Those who waited for the visit of US President William Clinton to
Israel and Palestine in December 1998, in the hope that it would
save the peace process, were disappointed.
For almost two years now, the peace process has been at a
standstill. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was trapped between
his declared policy and his own ideological tenets and narrow
government coalition with the religious and right-wing national
parties. It was obvious he enjoyed the situation, preferring to be
forced by his coalition to adhere to his ideology rather than to
act as a national leader. Netanyahu turns out to be incapable of
providing the sort of national leadership which respects
international obligations, and is sufficiently forwardlooking to
know where the national interests of his country lie in the long
term.
Only this can explain his efforts to evade the implementation of
the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the later agreements
based on it, known as the "peace process." According to these
accords, arrangements were agreed upon for an interim period of
five years during which land and authorities would be gradually
transferred to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
Final-status negotiations dealing with the very delicate issues of
Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements, borders, Palestinian refugees,
and water were slated to start at the beginning of the third year,
in May 1996 and to be concluded in a comprehensive settlement at
the end of the five-year interim period, on May 4,1999.
In spite of the symbolic opening of the final-status negotiations
in May 1996, the talks were frozen with the coming to power of the
Netanyahu government in July of that year. The impression is that
this Likud government is not at all willing to engage in serious
negotiations, and is planning to convert the interim arrangements
into the final settlement: In light of this development, the PNA
has made it clear that the fiveyear interim period cannot be
extended, nor will it be allowed to become a permanent arrangement.
Deliberate delaying tactics by the Netanyahu government, the PNA
announced,.will not warrant an extension of the agreed-upon time
frame.
If a settlement is not reached by the end of the five-year period,
that is by May 4, 1999, the Palestinians will unilaterally declare
a state on that date. Initially, the purpose of this declaration
was to force Netanyahu's government back to the negotiating table.
Now it has become an obligation the PNA owes its people. The only
way the PNA can be persuaded to refrain from taking such a
unilateral step is through the intensification of final-status
negotiations, in tandem with real and substantive progress on the
ground before May 4,1999. All the evidence shows that this is not
in the cards. The Netanyahu government demands that the PNA abstain
from taking any unilateral decision, but does nothing to help bring
this about. The Israeli accusations that the PNA has not fulfilled
its obligations are transparent ploys serving Netanyahu's efforts
to justify his stand. In reality, his policy is to block the way to
peace in the face of continued American efforts to revive the
process and to effect a change in the unyielding rejectionism of
the Netanyahu government.
The summit meeting in early November 1998, between Mr. Clinton, Mr.
Netanyahu and Mr. Arafat, was concluded - after ten days of
sleepless nights, according to Mr. Clinton - with the Wye River
Memorandum, which includes an agenda, a timetable, and clear steps
to whose implementation both sides have committed themselves. This,
it was agreed, would be carried out concurrently by both parties.
Accordingly, the Israeli government implemented the first part of a
military redeployment in some Palestinian villages in the north of
the West Bank, as a step towards further redeployment in the center
and south of the West Bank. Angered by this redeployment, the
right-wing coalition in Mr.
Netanyahu's government threatened to withdraw its support for the
government and to bring its rule to an end. Mr. Netanyahu toughened
his tone and escalated his demands of, and accusations against the
PNA: "If they do, they will take, if they do not, they will not
take." As stipulated in the Wye River Memorandum, President Clinton
came in December 1998 to visit Israel and the Palestinian Authority
areas, and to witness a big Palestinian meeting, where the
Palestinian Natior.al Council (PNC), the Central Council, the
Legislative Council, the Executive Committee, the heads of
ministries, and national figures would reaffirm the PNC resolution
of April 1996 to abolish all articles of the Palestinian Covenant
that are in contradiction with the peace process and the letters of
mutual recognition, and would reconfirm the letter conveying this
resolution to President Clinton.
This meeting took place as planned and the reaffirmation was
accepted by an overwhelming majority, to the satisfaction of
President Clinton and all international observers and media
representatives who came from all over the world to cover this
historic event. Prime Minister Netanyahu could not deny its
significance. He described it as a "positive development," but, as
expected, he immediately came out with a list of new demands and
conditions to be implemented by the Palestinian National
Authority.
Mr. Netanyahu has, long ago, missed the chance to free himself of
the blackmail of the religious and right-wing national parties by
forming with the Labor party a national-unity government - an
option, at the time, seriously considered by some Labor leaders. It
is now too late. Labor would rather hold new elections to win and
form the new government, or to improve its position in any future
coalition government.
There is no doubt that Mr. Netanyahu has wasted the historic
opportunity to become the second right-wing leader - after Menachem
Begin - who could bring Israel peace and the recognition of its
long-standing enemy, the Palestinian people. Unfortunately,
Menachem Begin's shoes have proven too big for Mr. Netanyahu. The
coming months will witness a freeze in the peace process, but no
one can guarantee that this freeze will not be accompanied by an
upsurge of violence. Neither freeze nor violence are wanted nor
sought by the majority of the two peoples of Palestine and Israel.