In these pages I will look at the phenomenon of unilateralism in
Israeli politics from two different angles: I will first attempt to
get to the roots of unilateralism, which I see primarily as a
cultural and conceptual state, characterizing the attitude of
Israeli society toward the Arab expanse surrounding it. I will
subsequently look at the implications of unilateralism on the
reality that is developing in the West Bank regarding the
settlements.
"Unilateral Identity"
In The Guide to the Perplexed, the most important philosophical
treatise composed in the Jewish world during the Middle Ages,
Maimonides (1135-1204) deals with the contradiction inherent in
ascribing names and titles to God - that is the problematic nature
of attempting to positively define God. Every attempt to do so
forces one to use concepts familiar to one from one's subjective
consciousness, which leads one in the end to what Maimonides calls
"idolatry". Maimonides moves on to build a "negative theology,"
that is reductive theology focusing on denying titles.
Analogously, it seems doubtful to me whether it is possible to find
a positive definition of the existence of the Israeli collective.
By which I mean a definition that would be acceptable to an
absolute majority of Israelis1. Israelis are not only mizrachim or
Ashkenazim (from Middle Eastern/North African or European
backgrounds). They are not religious or traditional, just as they
are not only secular. They are not only Hebrew speakers, since a
proportion of Israelis speak poor Hebrew, if at all. Even their
affiliation to the Jewish religion is not common to all, since a
significant number of Israelis (eligible under the Law of Return,
or their spouses) do not answer to the orthodox-halachic definition
of "who is a Jew."
Despite all this, there is one proven way of defining who is an
Israeli. But, as in the attempt to define divinity, it is necessary
to make do with a negative definition of Israeliness: an Israeli is
a citizen, or resident, who lives in Israel, but is not an Arab.
The significance of this is that the widest common denominator of
Israeli identity is built on the denial of the Arab identity. This
principle is valid when talking about the Arabs of Israel, or the
West Bank, or those in the Middle East surrounding Israel. I would
like to stress that this issue has nothing to do with another
question which fascinates Middle East researchers: is there a
common Arab identity? It is sufficient if we agree that, from the
point of view of most Israelis, there is certainly such an
identity.
This identity conflict is the cause of the State of Israel's
difficulty in defining the nature of its relationship with its Arab
citizens - who number about one- fifth of the population. One of
the most violent and painful expressions of this identity conflict
took place when, during the riots of October 2000, Israeli police
officers killed 12 Israeli Arab citizens.
It is my understanding that the seeds of unilateralism were
nurtured in the general Zionist experience, and in the Israeli
experience in particular, by the way that "Israeliness" sees
itself. It appears to me that some of the very foundation stones of
Israeli identity stand on the mother lode of the denial of the
legitimacy of the Arab-Palestinian existence in Israel. This is in
contrast to the phenomenon of the denial of the existence of the
Arab-Palestinian population in Israel, which from the time of the
former prime minister Golda Meir, who held that there is not a
Palestinian problem, since there are no Palestinians, is
diminishing from the central Israeli political discourse.
As a matter of fact the Arab-Palestinian existence (mainly in
Israel per se) is beginning to occupy greater volume in the Israeli
political dialogue. However, for the most part it is represented as
an imminent threat to the Israel collective. This no doubt explains
the success of the two parties that waved the flag of "borders
ensuring a solid Jewish majority" in the last elections - Ehud
Olmert's ruling Kadima party and the right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu
party, led by Avigdor Lieberman. The differences between the two
are simply in the degree of effort each are prepared to invest to
accomplish the goal - maximum territory with minimum Arabs.
The Settlement Enterprise - an Expression of
Unilateralism
"These are liberated territories belonging to the People of
Israel." (Menachem Begin, 1977)
From its first day the settlement enterprise was a unilateral
measure meant to serve the purposes of the Israeli collective. The
basis for this enterprise is that in the "Land of Israel," which
extends on both sides of the pre-1967 Green Line border, there is
one legitimate collective - the Jewish-Israeli collective. It is
the right of Jewish Israelis to do everything to safeguard their
monopoly. This attitude still permeates the Israeli leadership.
However there has been a significant change in the way a major
sector of Israeli citizens - particularly those policy-makers
surrounding former prime minister Ariel Sharon and who continue to
influence Prime Minister Olmert - regard the settlements. The Gaza
disengagement was the first authentic expression of this.
After 40 years of intensive settlement activity in the West Bank
the Israeli public has come to realize the obvious, that when
Israel rules in the settlement of Beit El, for example, it is also
responsible for what happens a few kilometers south of there - in
Ramallah. In other words many more Israelis now understand the
settlement enterprise has brought the State of Israel to a
crossroad where it must choose between two conflicting ways -
annexing the West Bank and creating a bi-national state, or
annexing the West Bank and formalizing the de facto apartheid
situation there. Since most of the Israeli Jewish population is not
interested in paying the price of these alternatives, the third
option is to reevaluate the settlement policy in the territories.
It should be noted that the first to comprehend the significance of
the Gaza disengagement were the settler leaders. The main thrust of
the obdurate opposition of the settlers, led by the Judea and
Samaria Council, was not against the Gaza disengagement as such
(even thought this was difficult for them), but rather that, for
the first time in nearly 40 years, Israeli settlement policy would
be weighed in terms of the cost and profit to the state. The
settlers realized the Gaza precedent would mean that sooner or
later the very foundations of the settlement ethos would be shaken
to the core. That since the state faced the same dilemma in the
West Bank as it had faced in Gaza - what to do with the Palestinian
population living in the territories captured in 1967?
Since much of the Israeli public had concluded that that the
settlement dilemma had to be dealt with, the question that arose is
which portion of the settlements needed to be evacuated in order to
escape the looming conflict? Once again unilateral measures seemed
to be of relevance. In theory Israel could initiate another
bilateral move. But in order to do so the Israeli government would
have to make two difficult decisions:
1. Firstly, it would have to recognize the legitimacy of the
existence, and the long-term interests of the Palestinian
collective. This would require not lip-service recognition, but
also a freeze on building in the settlements.
2. Secondly, it would have to come to terms with the evacuation of
a much bigger number of settlers who reside in the "settlement
blocs," which Israel had previously intended keeping under its
control.
However, Israeli governments have preferred marathon negotiating
sessions with dozens of delegations from countries thousands of
kilometers away from the conflict. All this in order not to carry
out meaningful negotiations with the Palestinians, since this would
have required of Israel a change of attitude it was not prepared to
undergo. This situation, which meanders between the pathetic and
the tragic, symbolizes above all the absurdity of our conjoined
reality.
Creating Facts on the Ground, Unilaterally
"The obstacle does not define the border and therefore its
erection is not based on any political frontier line."
- Defense Ministry Web site
http://www.securityfence.mod.gov/Pages/Heb?shelot.htm
"We would not be investing here if we did not know for certain
that the Ariel bloc would continue to be an inseparable part of the
State of Israel."
- Ehud Olmert during a visit to Ariel on 12 March, 2006.
There is no doubt, and on this score most of the supporters and
well as the opponents of the separation wall agree, that its
construction during the past three years has been the most
significant action affecting its links to the West Bank that the
State of Israel has carried out during the past decade. It is
patently obvious that the construction of the wall along its
present route is a blatant example of unilateralism. The wall is
creating a new reality in two main ways: on the one hand, most of
the territory and the Palestinian population of the West Bank are
found east of the wall. On the other hand most of the Israel
population living east of the Green Line are west of the wall
(about 370,000 out of some 440,000, including east Jerusalem). It
is most likely that in the near future, the wall will constitute
the frontier line between Israel and the West Bank. Therefore
Israel will continue to hold some key areas which will enable it to
divide the West Bank in several separate cantons.
The four main settlement blocs comprise:
* The Ariel-Kedumim-Karnei Shomron-Alfei Menashe bloc.
*The bloc north of Jerusalem comprising the following settlements:
Beit Horon, Givat Ze'ev and Givon, which are outside of the
Jerusalem boundary; and other suburbs that are within the municipal
boundaries such as Ramot, Neve Yaakov and Pisgat Zeev.
* The Maaleh Adumim bloc comprising Maaleh Adumim and five small
settlements in the area, a large industrial area, area E-1
earmarked for building another settlement and large open areas to
the east.
* The section of Gush Etzion east of Route 60 and comprising the
settlements of Efrat and Migdal Oz.
Two differentparallel narratives are taking place in the West Bank:
the first one is the old story of expansion of settlements. The
second one is the new narrative reflected in a shrinking of the
Israeli presence in parts of the West Bank. On the ground, the
expansion of some settlements and outposts and the construction of
bypass roads continue in areas which are east of the wall.
However, the construction of the separation wall, to the west of
which most of the construction activity in the West Bank is taking
place, is the counter balance to the shrinking of the Israeli
presence.
It seems that the fact that these two narratives "co-exist" is
resulting primarily fromthe the situation that while the "Greater
Israel" idea is struggling to survive, there is still no other
clear alternative policy which the Israeli government has
adopted.
In light of the new reality in which the government of Israel,
headed by a former "prince of the Likud," announces that it intends
redrawing the borders which would involve the evacuation of dozens
of settlements and tens of thousand of settlers, there are those
who believe that the left has won the debate on the future of the
territories. However, it seems that the reality is much more
complex. The Zionist leftist's political agenda stands on two legs:
the first is that it is necessary, and possible, to dismantle
settlements. The other is that the evacuation should be carried out
during negotiations which would deal as well with the other
non-territorial issues which feed the conflict. At least for some
of the Israeli left, the belief that negotiation is a necessity is
not just a tactical position but expresses deep criticism of the
lack of Israeli recognition of the legitimacy of the Palestinian
existence in this land.
It therefore appears at present that the demographic and security
reality has brought a sufficient number of Israelis to understand
that there is no alternative to the dismantling of some of the
settlements. However, it seems to me that a long, rocky road lies
ahead for those who would attempt to persuade the Israeli public
that the Palestinian existence in this land is not a "historical
accident" whose ill effects have to be countered, but they should
be recognized as an indigenous group, with its own language,
culture and history. And, furthermore, with its own political
rights.
1 By saying it I don't mean that there are no ways to
positively define Israelis, only that any particular definition
probably wouldn't be accepted by many members of the Israeli
society.