The Palestinian Right of Return (Haq Al-Awda) is one of the
most sensitive and complicated aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. The Palestinians, who were uprooted from their own
homeland and are now scattered all over the world, believe deep in
their hearts that a tremendous injustice has been done to them, and
that ultimate justice cannot be achieved unless they are all
allowed to return to their homeland. However, many of them are
convinced now that facts and realities on the ground do not make
such an ultimate justice possible. Taking that into account,
relative justice becomes desirable.
This Right of Return is not only a historical claim or a God-given
right; it is the combination of a historical claim and a national
right on the one hand, and an individual personal claim on the
other. It is the claim to a specific private property, a house, a
piece of land, a citrus grove, or even a particular tree. It is
also the emotional attachment to some very personal memories linked
to the particular property and its surroundings, within the context
of the national attachment of the Palestinian people to their
homeland, Palestine.
Many Palestinians were forced to leave their land and homes at
gun-point, or through psychological intimidation, or simply as
civilians fleeing from the battle-field, seeking refuge until all
was calm, and they could return. However, they were denied this
right and thus became permanent refugees, known as the Palestinian
refugees of 1948, though the legitimacy of their right to return to
their homes and land, or to be compensated is embodied in U.N.
Resolution 194 of December 1948, and all other relevant U.N.
resolutions.
Since that time, Palestinians have been living with the dream of
turning the clock back to the pre-1948 situation, in other words,
returning to the land and homes which were taken from them during
the 1948 war and from which they were uprooted and driven away.
They were not ready to accept the new reality created by the war of
1948. For them, Israel as a state did not exist, and Palestinian
literature from 1948 onward referred to it as the "Zionist enemy,"
or the "invading enemy," and Palestine was the "robbed" or "raped"
homeland.
The Palestinian refugees refused to be re-settled in any of the
neighboring Arab countries, and unlike the Jewish immigrants to
Israel, they refused to identify themselves with the countries
where they sought refuge. Palestinians have always viewed their
residence in the host countries, and even in the refugee camps in
the West Bank and Gaza, as a temporary situation. The years have
passed, but these refugees have not lost faith in the prospect that
one day they would be going back to where they came from - to
Palestine. They have waited for the results of U.N. missions,
Security Council resolutions, and even for the next war to take
them home.
Refugee camps became the symbol of the Palestinian national
problem. Furthermore, a willingness to assimilate into any other
place was seen by many Palestinians as a sign of readiness to give
up or to compromise on the Right of Return, a right which they
believed applied to every inch of Palestine.
Subsequently, in 1958, the Fatah movement was established, taking
the first step towards an organized national struggle for the
attainment of the rights of the Palestinian people, including the
Right of Return. The Palestinian program called for the
establishment of a democratic bi-national Palestinian state for
Arabs and Jews alike on all of Mandatory Palestine from the Jordan
River to the Mediterranean.
In the early 1970's, a new approach was developing within the
circles of Palestinian intellectuals in favor of realism. They
advocated compromise with Israel and sought a settlement to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict by establishing a Palestinian state in
part of Palestine alongside Israel, with the two peoples living
side by side on the basis of mutual recognition and
co-existence.
Those who adopted this approach were often labelled as traitors who
were giving up their homeland and selling the national rights of
their own people. A good number of the elite of Palestinian
intellectuals were assassinated in different European capitals
simply because they endorsed this approach, or were close advisors
to Chairman Arafat, and helped to push the moderate process within
the PLO. Qaleq, Khader, Hamshari, and Sartawi were among those who
paid with their lives on the road to realism, moderation, and
compromise.
Nevertheless, this new trend of realism took root and gradually
gained the support of the majority within the Palestinian national
movement, represented by the PLO as the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people. It found its expression
in 1974 when the Palestinian National Council (the PLO parliament)
adopted the first of successive resolutions calling for the
establishment of a "Palestinian national authority" on any part of
Palestine evacuated by Israel.
This was the beginning of a long process, that of preparing the
Palestinian people for a two-state solution: two states for two
peoples, with Palestine alongside Israel. For the Palestinians,
this was not their first choice. For years, they had been
advocating the option of a democratic bi-national state, with
Palestinian Arabs and Jews living together with equal rights and
duties as citizens of the same state. The Jews, on the other hand,
had strongly opposed the idea of a bi-national state, and insisted
on a Jewish state instead. Even after being faced with growing
pressure to recognize the Palestinian national rights, the Israeli
Knesset, ignoring the feelings of Israel's own Arab citizens and
Arab Knesset members, passed a law maintaining that Israel was the
state of the Jewish people.
Israel has always rejected the return of Palestinians to their
homeland claiming that their demand for this right proved they were
not serious about peace. It has further viewed the implementation
of this right as a threat to the very existence of the Jewish state
on the basis that this return would destroy the Jewish image of
Israel and turn it into a bi-national state.
Consequently the Palestinians reached the conclusion that, neither
the Israeli public, nor the Western world, were ready to adopt the
option of a bi-national democratic state; and a Palestinian state
alongside Israel became the most realistic option.
Hence, after great internal deliberations and carefully weighed
considerations, the Palestinian national movement adopted the "two
state" solution, not as its first choice, but as a compromise
proposal in order to accommodate the Israeli demand for a Jewish
state and the Palestinian national right and demand for an
independent state. It was not easy to make this change.
However, November 1988 saw the culmination of this process of
change as the P.N.C. declared its acceptance of the U.N. Partition
Resolution 181 of November 1947, and the Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338. This was not a chance combination. Indeed,
the first resolution stated the principle of partition, and the
second, by respecting the territorial integrity of all states in
the region, and the non-acquisition of land by force, was a clear
hint to Israel that the demanded withdrawal was to the borders of
the 4th of June, 1967.
In December 1988, this position was reinforced by Arafat's
declaration in Geneva that the PLO denounces terrorism, and
recognizes Israel's right to exist. Thus, the road was paved for a
reasonable settlement based on the principle of "two states for two
peoples". This stance confirms not only the Palestinian position,
but also that of the Arab peace initiative as expressed in the
September 1982 Arab summit meeting in Fez.
Accordingly, with a realistic solution becoming more possible than
ever, the Right of Return became a highly relevant topic for
discussion. However, the reality of Israel's existence and its
concern about staying a Jewish state, represent an obstacle to the
practical application of the Right of Return for the 1948
Palestinian refugee. Yet knowing the Israeli position in that
respect, does not entail that Palestinians give up their claim for
return in advance. One must distinguish between, on the one hand,
the "right of return" as a principle, and on the other hand,
exercising that right by literally returning to Palestine as a
national homeland, and to that same home, piece of land, or grove
which a certain Palestinian owned before 1948, as a private
individual property.
The circumstances under which the Palestinian refugees have lived
since 1948, and the suffering which they have endured and are still
enduring, have forced many of them to view their return as the
acquisition of national independence and dignity, and not
necessarily as a literal return. In other words, Palestinians
continue to believe that they are entitled to their claim to the
Right of Return, but they are prepared to bring it to the
negotiating table. This claim can be satisfied either through the
actual return of a mutually acceptable number of refugees, or a
symbolic number of them, or through compensation, or even through
the implementation of any other option agreed upon through the
negotiations on a comprehensive settlement to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
There should be no objection to the return of Palestinians to a
newly-created Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. This
will help put an end to the suffering of Palestinian refugees in
places such as Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and will provide a place
where returnees can be welcome after years of persecution, and
living as unwelcome guests in many countries such as Lebanon.
The Palestinian state will also provide the Palestinians with a
national homeland, as well as a passport, a flag, and a shelter.
Those who have already settled in many corners of the world might
choose not to come back, but they will inevitably sympathize with
the state of Palestine, and feel proud of it. A Palestinian Law of
Return will certainly be of great moral value both to them, as well
as to those who will pack up their belongings and return.
At this point, one should distinguish between the 1948 refugees,
the subject of this article, and the Palestinians displaced during
or as a result of the 1967 War. The latter, whose permanent address
is in the West Bank or Gaza, whether they were residing there at
the time, or happened to be outside (working, studying or
visiting), have the full right to come back. In fact, there is no
reason for Israel to oppose their return since it has to withdraw
from these territories in accordance with UN Security Council
Resolution 242 and within the framework of the peace process. The
return of these displaced Palestinians will be worked out according
to the D.O.P. by a combined committee of the PLO, Egypt, Israel and
Jordan.
In conclusion, land is the core of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, with the Palestinian refugees as the main victims. As
long as the problem of these refugees is not solved, the conflict
will persist and the Palestinian Right of Return will remain on the
agenda until it is addressed and settled in an honorable way. A
comprehensive settlement must, therefore, solve the Palestinian
problem in all its aspects, including the refugee problem. This
does not seem impossible in the light of the moderate winds blowing
from the Palestinian camp. A spirit of compromise and
reconciliation is prevailing, in spite of the very hard and
depressing conditions of daily life in the occupied Palestinian
land caused by the harsh, repressive measures of the occupation.
This historic opportunity should not be missed.