When examining the question of how the events of the past eight
months - the election of Hamas, the escalation in the occupied
territories and the war in Lebanon - have affected the Israeli
"peace camp," one is hard-pressed to resist the temptation to point
to superficial public opinion polls and conclude, yet again, that
its public support has continued to erode. A conclusion of this
sort, however valid, is unhelpful in devising strategy, for which a
broader appraisal is required.
Examination of the Israeli political construct through the prism of
"left" and "right" is somewhat anachronistic, ignoring fundamental
changes in Israeli public opinion that have taken place over the
past six years. Some Israelis still define themselves,
ideologically, as leftists or rightists, but they are a minority,
comprising no more than 40 percent of the public (with the right
slightly stronger than the left). In addition, these ideological
cores are not prone to major shifts in attitudes or voting behavior
and they present a challenge in terms of mobilization, not
conviction.
The rest of the Israeli public, the "center," is a loose, fickle
and non-ideological group of swing voters that began developing in
earnest in the 1990s and grew during the second intifada. It was
finally forged by one of the most successful "wedge campaigns" in
Israeli political history. Ariel Sharon's disengagement agenda
split apart or created a "wedge" in the support base of opposing
political groups, destroyed many of the remaining "tribal" voting
patterns and created Kadima.
By and large, this public is convinced of the existential necessity
of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the
same time, however, it is also convinced that this solution is not
feasible, at least in the foreseeable future. The perceived
feasibility of a negotiated solution was torn to shreds by Ehud
Barak's all-or-nothing maneuver at Camp David II and the outbreak
of the intifada, while faith in the feasibility of a unilateralism
as a solution was significantly weakened by the events of the
summer in Gaza and Lebanon.
Since 2000, groups such as the Peace Coalition and the Geneva
Initiative have spent millions of dollars on advertising campaigns
advocating a negotiated solution to the conflict. While sometimes
effective in mobilizing the left, these campaigns have had only a
marginal impact on the center. Realizing that the major challenge
lay in convincing the public of the feasibility of this solution,
the campaigns focused on the existence of a Palestinian partner for
its implementation.
However, as the intifada intensified, the Palestinian Authority
unraveled, and support for Fateh diminished, no amount of
advertising could convince Israelis that the personas presented
possessed sufficient political power to actually implement an
agreement.
The "no-partner" environment has entrenched further since the
beginning of this year and, at first glance, it seems that the
"peace camp" is devoid of options for effective action aimed at
political change. For most of us, however, inaction is not an
option. Wasting energy and resources on activities that have proven
ineffective in the past is an alternative, but not a particularly
attractive one.
Another possibility is to shift focus to modes of action on the
ground in the occupied territories that have had measurable success
since the "peace process" began coming apart. These are mainly led
by watchdog groups and human-rights organizations, such as
Physicians for Human Rights, Bimkom, B'Tselem, Settlement Watch and
many others.
Their common denominator is a belief that continuous and
incremental policy change leads eventually to political change and
that policy change can be achieved through media discourse. Their
advantage is that they are not dependent on specific political
conjectures, on variable diplomatic outcomes and on the political
performance of the other side. In addition, they are extremely
cost-effective, relying on precision PR, litigation and lobby. Most
importantly, they contribute to a slowing of the dehumanization and
bestiality that has been gathering speed as a by-product of the
conflict and protect democratic fundamentals critical to any
future. They keep the door open to dialogue to the growing number
of Palestinians who have never met an Israeli not clad in uniform
or living in a settlement.
Structurally, the government of Israel is vulnerable to
policy-oriented civic action. Faulty planning and decision-making
mechanisms have created a culture of government which deals with
only the most pressing problems, as they occur. The media is often
the arbiter of which problems are the most pressing, and effective
watchdog projects have used the media to place Israeli-Palestinian
policy issues on top of the public agenda. The lame duck
post-Lebanon Kadima-Labor government is doubly susceptible. Witness
how it has been recently forced into action again on two issues
requiring an expenditure of precious political capital - the
outposts and protection of Palestinian olive harvesters.
Policy-oriented projects have an ability to manipulate the media to
a degree currently unattainable by "peace" campaigns. The Israeli
press does not have the investigative capacity (or will) for
first-hand research into the intricacies of complex
Israeli-Palestinian issues such as the separation barrier,
Jerusalem and settlement policy. Therefore, it "eats from the hand"
of any credible provider of information. Professional watchdog
projects provide information that balances that provided by the
government. In addition, through sophisticated use of exclusivity,
they often use packaged information to actually shape the
agenda.
"Hasbara" is a Hebrew word that, in its political connotation,
defies translation. Beyond being a euphemism for propaganda, it is
a symptom of a widely held concept that Israel's problems will be
solved if "we just find a way to tell our story in a convincing
manner," regardless of policy and the reality on the ground. In
order to understand how deeply rooted this attitude is, one only
had to listen to Israeli leaders desperately calling for more and
better "hasbara" as the government and army bungled the war in
Lebanon strategically, tactically and diplomatically.
Over the years its seems that we in the Israeli peace camp have
also been afflicted by the "hasbara" syndrome, forgetting that,
ultimately, political change can only be brought about by a
sustained struggle for positions of strength in the power
structure. Given the current political environment and
inter-relationship between the Israeli, government, media, and
public, it may be time to consider focusing our efforts and
resources on using the media not to convince Israelis of "the need
for peace" or the existence of a "partner for peace," but to
directly tackle the policies which have enabled the occupation to
exist for so long.