The quest for regional security mechanisms has been part of the
Israeli-Arab peace process since the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.
This process was born out of the positive experience of the Cold
War and security forums from other regions. From the outset, such a
translation of principles from the relations between superpower
blocs to individual states was problematic. The lessons of other
regions where such attempts had been made were also rarely
relevant. In other areas of the world, regional security setups
were constructed in a context of an existing peace, whereas in the
Middle East they were discussed as part of a peace process within a
state of war.
The discussion of regional security in the 1990s took place within
a very different regional context than that which exists today. The
region was still in the throes of the trauma of the Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait and the debt to the United States for having
saved the Gulf states from their own Arab brethren. The radical
camp was in retreat: Syria had found itself without a superpower
patron; the PLO was shamed by its support of Iraq; Saddam Hussein
was restricted by sanctions, weapons inspections, no-fly zones in
the north and the south and coalition military power. The general
vector seemed to be toward stability.
There is a tendency to identify tensions primarily with the
Israeli-Arab conflict. This, however, belies the experience of the
region. The security events of the last two decades of the 20th
century featured the eight-year-long Iraq-Iran war; the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait; periodic flare-ups of crisis in the Kurdish
area (either between the Kurds and Iraq or due to Turkish
interventions); continued Iraqi support of the Iranian opposition
Mujahidin Khalq Organization (MKO) and exchanges of blows between
the countries; border conflicts between Iran and its Gulf state
neighbors; the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, and Syrian-Turkish
tensions over PKK terrorism inter alia. Each of these tensions
derived from different sources - none of them linked to the
Israeli-Arab conflict. The focus of discussions on regional
security on the Israeli-Arab angle could not provide appropriate
answers to these other issues. The "War on Terrorism," which has
overshadowed the peace process since September 2001, has given new
meaning to the link between domestic security and regional security
and has introduced new modalities of international involvement in
the region.
The Madrid Process
The "multilateral track" of the Madrid conference included the
Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) which
held a number of meetings (1993-1995) in which ideas were raised
for regional security cooperation (related to such areas as rescue
coordination, pre-notification of certain military activities,
INCSEA - the Incident at Sea Agreement - and exchange of military
information). Some agreements were reached but few were implemented
and those that were stopped functioning (e.g. "hotlines" that began
to operate in March 1995 based on OSCE [Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe] end stations but ceased to exist in
1999).
As mentioned above, the early concept of ACRS was strongly affected
by the paradigms of Cold War security agreements. However, the very
concept of regional security suffered from adaptation pangs to the
Middle East. The negotiations reflected fundamentally different
approaches by the various parties to the process as to its very
raison d'etre. In Israeli (and American) eyes, it was intended to
co-opt the countries in the region that were not part of the
bilateral negotiations, thus legitimizing relations between Israel
and those countries, creating an atmosphere of peace and supporting
the bilateral tracks. Practical Confidence and Security Building
Measures (CSBM) were supposed to contribute to this end by
enhancing the sense of security on all sides.
On the other hand, many of the Arab parties feared that
normalization - or even a relaxation of tensions - between Israel
and the Arab "periphery" would weaken the support of the Arab world
toward the particular demands of the parties to the bilateral
track. Egypt, which already had a peace treaty with Israel, feared
the process might diminish its unique position - which provided a
basis for its campaign against Israel's strategic edge vis-a-vis
the Arab states and for promoting ideas for a Nuclear Free Zone
(NFZ) in the Middle East.
The Madrid multilateral process petered off in 1995. It became
clear that progress in this track was contingent on a comprehensive
peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Without
progress in the bilateral tracks, it appeared the attempt to
develop practical regional security and arms control agreements was
doomed to failure. At best, it served as a confidence-building
measure and a vehicle for facilitating Israeli contacts with that
part of the Arab world that was not involved in the bilateral
track; at worst, it became a forum for posing unrealistic demands
for unilateral Israeli disarmament.
The Israeli Interests
Nevertheless, one can read between the lines of the positions put
forward in these talks some of the guiding principles of an Israeli
concept of regional security as it existed at the time. Some of
these may be relevant in the future - if and when the circumstances
for such a framework arise. First and foremost, the underlying
principle of this concept, in Israeli eyes, would be that a clear
distinction be made between security regimes for different stages
of relations between the states of the region:
1) In which peace has not yet been achieved;
2) In which the countries have an established peace, but it has yet
to be cemented;
3) In which peace has become the "natural state" of the
region.
According to this principle, no country should be asked to forego
an existing strategic advantage until such time as peace becomes
cemented and there is no more threat of its being overturned. On
the basis of this principle, the goals of regional security should
be prioritized: First and foremost there should be mechanisms for
prevention of military conflict as a result of mistaken perceptions
of mutual intentions and channels for direct communication and
consultation to avert crisis and to manage them when they occur;
only later can the arms reduction and arms control issue be
addressed. Any other method is to put the cart before the horse.
The process should focus on developing specific confidence-building
measures, such as pre-notification of large-scale military
exercises, development of hotlines, crisis prevention mechanisms
and verification procedures (the "operational basket").
As the process goes on, the goal of any regional security regime
should be to ensure a "win-win" process. In other words, the
outcome of the process at any given point should always enhance -
and not diminish - the sense of security on all sides. Willingness
by a party to give up existing unilateral security-enforcing
capabilities must be met with a commensurate compensation, so as to
preclude a compromise of net security. In order to meet this goal,
a "net security index" of a country should take into account
structural vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may be rooted in:
size and concentration of population (and therefore its exposure to
attack); the existence of threats, both within the region and
outside it, to the security of the country; the goal of such
enemies (limited territorial goals or total destruction); and the
existence of coalitions or alliances between threatening countries
(or entities) in the region or between them and outside
powers.
But who should define the perceived threat and the structural
vulnerability? In order to guarantee a true sense of security,
every state in the region should define both the threat it
considers relevant to its own security and its own relative
strength, to which the arms control and the regional security
process should provide adequate responses.
A salient question would be how threats such as terrorism could be
factored into a regional security structure. A terrorist threat is
not counterbalanced by a conventional or non-conventional strategic
capability (as terrorists are not deterred by the existence of such
a capability) and, therefore, such a threat is not relevant to the
"net security index" of a country. The constraints on a country,
which is a member of a regional security regime, should distinguish
between use of violence in interstate conflicts and response to
terrorist threats. On the other hand, the existence of state
sponsors of terrorism and the willingness of states in the region
to appease terrorists and to allow them an ideological and
operational safe haven raises interstate conundrums: Responsibility
of all parties to a regional security regime to maintain a monopoly
over military power in their respective territories; accountability
of states for acts of violence perpetrated or even planned from
their territories; rights of "hot pursuit" and arrangements to
preclude such actions from precipitating an interstate conflict
inter alia. Some may argue that these problems would strengthen the
claim that a terrorist threat toward a country entitles it to a
"counterbalancing" strategic advantage.
Another equally problematic issue is the impact of a potentially
nuclear Iran (with long-range delivery capabilities) on regional
security. Iran poses a threat not only to Israel but also to the
Gulf states, to Iraq, and past the region to its central Asian
neighbors. On one hand, Iran's status as a regional power cannot be
ignored; on the other hand, without a sea change in the attitude of
Tehran toward Israel and the pro-Western Arab states, any regional
security agreements would be an empty shell.
The relation between regional and global security regimes is also a
problematic issue. After the blatant failure of the NPT in Iraq,
Iran and North Korea, can it be a framework for a regional regime?
Or should a regional regime rely on its own mechanisms? What is the
role of the United States, with forces in Iraq, the Gulf and
Afghanistan and deep involvement in the internal security of a
number of the countries in the region? Regional security
arrangements must also take into account current initiatives such
as the "Greater Middle East," NATO involvement in the Middle East,
evolving European defense concepts (in light of a future accession
of Turkey to the European Union) and OSCE models. These trends
raise the question of the "borders" of the "region" and the
distinction between "local" and "international" forces.
A Concept for Phased Regional Security
In practical terms, building a framework for regional security in
the Middle East is an incremental task. The stages of such a task
could be:
1) A Declaration of Principles of all parties in the region barring
all violence as a means of solving conflicts, while preserving a
clear definition of the right for self-defense. The declaration
should clearly include rejection of terrorism (with an unambiguous
definition of terrorism) and violence against civilians, and define
moral, financial, logistic and political support of such acts as
violations of the principles of the regime. The declaration should
be followed by an installation of means for direct communication
between all parties of the region. Refusal of a party to join the
DOP (e.g. Iran) should entail sanctions by other parties in the
region.
2) A period of confidence building in which the means of stage one
will be tested and perfected. During this period, there should be a
"freezing" of the capabilities of all sides. No party or group of
parties should be allowed to offset the security regime by
acquisition of new military advantages, but no country will be
called upon to forego existing capabilities as a condition of
joining the security arrangement. This period should be concomitant
with an ongoing bilateral and multilateral peace negotiation
process.
3) Conclusion of bilateral peace treaties with all Israel's
neighbors and solutions for other outstanding security tensions in
the region (border conflicts, Syrian occupation of Lebanon, water,
etc.). Benchmarks for the assessment of the durability of the peace
should be set. One of these benchmarks will have to be the
acceptance of peace by all entities in the region and the reduction
of challenges to the peaceful relations. Such benchmarks may be:
The continued ideological or religiously based rejection of peace
by a state in the region or by political parties within states with
which peace treaties have been signed; domestic stability of the
states with which peace treaties have been signed, etc.
4) Negotiation of arms reduction along regional lines and gradual
implementation of such agreements.
The feasibility of a regime for regional security is based on an
assumption that all parties of the region share an interest in
stability and conflict prevention and will, therefore, act in good
faith to defuse any incipient crisis. As long as escalation and
brinkmanship remain a political tool in the hands of some of the
regional parties, it is doubtful that even the most modest security
regime can be built, and if constructed - survive.
For details on the ill-fated ACRS negotiations, see: Michael D.
Yafee, Promoting arms control and regional security, Disarmament
Forum The Middle East 2001 no. 2, pp. 9 - 25; Bruce Jentleson, The
Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Talks:
Progress, Problems and Prospects,
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/jeb01/#11. The second ACRS plenary
(Moscow, September 1992) was dedicated to the lessons that can be
learned for the region from East-West detente. Discussions on
Exchange of Military Information (EMI) and "Pre-notification of
Certain Military Activities (PCMA) were also based on the Cold War
experience.