Based on the author's contribution to a symposium held in the
summer of 1993 at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, on Islam and
Judaism where the complex of reciprocal relations between Jews and
Moslems throughout history was analyzed by prominent scholars from
Israel and abroad.
What is the nature of the relationship between Judaism and Islam,
Jews and Moslems, as it can be expected to evolve in the
foreseeable future? Is the relationship doomed to be one of
confrontation or can such a collision course be avoided, clearing
the way for cooperation and mutual enrichment between the believers
in those two great religions, or rather civilizations?
Starting at the end, my final conclusion is that confrontation is
inevitable on the conceptual and ideological level. It can,
however, be avoided on the pragmatic level.
Inconsistency
This distinction between the ideological and the pragmatic is based
on the phenomenon, with which social scientists are well
acquainted, of inconsistency between those two levels. The Polish
philosopher Leszek Kolakowski elaborated on this phenomenon in his
outstanding essay, "In Praise of Inconsistency." He argued - and I
thoroughly endorse his argument - ¬that inconsistency is an
essential feature of human behavior. Were human beings to behave
according to their ideological convictions without the slightest
deviation, the world would have been exterminated long ago, and the
very existence of the human race would have been rendered
impossible. What allows the survival of our world and the human
beings living on the face of the earth is the quality of
pragmatism, which enables them to reconcile their convictions with
constraints of reality.
Several learned presentations at this seminar have dealt with the
past and present status of Jews in Islamic countries. Certain
participants have mentioned the fruitful cooperation between Jews
and Moslems throughout many centuries, quite unlike the record of
discrimination and persecution that befell the Jews in Christian
Europe. Others have argued that this rosy description is grossly
exaggerated, and that Jews under the rule of Islam also in fact
suffered from an inferior legal and civic status.
It appears to me that we can reach a consensus, according to which,
dhimmis ("the protected ones" - Jews and Christians in Islamic
societies), by virtue of being monotheistic believers, did enjoy
individual and collective security and autonomy in running their
own community life, along with a certain legal discrimination.
Those circumstances which characterized that fabric of relationship
were conceivable from the Islamic point of view only as long as
non-Islamic communities within the Islamic societies committed
themselves to the rules of the game, namely acceptance of Islamic
domination. Indeed, non-Islamic communities constituted enclaves of
relative security and autonomy and were held in high regard within
a system run by the Islamic State.
New Realities
That state of affairs underwent a radical change in the aftermath
of the First World War. The major change that took place in our
region was the emergence of national-territorial states on the
ruins of the old system - the Islamic State. As for the Jews, the
meaning of the Zionist challenge for the surrounding Arab-Islamic
society was the transformation of the rules of the game. Jews
became, by virtue of the Zionist idea, a distinctive political
entity claiming an independent, unique, separate political status,
instead of a protected religious-cultural minority. The
Arab-Islamic society undoubtedly found it extremely difficult to
accommodate itself to the new situation which was part and parcel
of the overall Western challenge.
The Arab-Islamic society endeavored to cope with the changing
realities. The turn of the century witnessed the beginnings of an
Arab national movement, at first some almost negligible national
associations, with quite hesitant and confused tidings, developing
into a mass movement with a sweeping and unequivocal message. This
national movement appears to have been supra-religious, shared by
Moslems and Christians alike. The battle slogan of the Egyptian
national revolt of 1919 was "Inna al-din li-llah wa-al-watan
lil-jamee," meaning that faith in God was every individual's
business, whereas homeland was the joint asset of all the people.
But, in practical terms, the Arab national movement has been, and
still is, fraught with cultural and religious Islamic
substance.
The Israel-Arab Conflict
Turning to the conflict over Palestine it is, therefore, a
national-political conflict, carried out through political
instruments (including warfare), yet is certainly not devoid of
religious (Islamic, as well as Jewish) ingredients. Thus, for
instance, the basic Arab claim to Palestine has been religious,
pertaining to the sanctity of the land for Islam. It is in that
light that one should view the leading role of the Mufti of
Jerusalem in the Palestinian national movement in the 1930's and
1940's, as well as religious components in the PLO-inspired
Palestinian national experience.
We should ask ourselves, then, whether the present
Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict is basically a
religious one, also containing some national-political elements
which are instrumental to its religious centrality, or is it the
other way round: a national-political conflict, sustained by
religious elements which are crucial for mobilizing the support of
the masses.
Some spiritual leaders, both Moslems and Jews, would favor the
former interpretation. I am particularly referring to Rabbi
Menachem Forman of the settlement of Teqo'a, who has voiced this
attitude in many an article and interview. In his perception, not
only is the conflict, by essence, a religious-spiritual rather than
political-material one, but this is probably the more desirable
situation, since it holds more available options for solution.
Rabbi Forman strongly believes that dialogue between religious
leaders, based on the shared religious values of all monotheistic
believers, may be more fruitful than dialogue between politicians,
affected by earthly interests.
The National as the Core Element
My own view is quite different. I do not overlook the intertwining
of political and religious elements in the regional conflict. Any
attempt at separating one from the other is certainly doomed to
failure. It is worth noting that religious elements do exist in the
concept of the conflict not only on the Arab part, but - to a no
lesser degree - on the Jewish part. Substantial portions of the
Jewish-Israeli public see a messianic experience in the conflictual
situation.
It is not by accident that the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved at a
particular point in time, namely, in the age of nationalism, which
is the major phenomenon of the East/West encounter opening the
modern era in our region. It should be recalled that religious
trends in contemporary Arab societies, including fundamentalistic
ones, are not dissociated from local-national (Watani) context. The
full name of the Lebanese Shi'i Amal movement, for instance, is
"Lebanese Resistance Battalions." The more orthodox Shi'i
organization Hizbullah ("God's Party") can also be understood only
against the very unique local Lebanese background. Other examples
are readily available.
All this leads to the conclusion that the Arab-Israeli conflict is
basically and essentially a confrontation between two
national-political entities. However powerful, the religious
experience is, at the present stage, an attached element to the
core of the subject, but is far from being the subject
itself.
To sum up this discussion, Judea-Islamic confrontation is
unavoidable, as a point of principle, since the Zionist project has
disrupted a certain basic order exercised by the Islamic society.
Hence it constituted, and still does, an ultimate challenge for the
Islamic society in our region. But what may moderate the severity
of the conflict is, by paradox, precisely what has accorded it its
severity, namely, its political component, which is its very core
and which permits pragmatic arrangements. Ideological
reconciliation does not seem conceivable, but practical
arrangements on the ground may evolve into a degree of inter-state
cooperation. Contacts on the level of spiritual-¬religious
leadership may promote a political compromise, but cannot replace
it. The chances of bridging the inter-religious gap seem meager
unless it has at its basis a political understanding between states
and peoples.
Inter-religious understanding will have to wait until a mutually
acceptable political settlement is reached. This goal can be
attained if both parties recognize and respect the necessary
minimum that each is capable of undertaking without being defeated
or humiliated.