It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the
proposals, plans, indirect and even direct talks that have taken
place over the 60 years. Generally Israel's preference was for
direct, bilateral talks with the Arab states-direct, which might
carry the implication of recognition, and bilateral so as not to
have to deal with all the Arab states at once-believing that
separate deals could be struck if negotiated directly and
bilaterally. Bilateral talks via third parties were held mainly
after 1967, and there was occasional but reluctant agreement to
international conferences. The only international conference prior
to 1967 was the Lausanne Conference in the wake of the 1948 war,1
which was more a series of third-party talks held separately with
Israel and with the Arab states rather than direct negotiations.
Subsequently, there were the Geneva Conference in December 1973,
the Madrid Conference in October 1991, and Annapolis in November
2007. Secret talks were also held via mediators and directly, e.g.,
with Jordan. Prime Minister Menachem Begin, for example, sought
face-to-face talks with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat- which
Sadat, of course, provided himself. We may never know the number of
direct and indirect secret talks that were conducted, not only with
states, but with organizations such as the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO)-notably but not only for the 1981 PLO-Israel
ceasefire, well before Oslo-nor who all the mediators were or even
what was agreed.
The Armistice Agreements of 1949 reflected the general-not only
Israeli-attitude that the conflict was one between states and that
the Palestinians did not need to be seen as a people with national
rights, but were to be treated only as a refugee problem. The
Armistice Agreements, therefore, virtually ignored resolution 181.2
While these agreements included some land swaps and minor
adjustments of the ceasefire lines, the Israeli position under
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion might best be characterized as
"peace for peace." Ben-Gurion rejected Egyptian territorial demands
and, on the whole, believed that the status quo established by the
Armistice lines would ultimately be internationally accepted. This
position did not rule out minor "adjustments" in Israel's favor
through border skirmishes or creeping annexation-for example, in
the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria or along the border
with Jordan-nor mutual agreement with Jordan in the early 1960s
regarding, for example, part of the village of Beit Safafa. But
there was total rejection of anything even resembling a return to
the Partition Plan lines-an Arab demand supported in 1949 by the
Lausanne conveners: the United States, Britain and Turkey-or any
territorial concessions.
West Jerusalem was within this territorial status quo, as Israel
simply ignored the articles in UN Resolutions 181 and 194 referring
to the international status of Jerusalem. Israel's post-1948
position was that the invasion of the Arab states and the war
rendered the Partition Plan irrelevant.
This iron-clad position on territory was also adopted on the
refugee issue in the early years of the war. On June 16, 1948 the
decision was taken not to permit the return of any refugees. At the
end of the war, Israel's official position was the refugee issue
could only be raised in conjunction with a final peace agreement
with the Arab states. Yet, at the Lausanne Conference there was an
Israeli proposal-apparently a trial balloon-to annex Gaza with its
approximately 200,000 refugees. When this idea was rejected by
Egypt, the Israeli government authorized its representative to the
talks, Moshe Sharett, to try another proposal for the absorption by
Israel of 65,000 to 100,000 refugees and the remaining 600,000 by
the Arab states, in exchange for peace. This too found no support
from the Arab states and, in any case, it was withdrawn by Israel.3
In 1950, at the revived Palestine Conciliation Committee (PCC)
talks, Israel returned to its now familiar position rejecting any
return-aside from very limited family reunification taking place
quietly over the years-denying any responsibility for the refugee
problem, and arguing that Resolution 194 does not constitute a
"right" of return.4
Post-1967
The occupation of the West Bank and the Golan Heights along with
the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip in the June 1967 War
introduced the possibility of the "land for peace" concept of the
Labor-led government-although the term itself was not adopted until
some years later. Immediately after the war, on June 19, the
government agreed to return the Sinai and the Golan Heights, in
exchange for peace; Gaza was to be annexed, but held, first, as
occupied territory until the refugees there could be relocated; the
West Bank was to become an autonomous region, possibly even an
independent state, but Israel's permanent border was to be the
Jordan River, i.e., the Jordan Rift Valley. Following the Arab
League conference in Khartoum in August, 1967 and its rejection of
negotiations or peace with Israel,5 the Israeli government took
another decision on October 30 of that year against any return to
the 1967 lines, the borders to be determined by Israel's security
needs. Gaza was still to be retained, along with a strip of
coastline from Eilat to Sharm el-Sheikh.
Jerusalem was handled in separate decisions. The most important was
the government's decision of June 26, 1967, to annex East Jerusalem
and the surrounding villages, thereby expanding the municipal
borders of Jerusalem by 71,000 dunums (1 dunum = 1,000 m2),
tripling the size of what had been West Jerusalem. Jordanian
overtures during the summer for peace in exchange for the return of
all of the West Bank were rejected, apparently because of an
unwillingness to return East Jerusalem. Israel, reportedly, was not
interested in dealing with Jordan. Autonomy or even limited
Palestinian statehood -what has been called the first Alon Plan-was
still considered and, apparently, abandoned only after talks with
local Palestinian families brought no results.6 By the end of 1968,
the "Jordanian Option" became Labor policy in the form of a second
Alon Plan. According to this idea, part of the West Bank would be
returned to Jordan, with Israel holding on to large areas,
especially the Jordan Rift Valley. For the most part, this position
was dictated by pragmatic, security concerns, although there were
"sentimental" and nationalistic motivations with regard to such
areas as Gush Etzion.
Having opted for the Jordanian rather than Palestinian option,
Israel under Labor made every effort to weaken Palestinian
nationalist stirrings, jailing or deporting-or worse-PLO figures in
the territories, along with the early proponents of the two-state
solution, e.g., the Palestine National Front created in 1973. Yet
numerous secret meetings with Jordan failed to produce an
agreement. Even talks for a partial agreement such as the Jericho
Plan, proposed as part of the disengagement of forces initiated by
the Geneva Conference following the Yom Kippur War, failed to
achieve a breakthrough. The major obstacle was Israel's insistence
on holding on to the Jordan Rift area.
It would appear that, during this period under the Labor
government, Israel believed that a solution to the conflict was
possible, but on Israeli terms, namely, with the retention of East
Jerusalem and large parts of the West Bank. Moreover, aside from a
brief period after the war when the government considered dealing
with the Palestinians, Israel saw Jordan as the partner. However,
given the fact that the Palestinian issue lies at the core of the
conflict, this may have been the fatal flaw in Labor's
policy.
When the Likud gained power in 1977, ideology-primarily
nationalistic but allied with religion-replaced pragmatism. This
was an ideology that saw no possibility of solution to the
conflict. "Land for peace" was abandoned; "peace for peace" became
the Likud slogan, and the massive settlement enterprise pursued
throughout the occupied territories conformed to a notion of
"Greater Israel" (Eretz Yisrael Hashlema). The only measure that
appeared to contradict this policy was the agreement with the
Egyptians at Camp David in 1978 to a plan for autonomy in Gaza and
the West Bank. This plan called for gradual Israeli withdrawal from
the West Bank and Gaza, and it also included a provision for joint
Egyptian, Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian talks to decide on the
repatriation of the displaced from the 1967 war, and procedures for
resolving the problem of the 1948 refugees. Nonetheless, the idea
of autonomy went beyond the usual Israeli view of the Palestinian
issue as one solely of refugees. While Begin used the Hebrew term
"Arabs of Eretz Yisrael," the plan dealt with the Palestinians as
Palestinians, with the right to determine their own affairs. Sadat
attached a letter stating that Egypt viewed "Arab [East] Jerusalem
as part of the West Bank," and Begin attached a letter citing the
Israeli government's decree of 1967 declaring Jerusalem "the
undividable capital of Israel." It is far from clear whether Begin
intended to implement this plan, strikingly similar to the later
Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP). Autonomy talks were
undertaken only between Israel, Egypt and the U.S., and these
petered out in 1980 with no achievement whatsoever.
While the Labor Party and others continued to pursue unofficial
meetings and proposals with Jordan over the years, the last attempt
to activate the Jordanian Option came when the party shared power
with Likud in the mid-1980s. In 1987, following the failure of the
Arafat-Hussein Agreement for peace talks with Israel, then-Foreign
Minister Shimon Peres and King Hussein negotiated the London
Agreement. Basically, a call for an international conference with a
joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the plan was rejected by
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and, with it, what was left of the
Jordanian Option. The following summer King Hussein relinquished
his claim to the West Bank in favor of the PLO.
Oslo and After7
Once back in power in 1992, Labor restored the "land for peace"
concept as the underlying principle for its policy, reviving the
autonomy plan-as suggested in 1989 by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
prior to his election-that became the basis of the Oslo Accords.
The difference now, however, was that Israel viewed autonomy as an
interim stage on the way to a final agreement. Moreover, the
partner was the "Palestinian people"8 represented by their national
movement the PLO. This was possible, given the 1988 PLO decision to
accept UN Resolution 242 and the two-state solution. Similarly, the
Israeli public had been undergoing a shift with regard to the
desirability of ending the conflict, in part because of the [first]
intifada and its demonstration that holding on to the territories
was beginning to exact a price from Israelis, including in the area
of personal security.
Rabin was, in fact, skeptical of the chances of reaching a peace
agreement with the Palestinians and, perhaps due to his military
orientation, preferred talks with states, specifically Syria, which
he considered a greater threat to Israel's existence. Nevertheless,
he was anxious to exploit the opportunity opened by the changes on
the international scene: the demise of the U.S.S.R.; the emergence
of the new world order [with U.S. hegemony]; the Arab regimes'
concerns over rising fundamentalism and their interest in the U.S;
the dangers of a nuclear Iran; and the weakened state of the PLO
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of Saudi
backing after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The Oslo Accords were similar to the step-by-step approach that
Rabin had taken with regard to Egypt-partial agreements with
gradual withdrawal-whether out of a reluctance to present the
public with too drastic a change, to have a period in which to test
the other side, to build up trust between the two sides, or all of
these together. Thus the Oslo Accords, because of their temporary
nature, did not deal with the core issues of borders, settlements,
security, refugees, Jerusalem, and so forth. There was much to
criticize in this approach, and one can only speculate as to
Israel's intentions in its haggling over the interim
measures.
The only way to determine if a significant change had really
occurred in the Israeli approach to the Palestinian issue was to
see the positions on the core issues in the post-Oslo proposals:
Camp David II, Taba and the Clinton Parameters. Without stating it
directly, it was clear that the goal Israel was now willing to
accept was the creation of a Palestinian state on most of the West
Bank and all of the Gaza Strip. Despite Israel's refusal to return
to the June 4, 1967 lines, and despite all the arguing with the PLO
over percentages of land that would remain under Israeli control,
the proposals that did get Israeli agreement-even at Camp David but
especially with regard to the Clinton Parameters-were a far cry
from the Alon Plan of the earlier years. The object was separation
and the frame of reference was the June 4, 1967 lines. Then-Prime
Minister Ehud Barak reportedly agreed to proposals that called for
93%, and then less (88-90%) of the land to go to the Palestinians;
while he ultimately agreed to the Clinton Parameters that accorded
the Palestinians 97% of the West Bank, with equal land swaps to
compensate for the remainder, the equivalent in square kilometers
to the area occupied in 1967.
The Palestinians have argued that the security arrangements
demanded by Israel at Camp David, in part also in the Clinton
Parameters, would have left Israel in control of roads, air space
and the Jordan Rift Valley-albeit with limitations in terms of time
(six years for the Jordan Rift) or usage (for training or in
emergencies). Actually there was a significant Israeli step forward
in agreeing to the Clinton Parameters proposal for an
"international presence" to gradually replace Israel on that
border. The Taba talks and the Clinton Parameters also provided for
the return-to Israel-of a limited number of refugees as part of a
comprehensive resettlement plan. Israel was to decide on the
number, rumored to be in the vicinity of 40,000. And the Clinton
Parameters provided for a division of sovereignty in Jerusalem: the
Jewish neighborhoods go to Israel, the Arab neighborhoods to the
Palestinians. This definitely was not the full right of return
sought by the Palestinians, and it also seemed to allow for Jewish
settlements built in East Jerusalem after 1967 to remain. Labor
still believed an agreement could be reached on its own terms, and
one could argue that some of the terms were not absolutely
essential, but they did represent a more realistic approach on the
substantive issues of territory, Jerusalem, sovereignty, and even
the refugees.
However, the Clinton Parameters came too late, regardless of
Israel's response. The disappointment over the failure of Oslo and
Camp David lead to the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, the
election of the Likud and a total collapse of the peace process.
Back was the "no solution" approach because there is no partner
willing to accept Israel's existence. Since this attitude did
little to stem the violence or promise future security,
particularly in view of the demographics of holding on to the
territories, the Likud government under Sharon introduced a new
concept into Israeli policy: unilateralism. This was not a measure
for achieving a resolution of the conflict; it was not even a
measure designed to provide conflict management, for neither could
be achieved without some kind of agreement with the other side.
Sharon's motivation in unilaterally withdrawing from Gaza is not
entirely clear.
Cynics argued that the move was merely designed to divert attention
from personal legal problems; others that he sought to delay the
demographic problem by removing 1.3 million Palestinians from
Israeli control. It may also have been part of earlier ideas of
separating and splitting the Palestinian Authority to make it
easier for Israel to rule, at least over the West Bank; or it may
have been to placate domestic critics and, as Sharon himself
explained, ward off the possibility of an unfavorable-in his
eyes-settlement forced on Israel, like the Road Map or a plan
similar to the Geneva Initiative. That his conception of
unilateralism was not designed for conflict resolution was evident
by his insistence on retaining a Gaza "envelope," namely, Israeli
control of access by air, sea, and land to and from Gaza. The idea
of such an envelope appeared in Oslo as well, under the heading of
"external security" over areas evacuated by the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF), but Oslo withdrawals were based on mutual agreements
and cooperation, and only temporary security arrangements. A
potentially significant move, however, was Sharon's agreement to
Egyptian and European supervision of the Gaza border with Egypt,
rather than direct Israeli control-a precedent, perhaps, for the
adoption of the Clinton Parameters proposal for an international
presence on the future Jordan Rift border.
Whatever his motivation or ultimate goal, Sharon took the official
Israeli position a giant step forward. As early as October 2001,
well before his unilateral idea and still as head of the Likud,
Sharon declared Israel's support for the creation of a Palestinian
state. He may have envisaged only a very small area for such a
state or merely a patchwork of enclaves or Bantustans throughout
the West Bank, but the idea of two states became a declared policy
objective for Israel.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, often credited with initiating the
unilateralism idea, apparently sought to combine this new
unilateral method with the newly declared objective under the title
of "convergence," with the purpose of ending the Israeli presence
in-almost all of-the occupied territories. While his idea was not
entirely clear-how much territory would be evacuated? Would the IDF
remain beyond new lines? What would be Israel's relationship with
the area beyond these lines?-it was presented as a solution,
without a partner. There was little opportunity to test the idea as
the Second Lebanon War totally discredited the concept of
unilateralism in the public eye. Olmert reverted to the Barak
approach: seeking a final status agreement in direct talks with the
PLO leadership, with the help of the United States. A possible
difference was that regional developments had deteriorated to the
point that the Arab League had produced an innovative peace
initiative that promised an end to the conflict and normal
relations with Israel. Thus Olmert might be able to elicit broad
Arab assistance, unavailable in earlier years. Countering this,
however, was the rise of Hamas.
While virtually nothing has been officially revealed regarding
Israel's positions in the present talks, the debate over borders
appears to be somewhere between Barak's positions (90% of the
land?) and the Clinton Parameters, with Israel rumored to be
pressing for unequal land swaps to accommodate ever-growing
settlement blocs, along with security measures that sound much like
the Barak demands for use of air space, roads and a presence in the
Jordan Rift Valley-though the Clinton Parameters solution to these
issues and that of the borders may be on the table. As in the past,
Jerusalem is subject to negotiations; the official position on the
refugees is no return to Israel. Unlike in the past, the explicit
goal is an end to the occupation and the creation of a Palestinian
state. The "catch" is that, even if there was an agreement that the
Palestinians could view as a solution, it is to be a "shelf"
agreement, which means that implementation is to be put off,
ostensibly until Road Map obligations are met, but, in reality,
until an Israeli leader deems it politically possible or expedient
to end the occupation.
Conclusion
Present circumstances: the weakness of the Israeli and Palestinian
leaderships, and the disillusionment and skepticism of both publics
limit the immediate prospects, but Israeli positions have undergone
a possibly irreversible evolution. The 60 years have brought Israel
to a recognition of the Palestinians as a people, the acceptance of
the two-state solution, the June 4, 1967 lines as the reference
point for territorial agreement, the principle of agreed land
swaps, the preference for demographic over territorial
considerations, the removal of settlements, the negotiability of
the status of Jerusalem, security through an international presence
and the assistance of the Arab states. In addition, there are
numerous blueprints for the resolution of the most difficult
issues. Perhaps, the most significant aspect of all of these
changes is that they have been adopted by leaders-and publics-from
what was the political right, forming today the center in Israeli
politics.
1 Under the UN-created Palestine Conciliation Committee (PCC), the
three members of which were Britain, Turkey, and the United States,
acted as mediators in the conference meetings held in 1949, and
briefly in 1950 and 1951.
2 There is divers evidence as to Israel's tacit, maybe even
explicit, agreement that the land intended for an Arab state could
be absorbed by Jordan.
3 According to Benny Morris, 65,000 was the approximate number of
refugees who had managed to get back into the country or were in
the pipeline. Israel's population at the time of these proposals
was 650,000.
4 With regard to the resolution admitting Israel to the UN on May
11, 1949, stating that resolutions 181and 194 as the relevant UN
decisions upon which admittance was based, Israel noted Resolution
194 with "clarifications."
5 Syria did not attend the conference and the PLO refused to sign
the final resolution, both because the meeting was perceived as
"too moderate" for its acceptance of the Egyptian position in favor
of allowing international diplomacy for the return of the
territories.
6 Reuven Pedatzur (Haaretz, July 2, 2007) provides some interesting
details on the government discussions of the Jordanian
Option/Palestinian state ideas. The West Bank Palestinian state was
to be independent, even with a seat in the UN, but in essence an
enclave with Israel maintaining the Jordan Rift Valley as its
eastern border.
7 For a more detailed discussion of Israeli positions from Oslo
onward, see Galia Golan, Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and
Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement, 2nd edition (Princeton:
Markus Weiner Publishers), 2007.
8 September 9, 1993, letter from Rabin to Arafat accompanying the
DOP.