The "Accidental" War between Israel and Hizbullah, Summer 2006:
The Middle East Conflicts in the Lebanese Test Tube
After one Israeli soldier was kidnapped by Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip on June 25, 2006 and two were kidnapped by Hizbullah gunmen
on the Lebanese border on July 12, 2006, many observers in the
region were surprised at how quickly and fiercely the conflict
escalated into a bloody war.
Explanations were quickly proffered, but what all of them had in
common was a lack of conclusive evidence, as each of them only cast
light on one particular facet of the war. The most widely heard
were: Khaled Mash'al, the head of Hamas's external leadership based
in Damascus, asked Lebanese Hizbullah leader Sheikh Hassan
Nasrallah to start a war by kidnapping Israeli soldiers in order to
revive the spirit of Hamas in its battle against Israel. Or: Tehran
urged Hizbullah to escalate the conflict with Israel before the G8
Summit in St Petersburg on August 15, 2006 so that the issue of
Iran's nuclear effort would be struck off the agenda - which
happened. Or: The United States had long been encouraging Israel to
resolve the conflict with Hizbullah by military means - more or
less as a test run for predictable confrontation between the United
States and Tehran. All that was needed was the right
opportunity.
These explanatory efforts demonstrate, however, that the war
between Israel and Hizbullah is a multidimensional conflict with
local, bilateral, regional and international implications. There is
Hamas's struggle to govern the autonomous Palestinian territories;
Hizbullah's attempt to uphold its special status in Lebanon; the
attempt by the new center-left government in Israel to exercise its
right to self-defense and to deter its enemies in a convincing and
enduring way in a war on two fronts; Syria's interests in Lebanon;
the shift in the balance of power between Shiites and Sunnis; and,
finally, the nuclear conflict with Iran in its international
dimension.
UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 12, 2006 brought
about a cease-fire between Israel and Hizbullah. Nevertheless, this
cease-fire is extremely fragile, as the resolution was not only
unclear on matters relating to border controls, disarming Hizbullah
and the use of force, but also to date has only provided unilateral
security for Israel.
The complexity of the conflicts described here clearly illustrate
that the only way to defuse the crisis in this region in a
comprehensive and sustainable manner will be to undertake a joint
international initiative.
Revive the Comprehensive Middle East Peace Process
Since 2000 the Arab-Israeli Madrid Peace Process has been
thoroughly neglected in diplomatic quarters. It is high time that
this overall political process was not merely revived, but
reinvented.
Compared with 1991, the chances of success have improved as the key
external players - the U.S., the European Union, the United Nations
and Russia - have been meeting as the Middle East Quartet since
2002. The Near East Quartet also has a clearly defined goal - two
states - and this is founded on transatlantic consensus.
The U.S., which has in the past regarded EU policy as reactive and
ineffective, has begun to recognize the EU's strong points:
developing long-term strategies and providing backing for
diplomatic initiatives and financial support for the peace
processes. The EU is now better equipped, thanks to its Common
Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP), to respond more quickly and
efficiently to political crises and conflicts - as demonstrated by
the recent European-led UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. Israel, too, has
fewer reservations about the EU and is allowing the Europeans to
play a more active role in the Middle East conflict, reflected in
the first deployment of European personnel along the border between
Rafah and Egypt (EU-Border Assistance Mission) that began in
2005.
The Middle East Quartet has proved its worth as the most robust
mechanism for mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. The
mandate of the Quartet, which so far has been confined to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, should be extended to include other
conflicts in the region. It is also worth considering including
China in the group as a new key external player in order to be more
effective, especially on Iran.
Raising the status of the Quartet would send out a dual message:
The international community is working together on crisis
prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution in this
region. The international community is prepared, in light of the
region's multidimensional crisis, to involve the "Axis of Evil" in
the form of Syria and Iran.
Secure Israel and Assert Palestine
One vital factor for progress in this region is resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the current state of play is
anything but encouraging.
To end the violence the aim must be to end the occupation and to
resolve the conflict bilaterally. If Hamas is not prepared to do
this, negotiations could be held indirectly with the democratically
elected president of the PA and leader of the PLO, which is in any
case legally entitled to negotiate with Israel. The outcome could
be put to a referendum by the Hamas administration. Direct
negotiations with Hamas are also conceivable, if the conditions
which must be fulfilled before negotiations can begin are met step
by step (positive conditionality).
The credibility and legitimacy of international Middle East policy
can only be restored if the Middle East Quartet demonstrates that
the planned Road Map for peace is being implemented and accepted
internationally. This implies dealing with its downside:
phases-oriented gradualism. In retrospect, these phases have not
built confidence. The gradualism and the principle of reciprocity
have not yet led to any tangible results. Although the gradualism
of the Madrid Middle East Peace Process and the Oslo Process
founded on confidence-building did spawn a number of bilateral
agreements1, the phase structure did not bring the Palestinians any
land (given the advances made by the Israeli settlement and
infrastructure policies), nor did it bring the Israelis any
security (given the Palestinian strategy of suicide attacks).
In light of this, the parties should move directly to final-status
negotiations, as the compromise solutions for final-status issues
have been on the table for a long time. Another reason why
final-status negotiations should begin without delay is that the
window of opportunity for a two-state solution is closing, given
demographic trends and Israel's policy for settlement and
infrastructure in the Holy Land. A binational state, the logical
consequence of these developments, would present a gruesome
scenario from the Israeli standpoint, as it would destroy the very
foundations on which Israel is built as a Jewish and democratic
society.
Strengthen Lebanon
Solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a vital precondition in
any sustainable solution to the crisis in the Middle East, but in
itself it is, of course, insufficient. One fundamental factor in
the domestic pacification of Lebanon is a resumption of the
internal Lebanese dialogue on the full implementation of the 1989
Taif Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Disarming
Hizbullah and restoring the sovereign powers of the Lebanese state,
in particular the state monopoly on the use of force, depend upon
counter-incentives being offered to Hizbullah.
These incentives are above all political. To date the Shiites have
only had 27 out of 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament, because of
a fixed proportionate system based on religions. This is only
21.1%, although according to unofficial estimates the Shiites
account for a much larger share of the population.
This internal pacification process must be complemented by the
resolution of other open Israeli-Lebanese disputes, such as a
successful exchange of Israeli and Lebanese prisoners, as well as
international, above all Arab, financial assistance to facilitate
the return of internally displaced persons and the reconstruction
of devastated areas.
Involve Syria
Yet developments in Lebanon are not only influenced by the
relationship between Hizbullah and Israel and the political
imbalance between religious communities, but also by the activities
of the regional players Syria and Iran.
In the Arab world a triangular principle applies: no war without
Egypt, no peace without Syria and no agreement without Saudi
Arabia. This refers to the military power of Egypt, the disruptive
potential of Syria and the financial clout of Saudi Arabia. This
triad obviously also applies to Lebanon. Without Syria's active
involvement, all international efforts to stabilize Lebanon will
remain patchwork.
Syria has always held itself to be a leading advocate of
Pan-Arabism, or Arab nationalism, and the defender of the
Palestinian liberation struggle. That is why Hizbullah and the
radical Palestinian resistance groups always have been pawns and
Lebanon a proxy battlefield for Syria in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
obviously partly to avoid direct confrontation with a militarily
superior Israel. Today Syria needs Hizbullah for its continuing
gadfly campaign against Israel, but also to preserve its influence
in Lebanon.
Given the rapid decline in oil reserves - Syria will have become a
net importer of oil by 2020 according to Syrian data, and by 2014
according to foreign sources - and the continuing lack of financial
and economic aid from the Arab and Western communities, Syria's
iron foreign policy principle of "Live off the crisis, keep the
crisis simmering, but when it comes to the crunch be part of the
solution" is in jeopardy.
It is hardly surprising, then, that Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad since 2003 repeatedly has been offering Israel direct
peace negotiations without any prior conditions. It is also not
much of a surprise that, if Syria has turned on the charm,
Jerusalem is not taking any notice: As long as the U.S. can take
the cudgel to soften Syria up in its "War on Terror," Israel's hand
will be strengthened automatically in negotiations on the occupied
Golan Heights.
Syria - a state founded on a diversity of religions and ethnic
groups - will only be ready to yield its pawn Hizbullah, its direct
influence in Lebanon, its support for the Iraqi resistance and the
tactical alliance with Iran achieved through foreign policy if:
international pressure on Israel leads to serious, productive
negotiations about the Golan Heights; the EU chips in with its
unsuspended EURO-MED Association Agreement as an additional
incentive; the U.S. offers to repeal SALSA (Syria Accountability
and Lebanese Sovereignty Act of 2003); and Saudi Arabia makes a
Syrian-Israeli agreement look financially appealing. A solution to
the border demarcation between Lebanon and Syria - especially with
regard to the Shebaa Farms2 - can only emerge as part of this total
package.
Integrate Iran and Solve the Nuclear Conflict
Peacefully
Iran can only be expected to play a constructive role in the Middle
East conflict, i.e. refrain from using Hizbullah for asymmetric
warfare and acts of sabotage, if a compromise with Tehran is
reached on the nuclear issue that the Iranians feel "saves
face".
The U.S., which describes Iran in its latest national security
strategy assessment as the greatest threat to the country, so far
also has been absent from the negotiating table. And this was the
main reason why the negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran failed.
Apparently only Washington can deliver the security guarantees and
the status gain for Iran that might change Iran's cost-benefit
analysis of its nuclear program.
In addition, there have been proposals for political compromises
which would serve short-, medium- and long-term solutions, such as
those submitted in summer 2005 by Tim Guldimann, Switzerland's
ambassador to Iran from 1999 to 2004, and Bruno Pellaud, deputy
director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and head
of its Verification Department from 1993 to 1999.
Under this agreement Iran would undertake to exercise nuclear
self-restraint and would accept far-reaching international
monitoring of its nuclear activities. The international community
would, in return, grant the country a very limited enrichment
capacity, provide technological support and offer attractive
cooperation.
Stabilize Iraq
The break-up of Iraq can only be prevented by a strong federal
government of national unity, the withdrawal of foreign troops and
the fundamental review of the constitution. There is still time to
do this. The four-month period originally envisaged for
fundamentally revising the constitution after the government of
Nouri al-Maliki took office in May 2006 has been extended to 24
months. Without a broad commitment from the international
community, and without integrating the regional neighbors, hostile
ethnic groups will not, however, manage to maintain Iraq's
territorial integrity.
Increased political legitimacy is a basic precondition for
improving security in Iraq. It is equally important to enhance the
quality of the instruments for improving security, the Iraqi
security forces.
Build a Broad-based Policy of Disarmament and
Détente
Resolving the Middle East conflict, stabilizing Iraq and overcoming
the nuclear conflict with Iran are all prerequisites for a
broad-based regional policy of disarmament and détente, the
aim being to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction,
which must lead to greater security and cooperation in the
region.
The Middle East is suffering from a multipolar conflict, which is
taking place along several overlapping interfaces between Turkey,
Iran, Israel and the Arab world. In this region weapons of mass
destruction are not simply there for deterrence but are actually
being used. There is also no territorial status quo, with many
border issues still unresolved. Besides, apart from the Arab
League, there is no regional multilateral institution that might
serve to build confidence.
Other models - such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) - may offer
helpful inspiration for a regional security structure. The role of
the external players will focus on mediation, however. The
initiative needs to come from the region itself. And there already
exist several embryonic approaches: the Mubarak Initiative, the
initiative launched by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and, not least,
the initiative by the former Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan. This
process will only succeed in the long term if a common, viable code
of conduct can take shape. The process needs to be dynamic and
embrace all the players - the Arab world, Israel, Iran and Turkey -
to permit dialogue between the states in the region and between the
states and their (civil) societies.
Promote Socio-economic Development and Integration
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) will not replace the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or the Barcelona Process, but
since 2003 the EMP has been subordinate to the ENP. Through its
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) the EU has
made 14.3 billion euros available from 2007 to 2013, which is much
more funding for the 10 Mediterranean littoral states and six
Eastern European countries than in the past under the still
segregated programs MEDA and TACIS (8.5 billion euros from 2000 to
2006). This makes the EU the biggest external player in development
cooperation for the region, able to sustainably drive
socio-economic development and regional integration. The ENP also
offers more than the EMP, with access to the four freedoms
(capital, goods, services and labor). But the ENP must prove its
case by liberalizing trade in agricultural produce and constructing
a common migration policy.
Press for More Open Politics
The international community should be pressing for the region to
open up more in political terms. Two forums in particular, the ENP
and the Broader Middle East Initiative (BMENA), can be used. With
the ENP the EU is also changing course strategically. It renounces
the whip threatened but never applied under the EMP (suspension
clause) and relies instead on incentives (positive conditionality):
The better the common targets in bilateral action plans are
achieved, the greater the political, economic and financial
rewards. The EU should work to ensure that specific domestic
political reform targets are included in these action plans
alongside the many concrete aims relating to economic
modernization.
In the BMENA, born in 2004 when transatlantic ranks were closed
after the rifts engendered by the latest Iraq war, the
international community should ensure that the initiative is
founded on the following principles: Apart from regional ownership
and avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach, the priorities are
credibility and advancing democracy. The credibility of the BMENA
Initiative can only be achieved if consistent and non-violent
efforts are made to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraq
crisis and the nuclear conflict with Iran.
Promoting democracy must also answer hitherto unresolved questions
about how to deal with Islamism. The aim must be to integrate into
the political process those sections of the Islamist movement who
are ready and capable of this, and who declare unmistakably that
they renounce violence and are willing to live in peace and to
respect the rules of the democratic game in their countries.
It would be fundamentally wrong to tar all Islamist groups with the
same brush and stigmatize them as seditious or terrorist, or to
marginalize and repress them. Participation in parliamentary
activity and government not only serves integration, but inevitably
leads to a demystification of Islamist movements.
International political and financial support for secular,
democratic movements in the region is particularly important in the
way it can reconquer those spheres and sectors of society that have
so successfully been occupied by the Islamist movement.
Conclusion
Peace in the region of the Near/Middle East and North Africa
currently seems to be a mirage, a hallucination. But a mirage is
not an optical illusion so much as a visual effect, a reflection in
the air. The mirage, then, is rooted in natural processes that can
be physically explained. Peace in the Middle East is also possible
if we address the origins of the conflicts in this region.
1 The Declaration of Common Principles of 13/9/1993; the
Cairo Agreement (Oslo I) of May 4, 1994 (including the Paris
Protocol on Economic Cooperation of April 29, 1994); the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) of September 28,
1995; the Hebron Protocol of January 15, 1997; the Wye River
Memorandum of October 23, 1998; and the Wye River Agreement II of
September 4, 1999.
2 UN Security Council Resolution 425 has been confirmed after
Israel's complete withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 on the basis of
at least two documents: the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the
Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line of 1949 attributing the Shebaa Farms
to Syria. Lebanon and Syria have so far resisted this
interpretation but without producing documentary
substantiation.