinately continue to support its basic positions, while
Israel will want to offer less and less, particularly on the
subject of the refugees, but also in the territorial sphere.
Israel, in the wake of the Intifada, will undoubtedly want to use
security arguments to reduce the degree of independence of a future
Palestinian state. It is also understood that the continued growth
of extremist Islamic fundamentalism among the Palestinians will
make it even more difficult to arrive at such an agreement as time
passes.
In my view, the time factor is working against Israel. Waiting for
a new Palestinian leadership to emerge from the Territories rather
than from Tunis - a leadership that will prefer an agenda of
establishing a state rather than demanding the "right of return" -
may take a very long time, and it is doubtful whether it will ever
materialize. Meanwhile, the demographic process is progressing with
no connection to Arafat's positions, and a possibility exists that,
with time, a movement will evolve (we can see its first buds
already), which will demand a reversion to the original idea of one
state for two peoples. The immediate significance of this could be
that the Palestinian motivation to arrive at an agreement with
Israel might decrease markedly in the near future.
From the Palestinian point of view it should be clear that another
opportune time has arrived via the Road Map, and the American
government is ready to help the current leadership rehabilitate
itself and arrive at a political settlement. The Palestinians will
have to seriously consider the value of continuing their reliance
on the Arab world and the continued uncompromising adherence to
"international legitimacy." The Palestinians will also have to
acknowledge the fact that it was a tragic mistake to continue
riding the wave of the Intifada. Despite the heavy price, the
international community did not rally to apply pressure on Israel
and it did not send forces to the region, while the Israeli
society's ability to endure terror attacks was not impaired. There
are signs that existing elements within the Palestinian leadership
understand the significance of the new situation - that to miss
this opportunity may result in another historical error. This could
lead the international community to abandon them to Israel's will;
for example: to a unilateral act such as establishing a separating
fence which could become a default option, or, in Israel's point of
view, even a desirable one. The possibility of breaking through the
"closed circle" containing both the end and the beginning of the
conflict will require geo-political, circumstantial and other
conditions. It will also require national leadership ability on
both sides, and the public support to make the historic decisions
needed to reach a "two state solution" without considering it a
"zero sum game."
This leadership will be required to recognize the fact that the
negotiations should deal with political issues, not national
narratives. It must adopt a solution approach, whose comprehensive
outcome will outweigh the sum of its individual parts. This means
ending the territorial conflict by drawing a mutually agreed-upon
political border with security arrangements and conflict-settling
apparatuses; solving the refugee problem by compensation and
alternatives for the "right of return"; and settling the Haram Al
Sharif/Temple Mount question by establishing a special regime. This
must be a peace treaty that will last for generations, even though
there will always be Palestinians who continue to dream of Greater
Palestine, as there will always be Israelis who continue to long
for the Land of Israel.
The practical conclusion must be that the leaders of both sides be
required to make decisions, not only in accordance with the
immediate security challenges that they are facing, such as the
confrontation with terror, but mainly on the basis of understanding
the entire political, demographic and historic process.