New and Renewed Partnerships and Their Implications for
Peacekeeping in the Israeli-Palestinian Arena
As a result of the second Lebanon War and in accordance with United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006,
UNIFIL's (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) mandate was
extended and enhanced, and the troop strength significantly
enlarged. An important number of European countries and several
Asian countries have responded to the UN's call, sending troops to
Lebanon and contributing to the creation of an upgraded
multinational force that is currently being deployed on land and at
sea.
At the same time and in close proximity, despite the international
community's concerted efforts, Israelis and Palestinians have been
unable to progress in resolving their conflict since the beginning
of the second intifada. Even if current obstacles to a resumption
of the political process are overcome, the fate of such a process
is dubious. Previous experience shows that both sides have
tremendous difficulty in overcoming the barriers to peace, and may
stand to benefit from the assistance of international organizations
like the UN, NATO and the EU, as well as regional actors like
Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and others, in addition to the traditional
American involvement.
One promising means of international assistance is the traditional
peacekeeping operation, used in the region in abundance, mostly
deployed in or around the borders between Israel and the
neighboring Arab countries. These existing and longstanding forces
all have the mandate of observing and monitoring, among them UNDOF
(United Nations Disengagement Observer Force), maintaining the area
on the Israeli-Syrian border; UNTSO (United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization), the first UN peace mission whose
military officers currently occupy the observation posts of UNDOF
and UNIFIL; and the MFO (Multinational Force and Observers), an
independent international organization responsible for supervising
the implementation of the security provisions of the peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel.
Contemporary peacekeeping missions, known as Peace Support
Operations (PSO), however, extend far beyond the monitoring and
verification tasks of their predecessors and include a much more
varied force composition. The mandates of those missions are also
expanding on multiple horizons. Peacekeepers are increasingly
charged with nation-building tasks like economic rehabilitation,
democratization and building civil institutions and working police
forces. In addition, missions are being deployed in settings
considered less and less ripe for conflict resolution, adding to
their mandates authorization for the use of force and intervention
capabilities.1
One of the consequences of a heightened international involvement
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the recent creation of the
EU Border Assistance Mission (BAM) at the Rafah crossing point on
the Gaza-Egypt border and EU COPPS (Coordination Office for
Palestinian Police Support) who provide support to the Palestinian
Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing
arrangements. In the past few months there have also been renewed
discussions, initiated by European countries, on the possibility of
deploying new PSOs in the theater.
This paper outlines the preliminary lessons from the initiation,
acceptance and settling-in of UNIFIL II in the Israeli-Lebanese
arena that can be applied to a possible multinational PSO in the
Israeli-Palestinian arena. Special emphasis is given to the renewed
cooperation and partnerships created between the involved parties
around the decision to use the force as a means to implement
Resolution 1701 and the ensuing processes around its
deployment.
UNIFIL II: Current State
UNIFIL was created in 1978 by the UN following the adoption of
Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 to confirm Israeli
withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security,
and help the Lebanese government restore its effective authority in
the area. It was (and is) primarily deployed along the UN-drawn
Blue Line dividing Israel and southern Lebanon, and operated under
a Chapter Six mandate, limited to observing, monitoring and
patrolling activities.
During its long presence in Lebanon, UNIFIL has operated under
difficult conditions - with Israel, the South Lebanese Army (SLA)
and the PLO (and later Hizbullah) not fully accepting the UNIFIL
mandate with all its implications. The force's difficulties have
included the 1982 Israeli invasion, as well as becoming the target
of violence from different Lebanese sects and militias within its
area of operation. UNIFIL - and with it the UN - have also fallen
out of favor with Israel, which was highly critical of the force
for, among other things, collaborating with Hizbullah too closely
while not fully assisting with the goal of enhancing the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF). The low point in this complex relationship came
in October 2000, with the insufficient reporting of the abduction
of Israeli soldiers at Har Dov, followed by the UN's denial that it
possessed a videotape related to the kidnapping, to which it
admitted in July 2001.
The recently enhanced UN mission, deployed in Lebanon to implement
Resolutions 1701 and 1559, now numbers over 11,000 troops from 23
countries, a significant increase compared to the force of 2,000
that had dwindled since Israel's 2000 withdrawal from southern
Lebanon.
Resolution 1701, which ended 34 days of fighting, provided for a
strengthened mandate, coupled with a complete Israeli withdrawal
and the deployment of the LAF in the south. UNIFIL's renewed tasks
are "accompanying and supporting the Lebanese armed forces as they
deploy throughout the South, taking steps towards the establishment
between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any
armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the
Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL; assisting the Government of
Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry
points to prevent the entry in Lebanon, without its consent, of
arms or related materiel; coordinating its activities with the
Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel; and extending
its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian
populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced
persons."2
Additional roles for UNIFIL peacekeepers are the continued
provision of humanitarian assistance to the local population,
including medical, dental and veterinarian aid. Over the past
months specialized teams of de-miners have destroyed more than
16,000 explosive devices that included rockets, grenades and
cluster bombs. Troops are also involved with the reconstruction of
infrastructures, especially roads and bridges.
The mandate given to UNIFIL II is the most robust mandate given to
a force operating in the Israeli-Arab theater. It is positioned
between the UN's classic Chapter Six of monitoring and observing
and Chapter Seven, which gives the Security Council broader powers
to take action (i.e., peace enforcement), including warlike actions
to deal with threats or breaches of peace. The new resolution
states that UNIFIL can "take all the necessary action in areas of
deployment of its forces, and as it deems with its capabilities, to
ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile
activities of any kind."3 In other words, there is a mandate to use
force beyond self-defense, including the "resisting of attempts by
forceful means to prevent UNIFIL from discharging its duties."
After long negotiations with and within contributing countries, the
mandate does not, however, include the interception of arms
shipments from Syria unless requested to do so by the Lebanese
government, nor will it directly disarm Hizbullah but only support
the LAF in doing so through assistance on the ground and by
training personnel.
The problematic consequences of the first part of this decision are
already manifested on the ground - UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
in his December 1, 2006 letter to the Security Council, indicated
there were "significant deficiencies" in equipment, training and
coordination among four different Lebanese government services
responsible for the borders."4 The report mentioned the reports of
incidents of illegal arms smuggling across the Lebanese-Syrian
border, and Hizbullah getting stronger as a result.
Thus far, relatively few serious (and expected) violations have
been reported by Israel and Lebanon. In addition, several incidents
of unauthorized weaponry were reported by peacekeepers, which the
Lebanese army destroyed. An incident in which a de-mining team was
challenged by two Hizbullah personnel in uniform carrying rifles
led to their arrest by the LAF. However, booby traps have been
found around an arms cache meant for UNIFIL,5 and reports of Al
Qaida threats to harm UNIFIL persist.6 The more publicized
incidents concerned Israeli intelligence flights over Lebanon and
coordination mishaps with the German Navy. In the past month,
however, Israel has changed its flight maneuvers so they will not
be perceived as threats, and the coordination arena is calm, part
of an effort at better cooperation. In sum, in the short term a
relative calm is being kept, but at the same time Hizbullah seems
to be re-arming itself significantly, with arms and men entering
Lebanon from Syria, capitalizing on the fact that Resolution 1701
does not include UNIFIL's control of border crossings.
Lessons Learned: UNIFIL II to the Israel-Palestine
Arena
Several similarities exist between the conditions under which
UNIFIL II operates and the conditions facing a potential PSO in the
Israel-Palestine arena - chaotic environments that include dealing
with both intra- and interstate conflicts; the extensive use of
terror by one of the parties, the necessity of both peace
enforcement and nation-building elements, and the centrality of the
conflict and its resolution to the Western world. These
similarities have led to an analysis of the initial UNIFIL II
experience, which identified several conditions and
confidence-building measures that could be potentially useful in
enhancing the effectiveness of the PSO:
* A fundamental understanding that, at a minimum, the
governments of Israel and Palestine, the troop-contributing states,
the international community and the UN can potentially achieve the
majority of their goals via an effective multinational force. A
related requirement is a basic partnership among the relevant
parties, which will only come about through a mutual and long-term
process of changing attitudes and mentalities. In the case of
Lebanon, the fact that Hizbullah is only a partial partner at best
is taking its toll, the recent uprising against the Siniora
government being one example.
* The creation of the multinational force being considered an
achievement by both parties, declared publicly by the highest
political figures to be a positive and necessary entity. For
example, the Israeli government indicated that Hizbullah's removal
from its positions along the border and the deployment of an
international peacekeeping force that enables the beginning of
diplomatic processes were considered the most important
achievements of the Lebanon War. Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad
Siniora described the 1701 resolution as "a triumph for Lebanese
diplomacy."
* The parties' deep involvement in the negotiation processes
over the terms set for the force. Both Israel and Lebanon were
an important part of the Track One and Track Two negotiations over
Resolution 1701. Although compromises were made regarding the Rules
of Engagement - mainly that UNIFIL troops would not actively
participate in the disarmament of Hizbullah and not be deployed at
border check points to prevent arms smuggling - the actual
influence exerted by Israel in the weeks before and after the final
signing contributed to the current state of higher commitment
rather than the dissatisfaction and bitterness that was typical of
Israel's attitude towards UNIFIL I. For example, Israel was
involved in multilateral and bilateral efforts to influence
European countries to send their troops to UNIFIL, and in
determining the overall composition of the force. Israeli Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni expressed, in her meeting with Annan on August
16, 2006, Israel's desire for a mixed force of European and Muslim
countries. An example of Siniora representing Lebanese interests is
his strong criticism of the early drafts of Resolution 1701,
written jointly by the U.S. and France, for not requiring Israel to
withdraw from southern Lebanon.
* Realistic expectations from the forces' mandate. Timur
Goksel, former spokesman for the UNIFIL, indicated in July 2006
that part of the great Israeli disappointment is a result of the
expectations that UNIFIL, rather than being a peacekeeping force,
would be a "combat force or an anti-terror force."7 Realistic
expectations and detailed and concrete agreements about the mandate
of the force and its rules of engagement are especially important
in the sensitive Israel-Palestine arena, where fantasies, strong
emotions and violence play a major part, as experienced by the EU
BAM force at the Rafah crossing in December 2007, when the crossing
was attacked by Hamas demonstrators.
* One of the keys to both Israel's and Lebanon's acceptance of
UNIFIL being that democratic European states, with their values and
their professional armies dominate the force, combined with having
a UN mandate and legitimacy. There is a strong similarity to
NATO in terms of composition and potential military effectiveness,
while at the same time reducing some of the controversies and
negative emotions that are often attached to the presence of the
U.S. and Britain in the Arab world, significantly enhanced by the
Iraq War. Additionally, it allows for the presence of forces from
Arab and Muslim states that promote its acceptance.
* Deep involvement and additional strong motivations of the
troop-contributing countries to succeed in the mission. Italy,
France and Germany, which contributed the largest number of troops,
have similar aspirations to strengthen their positions in Europe
and NATO. Italy's Prodi government has made a public strategic
decision to increase Italy's involvement in resolving conflicts in
the region. As of February 2007, it will also lead UNIFIL II.
UNIFIL's success in achieving its mission is tied, then, to the
image and esteem attached by external parties and internal
participants to the military capabilities of its most significant
contributors, motivating each contingent to perform at its
best.
* A balanced public view of the international community involved
in the multinational force that takes into account: the fundamental
right of Israel to exist, and to exist in a permanent secure
homeland for the Jewish people - free from attack, free from
terrorism and free from the threat of attack; and at the same time,
a belief in the fundamental right of the Palestinians to
independence, freedom, self-determination and a dignified
future. Reconciling these two fundamental beliefs into one
common vision has been the central effort of the mediation and
diplomatic efforts by the international community in the recent
past. The belief that Lebanon as represented by Siniora's
government is entitled to the same principles of independence,
freedom and self-determination, combined with a sense of urgency,
have been one of the catalysts of the relatively fast decision to
deploy UNIFIL II.
* Sound relationships with the international bodies responsible
for commanding the force. While Palestinians, for a variety of
reasons, have a strong relationship with many UN bodies, Israel's
relationship with the UN has seen significant and important changes
and progress in the past five years. New steps to enhance the
relationship are being taken; moving away in some parts from what
has long and often been a troubled relationship. This is generally
true, to differing extents, for the General Assembly, the Security
Council and the Secretariat, operating under the secretary-general.
Quite often the Secretariat charts a semi-independent course, such
as the work through the Middle East Quartet and the efforts
dedicated to the Road Map.8
Annan began to explicitly emphasize the need for the UN to be
balanced some time after the Lebanon War. This attitude, also
evident during the war, allowed Israel to relax its position
towards continuing and enhancing the deployment of UNIFIL, and is
therefore another pre-condition to the deployment of a PSO in the
Israeli-Palestinian arena.
Tactical coordination arrangements on the ground, some already set
before the deployment of the force, are also crucial to its
effectiveness. Examples from UNIFIL II include:
1) Frequent, regular and efficient meetings between high-level
military representatives of the involved parties. Such meetings are
also recommended at the strategic and political levels.
2) Enhanced and structured liaison mechanisms and channels, dealing
with day-to-day and emergency situations.
3) Continual mutual sharing of relevant intelligence and
information between the force and the parties that benefit from its
presence.
To summarize, Resolution 1701 and the ensuing UNIFIL II in its new
form have been in existence for only a short time, and a much
longer process is needed to be able to determine accurately the
effectiveness of its peace support mission and the necessary
conditions and factors that lead to it. However, it is a good time
to start reflecting on its initial relatively positive results and
to try and adapt this preliminary knowledge to the
Israeli-Palestine arena to help determine the conditions for a
successful and potent force that will help ease the complex
relationships between the parties.
Further indications that this kind of analysis is already being
carried out at the highest levels of the UN were seen in Annan's
remarks during Security Council sessions devoted to the
Israeli-Palestinian issue in December 2006, before the end of his
term as secretary-general. In more than one session Annan warned
that the situation is "more complex, more fragile, and more
dangerous than it has been for a very long time,"9 admonishing the
international community to shoulder its responsibility to help
promote a negotiated two-state solution.
This analysis is of special relevance because of the new
initiatives proposed by European countries to deploy such a force,
and the new openness displayed by Israel and Palestine to consider
different alternatives and ways for establishing an international
force in the territories as part of a future agreement.
1 Taken from a description of the Truman Institute Conference
on PSO in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict held at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem in June 2006.
2 UN Security Council, SC/8808, August 11, 2006.
3 UN Security Council, SC/8808, August 11, 2006.
4 UN Security Council S/2006/933. December 1, 2006.
5 From a very reliable report, the source of which I cannot
reveal.
6 IDF Major General Amos Yadlin, Knesset Foreign Affairs and
Defense Committee, January 9, 2007, as reported in The Jerusalem
Post.
7 From Democracy Now's web site and a telephone interview, July 26,
2006.
8 Based on a speech by Terje Rod-Larsen, former UN Special
Coordinator to the Middle East Peace Process, given at a 2004
conference at the Hartog School for Government and Policy.
