For centuries now, the Arab world has been tightly linked to
Europe, such that the two regions have periodically influenced and
been influenced by each other. The majority concur, however, that
Napoleon's Middle Eastern campaign (1797-1801) constituted a
watershed in the interaction between Europe and the Arab region
that has prevailed to this day. This relationship with Europe has
oscillated between the "Oriental question" in its various stages
and the desire to dominate, contain and subordinate on the part of
the two "blocs." A Levant that is retrograde, servile and
rebellious are epithets that have been intermittently used by the
Europeans in connection with the Arabs, and the coupling of
terrorism with them has led Europe to identify more with
international struggle than to look for elements of lasting
interest to both sides. Where do the Arabs stand today in light of
the waning European role vis-à-vis the United States and of
the ebbing Arab performance that has reached its lowest in this
century?
A history of the European position regarding the Arab world and its
issues is beyond the scope of this discussion; instead, this
article will present an overview of the European position regarding
the most protracted, complicated and sensitive of Arab issues - the
Palestinian question. And as today we are on the threshold of a new
reality, we should note the variables that have affected both
Europe and the Palestinian question throughout the latter's
history, to draw conclusions about the stand Europe is likely to
adopt regarding the Palestinian leadership's policies in the period
ahead.
European Responsibility
Historically, the Arabs and Palestinians view Europe as largely
responsible for the creation of the crisis in the region, in
particular, and the Arab world as a whole, during the era of
colonization, hegemony, control and trusteeship. Nevertheless,
Arabs and Palestinians feel comfortable with the new developments
in the European position, in spite of continued European insistence
on the necessity of the recognition by the Arabs, especially by the
Palestinians, of the right to existence of the entity that was
established on the land of Palestine with full European backing.
Thus, over the years, the European countries have made several
attempts to bring together Palestinians and Israelis, especially
after the 1973 war and the coming into prominence of the PLO as an
Arab and international body after 1974.
In the case of Palestine, Europe has pursued an inconsistent policy
since the beginning of the 19th century. The reason was to bolster
the idea of the establishment of a Jewish state on the land of
Palestine, an idea that was not counter to the desires of the
majority of Europeans, in spite of the divergence of their
respective interests on the eve of the First World War and after.
Although Palestine came under British control after the war, Europe
did not object to the consecration of the Zionist entity on the
land of Palestine through its endorsement of the Balfour
Declaration. The many changes that affected Europe at the beginning
of the 1930s concorded with the Jewish desire to turn Palestine
into a homeland for themselves, using to their advantage the
situation prevailing in Europe regarding Jews and minorities. Thus,
the biggest immigration wave to Palestine at that time took place
under Nazi rule in Germany and in light of the German threat to
Europe. This resulted in what can be termed as "the Palestinians
and Arabs having to pay the price for the sins of Europe toward
itself." This is what took place after the Second World War and it
was underpinned by the unlimited support for the recognition of the
Zionist entity in Palestine, whether through voting on the
Partition Plan (U.N. Resolution 181, 1947) or through the
recognition of the Jewish state and its admission to membership by
the community of nations at the beginning of 1949. Given Europe's
political and material support to the Israeli state, and especially
its help in the area of military technology, conventional and
unconventional, that led to a confrontation with the Arabs in 1956,
when Europe stood in alliance with Israel, Arab fears grew
regarding the European position towards the Palestinian question
and other Arab issues.
With the growing role of the United States on the Arab scene in the
1950s and 1960s, several European countries retreated slightly from
their previous policies, especially since this period also saw the
intensification of the Cold War between the Western and Eastern
poles, the decline of European capabilities on international and
regional levels, the marked primacy of Arab oil and the strategic
importance of the region with the growing challenges posed by this
international polarization. The Jewish state became a "necessity"
and a mainstay of American policy in the area. Israel, for its
part, tilted more towards America than Europe, clashing frequently
with European interests. The 1967 war became central to the
European position leading to clear policy changes regarding the
Palestinian issue, although never radical or at variance with the
U.S.A. The majority of European states, nonetheless, rejected the
1967 Israeli occupation of Arab land. This manifested itself in the
path the voting of European countries had taken in the United
Nations and the Security Council pertaining to the legal status of
the occupied territories, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
Criticism of Israel
Europe embarked on its own individual course, pioneered by France
as well as by other countries that were more susceptible to
developments on the Mediterranean coast, those directly affected by
stability or instability in the area. France, under the leadership
of De Gaulle, declared the necessity of Israel's withdrawal from
the land it occupied in 1967. De Gaulle stated this in a press
conference held at the end of 1967 when he also announced the
discontinuation of arms shipment to Israel. Germany found itself in
the embarrassing position of having to adopt a stance unacceptable
to Jews against the background of the German "guilt complex." The
Italians, who had many interests in the Arab countries, and fearing
the consequences of post-1967 developments, adopted a stand in line
with the European Community, one especially close to the French
position which was accused of bias against Israel. In fact, the
beginnings of the 1970s saw rising criticism against Israel by some
leftist parties in Europe. Britain, on the other hand, linked its
position with that of the Americans and was not influenced by the
European Community as it did not achieve membership until
1973.
As for the other European nations like Holland, Denmark and Norway,
they showed great solidarity with Israel, although, in Sweden, an
active movement was formed in protest against the 1967 Israeli
occupation of Palestinian land. A review of the voting patterns of
these countries in the U.N. after 1967 reveals that they wished to
maintain their policy supportive of Israel, though the latter had
embarked on changing the reality on the ground in the occupied
territories in contravention of international laws and
resolutions.
The 1970s marked a new era in the European position vis-à-vis
some of the central issues of the Palestinian question, when a new
and different discourse began to be heard in those countries.
Reports of Palestinian movements started to occupy space in the
European media alongside those of Israeli practices violating
international law and human rights in the occupied territories
through arbitrary and oppressive measures. In 1971, the European
Community presented a document that emerged from the meeting of its
foreign ministers in Paris, asking for a peaceful settlement in the
Middle East based on U.N. Resolution 242. This formed a departure
from its 1970 meeting which had shown a marked division among the
European countries: on one side were France and Italy and on the
other Germany, Holland, Denmark and Belgium, despite the members'
concurrence that the Middle East crisis constituted one of the
gravest threats to European interests, given Europe's geographic
proximity to the region, and its economic and political ties with
the Arabs. The year 1971, then, is considered the beginning of a
movement when a lowest common denominator was reached between the
two poles of the European Community that, under the leadership of
France, began to be concerned with preserving Europe's interests in
the region and safeguarding its security and economic projects
there.
The year 1973 was another landmark in the twists and turns of the
European stance towards Palestine and the Arabs, as the Europeans
realized that they were the party that stood to suffer most on the
economic, political and security levels in the wake of the 1973
war. Indeed, the use the Arabs made of their oil during that period
was one of the main factors that brought home to the European
nations the extent of their need of the Arabs and their oil.
Moreover, changes started to take place on the international scene
following the growing number of countries that had shaken off
colonialism and had adopted their own individual position regarding
the Palestinian problem. Thus, in addition to the role played by
the Soviet Union in this respect, the Muslim, non-aligned, and
Latin American countries formed a bloc supportive of the Arabs and
the Palestinians.
Europe Divided
American policy regarding the Palestinian problem, on the other
hand, was hardly evenhanded and, at the end of the day, could not
be conducive to bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiating
table. The European declaration made in October 1973 was to
reaffirm their 1971 document, emphasizing the necessity of a
peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but without taking
any concrete steps, as the European Community decided to leave the
resolution of this problem in the hands of the superpowers. The
Arab-European debate after 1974 was a testing ground for Europe as
one of the main subjects under discussion was that of PLO
representation in Europe. On that issue, the European Community was
divided, with France, Italy and Ireland in favor of representation
and Britain, Holland, Denmark and Germany against. The same
division characterized the European position regarding the
invitation of the PLO to the United Nations and Arafat's historic
speech in the General Assembly in 1974.
In the case of General Assembly Resolution 3236 of November 22,
1974, calling for the affirmation of the inalienable rights of the
Palestinian people, Norway and Iceland voted against the
resolution, while Sweden, Britain, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and
Holland abstained. Spain and Cyprus were the only European
countries to vote in favor of the resolution, alongside several
other non-European countries, totalling 89 votes. As for General
Assembly Resolution 3210, inviting the PLO to participate in
deliberations in the General Assembly, it was approved by the
European countries, with the abstention of Germany, Denmark,
Luxembourg, Holland and Britain; the other non-European countries
voted in favor. Regarding Resolution 3237, giving the PLO observer
status in the U.N., the European vote was as follows: Germany,
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Britain,
Norway, and Holland against; Sweden, France, Austria and Greece
abstained.
Ups and Downs in European Policy
The years following 1974 saw several individual and general
developments on the European scene, culminating in the Venice
Declaration of June 13, 1980. The declaration called for active PLO
participation towards a settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict.
This came following the several statements made by leaders from
Britain, France, Germany and Italy about the Palestinian issue and
the necessity of dealing with it in a more comprehensive manner
than the Camp David Accords. The growing role of the national
Palestinian movement in the occupied territories, the
intensification of Jewish settlement activity after the Likud came
to power in Israel (1977) and the increased repression of the
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (especially the
assassination attempts against the mayors, their deportation and
dismissal in the early 1980s), led Europe to espouse a strong stand
vis-à-vis Israel, and to consider its practices in the
occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, those of an
occupation power.
The 1980s, on the other hand, marked a cooling in Europe's attitude
towards the Palestinian question. This was a result of several
factors: the advent to power of Thatcher in Britain, Reagan in the
United States and Mitterrand in France reconjured the specter of
the Cold War, especially after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan.
On the Arab front, divisiveness reigned after the dismissal of
Egypt from the Arab League in the wake of the Camp David Accords.
The period was also marked by the assassination of Egyptian
president Anwar Sadat and the Iraq-Iran war. The change in the
French position trickled down to other European countries after
Mitterrand distanced himself from the stand taken by his
predecessors - De Gaulle, Pompidou and D'Estaing - as well as from
the European declarations of the 1970s. In his visit to Israel on
3-5 March, 1982, Mitterrand praised the courage of the young state,
eschewing any criticism of its racist practices against the
Palestinians living under occupation. On the contrary, he attacked
the PLO and wondered how it could sit at the negotiating table with
Israel without having recognized that state. Nevertheless,
Mitterrand did not abandon the notion of an eventual Palestinian
state, built on dialogue and negotiations between Palestinians and
Israelis.
The Lebanon war of 1982 shocked Europe with the magnitude of the
invasion, reviving the image of an unstable region, placing
European interests in jeopardy, to the extent that the Bonn
Declaration of June 9, 1982, hinted at the possibility of the use
of sanctions against Israel. But Europe was unable to liberate
itself from the clutches of the Reagan-Thatcher collaboration
towards a toning down of the European stand regarding the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon. This is what emerged in the Brussels
Declaration of June 29, 1982, in spite of a European call for a
rapid Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the affirmation of
Palestinian rights, including the right to
self-determination.
Europe's higher policy regarding the Palestinian question remained,
all along, hostage to that of the Americans, until the year 1986.
On October 27 of that year, the ministerial council of the European
Community adopted a proposal pertaining to the labeling of "Made in
Palestine"of products coming from the occupied territories. Also
the entry that year of Spain and Portugal into the Community
enhanced the "pro-Palestinian" stream within it. Europe called for
an international conference to debate the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict and for an improvement of the living conditions of the
inhabitants of the occupied territories. This impacted not only on
the official European position, but also on a popular level on
public opinion, especially with the eruption of the Intifada (1987)
that pushed Europe to the forefront of politics in the
region.
Reappraisal of the PLO
The Intifada was a cause for a reappraisal of the role of the PLO,
on the one hand, and for a heightened preoccupation of regional and
international politics with a prominent Palestinian occurrence that
could not, under any pretext, be ignored. During this period,
Yasser Arafat visited several European capitals, among which was
Rome, on 3-4 November, 1988, before the proclamation by the
National Council of its recommendations and important resolutions
on November 15, 1988, which included a Palestinian peace
initiative, alongside the declaration of independence. Europe's
response to this was one of encouragement as spelled out in the
Brussels Declaration of November 21, 1988. Subsequently, several
European capitals received Arafat - Madrid in January and Paris in
May, where he met with Mitterrand. With this the
Palestinian-European relations entered a new and important phase.
In this connection, one cannot ignore the role Sweden played in
opening channels of communication between the PLO and Jewish
American groups in the U.S.A., nor the role played by the PLO
membership in the Socialist International and its relations with
the European socialist parties, a fact which also helped break the
ice between it and the leaders of the Israeli Labor party.
Europe formed the bridge that was ultimately to lead to those
Palestinian-Israeli meetings that had considerable impact on the
core of the Palestinian question. In spite of the Gulf War in
1990-1, which could have led to a cooling in the European stance
regarding Palestine, the European Community, its passive role
notwithstanding, was supportive of the Palestinians in the Madrid
Conference of October 30, 1992. Thus stood the situation at the
time of the Declaration of Principles (Oslo) in September 1993. A
"new" Europe had entered the secret-contacts race between
Palestinians and Israelis, initiating contacts that are said to
have started in London before moving to Norway, but whose real
beginnings took place in Stockholm in 1988. After the signing of
the peace agreement in Washington, Europe took upon itself great
commitments: it is considered one of the biggest donors to the
Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
The defeat of the Israeli Labor party in the 1996 elections,
following Yitzhak Rabin's assassination, prompted the adoption by
Europe of a firmer stand towards Israel. This was expressed in
several areas, such as the United Nations, and in the show of
solidarity with the Palestinians by providing financial assistance
to the PNA. The problem with the European position is that it is
more acceptable to the Palestinians, but is rejected by Israel,
blocking Europe's attempt at an active role in the
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
A More Independent Position
Today, Europe receives Arafat on its soil in an official capacity,
gives millions in financial assistance to the PNA and helps diffuse
tension in the area during periods when the United States has other
priorities. Nonetheless, Europe has failed to accede to the role of
a major mover or partner in developments that are shaping a region
so close to it. Europe, which in the past was incapable of taking a
stand of its own in the face of the United States in matters
pertaining to European issues (like former Yugoslavia), will again
be unlikely to adopt an independent position on the Middle East in
1999 - and certainly not one that would be considered extremist or
radical by Israel and the United States. Thus Europe is trying to
consolidate its role in an attempt to avert the moment of
embarrassment that threatens the future of the peace process in the
area, capitalizing on the quality of its relationship with the
Palestinians, as well as their weakness and, occasionally, their
financial needs.
Europe has in 1999 adopted a more positive policy vis-à-vis
the peace process in the region, the right of Palestinians to
self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
The Berlin Declaration of March 1999 crystallizes the European
stand regarding a Palestinian state and calls for the necessity of
reaching a permanent settlement before year's end. In a similar
vein are the resolutions and recommendations of the European
parliament relating to this topic, as well as the decision by the
Republic of Ireland to upgrade the level of Palestinian
representation and to open a representation office for it in
Palestine. For the European Community, much will depend on the
formation of the new Israeli government and the unfolding of its
agenda.
Sources used in addition to newspapers, radio and
TV
1. Khader, Bishara. Europe and the Arab World: Closeness and
Proximity. Trans. Abdallah, Joseph. Beirut: Center for Studies of
Arab Unity, 1993.
2. Al-Az'ar, Mohammad Khaled. The European Community and the
Palestinian Question (Arabic). Amman: Dar Al-Jalil Lil Nashr,
1991.
3. Institute of Palestine Studies. United Nations Resolutions
Pertaining to Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-1974,
Vol. I.