The UN plan to divide Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish
states and a Special International Regime for Jerusalem (November,
1947) had been preceded by a somewhat similar design in July 1937.
At that time, the British Peel Commission recommended that Mandate
Palestine be partitioned into a small Jewish state, comprising the
Galilee, the Jezreal Valley and the coastal plain, and a large Arab
state - the rest of Palestine united with Transjordan. Jerusalem,
Bethlehem and a few other areas would remain a British Mandate
zone.1
The major cause for the 1937 partition proposal, namely that Arab
and Jewish interests could not be reconciled, was aggravated in
1947, after both parties rejected the 1946 recommendation by an
Anglo-American committee to establish a bi-national state in
Palestine under UN trusteeship. While the Jewish community accepted
the 1937 and 1947 partition plans, the Palestinian Arab leadership,
dominated by the Husseini family, rejected both plans
categorically. Indeed, most Palestinians turned down the 1937
design, even though it designated only 20 percent of Palestine to
the proposed Jewish state. Furthermore, the Palestinian leadership
even rejected the 1939 British White Paper, which had promised them
an independent state within ten years while limiting Jewish
immigration and turning the Jews into a minority in an Arab
Palestinian state.2
Why, then, did the Palestinian Arabs reject these schemes, in
particular the 1947 UN partition plan? Undoubtedly, some moderate
or pragmatic Palestinians were prepared to accept a small Jewish
state in part of Palestine.3 But the Husseinis' leadership - not
democratically elected but backed by the Arab League - continued to
intimidate its moderate brethren and to maintain its uncompromising
position against the Jews. Even according to moderate Palestinian
intellectuals, this leadership adopted an extreme policy
vis-à-vis the idea of two states, thus grossly ignoring the
will of the UN and the Great Powers, and leading the Palestinians
into war and tragedy.4
Indeed, this militant syndrome of the Palestinian leadership
significantly contributed to preventing a political solution to the
Arab-Jewish dispute over Palestine in 1947, as in 1937. This
syndrome was inspired by an intense Islamic and nationalist
ideology, dominated by the Husseini family and in particular, Hajj
Amin al Husseini, the charismatic Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Head
of the Supreme Muslim Council. Denying the right of the
Jewish-Zionist community to national self-determination even in
part of Palestine, the Husseinis periodically used violence and
terror against Jews, as well as against the moderate Palestinian
Nashashibi faction that for many years cooperated with the Jewish
community and acknowledged its national aspirations. But this
moderate faction, although supported by many families and notables
throughout the country, was not as organized, armed, motivated or
influential among the younger generation as the Husseinis.
Consequently, the moderate/pragmatic Palestinians were unable to
neutralize the powerful militant Palestinian nationalist leadership
or induce it to accept a political settlement.
Abdallah's Annexation Plan
The Nashashibis were politically supported by King Abdallah of
Transjordan and also, for a period, by his patron - the British
government in Palestine. But neither the British government nor
King Abdallah helped the Palestinian moderates; in 1947, both
objected to the UN partition resolution, while Abdallah also sought
to annex Arab Palestine to his kingdom. As for the leaders of the
other neighboring Arab nations, they shared, indeed molded and
reinforced, the militant-negative Palestinian attitude to the 1947
resolution, as well as to the Jewish-Zionist national movement and
political aspirations.
The uncompromising Palestinian-Arab and all-Arab positions toward
Zionist aspirations and the partition of Palestine predominantly
derived from fundamental Arab nationalist and Islamic religious
concepts, namely, rejection of a Jewish national/political presence
in Islamic and Arab Palestine. Muslim Arabs were ready to
acknowledge a small apolitical Jewish religious community in
Palestine, "a small community gently serving the Arabs and getting
along with them beautifully,"5 but not a motivated, vigorous,
fast-growing, European-oriented nationalist-Zionist community.
Indeed, by purchasing large tracts of land, building villages and
towns, and establishing autonomous and effective institutions, this
community posed an increasing threat to Arab control over the
character of Palestine. Numbering, in November, 1917 (the time of
the Balfour Declaration) only about 10 percent of the total
population (60,000 out of 650,000), the Jewish community in
Palestine increased to almost one-third by November, 1947 (i.e.,
600,000 out of about two million). Nevertheless, it was granted
more than 50 percent of Palestine (a large part of that included
the Negev desert).
Emerging Nationalist Aspirations
From the Jewish-Zionist viewpoint, it was vital to create a
"national homeland" (initially with British help) and subsequently
a state in part of Palestine, letting the Palestinian Arabs possess
its other part. Driven by newly emerging nationalist aspirations to
return to biblical Zion, on the one hand, and by European
anti-Semitism on the other, Zionist Jews had emigrated from Europe
to Palestine since the early 1880s, either ignoring the Arab
presence or trusting that there was room for both of them in Eretz
Israel. As Nazism ascended in Europe and the terrible Holocaust
occurred, hundreds of thousands more Jews found refuge in
Palestine, integrating into the Zionist yishuv, and determined to
be masters of their own destiny. Already in May, 1942 the Zionist
movement issued the Biltmore Program, which, inter alia, mentioned
the Balfour Declaration's (1917) reference to the, "historical
connection of the Jewish people to Palestine," and demanded, "that
Palestine be established as a Jewish commonwealth," which would
absorb Jewish survivors of, "the ghettos and concentration camps of
Hitler-dominated Europe." The program also expressed, "the
readiness and the desire of the Jewish people for full cooperation
with their Arab neighbors."6
Yet, unlike the Biltmore suggestion and contrary to the
uncompromising Palestinian Arab position (and that of Jewish
revisionists), the Jewish yishuv, led by David Ben Gurion, agreed
in 1947 to create a Jewish state in part of Palestine. This
pragmatic position, coupled with international sympathy for the
Jewish plight and the backing of the two new superpowers - the US
and the USSR - procured the historic UN resolution to establish a
Jewish state and an Arab state in Palestine.
Even though the Jewish community in Palestine, not just its
right-wing faction, aspired to obtain a larger share of the
country, if not the whole of it, it realistically considered
partition as a minimal or tolerable solution. Because of the
demographic advantage of the Arabs vis-à-vis Jewish national
aspirations, the yishuv mainstream rejected the bi-national
solution. Given these factors, Palestinian and inter-Arab hostility
on the one hand, and the plight of Jewish refugees on the other,
partition was the only option, particularly since the international
community, through the UN, approved it. The Jewish yishuv had been
fairly prepared to establish a state in part of Palestine, having
created a solid infrastructure of political, social, economic and
educational institutions, as well as a well-trained paramilitary
organization - the Haganah. Although the Palestinian Arab community
was not as well organized as the Jewish-Zionist yishuv, it would
have been capable of creating its own state in part of Palestine,
in coexistence with a Jewish state.
British Self-Interest
But, as already indicated, not only did the Palestinian leadership
reject the partition plan, the Arab states and Great Britain also
objected to it, although they were certainly capable of inducing
the Palestinian Arabs to accept the scheme. Britain not only
objected to the UN partition resolution, it also refused to help
implement it or even to permit UN observers to prepare the ground
for the partition - rejecting official UN requests.7 This British
refusal was largely motivated by self-interest - to avoid damaging
its relations with the Arab states that had overwhelmingly rejected
the 1947 partition. Furthermore, the Arab states - and the Arab
League - had, in early 1947, already started military preparations
to prevent the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. In late
1947, a pan-Arab "Liberation Army," comprising volunteers from
several Arab nations and commanded by regular Arab military
officers, invaded Palestine in order "to nullify the UN partition
resolution, to eliminate any remains of Zionism.... and to secure
the Arabness of Palestine."8 Simultaneously, irregular Palestinian
Arab militiamen waged armed attacks on Jewish towns, villages and
inter-city traffic. The Jewish Haganah and the "Irgun" retaliated.
A civil war broke out in Palestine, which turned into an
Arab-Israeli war on May 14, 1948, when the creation of the State of
Israel was proclaimed and several Arab armies invaded Palestine.
Initially, the survival of the newly born Jewish state was in
jeopardy but eventually Israel defeated the Arab armies and the
Palestinian militias and occupied more land than had been allocated
to it by the 1947 UN resolution. For the Palestinian Arab
community, this constituted a grave disaster (Nakba). About half of
this community fled or was driven out by Israeli troops and became
refugees in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria and
elsewhere.
Conclusions
Could the Nakba and Palestinian dispersion have been prevented in
1948? As we may gather from the above account, the acceptance of
the 1947 partition resolution by the Palestinian Arab leadership
could possibly have prevented the armed conflict and its tragic
consequences. But this would only have been possible if the
leadership had been more pragmatic than ideological, as well as
democratically elected, attuned to the political and economic
interests of the Palestinian community, and not subject to the
militant dictates of the Arab League.
The British government could have induced the Arab League and the
Palestinian leadership to accept the UN partition resolution and
helped both Palestinians and Israelis to implement it, as requested
by the UN. Instead, they backed the alternative drawn up by King
Abdallah and the Jewish-Zionist leadership in early 1947, namely
that Abdallah would annex the populated Arab areas of Palestine,
designated by the UN to become an independent Arab state, in return
for his tacit recognition of the Jewish state.9 If implemented,
such a strategy could possibly have prevented the 1948 War, but
King Abdallah, concerned about alienating his government and
people, as well as other Arab nations, withdrew from this tacit
understanding to play a major role in the 1948 War. Ironically,
only after the war, once the Palestinians had been vanquished, did
Abdallah implement his previous plan by annexing the West Bank to
his kingdom.
Finally, another plan that, if implemented, could have prevented
the 1948 War was the UN proposal to create a federal state in
Palestine, which was presented to the UN General Assembly as a
"minority proposal" (versus the majority proposal, i.e.,
partition). This put forward the idea that an "independent federal
state would comprise an Arab state and a Jewish state. Jerusalem
would be its capital... Full authority would be vested in the
federal government with regard to national defense, foreign
relations, immigration... The Arab and Jewish states would enjoy
full powers of local self-government and would have authority over
education, taxation..., police..., social institutions.... The
organs of government would include a head of state, an executive
body, a representative federal legislative body composed of two
chambers ... Election to one chamber of the federal legislative
body would be on the basis of proportional representation of the
population as a whole, and to the other, on the basis of equal
representation of the Arab and Jewish citizens of Palestine..."10.
However, as we know, this proposal was not even accepted by the UN,
let alone by the Israelis or the Palestinians.
The two sides have been engaged since then (and even before) in a
bitter and bloody conflict (except for several years of relative
calm, following the 1993 Oslo Accords). This bloody conflict
intensified significantly after September, 2000, following the
collapse of the Camp David negotiations (July, 2000).
Mutual acts of violence involving great loss of life are likely to
continue unless a political settlement is achieved between these
parties. If the two sides wish to reach a political settlement,
they should draw lessons from the pre- and post-1947 period,
namely:
1) Militant positions, derived from extreme religious and/or
nationalist ideologies, undermine mutual coexistence and peace
settlements between Arabs and Jews.
2) It is essential to enlist the support of Arab nations,
particularly Egypt, for an Arab-Jewish settlement in
Palestine.
3) The international community, the UN and the Great Powers should
intervene at crucial junctures, to suggest peace plans and give
legitimacy to political settlements.
4) The principles of the UN partition resolution, or the UN
"Federal State" solution (both passed in 1947) should be the basis
of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement that takes into account the
new realities, namely: either a two-state solution, as suggested by
US President Bill Clinton on December 23, 2000, or a confederation
between Israel and Palestine, with Jerusalem as capital of the
confederation, as well as of the two states.
1 For the Peel Commission and the UN partition plans see Walter
Laqueur and Barry Rubin. The Israel-Arab Reader (New York,
Penguin Books, 1995), pp.48, 97ff (respectively).
2 Ibid. pp.54-64.
3 Cf. M.E. Yapp. The Near East Since the First World War
(Hebrew edition, Jerusalem, The Bialik Institute, 1996), p.109;
Eliahu Elyashar. To Live with Palestinians (in Hebrew,
Jerusalem, 1975), p.1210.
4 Muhammad Abu-Shilbaya. No Peace Without an Independent
Palestinian State (in Arabic, Jerusalem, 1971), pp.12-15.
5 Shukri al-Quwwatli, a Syrian leader, to Elias Sasson, a Jewish
official, quoted to Moshe
Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1995), p.35.
6 See Laqueur and Rubin, op. cit., pp.66-67.
7 Yapp, op. cit., pp. 114-115; cf. Laqueur, op. cit., pp.
97-98.
8 Quoted in Ma'oz, op. cit., p.18.
9 Cf. Ilan Pappe. The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict
(London, Tauris, 1992),
p.119.
10 Laqueur and Rubin, op. cit., pp.94-95.