On September 13, 1993, Mr. Arafat and Mr. Rabin signed an initial
agree¬ment in front of the White House. This immediately
became the symbol for a potential future peace after one hundred
years of bloodshed and rivalry between the Palestinian and the
Israeli people. However, aside from the positive feeling of
hopefulness, some unexpected stressful reactions could be
identified among the two groups. It is unusual to identify
prospective peace as an unexpected or even traumatic situation, one
which may initi¬ate stressful reactions. One would usually
assume that the longing for peace after lengthy periods of warfare
would provide more relaxed, posi¬tive and hopeful reactions.
This could be basically true also in the Israeli and Palestinian
contexts.
However, just when such a possibility started to materialize (as it
hap¬pened after the Oslo agreement), completely different
reactions surfaced. In the present paper, I will address the
potential for a peace-related, inter¬mediate stress syndrome
(PISS)¹ which I identified recently in Israeli soci¬ety
and which should be taken just as seriously as delayed stressful
reac¬tions. Though the Israeli experience is unique in many of
its specific com¬ponents, this syndrome can probably be
applied to other settings in which sudden, normative changes of
expectations, assumed to have a positive meaning for the society,
might elicit also negative or stressful reactions.
Stress is a human reaction to unexpected worsening conditions and
to a lack of orientation (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Wilson,
Harel & Kahana, 1988). We prepare ourselves for something bad
happening to us or relevant others, but we actually do not know
what to expect; we may lack a cogni¬tive map for interpreting
current events; we may try to react to them in familiar ways, but
these reactions no longer yield the expected outcomes (Seligman,
1980).
Stress reactions may develop owing to the mere threat of future
traumatic events. We know of stressful reactions to the possibility
of nuclear war, or of similar reactions to the possibility of
chemical warfare prior and during the Gulf War (Gal & Meisles,
1992). In such cases, a learning process of anticipation may
evolve: you can train people to react efficiently during war and to
overcome fear or even anxiety reaction while anticipating threat
(Goldberg & Bretnitz, forthcoming). The Israeli society has
been especially well-trained to expect war or states of warfare
(Solomon, 1993). However, do these procedures also prepare us for a
qualitatively different state of affairs? For example, the
possibility of moving towards peace, while some alertness for
warfare is still necessary?
No More Wars
During all these years an underlying, idealistic wish for a future
state of peace has prevailed within the Israeli society. As an
example, many of us recall this expectation when our first children
were born: "maybe they will not have to fight, or even go to the
army." Peace was perceived as an opti¬mal, totally new state
of mind and reality in which we would be able to relax from our
anticipating war and threat-oriented psychological state of mind.
"There will be no more wars between us" was the famous
expres¬sion President Sadat used when he came to Jerusalem and
addressed the Israeli Parliament in 1977. Peace was expected to be
total peace as opposed to the previously unquestionable warfare.
This expectation was supported by an either peace or war
argumentation (Bar-On, 1992). Interestingly, it was characterized
by more passive expressions ("when peace comes to us") in contrast
to the active expressions of war ("winning the war,"
"over¬coming the threat of annihilation"). After the Six-Day
War there was a famous idiom that the Israeli leaders were awaiting
a phone call from the Arab leaders, pleading for peace. In the end,
the phone call never came.
Though this idealized quest for peace is still the prevalent one,
since Rabin-Arafat's agreement in September, 1993, one can identify
the begin¬ning of a more sober understanding that between
total warfare and total peace there may be a long and stressful
period of movement towards peace accompanied by ongoing hostile
feelings and acts. Though the first steps towards the possibility
of peace have been made, the potential for a sud¬den and
dangerous outbreak of war, as well as ongoing guerrilla activities,
has not diminished. On the contrary, the better did the chances for
the peace process materialize, the more did extreme groups on both
sides try to prevent it from happening. Both negotiating parties
claim to have the majority of their people's support. However,
within the year, since signing the accord in Washington, the
pragmatic negotiations between the parties came to a halt several
times due to murderous acts of extremists on both sides. There were
even moments when the impression was that support for the process
was undermined.
How can we account for these difficulties?
The Gray Area
I would like to argue that the gray zone of war and peace is
psychological¬ly more stressful than unambiguous war or peace,
especially for people who got used to anticipating either one of
them. The new gray zone is char¬acterized by a loss of
orientation and the lack of a clear set of expectations. The
central difficulty is that one does not know how to relate to the
relevant other, and to oneself in relation to the other. During
warfare Arabs were the enemy from the Israeli perspective; in the
future peace they should become our friendly partners. But how can
we expect then to be both enemies and partners, especially after so
many years of embedded hatred and rivalry? Is it not easier to go
relating to them as total evil (Hadar, 1992) until they turn
somehow into total good? Here, one is faced with two separate but
confounding difficulties: to overcome the burden of the past one
hundred years of hatred and fear, and to get over the present
ambiguous perspective. One way, used mainly by the Israeli
Government and media, was to try and differentiate: there are the
other good ones (basi¬cally the PLO) who have changed their
attitude from warfare to peace, and there are the bad guys
(basically the Islamic fundamentalist movement ¬Hamas) who try
to resist and sabotage the agreement. This new perspec¬tive
takes care of the current disorientation but it does not take into
account the burden of the past, still affecting many of the people
on both sides who grew up in fear and hatred.
The complexity of this intermediate gray area in light of the
burden of the past could actually be anticipated. We are not
machines, and even if we genuinely want to move away from years of
hatred and warfare into a clear-cut peace, this cannot be achieved
overnight, especially as we will have to share one land and each
give up dreams of its total occupation. One could expect a
relatively easier shift in the mutual perception of Israelis and
citizens of Arab states, once moving out of warfare, as they do not
have to share one land, or work through each others' dreams. This
was, for example, the case in the Israeli-Egyptian peace process,
in which the lead¬ership of both countries were the only ones
to encounter each other. However, when the relations with the
Palestinians are considered, large groups of citizens from both
sides will have to be in daily contact with each other, many of
them still maintaining their dreams of zero-sum victory over the
other, dreams which have been nourished by many years of
igno¬rance, frustration and disillusionment. The complexity of
a possible solu¬tion that will genuinely satisfy both sides
may, in turn, prolong this inter¬mediate gray area of war and
peace.
Many human beings cannot tolerate ambiguity when under stress and
do not easily manage cognitive complexity (Tetlock, 1987). Most of
us will try to reduce it, using cognitive dissonance strategies
(Festinger & Carl smith, 1959). Some may even choose to
interpret their world as an ongoing total warfare, in which
expectations and behaviors are clear-cut and familiar, rather than
be exposed to the prolonged ambiguity and disorientation of the
transition period between war and peace. This may be so even if
they know, logically, that this ambiguity leads to the expected
state of peace. Cognitive simplicity makes it easier to return to
war expectations (charac¬terizing mainly the political right),
or dreams of a future ideal peace (char¬acterizing more the
political left), rather than getting involved into the more
stressful ambiguity of both war and peace.
Changing Moods
Which are the pre-peace stressful emotional, cognitive and behavior
pat¬terns which we2 identified among the Israeli population
within the last year? We found people reporting that since the
peace accord, they have more daily difficulties to concentrate and
function at home or at work, including sleep difficulties and
extreme nervousness. Quite a few people reported that this was
accompanied by fast and extreme mood changes, moving from
exaggerated optimism and euphoria ("soon we will go and have dinner
in Damascus") into anger and depressive moods ("no chance anything
will change in this area: just killing each other"). These changes
were very much influenced even by minor events reported hourly in
the media. Every stabbing, or every word mentioned concerning the
peace process got a magnified meaning, causing these mood
changes.
On the other hand, we found reactions of numbness, a kind of total
apa¬thy to what was happening. One could view this kind of
reaction as a defense mechanism - how to avoid the extreme mood
changes of the first group. These are two different ways to deal
with the same ambiguity (Solomon, 1993). One could see that both
overreaction and numbness are inadequate reactions, as they do not
help the persons accommodate the reality in a more balanced way.
These people reported that they also had difficulty accepting the
possibility that something new, regardless if viewed positively or
negatively, will emerge out of the present ambiguity.
There is a third common reaction formation: people trying to avoid
the news by concentrating on the concrete, minute, daily
experiences, espe¬cially those unrelated to the peace process.
They talked in their interviews for hours about all kinds of events
that had happened in their lives recent¬ly, their reactions
and those of others, carefully avoiding anything con¬cerning
the recent political developments. When asked about those events,
some would shrug their shoulders, as if saying, "this has nothing
to do with me and my thoughts or feelings."
When some of these people are asked about their fantasies
concerning war and peace, one hears that some want it done and over
with. In Hebrew there is an expression for it: zbeng vegamarnu,
which means "one blow and we finished" - never mind at what price
or what the outcome.3
Similarly, while talking with people after a new move towards the
next round of peace talks or following the latest assault on an
Israeli by an Arab (or vice versa), one hears familiar expressions
of fantasies or anger and frustrations, but very little new
expressions or discourse related to more moderate and realistic
expectations. We interpreted it as the difficulty peo¬ple
exhibit in disassociating themselves from their past perspective of
war¬fare. Certain interviewees spoke openly about their pain:
their life invested to be wasted time and effort which did not
materialize into the expected positive outcome.
Another reaction we identified was that of floating anxiety:
fantasies about "them" ("how will they react to us after all that
we have done to them?"); fears about one's own people ("we will
never be able to integrate into the Middle East society because we
are strangers here"); even some fear concerning oneself ("who am I
if I am not the brave Israeli fighting against our enemies"). Fears
were usually associated with lack of trust in the negotiating
parties, who may "try to solve some issues and leave us to live
afterwards with all the problems." One person reported dreams of
doomsday in which "all this [peace process] will turn suddenly back
on us, but we will not be able anymore to defend ourselves, the way
we could until now, as we have already given up our control of the
territories."
The Hazards of Peace
Like PTSD reactions (Figley, 1986; Solomon, 1993), there is a
realistic aspect in each of these attitudes and emotions. However,
we start to view them as traumatic-stress when they control one's
perspective and do not enable a more relaxed form of reality
testing. The main problem is to envision the possibility that the
future will slowly become different than the past (war¬fare)
or the present (ambiguity).
Some interviewees projected their anger at the political leadership
involved in the negotiations. Certain interviewees spoke of the
"betrayal by the leadership which is tired of wars." Others accused
them of their lack of courage to admit past mistakes: after all, it
is the same political leader¬ship which claimed all the years
that they will never sit together with Arafat at the same table.
Both groups actually expressed the feeling that the leadership did
not assist them in constructing adequate expectations which could
help them cope better with ambiguity of the intermediate phase. "In
the past, the leaders had preached that the peace would emerge only
as a result of each side's strength and victories. Now we are
expected to take the perspective of the Palestinians into
account."
Some argued that only the previous leadership could help the
Israeli pub¬lic go through this change. However, others would
argue that this only adds to the stressfulness of the situation.
They believe that only a fresh political leadership, disassociated
from the collective memory of the past, could help the public
accommodate the new changes and the ambiguity of the intermediate
state. Similar projections were made towards the media and the role
it plays in accommodating the peace accord. They have been accused
of being pro-PLO and anti-PLO by different interviewees, relating
almost to the same programs. It seems that certain parts of the
media suffers from an additional difficulty during the ambiguous
intermediate phase. It is the part of the public media which tends
to reinforce simplification as they gain their fame by presenting
clear-cut news and sensationalism. They do not view it as their
task to help the public cope better with the intermediate gray zone
of war and peace.
One could ask if there were more specific reasons or conditions
which made the Israeli public more vulnerable to the intermediate
stage, more than the usual human difficulties to accommodate
changes and live with ambiguities? Though striving for peace for
many years, the Israelis have to face many realistic hazards which,
manifestly, can be associated with a future state of peace. We have
had (and may have) to give up territories, a fact which in certain
future scenarios could endanger our existence. Israel is still
surrounded by totalitarian regimes and strong fundamentalist
extreme movements. They are many and we are few. They have natural
resources upon which the world is dependent. However, there are
other, more latent psychological hazards in a future peace. Many
Israelis will have to question and relinquish the part of their own
self-definition which has been achieved mainly through the negative
use of the other. This part of their self-definition was achieved
though a consistent negative relation to the enemy. Such a
definition is, psychologically speaking, more easily achieved than
a positive self-determination with no available and negative other.
We, as Jews, have been well-trained throughout the ages to define
ourselves by experiencing the other who persecuted us and tried to
exter¬minate us (Keen, 1987).
Let us examine some normative rituals which the whole Israeli
public is exposed to. For example, the education we provide our
children with in relation to the relevant other. They learn from a
very young age that our festivals are associated with the other who
endangered our existence. The calendar year in the kindergarten and
elementary schools starts with Hanukkah, the festival commemorating
our success in stopping the ancient Greeks from taking over the
First Temple. It continues with Purim, which celebrates success in
preventing the extermination of the Jews by the Persians. Then
comes Passover, when we succeeded in running away from the Egyptian
oppressors, followed by Holocaust Day (the Germans) and
Independence Day (the Arabs). Last on the list is the Ninth of Av,
the day of the destruction of both Temples (by the Babylonians and
the Romans). An anecdote illustrating this trend was shown on
television during the first school day, September 1, 1993. The
Israeli Minister of Education, Prof. Amnon Rubinstein, visited a
kindergarten in Jerusalem and asked the kids if they knew about the
peace process and with whom are we trying to make peace. A few of
the kids reacted spontaneously: "Of course we know." One spoke
about the Germans, the other about the Egyptians. Only one said
"with the Palestinians."
Losing an Enemy
We are not the only people who were threatened by the loss of the
enemy. Russia is moving these days through a painful transition in
which it not only lost its enemy, but also its own pure-ideological
identity of a world superpower (Zizeck, 1989). The American people
lost their traditional enemy after the collapse of the Communist
bloc. Though these enemies were imagined rather than real ones,
they did however preoccupy people's minds and imagination, in both
countries, for quite a few decades. In a sense, this is a stressful
situation because one has to face oneself, one's internal problems,
after being accustomed for many years to define oneself through
negative others. In the Israeli case, this danger is not yet so
acute. Even if the peace process moves on, certain others may still
be counted on as enemies: the Iranians, Hamas, Hizbullah. Still,
the fear of losing the enemy who helped one define oneself in the
past, the fear of falling apart as one people owing to internal
conflicts (religious-secular; ethnic groups; political
orientations), the uncertainty of obtaining enough positive and
internal resources for self-determination as a people, can be
stressful.
There are specific groups within our society (and probably also
within the Palestinian society) which may not only suffer from a
latent danger of los¬ing an enemy, but whose stressful
situation is real and practical. Some peo¬ple have been
economically linked to the production of weapons (Kimmerling,
1993). Others have their occupation directly linked to
main¬taining our security. For these groups a future peace may
mean personal uncertainty or a loss of career. In addition, there
is a whole section of Israeli society which moved to the Golan
Heights, to the West Bank and Gaza for ideological and religious
reasons - not economic ones. For these, even the first step of the
intermediate phase of peace and war is very stressful because they
can anticipate that the following stages will endanger their future
in these places and/or their security.
An additional group should concern people in charge of the helping
pro¬fessions. Within or right after the intermediate phase,
those who suffer from latent PTSD, experienced during one of the
previous wars, and espe¬cially who experienced it during the
Intifada, may suddenly show overt PTSD symptoms. Perhaps some of
the reactions quoted earlier from the interviews are early signs of
this pattern. These people will now be able to express the
traumatic experiences they have had to deny earlier, when the
political conflict around the Intifada was still full-fledged and
did not enable them to relate to their own experiences (Bar-On,
1992). They may soon find themselves alone with their trauma
because their commanders and the politicians who had supported
their activity may be more than happy to forget their
responsibility for that period.
Another group which may face additional stress in the intermediate
phase of war and peace are those families who lost members during
the long period of warfare with the Arabs. For them the
justification for their loss was that one day peace would come and
compensate the living for the dead who, thus, would not have died
in vain. However, this justification is based on the illusion or
fantasy of total peace, not on the ambiguous and complex
intermediate phase of peace and war. Such a phase may cause them to
question the former justification and feel the meaninglessness of
the loss: "Did our dear ones die for this kind of peace?" Again,
some of the reactions I have quoted before relate to this
aspect.
Role of Leadership
It is usually seen as the task of the political and social
leadership to assist the vulnerable groups in the society, as well
as the society as a whole, to accommodate the delicate and complex
demands of the intermediate phase. They will have to confront
previous unrealistic expectations which have developed during
earlier stressful and frustrating years of warfare. However, it is
not easy to suggest what they should actually do to enhance such a
process. For example, when they prefer to present every new act or
situation as an error or as a coincidence, rather than as an
anticipated part of a larger process, this may help some people
while perhaps distress oth¬ers. It would help those who cannot
cope with the whole process at once, while it may hamper the
efforts of others who could gain from a wider interpretive map
which would help them reduce uncertainty, but prefer to give it in
bits and pieces, or present voluntary acts as concessions to
American pressure. As they cannot predict the outcome of the
process they are leading, they may prefer to limit their own
perspective and that of others, rather than show a clear direction
and be punished if this fails at some point in the future.
The PISS concept can be applied to other social contexts in which a
sud¬den collapse of the enemy or an intermediate phase of war
and peace can be identified. This is true of the countries which
were deeply involved in the cold war, such as the U.S.A, Germany
and those in East Europe. Other societies that suffer from long and
exhausting conflicts, such as North Ireland, Bosnia, Cambodia and
South Africa, and that try to move towards resolving the conflict,
will experience a similar intermediate phase like the one described
earlier. However, in each social context these factors, and
possibly also others, have to be assessed separately, according to
the spe¬cific characteristics of that context.
This paper was first presented at a symposium of the Israeli
Society for Family Therapy, on May 19, 1993, at Tel Aviv
University.
Endnotes
1 I suggest PISS and not anticipatory stress as the major issue of
the current stress that one cannot anticipate as one does not know
what to expect from the future. On one hand, it may include many of
the symptoms of PTSD (sleep and functional dis¬turbances,
aggression, helplessness). However, these reactions will be
associated with future ambiguity in relation to war and peace,
though they will be based on past experience with traumatizing
events. The segments of the population which I expect to be less
tolerant to this kind of ambiguity will be discussed later in this
paper.
2 I refer here to a study currently being conducted by the author
and Dr. Sarit Helman, in which we follow changes in the discourse
of the Israeli population owing to the peace process. We surveyed
the major daily newspapers, media news and talk-shows and conducted
interviews with about thirty students. This sample is yet too small
to draw statistical conclusions, but large enough to follow certain
trends by narrative analysis.
3 Dr. Tom Greening suggested the phrase "the temptation of facile
fatalism and dreamy optimism" to describe the simplistic solution
some people tend to prefer when faced with the ambiguity of a
sudden transition like the one from war to peace (personal
communication, December 17, 1993).
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