The Palestinian general elections for the president of the
Palestinian National Authority and the members of the Legislative
Council, held on January 20, 1996, can be summed up as quite
satisfactory. Yasser Arafat became an elected president with a
sweeping majority, and an elected rep¬resentative council for
Palestinians is now operative on Palestinian soil: two highly
significant political facts.
Furthermore, the high percentage of participation in the electoral
process, in spite of calls for a boycott by various political
elements of the opposition, leads to two important conclusions.
Firstly, the high turnout on election day attests to the general
acceptance, by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, of the
ongoing peace process with Israel. It is also an indication of
their empowerment of Arafat to proceed towards the completion of
those steps which they expect will lead, in the final analysis, to
the establishment of a Palestinian state.
The reason for this situation is clear: having suffered the
Occupation with all its negative aspects and watched the cancerous
expansion of settlements on Palestinian land, the claims of
Palestinians of the "inside" (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) have
always been modest, compared to the general Palestinian ones.
Unlike the maximalist demands of their com¬patriots in the
Diaspora, theirs proceed from a minimalist approach, mov¬ing
upwards toward fuller realization. Thus, the complete liberation of
Palestinian soil is not the beginning of the process, but the end.
The begin¬ning lies in the lifting of the Occupation, in
phases, if not all at once. In this context, a continued support
for this staged political process becomes understandable. Each
stage, however limited or deficient, is viewed as an improvement in
their general condition, yielding positive returns towards the
future overall Palestinian situation. That is why it is vital for
them that the political process not stop or be curtailed, because
in its continuation lies their salvation.
Secondly, this high percentage of participation constitutes, by the
Palestinians of the "inside," a public referendum on the
opposition. Had the latter restricted itself to condemnation of the
elections without calling for a boycott, the abstention votes would
have counted as support in its favor. However, by calling for a
boycott, the opposition placed the extent of its influence and
authority in the Palestinian street to the test. The result was
that it lost - and with a wide margin - this referendum, a fact
which leads it to review its position and political judgment.
Basic Results
The general elections represent an important juncture in the
political process aimed at finding a lasting solution to the
Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict. To this end, Palestinians and
Israelis have engaged in a protract¬ed, exhausting covert war,
to establish facts, later to be exploited in the final-status
negotiations and to deal with exaggerated symbolism. In spite of
such expected exploitations, the elections' basic merit lies in
their meet¬ing the demands of the different political parties,
all of which were com¬pletely satisfied by the event and its
outcome, albeit for different reasons.
Nevertheless, certain basic conclusions can be drawn from the
elec¬tions. First, although their aim was political, the
elections were not politi¬cal in nature. The opposition's
abstention from official participation, and the pervasion of
general topics and slogans related to the Palestinian
des¬tiny, resulted in a lack of clear and defined electoral
platforms among the candidates. The huge army of candidates had, to
a large extent, similar election campaigns, which suffered on the
whole from political platitudes and shallowness. Therefore, on
election day, the choice among candidates was based on personal or
national considerations, rather than on political ones. This
explains the strange and heterogeneous political combination among
the winning candidates.
Second, criticisms in voting circles regarding serious
irregularities in the elections had no impact on the unofficial
Palestinian majority. The elections were a national occasion, and
the criticism leveled against them did not elicit any strong
reaction on the Palestinian street. On the contrary, the
Palestinians believed that by merely placing the election card into
a ballot box, they had accomplished their job. In fact, this
underscores the political ineffectiveness of Palestinians in the
face of their national author¬ity, which points to the fact
that the predominant political culture among West Bank and Gaza
Palestinians is one dictated from the top, and not a shared one,
proceeding from the bottom up. On this basis, one can predict that
the future relationship between the council members and those who
have elected them will remain artificial and limited. By the same
token, the effectiveness of the elected council will be quite
limited vis-a.-vis the executive power, which will retain a
monopoly on political decisions.
Third, the electoral process brought to light several negative
aspects in the current electoral law, highlighting the necessity
for a future revision. The proportional majority system, in open
and asymmetrical districts, will never promote national Palestinian
integration, but will deepen regional and factional fragmentation.
Additionally, this system does not enhance Palestinian political
life because it does not promote a change from clan politics to
party politics. This was quite obvious in the disjointed election
lists, where each candidate pursued an election campaign
independently of those on the same list. The elections also showed
the bias of the electoral system in favor of big parties. Under the
circumstances, small political powers stood no chance of competing.
It is obvious that the electoral law was tailored to fit the
requirements of the current political stage and the needs of the
"ruling party." It is also clear the sectarian quota system, which
was introduced in this law, will lead to latent, negative
effects.
Features of the Forthcoming Stage
In spite of the deficiencies and defects which have tarnished the
electoral process, the existence of an elected representative
Palestinian council, on Palestinian soil, represents a qualitative
change in the continued, century-¬long Palestinian attempts at
establishing the legitimacy of their national rights in the
homeland. The election of the council by a reduced list of
vot¬ers might lead to a redefinition of who is a Palestinian,
according to a restricted, diminished and inequitable basis,
damaging to the unity of the Palestinian nation in the "inside" and
the "outside." Nonetheless, the elec¬tion of such a council
has led to Israeli and international recognition of the existence
of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian entity in Mandatory
Palestine and not, by any means, outside it. This, undoubtedly,
signifies the dismantling of the classical Zionist political
thought, a retreat from the concept of "Greater Israel" and a
tactical Palestinian victory towards the establishment of a
Palestinian state.
However, one should be cautious in considering this an automatic
change in the stages which characterize Palestinian political life.
The elections do indeed draw the curtain on one political phase but
without leading directly into a new one. It would seem that the new
stage will not commence until the conclusion of the final-status
negotiations and the holding of new general Palestinian elections.
Thus, the period stretching between these elections and the coming
ones can be considered an interim political one. During this
period, a transformation will occur from the existing Palestinian
political system, based on an exilic and dispersion mentality, to
one rooted in the homeland.
A New Political Map
Although the features of the new political order have not emerged
as yet, certain political aspects that will evolve during this
period bear close examination. These will impact on the future
course of Palestinian politi¬cal life, especially on the
reorganization of the present political map. First, the main center
of Palestinian politics will move from the "outside" to the
"inside." The Palestinian Authority with its elected council will
obtain the place of prominence in Palestinian political life, and
in time, the PLO and its National Council will effectively, if not
theoretically, recede. This final transfer will lead to a
reorganization of the bases of the political process according to
the realities and requirements of life inside Palestine, and not
anywhere else in the outside. And though the political discourse
will remain faithful to the pending and pressing issues which are
focused on the outside, e.g., the refugees, such fidelity cannot,
from now on, emanate from a political power based in the
"outside."
Second, we are seeing the termination of formulas which have
dominated the Palestinian political act during the past three
decades, and which have been dictated by the requisites of the
national liberation stage and the presence outside the homeland.
Such formulas as political factionalism within the framework of
"national unity," the distribution of positions according to
"political quotas," and "backdrop coordination," appointing
factions as final and definitive political reference, have lost
their effectiveness in the political process and in the revival of
the ossified Palestinian political life. The new reality which
developed during the period of the elections has opened the horizon
for a new political dynamic.
It is grounded in a latent, but growing, rejection of the principle
that allows political factions to dictate their ideals and
standards to the people, as was the practice in the past. Instead,
there are increasing calls for democracy, accountability and
respect for the rule of law, within the framework of an elected
parliamentarian system. Such a system will con¬tribute to the
separation of powers, and will provide individuals with the
possibility to express their political views and stands.
Third, the transfer of the center of political life from the
"outside" to the "inside" has led to a change, not very discernible
at this point, in Palestinian political life from one of a struggle
to achieve "maximalist Palestinian aims," to a stage of
reductionalism and the accumulation of "minimalist Palestinian
aims." In other words, what is going on now on the Palestinian
scene can be summarized in the curtain call of the
"revolu¬tion" stage, aimed at the establishment of the
legitimate Palestinian rights over the whole of Palestine, and the
beginning of a new stage of accepting the building of a national
entity on only part of the homeland.
Because the acceptance of change from the "total condition" to the
"partial condition" remains a thorny, complex and complicated
matter, the general Palestinian condition is now witnessing a state
of schizophrenia. It is split between a political discourse still
carrying the remnants of the style and utterance of the
"revolution" stage, and realistic action aimed at build¬ing
the Palestinian national entity, hampered by heavy Israeli
constraints. It is expected that such schizophrenia will recede
during this interim political stage by the restoration of harmony
through national ceiling reduction.
Fourth, the interim political phase is going to witness structural
changes in the Palestinian political arena. Since the "revolution"
stage, with its related mentality and systems, is now passing
through the final stages, it is expect¬ed that the
transformation will affect all political movements without
exception, and will lead to changes in the political map in the
coming three years. The Palestinian factions and movements on the
arena now, and which have expressed the stage of "armed struggle"
and "resistance to occupation," will find that they cannot proceed
with old ideologies, politi¬cal discourse and
organization.
The New Stage
It is obvious now that this interim political stage will see a
departure from the phase of the "improvisational" style of factions
and movements to that of political parties with clear political
platforms. In other words, "dogmatic ideology" will gradually give
way to "politics," providing the Palestinian arena with new
parties, acting according to the dictates of a staged political
program. This was witnessed in the disarray among the factions and
political movements during the elections, be it in the
depar¬ture of some of the Fatah candidates from the official
lists of the move¬ment, or the controversy among the
opposition about official participation in the elections.
At the end of the day, it would seem that the ossification
characteriz¬ing Palestinian political life will gradually
begin to disintegrate. The new stage will see a political activity
pivoted on the "inside." With the end of the 20th century there
will be a new Palestinian political map in the coun¬try, which
is witnessing the birth of the future Palestinian state.