In August 2005, the Palestinians rejoiced in the Gaza Strip: After
38 years of military occupation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
withdrew and the Jewish settlements were dismantled. Green and
white wooden fishing boats from Rafah and Khan Younis,
respectively, came to join a small yellow fleet in the Gaza City
port, where Palestinian flags fluttered in anticipation of Mahmoud
Abbas's appearance. The Palestinian Authority (PA) president
arrived at the port and gave a passionate but prudent speech,
urging the Palestinians to demonstrate restraint in the face of
this unprecedented opportunity: freedom in a piece of what remained
of Palestine. Not a bullet was fired at the departing Jewish
settlers, nor was a missile launched into Israel. The festivities
continued into the night: trucks with young men pounding drums and
chanting in the streets; women waiting and watching from the
windows; synthesizer music blaring from blown-out buildings
converted into pre-nuptial dance floors, and lively parties at
sea-front hotels; kitschy artificial flower wreaths on the
sidewalks, posters of Abbas and, of course, Yasser Arafat; and
always the staccato spattering of gunfire rounds. Summer is the
season of marriages, and every night was a party. The occupation
was over and the Gazans were happy for a short while.
Short-lived Joy
The fleeting taste of freedom dissipated as reality set in. No IDF
soldier or Jewish settler remained inside the Gaza Strip, but the
small sliver of territory remained closed to the outside world. The
hope instilled by the UNDP-PAPP banners - "Today Gaza …
Tomorrow the West Bank and Jerusalem" - turned to spiteful
disillusionment as the Gazans remained largely quarantined. The
Israeli Navy limited fishing to within a few kilometers of the
coast. And Israel has stopped granting permits to Palestinians to
work in the southern Israeli cities of Ashkelon (Majdal) or Ashdod,
or to look for work in Tel Aviv. Plenty of young men loiter along
the beach, the bullet wounds in their legs the telltale signs of
their attempt to swim to the smokestacks of Ashkelon in search of
work. Small arms and light drugs still freely pass the Israeli
barrage, going through Gaza into the Negev and Sinai deserts, via
the infamous tunnels, also used by resistance fighters to carry out
operations such as the kidnapping at Kerem Shalom on June 25,
2006.
In November 2005, the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EU
BAM-Rafah) went into effect to monitor the passage of people
through the only crossing point along the Egypt-Gaza Strip border.
Upon leaving, the IDF removed all technical equipment at the Rafah
crossing. The Palestinians then resorted to using the old scanners
and conveyor belts from the closed Rafah International Airport.
Germany had provided financial aid, but the IDF bombarded and
bulldozed the runway. Nonetheless, the number of Palestinians
passing through the Rafah crossing did increase substantially, and
the EU civilian mission was deemed an immediate success for having
deployed so rapidly. However, the other clauses of the Agreement of
Movement and Access (AMA) between Israel and the PA, providing the
guidelines to the EUBAM-Rafah, were not implemented. Some of the
outstanding points include:
* a safe passage connecting the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, to
allow for the transport of goods and people;
* the restoration of the Rafah International Airport;
* the reconstruction of the Gaza City port; and
* the facilitation of movement within the West Bank by decreasing
IDF checkpoints.
And as attention was diverted to the Israeli disengagement from the
Gaza Strip, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon tried to
promote construction in the E1 area between Jerusalem and Maaleh
Adumim, in an attempt to expand the Israeli hold on "Greater
Jerusalem" while cutting off East Jerusalem from the West
Bank.
A Victory and Its Aftermath
With the widely held belief that Hamas "drove" the Israelis out of
Gaza, the Palestinians saw that their hope for achieving freedom
lay in a change of government. This resulted in the electoral
victory of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in January 2006.
European observers deemed the Palestinian legislative elections
fair and democratic, but Israel quickly imposed three conditions
for dealing with a Hamas-led PA: 1) the immediate recognition of
Israel, 2) the renouncing of the use of violence, and 3) the
recognition of all previous agreements between Israel and the PA.
Having gained popular credit for its armed resistance against the
Israeli occupation and for the "liberation" of the Gaza Strip,
Hamas would have been committing political suicide to acquiesce
immediately or explicitly to these demands.
Israel then drove the last nail in the coffin of the Oslo Accords
when it broke the Paris Protocol of April 1994 by withholding
payment of all customs and tax revenues - some US$50 million
destined for the PA every month. The financial embargo was matched
by an international freeze on all foreign funds to the PA, and all
diplomatic contact was cut with the new Hamas-led PA
government.
The provocative Israeli shelling of Palestinian families on Gaza
beaches and the killing of a prominent militia leader, Jamal Abu
Samhadana, who had recently been nominated to the top Palestinian
security position, drove Hamas to launch homemade Qassam rockets
into Israel. Incidentally, Hamas was the only Palestinian militant
group to have maintained the 16-month truce with Israel since Abbas
managed to negotiate a ceasefire with Sharon in Sharm al-Sheikh in
February 2005.
For Israeli security reasons, the Rafah crossing, as well as all
other crossing points, remain closed. Curiously, the IDF still
retains ultimate control of the passage of Palestinians at the
Rafah crossing from Kerem Shalom, even though Rafah is on the
Egypt-Gaza border. EU mission activities at Rafah have been
suspended and no Palestinians are allowed to pass. The Gaza Strip
is completely sealed and is being pounded relentlessly by the IDF,
an action now widely perceived as an attempt to smash for good
Hamas's capacity to govern the PA.
The subsequent kidnapping of an Israeli soldier on June 25, 2006,
at Kerem Shalom was allegedly an act of revenge by independent
Palestinian militants. As the World Cup mesmerized the world, the
IDF ravaged the Gaza Strip; the IDF bombed the bridges connecting
the Gaza Strip and destroyed the electricity plant providing over
50% of the Gazans' energy supply. Due to the Israeli closure, the
scarcity of fuel and food quickly deteriorated into what the UN
called "a grave humanitarian crisis." The IDF proceeded to kidnap
newly appointed PA ministers and parliamentarians, as well as over
60 civil servants affiliated with Hamas in Ramallah and East
Jerusalem; they also destroyed the PA Ministries of the Interior
and of Foreign Affairs, as well as the prime minister's office in
Gaza City. Enticed by pure escapism, the Palestinians preferred
watching the World Cup, rather than living with the constant sound
of death.
'Just Like Beirut'
In the Gaza Strip, F-16 fighter jets constantly break the sound
barrier. The pressure from the sonic booms shatters glass and
windows. "Just like Beirut in 1982," said Michael Jansen, after her
exit from the Gaza Strip. Coincidentally, the veteran Middle East
correspondent is the author of The Battle of Beirut1, the first
book about "Why Israel invaded Lebanon." On a fortuitous taxi ride
to Amman, she said the Palestinians kept their windows and doors
open as they watched the World Cup, just like in Beirut, not caring
so much who won, provided there were goals scored - some
existential excitement and distraction from death.
During the Israeli siege and bombardment of Beirut in August 1982,
the Lebanese brought their television sets down into the streets to
watch the World Cup. The street is safer than an apartment room and
creates a sense of solidarity with fellow citizens. And this
solidarity that emanates from cheering for a common cause is what
Mahmoud Darwish, the renowned Palestinian poet, describes
insightfully, contrasting the delayed boredom with the Palestinian
cause with the thrill of the World Cup: "Soccer provides the outlet
previously provided by Palestine."2 Once having rallied to the call
of Palestinian national aspiration, Arab states - degenerate
monarchical and repressive military dictatorships - remain silent
and inactive in Gaza in 2006, as in Beirut in 1982 and again in
2006.
Saturation and Apathy
The repetition of death connected with the state of Palestine,
Darwish writes, "creates boredom when the scene goes on too long."
And Jansen's description, "just like Beirut," was eerily prophetic
as Israel invaded and destroyed Lebanon again in the wake of the
abduction by Hizbullah of two Israeli soldiers. In August 2006, a
year after Israel disengaged from Gaza, the renewed Israeli
incursions into, and bombardment of, the Gaza Strip have become
banal, rarely arouse interest, and barely make second-page news. On
the front page, on radio and the evening news, Israel's bellicose
acts reflect the inherent recurrence of the Israeli-Arab conflict.
International attention now focuses on Hizbullah and Lebanon
instead of Hamas and Gaza, thus continuing to neglect the initial
root cause of the conflict. And as a viable Palestinian state slips
further out of sight, the world keeps watching.