The situation, as I see it, is that the Israeli and the Palestinian
leaders wanted to arrive at an agreement. There were talks, but
there was no agreement, which enabled both sides to stick to their
fundamental positions, freezing the peace process and preventing
them from liberating themselves and arriving at a reasonable
arrangement. The endless cycle of violence that we find ourselves
in does not lead us anywhere. The attributes of the current
situation, following the second Intifida, have become more and more
dangerous. Both sides are becoming less rational and are
introducing farfetched ideas derived from religion, justice or
historical rights, which don't advance us one step forward. To
arrive at some kind of solution, we have to speak in different
terms, if it will be at all possible to speak. The problem is that,
during the past two years, we haven't been talking. The Israelis
claim that there is no one to talk to, and the Palestinians say the
same thing.
Confronting the Illness
This situation brings us to a discussion of the basic schools of
thought within Israeli society. The conventional view of the
majority of Israel's political and military leaders, provides a
prescription only for a symptom of the illness - a struggle against
terror. Justified as this may be, and I understand it, this doesn't
get at the roots of the problem. This approach is like conventional
medicine. But sometimes it's preferable to look at complimentary or
alternative medicine - to use all the options available to confront
the illness. And there is an illness. We have to find a remedy for
the roots of the problem, the causes, and not just fight the
symptoms - not because one side is more justified than the other
but because this is the only way to create a new situation.
Two Schools of Thought
Looking at the present situation, we can see that two basic schools
of thought have reemerged in Israeli public opinion. One is based
on the belief that a total clash between the Israelis and
Palestinians is inevitable, because both sides are dogmatically
adhering to their beliefs, their historical justice, and are
struggling over the same land. During the past two years, an
attempt was made to move the clash forward as much as possible. If
and when it occurs, even those who believe in this scenario find it
impossible to predict the result. This represses a discussion of
the results, the outcome, of such a total clash.
The second school of thought, which is not necessarily related to
the traditional right and left division since 1991, has a more
skeptical approach. It says, and I tend to support this view, we do
not know if there will be a clash but we are obligated to prevent
it. Even if it's impossible to prevent it, we should delay it as
long as possible because we are still in the process of building a
nation, a society, a state, and there's a lot more to do before we
can feel secure. Therefore, we have to engage in a conflict
resolution process, even if we are not sure it is possible to
achieve a solution.
Until the past two years, the controversy between the two schools
of thought was resolved in favor of the latter approach. All of the
prime ministers since 1991 supported dialogue (though they differed
on the solution). The 1991 Madrid Conference was convened under the
auspices of a Likud government headed by Yitzhak Shamir. The Labor
Party prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak
acted in this way. Even Benjamin Netanyahu from the Likud accepted
and adopted the conclusions that stemmed from Oslo, despite the
fact he had ideological problems with them.
Ariel Sharon
I have some difficulty evaluating Ariel Sharon, the current prime
minister. I tend to believe the political potential exists within
him. Yet, the fact is, he didn't carry out any political
initiatives during his first term, based on the claim that he was
dealing with terror, etc. Yet, I still believe, even if he wouldn't
agree with me ideologically, that he understands my view and that
he can be sufficiently pragmatic if an opportunity is created, or
he himself creates an opportunity. He could do more than others
because of his level of political support and because of the
pragmatism that is attributed to him.
Camp David and Oslo
Since fall 2000, the controversy between the two schools of thought
is once again on the public agenda. Barak had an impossible
dialogue with Palestinian Chairman Arafat. But it would be wrong
and even unwise to say who bears more of the blame for what
happened. I have no right to attribute blame, but I do remember
that Arafat claimed, on the eve of the Camp David conference, that
it wasn't ready, that it wasn't possible to arrive at a settlement.
Still, a very problematic dynamic did develop. In the end, did the
dialogue collapse because of the why (the contents) or the how (the
nature of the process)? It was probably a combination of both. This
raises the question of whether both sides, and particularly the
Palestinian side, are ripe for a permanent agreement.
When I was head of military intelligence, I said the situation was
not ripe to deal so quickly with problems that touched on the ends
of the sensitive ideological raw nerves, which was required to
arrive at a permanent solution. I also believed it was preferable
for Israel to resolve its territorial disagreements with the
neighboring Arab states before it arrived at the very difficult
discussion, requiring in-depth internal soul-searching, about the
permanent settlement with the Palestinians. But, as we now know, we
arrived at an agreement with the Egyptians and the Jordanians, but
not the Syrians or the Lebanese. I now consider that evaluation an
error on my part, and can add that Israel contributed its share to
the failure of the discussions with the Syrians - it wasn't only
Hafaz El Assad. Still, when we look at the Oslo Agreement, which so
many people are condemning, with all of its many deficiencies, it
remains worthwhile for three reasons:
1) Both sides understood that rational and verbal dialogue have a
value, beyond throwing bombs at each other.
2) Israel received, at least in its own eyes, a form of catharsis,
a type of legitimization in the eyes of others.
3) Oslo tried (though it failed, and both sides contributed to this
failure) to create a path for progress toward a solution of the
fundamental problems, which were avoided by the agreement of both
sides at Oslo itself - the settlements, the Palestinian right of
return, Jerusalem, all the known topics.
The Present Situation
There are two major problems that threaten our security situation
today. The first is that we have no answer to individual terror,
particularly that of the suicide bombers. Terror has accompanied us
since the establishment of the state (and even beforehand),
particularly on the part of those who oppose any dialogue and any
peace process. But we have no answer to the current wave of suicide
bombings, because the space is open, with no constraints. It's a
terrible blow, not only to those who suffer directly, but also from
a general psychological point of view. The sense of personal
security has been undermined to such a degree that life, both in
the territories and within the area of the Green Line, has become,
in some ways, unbearable. Second, we don't have an effective answer
to the threat of unconventional weapons that is beginning to appear
on the horizon. It can be asked, what's the connection between this
threat and the dialogue with the Palestinians? Well, it's possible,
and desirable, to respond that the very creation of a different
atmosphere, a different dynamic, a resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, will make a major contribution to
reducing the severity of the unconventional dangers. For example,
Israel is only one of the factors motivating Iran to take an
interest in manufacturing nuclear weapons. A State of Israel that
arrives at a successful dialogue with all its neighbors will not be
perceived as posing the same type of danger it poses today.
The Israeli security ethos should have undergone a modification
even before the events of the past two years. We are no longer
facing a combination of all the Arab states, with an impossible
concentration of tanks, planes and artillery threatening to overrun
the State of Israel. I believe the security ethos should be
responsible for outlining the other long-term dangers that confront
us. We should be analyzing the demographic dangers, the
moral-ethical problems and the economic problems. These issues,
along with the social and organizational problems confronting our
society, concern me to a much greater degree than the number of
tanks in the hands of any of our neighbors.
My diagnosis is that, on the political front, there is no
possibility, capacity and perhaps even desire for a serious
dialogue with the Palestinians. We simply cannot arrive at a
resolution of today's fundamental problems - neither concerning
Jerusalem, nor the Palestinian right of return (which they insist
on, and we reject, myself included), nor the status of the
permanent border. But the State of Israel can do a number of other
things. Israel is strong enough today - because most of the cards
are in its hands - to influence reality to a great degree.
Four Options
After the diagnosis, which can be arrived at with a fair degree of
consensus (though there are still some who differ), I have
willingly agreed to confront the question as to what should be
done, and have concluded we have four options:
1) To try to turn back the clock by reconquering all of the
Palestinian territories and taking control of the entire
population, while continuing to fight the terror, realizing that we
will once again be completely responsible for the civilian
population. That's a messianic, power-driven approach that ignores
many processes and prefers to look only at our justice and
morality, while ignoring their justice and morality. This approach
may provide some short-term solutions but it totally avoids a
long-term approach to things.
2) Another school of thought says there's nothing we can do at this
time, so we have to carry out a unilateral withdrawal, an
artificial separation, which won't have any impact on the root
problems of the situation. It also ignores major elements of the
reality and seeks a form of short-term messianic solution. There is
no deluxe, cost-free separation - the terror, the demographic
problems, etc., will continue.
3) There's another approach, perhaps the most fashionable one in
Israel today. To continue to fight terror - a well-known mantra.
We've seen the "tremendous victories" in this area and I'm not
underestimating the ability of the IDF, which is doing a tremendous
job. But it's unable to guarantee an end to terror. This would be
true of any army, not only the IDF. Other nations have a similar
experience and it's definitely possible to learn from history, even
if there are no exact extrapolations from historical examples. When
we look at the experience of other nations, no less talented than
us, none has ever succeeded in putting down this type of uprising.
This lack of decision, the inertia that is so characteristic of the
State of Israel, has always led to traumas. Look at the l973 war.
Look at the inertia after 1967 that eventually led to the Intifada
of 1987. Suddenly, we were surprised, we didn't know, and there was
no awareness even if there was knowledge. But anyone with a minimum
of understanding should have known. This third approach is the most
dangerous of all, because it is really incapable of predicting what
will be.
4) The fourth approach is the one I support. Let us try to shape
our own future, to the degree possible, as much as mortals can. We
can't do everything, but we have to try to confront the security,
the demographic, the psychological and, hopefully in the future,
the political aspects of the problem. We have to define our own
borderlines and place a fence there.
Alternative to Violence: A Fence
A fence provides a response to a number of challenges. First,
Israel has to provide an immediate solution to the problem of
personal security, even if it's not a total one. I believe a fence
can make a significant contribution in this area (even if it's not
an absolute solution, nothing is ever absolute).
Second, we have to define for ourselves what our aspirations are
concerning borders. We are a state without a border. We have
borders with Egypt and with Jordan, but we have no border along the
other parts of the country. If we establish a barrier, we will not
be able to gain legal legitimization for it, but we will be able to
gain both de facto and de jure legitimization from a number of
quarters. De facto, from the Palestinians, because they won't have
any alternative, and de jure from the international community, the
Europeans and the Americans who will agree to such a temporary
arrangement, until there can be a permanent agreement (and I'm not
sure there will be a permanent agreement). I believe the border
should be delineated in an intelligent manner, based on
consultations with demographers. The borderline I am advocating is
not exactly parallel to the Green Line, but it is very similar to
the line that US President Bill Clinton advocated in December 2000.
It includes a line that would go east of the main settlement blocs,
which would enable most of the settlers to remain within the State
of Israel.
We owe this to ourselves and mainly to the younger generation. I
know my proposal for a political initiative, which includes a
separation barrier, will require the removal of settlements and a
return inward. But it will enable us to revive a new, dynamic
settlement project in the Negev and the Galilee areas. I'm aware of
the problems involved. Since this will not be a permanent border,
I'm flexible enough to realize that the creation of this temporary
border will have to include within it as large a number of
settlement blocs as possible. This means the area around Jerusalem,
the Ariel bloc, the three or four main blocs that will enable us to
build a fence that will create a separation between us and the
Palestinians - not a total barrier but a "breathing border", which
will be both clear and secure, a delineation that will enable 80
percent of the settlers in Judea and Samaria to continue to be
Israeli citizens in all senses of the word.
The first stage, the building of the barrier, will take two years.
During this period almost no settlements will be removed, to ensure
as broad a consensus as possible. Only six settlements will have to
be removed because they are almost totally indefensible. At the
conclusion of the first stage, all of the Gaza Strip will be
evacuated. The next stage, which will also take two years, will
contain the development of the vision, including a transfer of
infrastructure to enable absorption of a Jewish population in the
Negev and the Galilee, or wherever else they will want to go. They
will determine their preferences - the state will not tell them
where to go.
We've spoken about security, and only a little bit, not enough,
about demography. I'm not inventing any new statistic that is not
known. We will soon lose our Jewish majority on the western side of
the Jordan River. The founding fathers dreamed of a state that
would have a Jewish majority, would be democratic and would (and
will) be Zionist. All of these things can't be maintained in a
state of indecision.
Conclusions
The events of the past two years have led me to arrive at the
following conclusion: If it is possible to engage the Palestinians
in discussions on practical issues, then we should try to initiate
a political process of negotiation. But, simultaneously, we should
begin to realize the plan of building a fence. I would prefer to
arrive at an agreement with the Palestinians but, if this will not
be possible, the State of Israel can't afford any further delays. I
don't think that separation is a goal in and of itself. In this I
differ from most supporters of separation. I am in favor of
separation and the building of a fence (barrier), not only from a
security point of view. We also have other, difficult problems that
have to be confronted.
We Must Decide
I believe it's up to us to decide. I am not saying this will
require the presence of an international force but maybe that will
be necessary, as well. If there is a possibility of renewing
political negotiations, I give it my complete support. But since,
according to my diagnosis, this is not possible, at least in the
coming months, I reverse the order of things. I say we should
formulate our proposal and carry it out. At the same time, we have
to continue our efforts to engage in dialogue with the Palestinians
and also have to carry out dialogue and coordination on the
international level. I am referring first and foremost to the US,
but I also wouldn't want to surprise the Egyptians and the
Jordanians on these matters (even if they won't be ready to give
public support to the initiative). We should also involve other
factors in the international community, like the Europeans, who
might want to invest in this initiative. After we withdraw, this
might lead to the stationing of an international force in the
area.
Within such a unilateral action, we will remain in the Jordan Rift
area. We might have to remain there for another 50 years before we
can leave. And we will continue to control the Jordan transfer
points, for security reasons. At the same time, this plan will not
preclude the possibility of returning to negotiations with the
Palestinians at any stage of its implementation. If this occurs, it
will delay and precede any further implementation, provided
everything is based on mutual agreement. In a political dialogue,
from my point of view, everything is open, except the right of
return. As far as Jerusalem is concerned, we believe there should
be a special status for the holy basin and that everyone should run
their own lives. We don't delude ourselves. In essence, the city is
divided today. We should recall that in the UN partition plan,
Jerusalem had a special extraterritorial status. I don't have any
nostalgia for that idea but we should look at things from a
realistic perspective.
I would be very pleasantly surprised if the new government were
ready to adopt and implement such an initiative. I don't think it
will happen, though I hope I will be proven wrong.
This proposal, constructed together with former senior negotiator
Gilad Sher as an academic initiative, is a preparation for the next
elections. People like me also want to have a say in this state. We
have to prepare for the future.
Ben-Gurion's Example
In this country, decisions are almost never made unless there is no
alternative. David Ben-Gurion made an exceptional decision - in
1947-48, he actually thought there was a combination of no
alternative and an extraordinary opportunity. Most of the other
strategic decisions made here were the result of force, not
initiative. This was true of 1973, Lebanon, and the first Intifada.
In all of these cases, processes of change had already begun but
force became the catalyst for genuine change. In the case of the
first Intifada, it is possible there was also an emotional
motivator for change. I, and most of my colleagues in the General
Staff, faced a situation where our children were doing the
fighting, both in Lebanon and in the territories. This fact also
had an influence.
I hope that the present initiative will lead to a solution. If not,
it should at least be a catalyst for providing an alternative to
violence.