The substitution after the creation of Israel of the term "Israeli
Culture" for that of "Hebrew Culture," which had been the accepted
term during the pre-state period, expresses a transformation in the
culture itself. Not only did the political and social institutions
of cultural life change, so did the way of life, the patterns of
human relationships and the ways in which these were expressed. As
a result, the understanding of the nature and function of culture,
and of spiritual creation, as uniting and identifying processes,
likewise changed. These processes are no longer perceived as the
central factor identifying one national society or people. As for
the society as a whole, people no longer seek within the framework
of nationality all their spiritual needs and the expression of
their "self" as individuals.
Thus the totality of individual and group creation is no longer
understood within the monistic framework of national culture.
Rather it is perceived as composed of many different compartments,
including the national, the religious and the national-religious,
which are not necessarily open and accessible to one another. In
place of a type of national society and culture, which seek
integration, there comes a broad gamut of partial identities and
belongings. Not only various communities, ethnic groups or
movements, but even single individuals can identify partially with
several of these, choosing their own "piece" at will (how young
people love the expression "this piece" ha-keta ha-zeh as a form of
expression typifying their way of thinking!).
In other words, the individual no longer entirely defines his/her
identity within the realm of nationalism, or even of religiosity.
This definition has been moved over to the instrumental and
organizational framework of the material culture, described in the
universal political terms of the state. This is, in fact, the
significance of "Israeliness," which for the majority of those who
identify themselves as "Israelis" connotes civil
political-linguistic-territorial belonging. This usually
incorporates a certain measure of "Hebraism" as well as of
"Judaism," in the religious, traditional or national sense, but
these factors are generally partial and fragmented. Even when found
at the core of personal identity, they are liable to be limited,
marginalized, or externalized in friendly relation or hostility to
the identity of others in the nation. They might even disappear
entirely, leaving in their wake, only a hazy memory of
"origin."
Emergence of a Fragmented Israeli Culture
This was the dialectic result of the establishment of the state. A
dialectic result was quite clearly not the intention of the
founders, who after "two thousand years of Exile" created a Jewish
state to be based on Hebrew culture. The state was called "Israel"
after the ancient name of people, for which in turn the land was
named, to indicate a distinct cultural and national identity.
According to the Declaration of Independence, Israel was intended
to be not only "the state of the Jews" but also "a Jewish state."
Laws were thus introduced shaping a policy of ingathering of exiles
and their social-cultural integration, of Jewish-national
education, and of the shaping of a Jewish public realm. Moreover,
in its early years, the state functioned as a "melting pot," whose
purpose was to forge an inclusive cultural-national identity on the
basis of the tradition of "Hebrew culture" from the pre-state
period.
However, the result of this process was just the opposite. In
practice, it focused on the establishment of a modern Israeli
"statehood" (mamlakhtiyut), in which priority was given to national
security and economic progress. The unifying national message
focused upon the immediate work at hand: the establishment of state
institutions and their efficient functioning, mainly requiring
knowledge and expertise drawn from external rather than traditional
Jewish sources.
Against this background and in an era of mass immigration within
the formal education frameworks there began a process of voluntary
rehabilitation of the cultural, religious, traditional, and ethnic
or modern-national heritages brought by the immigrants from
different backgrounds. Simultaneously, young people who had been
born and educated in the state sought their identities at a growing
distance from their parents' old-fashioned cultural sources. Thus,
the effort to integrate and to unite the people within the melting
pot of a national state culture led to the decline of the pre-state
culture and the emergence of a multicompartmentalized and
fragmented Israeli culture.
For the most part, the mass aliya rejected the Hebrew culture of
the pre-state community as alien, inadequate and irrelevant. Among
the reasons for this culture's demise was the vast size of this
aliya, not only in the sense that within a few years Israel's
Jewish population doubled in size. More importantly, each aliya
created a sociocultural reality of uprooted masses of people whose
cultural memories had been suppressed and denied expression during
the traumatic process of absorption. They were unable in this
period to confront the cultural influences of the absorbing
society, beyond assimilating certain material elements and
passively accepting the secular values and norms that accompanied
them.
Zionism as the Official Ideology
The Hebrew pre-state culture had been developed by the main streams
within Zionism (socialist-Zionism, general Zionism,
nationalistic-Zionism and religious Zionism) under the influence of
European nationalism and socialism of the first half of the
twentieth century. Embodying European patterns, these were
expressed in the revived Hebrew language and on the background of
layers of Jewish literary, traditional and historical
heritage.
The shift of influence from Europe to the United States, in the
post-modernist period following the Second World War, effected a
sweeping transformation. Albeit, for nearly a generation, Zionism
remained the ideology that shaped the official identity of the
State of Israel, despite the fact that during that period it had
actually changed from a controversial minority ideology to a
general Jewish consensus. With the traumatic memories of the
Holocaust, Zionism, as realized within the state, became the
central symbol of Jewish unity and identity, and the accepted
ideology among all those Jews who related positively to their
Jewishness. It was only later that hard questions began to be asked
about the relevance of Zionism in the era of "state-ism"
(mamlackhtiyut).
After the creation of the State of Israel, Zionism in effect also
became the official ideology of the general state education system.
Its program included settlement, the creation of Hebrew culture,
and the establishment of an ideal Israeli society. Zionism became a
declaration of faith. Conscription into the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF), including extended reserve duty, was taken for granted.
Zionism also involved solidarity with the Jewish people, accepting
emotional responsibility for the lot of the people after the
Holocaust, loyal citizenship of the state, and a sympathetic
attitude toward, the social absorption of the aliya.
Americanization gradually replaced the old socialist ideology. From
the beginning of the 1960s, there began a change in the
socioeconomic policy, accentuated after the Six-Day War. The
socialist policy retreated and its institutions (like the Histadrut
and the kibbutz) collapsed. In their place was created the
economic-social foundation required for the individualistic
competitive ethos and other characteristics of American mass
culture, and particularly of youth culture. In terms of the Jewish
characteristic of Israeli culture, there developed a type of
assimilation that strives to obscure all unique characteristics of
modern national identity. Only self-enclosed, sectarian religious
factors, lacking influence on the cultural periphery within which
they are mixed and alienated, retained some legitimacy.
Education for Values
The greatest theoretical and practical effect was felt in the realm
of education, particularly in the educational philosophy of the
general state school system, embracing all but the national
religious and ultra-orthodox schools. The functions of
cultural-value socialization of its students-what is known as the
"passing down of heritage"-were renounced.
Schools failed to convey a cultural-historic perspective, a feeling
of belonging and rootedness of the individual in the culture of his
origins: his family, his community and his people. The formulation
of an overall personal-social world view that presents the
individual with binding and meaningful ideals of human life was no
longer encouraged.
As students get older, more importance is attributed to messages of
"instruction" (not education!), of "knowledge" and "expertise,"
whose main purpose is professional socialization on the basis of
individual choice, while diminishing the heritage-oriented study
framework. The educational philosophy of the high school and
university is thus primarily directed to preparing students for the
competitive race that awaits them in their adult life in accordance
with their specific choices, and of course within the framework of
the expectations of the marketplace. The personal competitive
motivation overrides that of solidarity and belonging.
Accordingly, there inevitably emerges a serious problem in the
realms of social and spiritual values, and of identity. The school
curriculum itself and its manner of instruction, including the
teaching of "humanistic" and "Judaic" subjects, are conveyed as
collections of information and as professional disciplines.
"Education for values" is then added as yet another subject in its
own right. Thus, even subjects like Bible, history, Hebrew language
and literature, oral law (Torah) and Jewish thought, as well as
Zionism and "education for democracy" are not seen as the main
instructional function of the school, but as matters of secondary
importance. Any relation to the society and the people, to history
and to cultural heritage, or to any vision of a people or of
mankind is likewise exclusively understood from the individual
utilitarian-functional viewpoint.
Obviously, the issue of the "Jewish identity" of students in the
general school system falls into the framework of "education for
values." At least once every decade, complaints are heard about the
educational failures of the general school. Jewish education is
said to be too weak and student identification with the Jewish
people and with Zionism is superficial. In particular, it is
claimed that the problem of yerida emigration from Israel) is not
tackled, nor is a basis created for understanding with Jews of the
Diaspora and with new immigrants. Youth does not receive
sufficiently convincing answers to existential questions. They
would ask: why do we need to carry the burden of responsibility for
the realization of Zionism, and to sacrifice precious years of my
life in military service, when the message of the school is
consistently directed towards the ideal of individual
"self-realization"?
"Civil Religion"
In the political and legal realms, the question of the Jewish
identity of the State of Israel has been primarily discussed in the
context of the status of established religion in a secular
democracy, and the issue of the status of non-Orthodox Jewish
religious movements in the state ("Jewish pluralism"). However, the
stormy and prolonged social-cultural debates on these issues
changed into a Kulturkampf shaping the nature of Israeli-Jewish
society.
Due to Knesset legislation, the following cultural characteristics
are found in the public domain: Hebrew as the official national
language; respect for the Hebrew calendar, its Sabbaths, holidays
and other dates, and their observation by state institutions, the
army, and so on; respect for the demands of kashrut (Jewish dietary
law) by institutions of the state, the army, and others; commitment
by the state to provide for the religious needs of the population
through synagogues, religious institutions, and other
establishments.
By virtue of Knesset legislation, halachic (Jewish law) norms shape
the definition of individual Jewish identity, with regard to both
acceptance, conversion and registration as Jews, and family laws
pertaining to marriage and divorce. Central symbolic ceremonies
express the belonging of the individual to the entity:
circumcision, bar/bat mitzvah, marriage, burial and mourning, or
the placing of a mezuza upon the doors of one's home. All these may
be defined as a "civic religion" or secular tradition.
These ceremonies of "civil religion" have a certain impact upon
everyday consciousness of belonging to a people and a state.
Moreover, non-religious Jewish family life typically draws upon
further signs of tradition, particularly folkloristic elements and
those of Sabbaths and festivals, which in varying degrees become
part of the cultural milieu. However, the ceremonies of civic
religion are increasingly understood as an external, coercive
presence, which are at best conformed to, in many cases with open
non-willingness and with a feeling of having no option, or are
rejected. Also, the choice of those signs that are willingly
adopted to mark the milieu of the Sabbath and festivals bear less
relation to a tradition that is rooted in religion, and more to
folklore, a mass or folk culture. It is hence clear that the
secular milieu created in this manner through the use of
traditional materials removes itself progressively from uniquely
religious meanings, without even being aware of them.
The rebellion against the imposed nature of religious symbols and
norms-in particular the growing feeling of contradiction among
halachic norms imposed upon the general public by of the
Rabbinate-result in a stormy "cultural war."
Thus far, obligatory acquiescence by individuals and in public life
in Israel was bolstered by three factors:
• A sense of responsibility towards preserving the unity of
the people, particularly as long as the feeling of a security
threat against the State of Israel continued.
• Political considerations rooted in the party structure of
the government.
• The fact that most members of the first and second
generations of those who immigrated after the establishment of the
state remained traditional, even when they become part of the
"general" (that is non-religious) sector of the Jewish
public.
Separating Religion and State
During the past decade a dramatic change has been felt as regards
these factors. This has resulted from the coming of age of a new
generation of young Israelis educated in the general school system,
whose attitude to the contents of traditional Judaism differs
substantially from that of their parents. Another factor is the
mass immigration from the states of the former Soviet Union, and
most of these immigrants have neither knowledge of nor connection
to Jewish life of any sort. Thirdly, the peace process made it
appear for some time as if there was no longer a sense of external
threat hanging over the State of Israel, with the accompanying need
to assure pan-Jewish unity at any cost. In contrast, a highly
polarized debate flared up concerning the issue of peace and
"greater Israel." As this confrontation tends to take place between
the religious-Zionist and the secular public, it also weakened the
sense of Jewish unity.
Likewise, the positive attitude towards tradition has become
weakened among most members of the second generation of immigrants
from eastern lands. Protest and opposition to religious coercion in
the name of democratic values and individual freedom have become
stronger. Meanwhile, religious legislation is supported almost
exclusively by the religious public and some political leaders, but
not by the majority of spiritual leaders and non-religious
educators.
Despite the continued existence of "religious legislation" ("status
quo"), and the desire in some religious circles to extend it,
obedience to religious laws is progressively weakening. The Jewish
and Israeli public domain have become more and more secularized, a
feature felt particularly on the Sabbath and during festivals.
Opposition to religious legislation has become a central tenet in
the new ideology that has come to displace Zionism as the defining
ideology of secular Israeli identity. The new ideology styles
itself as "post-Zionist"-apathetic towards national and religious
values as such, but intensely opposed to them as values meant to
shape the image of the state. Priority is given to the values of
democracy and freedom of the individual, one's dignity and
happiness, as universal values. Hence, this ideology is presented
to the Israeli Jewish public, not only as an "option" for a new
cultural identity beyond Judaism and Zionism, but as an exclusive
and all-encompassing form of identity staunchly opposed to the
continued definition of Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state.
Secular Jews demanded satisfactory solutions to the issues of
personal identity, conversion and family life, sensitive issues for
the non-religious public and to which religious halacha did not
give adequate responses. It was assumed that it would be possible
to find appropriate solutions without damaging the Jewish and
Zionist identity of Israel per se, and without denying the status
of the Jewish religion as an influential factor in society and
culture.
A Contemporary Secular Culture
The pre-state Jewish national community which defined itself as
secular (hiloni) or as "free thinking," attributed importance to
the religious definition of Judaism only in so far as one related
to religious Jews as members of one's people. Their specific
definitions of Jewishness was rejected.
Thus, for the non-religious, whatever they did and created,
including elements borrowed from other cultures, was seen as their
own "Judaism." Had all that the Israeli created been considered
"Jewish," while all that the "Jew" did be considered "Israeli,"
they could have found their own way towards the sources and history
of Jewishness. But once a reality was created in which Israeliness
came to be considered as something outside of Jewishness, while
Jewishness was viewed as being outside of Israeliness, this
dichotomy became unavoidable for different types both of
religionists and secularists.
Both "Israeliness" and "Judaism" became things unto themselves. The
two may indeed make peace with and complement one another but they
may also entirely contradict one another. For the secular Jewish
identity is understood, at best, as a marginal compartment within a
multi-storied culture and personality, most of whose compartments
are non-Jewish and tend to be in the surrounding cultural
environment, Western or Eastern. Hence, they identify as American,
French, or Israeli, more than they do as Jews.
One cannot ignore that postmodern Western culture, which developed
following the Second World War and is the source of post-Zionist
and post-Jewish thinking in Israel, expresses a universal syndrome
in modern Western culture. Its dominant ideology requires
assimilation into the "global village." This ideology does not
ascribe any importance to national and religious traditions, even
though these traditions are once more struggling bravely for their
existence. The academic elite, particularly the technocratic and
communication elite, are abandoning these traditions and striding
towards a vision of a cosmopolitan secular culture, always
contemporary and always prepared for futuristic changes. These
inevitably transform all forms of cultural identity into something
transient, external and exchangeable.
We are witnessing a strong and continuous tendency to be swept
along by the materialistic and individualistic-selfish values of
the culture of a "society of abundance" ceaselessly imported from
the United States. Unless there is a reorientation in Israeli
education in the direction of transmitting the cultural heritage
and expression of our own cultural identity, the split between an
encapsulated Orthodox Jewish religious culture and a secular
Israeli culture alienated from its Jewish sources will become
unequivocal.