From 1993 until 2000 many thought the peace process was moving
toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. This began to look
inevitable when Ehud Barak was decisively elected Israeli prime
minister in 1999, with the declared goal of negotiating a
settlement. He eventually sought a summit meeting with PLO Chairman
Yasser Arafat in summer 2000.
The 13-day summit at Camp David ended on July 26 with no agreement.
Much angry, public finger pointing followed, and so did as many as
52 negotiating sessions between the parties in different parts of
the globe. Meanwhile, Israeli settlements in the West Bank
continued to increase, the Palestinian economic situation continued
to deteriorate, and in September, as many had predicted, the second
Intifada broke out. In late 2000, Barak called for elections to be
held on February 6, 2001. Ariel Sharon emerged as Barak's opponent,
and the polls showed an increasing margin of victory for the
challenger. Given Sharon's career-long commitment to the use of
military force in relations with the Arabs, his threat to remove
all of Barak's offers from the table were he to win was completely
credible and widely believed.
On December 23, President Bill Clinton called representatives of
both sides to his office and read them his ideas for a compromise.
After a number of days, each side said it accepted the Clinton
principles, with reservations. In mid-January, three weeks before
the Israeli elections, the Israelis and Palestinians announced one
more negotiation session, which would take place at Taba, an
Egyptian resort in the Sinai. With experienced negotiators, the
hard lessons of Camp David II, the Clinton compromise, and - most
importantly - facing the imminence of Sharon as Israeli prime
minister, if ever there was a time to seek a real deal, this was
it. Facing an 18 percent gap at the polls two and a half weeks
before the election, did Barak have a better political move than to
come to the Israeli electorate with an agreement in hand? Though
many doubted Arafat wanted any deal after Camp David II, others
believed his strategy was to stretch the negotiating process until
it got him the best deal he could get. Surely he would see that
Taba was the end of the negotiating road, the place to make that
deal.
The Taba negotiation began on Sunday evening, January 21, and ended
on Saturday afternoon, January 27. At the closing press conference,
the parties issued this joint statement: "The sides declare that
they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus
our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the
resumption of negotiations following the Israeli election." There
were 28 negotiators and professional staff at Taba, and in the
course of this research I interviewed 17 of them.1,2
The Taba Talks3
Some reports in the press suggested that the idea for one more try
at a full team negotiation originated with Arafat. Israeli memoirs
say the idea came from the Israeli Peace Cabinet meeting of January
16, probably from Shimon Peres. Barak seems not to have given a
clear mandate to the whole negotiating team, so each negotiator
inferred their own. Though their recollections of how they entered
the negotiation emphasizes skepticism, the evidence suggests that
some actually thought a full agreement was possible, while others
aimed at a "framework agreement."
The Palestinians wondered if negotiating with a lame duck/probable
election-losing prime minister was worth the effort; or worse they
worried that a negotiation could expose them to making concessions
that would not lead to a binding agreement. By one account, on the
day before Taba began, Arafat told Abu Ala, the head of the
Palestinian delegation, that if he could reach and recommend an
agreement, Arafat would sign it. Abu Ala seems not to have told
others in the delegation about this. The decision to negotiate was
taken on January 17 and 18, and the first plenary session occurred
on Sunday night, January 21. The Palestinians sent top-level
negotiators who had participated in many of the prior negotiations,
and a small professional staff. The Israelis sent top-level
negotiators with similar experience, adding two highly
pro-negotiation participants who had not represented Israel in
peace negotiations under Barak. The Israelis also had a small
professional staff. No one knew how long the negotiations would
last.
The opening plenary on Sunday night began with ardent speeches
about seizing the moment. Both sides emphasized the inevitable
disasters if the negotiations should fail, the parties' joint
commitment to a two-state solution, the uniqueness of the
opportunity, and the need for hard work. This was followed by some
bickering about whether the Clinton principles of December 23 would
be the starting point for the negotiation: The Israelis said they
should be, one Palestinian said no, and another Palestinian said
they could be a foundation. No resolution of this question was
achieved at the plenary, but, in practice, the Clinton principles
were the basis for much of the week's negotiating. The teams then
agreed that beginning Monday morning they would break into four
groups, focusing on borders (including the question of
settlements), Jerusalem, security and refugees. There was talk of
what to do about the issue of water but, in practice, the topic was
not addressed.
From Monday morning through Tuesday afternoon, numerous small
conversations among people from both sides took place. In addition
to the core topics, the content of the conversations included the
Intifada, the Israeli election, and the health of children and
grandchildren. Two chief negotiators, some staff and occasional
visitors comprised the group dealing with the question of refugees
that almost never ceased its work. Discussions about security were
also fairly stable. Discussions about borders and settlements were
conducted by staff from each side and by top negotiators. Jerusalem
was apparently not discussed.
Late on Monday, Gilad Sher (Barak's chief of staff, and one of the
heads of the Israeli delegation) called Barak to report that
agreements on security and borders were possible; on Tuesday
evening, the Palestinian chief of staff called his office in
Ramallah to ask for additional staff because an agreement on
refugees was possible.
On Tuesday afternoon, two Israeli restaurant owners visiting the
Palestinian town of Tulkarm were murdered. This prompted Barak to
raise the question of whether to continue negotiations. Several on
the team argued that the negotiations might be moving toward a
historic moment, and that ending or even suspending it would
destroy the momentum. Barak nevertheless decided to suspend
negotiations, ordering the cabinet ministers back to Jerusalem. He
left open whether the negotiations would reconvene. The Palestinian
team was incredulous and angry, arguing against the loss of
momentum and the historic moment.
The Palestinian team remained at Taba, as did Sher and the Israeli
staff. Though there was some understanding that no negotiating was
to take place in the absence of the Israeli cabinet ministers,
staff consultations between the sides continued. On Wednesday
evening, the Israelis initiated a dinner meeting at a restaurant
south of Taba. The Israelis maintain that they declared that this
was a "moment of truth" and that they urged Abu Ala to fly
immediately to Arafat to determine if he was really serious about
reaching an agreement. The Israelis maintain that Abu Ala declined
the offer and said, "the master of the house does not want an
agreement." Abu Ala denied having said this, though he did not deny
that the Israelis raised the question. No word of this meeting was
uttered, and the story came out eight months later in one
participant's memoirs4. Whether this conversation occurred as the
Israelis described it is important because, if it did, it helps
explain why the negotiations ended.
There is little likelihood that the urbane and experienced Abu Ala
would say anything as blunt or damaging as the Israelis quote him
as saying. I doubt the Israeli account of the Palestinian response,
but I do believe the Israelis initiated the dinner. This is
important because it suggests that they saw serious progress
occurring and a significant agreement as possible.
On Thursday, Barak decided to return his cabinet ministers to Taba,
and negotiations resumed that day at noon. Dan Reisner (legal
counsel to the Defense Ministry and a veteran of many
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations) left on Friday, and Amnon
Lipkin-Shahak (minister of tourism and former chief of staff) did
not return from the break at all, each saying later that he saw no
value in the process. The Palestinians, on the other hand, added
three professional staff on Thursday. The process that resumed
looked like the process on Monday-Tuesday, except that
conversations about Jerusalem now became focused.
Yossi Beilin (Israeli minister of justice and lead negotiator on
the refugee issue) says the mid-week break undermined the momentum
generated in the first two days of negotiation, but the individual
accounts of what happened from Thursday noon until Saturday noon
indicate there was progress, nonetheless, on each of the four
topics. On Thursday, another Israeli was killed, but after
discussion between Barak and the negotiating team, the prime
minister decided to let the talks go on. On Friday night, the
Israelis hosted a sabbath dinner for both groups. The tone was
collegial, and after dinner at least some of the participants went
back to negotiating. On Saturday, the work continued until midday
when there was an announcement that the negotiation was about to
close.
There had been guesses about when the negotiation would end (on the
coming Sunday, or Monday, or Wednesday), but most negotiators said
that ending on Saturday came as a surprise. The announcement
produced disappointment among some negotiators, but there does not
appear to have been any harsh disagreement with the decision at the
time.
A group of top negotiators from both sides gathered to prepare for
the closing press conference. It was agreed they would say there
had been considerable progress during the week, that they had never
been so close, had run out of time, and could close the gaps after
the election. Abu Ala made explicit that, on the right of refugee
return, they would say the Palestinians still insisted on the right
and the Israelis still refused. Both Beilin and Nabil Shaath, the
lead negotiators responsible for the issue, interjected that this
was not true, that they had made great progress toward resolving
that issue. Abu Ala countered that it was in the interest of both
sides to tell the press that no progress had been made, and Shlomo
Ben-Ami (Israeli foreign minister) concurred. At the press
conference the parties were amicable and collaborative, and spoke
as Abu Ala and Ben Ami had decided.
As Taba ended, there was general talk about further steps. One
proposal was a meeting of Barak and Arafat, before the election, to
achieve an undefined breakthrough or to agree on a framework.
Another suggested reconvening the negotiators after the election,
with the goal of reaching agreement by April 30. Some planning
toward further meetings did occur, but a bitter speech by Arafat on
Sunday, January 28, in Switzerland, attacked Israel with language
completely at odds with the Taba negotiations, and that marked the
end of the process.
How Far Did They Get?
When I asked the negotiators: "If you had four more days in which
to negotiate, could you have reached agreement on your topic?" the
answer was almost uniformly positive. Yet a negotiator's inference
that an agreement was possible leaves open the possibility that he
was reading the signals incorrectly, that the opposite number would
change his mind, or that the other side was intentionally
deceptive. And no one on either side had pulled together all the
potential agreements and reviewed the entire package. Thus, even
the most optimistic reading of the Taba negotiation must
acknowledge the distance left to go before the reaching of an
agreement.5 Though some negotiators at the beginning may have had
full agreement as their goal, by mid-week the most optimistic goal
was a "framework agreement." How much detail and clarity should go
into a framework was never explored, nor was the answer free of
political meaning. In general, the Palestinians favored more
detail, the Israelis, less.
There was nearly no discussion about the issue of when and how to
end the conflict. The Palestinians wanted an end of conflict to
occur officially when the main agreement was actually implemented;
the Israelis wanted it to occur with the signing of the full
agreement. This topic could have been broken into workable
sub-questions (i.e., control of terror, what to do in the event of
violation of the agreement, monitoring mechanisms) that could have
allowed the signing of a framework agreement, but there is no way
to gauge what four more days of negotiation would have produced.In
the face of these difficulties, what can be said about how far the
parties went and, more significantly, how far could they have
gone?
Borders
The Palestinians had long insisted that Palestinian sovereignty
must begin at the line that had divided Israel from the Arabs at
the end of the 1948 war, with minor adjustments. As Israel has
installed many settlements on the Palestinian side of that line,
the central question to be addressed was what part of the West Bank
would be retained as part of Israel. All accounts of the Taba
negotiation on this issue coincide closely. The Palestinians agreed
to the Israeli annexation of about 3.6 percent of the West Bank,
the Israelis asked for eight percent, with two percent of that
being in the form of a lease. (The Palestinians did not say "no" to
the lease, but wanted to discuss it later.) Thus the parties were
about 2.4 percent apart. The percentage question was another way of
talking about whether the settlements would be grouped into
"blocks," thus allowing room for population growth within them, or
kept smaller, limiting growth. The negotiators were sure that the
remaining gap (a little more than 100 square kilometers) could be
bridged in four days of work. There was agreement that the
Palestinians would receive land from Israel proper, in compensation
for the percentage of the West Bank ceded to Israel, but there was
no agreement on how much Israeli land or where it would be (except
that it would be contiguous with some portion of Palestine). The
negotiators foresaw agreement on the amount of Israeli land to be
ceded, but not on its location. Also still open were questions
about whether the percentage figures being used included East
Jerusalem or the "bridge" linking Gaza with the West Bank, and
allocation of a disputed piece of land at Latrun, but both sides
seemed clear that these would be resolved with a few days
work.
Though the negotiations about land to remain part of Israel
involved several areas, the process concerning Ma'ale Adumim
illustrates some of the difficulties in pinning down where the
parties were when the negotiation ended. Ma'ale Adumim is a large
Israeli settlement (25,000 people) east of Jerusalem, blocking much
north-south traffic for the new state of Palestine. The
Palestinians were extremely fearful that the future Palestinian
state would be divided by Israeli lands and roads, leaving it
without a coherent land mass. Ma'ale Adumim raised this specter. At
one point, the Palestinians agreed that Ma'ale Adumim would be
annexed to Israel as part of the overall percentage. Israel argued
for more area around the settlement, and connection to other
settlements, and the Palestinians then rescinded their agreement.
"Unofficially," however, the Palestinians acknowledged that Ma'ale
Adumim could be part of the annexation if the parties could work
out the scope of the surrounding area. Thus, when the negotiation
ended, the official Palestinian position refused Israeli annexation
of Ma'ale Adumim, but, unofficially, negotiators on both sides saw
the trade that would have reversed that position (access roads for
the Palestinians and limited growth space for Ma'ale Adumim).
A clue supporting the negotiators' optimism about the outcome lies
in the mystery of the maps. It is acknowledged that both sides
exchanged maps (altogether there were as many as three or four)
indicating which Israeli settlements would remain with Israel, but
only one portion of one of these maps has come to public light. The
only reasonable interpretation for this secrecy is that concessions
were illustrated in those maps that the conceding party would - as
no overall agreement was reached - now find embarrassing. There was
little discussion about Gaza, and it was generally assumed that all
Israeli settlements would be removed.
Jerusalem
This topic can be considered in three parts: allocation of portions
of Jerusalem to each side; administration of the city; and control
of the holy places. Using the Clinton principle (Palestinians get
the Arab areas, Israelis get the Jewish areas), the parties worked
through the many sub-issues involved in allocating land to each
side and, with the exception of a few neighborhoods, both sides
felt the results were clear, even by the time the negotiation ended
on Saturday.
Regarding the administration of the city, agreement was probable
regarding the Palestinian view that there should be no governing
unit that could infringe on the Palestinian claim to full
sovereignty in its part of the city (i.e., there would be no
city-wide coordinating council). There was more difference over the
definition of an "open city." The bulk of the conversation focused
on whether the border between the two parts of the city would be
"hard" or "soft." The Palestinians favored the latter, with very
little control between the two halves of the city. The Israelis
favored the former, with more control. On this issue, the
negotiators were less optimistic that an agreement could be reached
in a few days.
There was less progress or optimism about the control of the holy
places. The parties discussed different plans to meet the needs of
both sides for the Temple Mount, the Western Wall and the Holy
Basin. These included international sovereignty, divine
sovereignty, divided sovereignty, ignore sovereignty, and postpone
a decision. But sovereignty over holy places had too much about it
that was non-rational, and clearly none of these suggestions would
have succeeded even with more negotiating days at Taba. There have
been some reports that the Palestinians were willing to grant
Israel sovereignty over part of the Western Wall, and Barak was at
first willing to grant sovereignty to the Palestinians over the
Mount, but later he declined to do so. Taba ended with no optimism
about a solution. In a process of fragile but careful progress, the
issue of the holy places is the one obstacle that could have
stymied everything.
Refugees
Many Palestinians who left Israel during the 1948 war, and their
descendants, have since then had refugee status. This has generated
many difficult and painful issues. On all these issues, save two, a
framework agreement was drafted at Taba, though there are some
differences about what exactly that agreement was. The parties
agreed to a mechanism for compensating refugees, to a method for
relocating them out of refugee camps and status, to an
international process for accomplishing this, and to Israel's
control over which refugees could take up residence in Israel. The
parties agreed to a way of presenting their different views of the
refugee history, though in some accounts this led to one narrative
and in some accounts to two. The method for determining the amount
of compensation was still in debate, as was the question of how
many Palestinians would be allowed to return to Israel. The former
question could have been resolved with four or five more days of
negotiation; more work was needed for the latter, and it would
probably not have been resolved in four more days.
The hottest question concerning refugees was whether the
Palestinians would be entitled to a right of return to the homes
they came from in Israel. Though there is much debate on whether
the parties did come to agreement on this, the evidence is pretty
clear. The interviews, the uncontested account of the meeting that
preceded the Saturday press conference, and the written record, or
its absence, all point to agreement. There was a widespread
unwillingness at Taba to commit agreements or even positions to
writing, but this was not the case for the negotiators about
refugees. They engaged in marathon drafting sessions, conducted
sometimes by one side, sometimes jointly. But since Taba these
documents have been assiduously kept hidden. Though there have been
references to them, including a draft of one Israeli document in Le
Monde6, as recently as July, 2002, Taba negotiators were making
reference to Palestinian documents which would not be made public7.
As with the maps, the only reasonable inference from this secrecy
is that concessions were made for which the parties would now
prefer not to accept responsibility. The only issue that could
generate this much heat would be a Palestinian concession on the
right of return. By one account, the Palestinians agreed to waive
this right in return for an Israeli statement accepting at least
partial responsibility for the departure of the Palestinians in
1948.
On the question of how many Palestinians might be allowed to return
to Israel, the Israelis proposed in writing 25,000, and orally
40,000. The Palestinians were quoted as having said "not less than
six figures."
Security
"Security" referred to protections sought by Israel. Many of these
issues had been resolved before Taba, and there were three main
ones left: arms limitations for the Palestinians, border control
along the Jordan, and control of airspace over Palestine. The
principle of the first was determined, enough for a framework
agreement; the principle of the second was still under debate
(duration of Israeli presence, who would participate in the
military presence), but a few more days might have worked this out;
and the third was still problematic and may or may not have reached
agreement, even for a framework, in a few more days.
In short, there was reason on the last day of Taba to believe that
with four or five more days of negotiating, a framework agreement
for most but not all issues was possible.
1 Beilin, Yossi (2001), Manual for a wounded dove. (Hebrew)
Tel Aviv, Israel: Miskal-Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books;
Sher, Gilead (2001), Just beyond reach. (Hebrew) Tel Aviv, Israel:
Miskal Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books.
2 Klein, Menachem (2001), Shattering a taboo: The contacts toward a
permanent status agreement in Jerusalem 1994-2001. (Hebrew)
Jerusalem, Israel: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies.
3 End of a Journey, an interview with Shlomo Ben Ami. Haaretz
Magazine, Sept 14, 2001; Hanan Asfour, Ben Ami's Occupation
Syndrome. Haaretz Magazine, Oct 19, 2001; Akiva Eldar, How To Solve
the Palestinian Refugee Problem, Haaretz, May 29, 2001; Akiva
Eldar, Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House, Haaretz, May 31,
2001; Ze'ev Schiff, What Was Obtained At Taba Regarding Palestinian
Refugees, Haaretz, Sept 12, 2001; Akiva Eldar, Taba Document, The
First Unveiling, Haaretz, Feb 14, 2002.
4 All material in this narrative comes from interviews with the
negotiators and from the memoirs listed in prior footnotes. I also
used the daily coverage of the Taba negotiation printed in Haaretz
and The New York Times.
5 Sher, supra, note 1.
6 I also cross-checked with a report of Taba done by Miguel
Moratinos, envoy of the European Union. Moratinos and his staff
were at Taba but not in the negotiations; they interviewed
negotiators after the sessions. The report describes the
negotiators' account of negotiating positions when Taba ended. This
report has been accepted and denied by various negotiators. It
appeared first in public in Haaretz, February 14, 2002.
7 Le Monde, June 6, 2001.
8 Beilin, Yossi, What Really Happened At Taba, Haaretz, July 16,
2002.
The concluding part of this article, analyzing the reasons for
the failure and drawing conclusions for the future, will be
published in the next issue of the PIJ.