Israeli Jewish identity or rather identities have been shaped in
the context of the Jewish-Palestinian colonial conflict. The
success of the colonial Zionist project required that the Jewish
community in pre¬1948 Palestine (Yishuv) be constituted as a
highly mobilized community, committed to a common purpose - the
fulfillment of Zionism. The most cherished expression of this
commitment, Chalutziyut (pioneering), was conceptualized as a
composite of two distinct qualities, corresponding to the two bases
of legitimation invoked by the Zionist settlers. These were, first,
Jewish historical rights in Palestine and, secondly, the redemptive
activities of the "pioneers": physical labor, agricultural
settlement and military defense. The pioneers saw what they called
"self-realization" of these concepts as their personal
obligation.
Chalutziyut was considered the ultimate form of contribution to the
Zionist effort, and its practitioners were considered w.orthy of
the highest social recognition. This laid the basis for
distinguishing between Jews and Palestinians as protagonists or
opponents of Zionism. It also differentiated between the various
groupings within the Jewish community itself, according to their
presumed contributions to the implementation of Zionism. As a
result, the rights, duties, privileges and obligations associated
with the notion of citizenship have not been accorded equally to
all Israeli citizens. Rather, they have been distributed
differentially between the different social sectors, resulting in a
highly fragmented and hierarchical structure of citizenship and
identity.
In recent years, the "normative" or hegemonic form of
Israeli-Jewish identity based on these Zionist-oriented notions and
associated most clearly with the veteran Ashkenazi elite has faced
a challenge by some of the sectors created by this uneven
citizenship structure. A structure including Mizrahim Oews from
Eastern countries), Orthodox religious Jews, immigrants from the
former Soviet Union - indeed the descendents of the very "pioneers"
themselves. These challenges have weakened the traditional elite
and increasingly hampered its efforts to pursue coherent policies
in any policy area, particularly in the sphere of
Israeli-Palestinian relations. Since, as I argue, it is the
traditional elite that is most interested in pursuing peace with
the Palestinians, for economic as well as political and cultural
reasons, its diminished political standing has contributed to the
temporary derailment of the peace process.
The "Pioneering" Identity of the Ashkenazi Elite
The notion of "pioneering" stemmed from the experience of the
Ashkenazi (East European) Jewish immigrant workers of the second
aliyah (immigration). This wave of immigration occurred in
1904-1914. The plantation colonists of the first aliyah (1882-1903)
had found a large and relatively cheap indigenous Arab labor force
in Palestine. Palestinian Arab workers possessed some land,
housing, and social services within their traditional economy, and
sought only seasonal work and supplementary income in the Jewish
settlements. When the immigrant workers of the second aliyah
arrived, and sought to replace the Palestinian workers, they
demanded year-round jobs, which were their only source of income
and better wages, because they were used to a higher standard of
living. Most of these immigrant workers, though inexperienced in
agriculturallabor, were not sufficiently acquiescent in the eyes of
their employers. As a result, the Jewish planters preferred to
continue to employ Palestinian-Arab workers, rather than their own
Jewish brethren.
Having tried, and failed, to adjust to the wage levels of Arab
workers, in 1905 these Ashkenazi workers adopted a new strategy,
the "conquest of labor." They claimed that "a necessary condition
for the realization of Zionism is the conquest of all occupations"
in Palestine by Jews. This new strategy enjoyed only modest
success, however, and was soon replaced by a new one - "pioneering"
collective agricultural settlement on national Jewish land reserved
exclusively for Jewish settlement and Jewish cultivation.
This form of settlement led, eventually, to the development of a
new economic sector, employing only Jews and under the control of
the Labor Zionist movement, operating through the formidable
Histadrut Jewish workers movement (Shafir 1989; Shafir and Peled
2002). This economic sector, with Labor Zionism's most famous
social innovation, the kibbutz, at its center, gradually developed
into an economic empire encompassing, in its peak days, vast
economic concerns alongside its trade union activities. This
encompassed agricultural, manufacturing, construction, marketing,
transportation and financial activities, many cooperative ventures,
and a whole network of social service organizations, including a
national health service. This conglomerate had operated under the
aegis of the Histadrut, and as long as Labor was in power
(1933-1977), it enjoyed the support first of Zionist institutions
and then of the state as well. At the same time, this economic
infrastructure played a crucial role in maintaining the political
and cultural hegemony of the Labor Zionist movement, thus ensuring
the privileged position of a large segment of Ashkenazi Jews.
Mizrahim between Quality and Quantity
The dominant status of Ashkenazim in Israeli society is usually
explained by their having been the earlier Jewish settlers in the
country. Massive immigration of Mizrahi (Eastern Jews from the
Middle Eastern and North African countries) took place only after
1948, so the argument goes. By then the old-timer Ashkenazim,
especially those organized in the Histadrut, had already laid the
foundations for a new society, in which they occupied the
commanding heights.
In actual fact, however, throughout the period of the Yishuv the
number of Jewish immigrants from the Moslem East arriving in
Palestine had been proportionate to their share of the world Jewish
population at the time¬approximately ten percent. Yemenite
Jewish immigrants, for example, arrived in Palestine simultaneously
with the founding fathers of both the first and second aliyot. Like
their Ashkenazi counterparts, the Yemenites of the second aliyah
expected to replace Palestinian workers in the Jewish¬owned
plantation colonies (Moshavot), but failed in this attempted
"conquest of labor." However, while the "pioneering" Ashkenazi
workers went on to make history by establishing cooperative
settlements, the Yemenites were relegated to the sidelines of both
Jewish-Israeli society and the Zionist historical narrative.
The different historical trajectories of the two communities
reflected the superior organizational ability of the Ashkenazi
workers, which placed them in a better position to procure
resources from the World Zionist Organization. The Ashkenazim,
however, legitimated their demands by drawing a distinction between
themselves as "idealistic" and the Yemenites as "natural" workers.
"Idealistic workers" were those who had forfeited the comforts of
European urban life and the opportunity of immigrating to America,
and chose of their own free will to become agricultural workers in
Palestine. "Natural workers," on the other hand, were not as the
term implies, necessarily experienced agricultural workers and most
Yemenites were not. The term referred, rather, to people capable of
performing hard work for very little compensation. "Idealistic
workers" were the stuff pioneers were made of, blazing the trail
and setting moral standards for the community. "Natural workers,"
on the other hand, were to be foot soldiers in the Zionist
campaign, adding quantity to the pioneers' qualitative
efforts.
This distinction between quality and quantity was meant to bridge
the gap between the pioneers' claim to be a dedicated, exclusive
vanguard, deserving of special privileges, and the need to draw the
Jewish masses to Palestine. This proved to be of crucial importance
in the 1950s and 60s, when the pioneers, now occupying all dominant
positions in the society, had to deal with a massive influx of
Mizrahi immigrants. Thus, as Jews immigrating under the Law of
Return, Mizrahi immigrants were granted all civil and political
rights. At the same time, however, they were socially marginalized,
sent to settle in border areas and in towns emptied of their
Palestinian inhabitants in 1948, to beef up the lower ranks of the
military, and to provide unskilled labor for the country's
agricultural and industrialization drive.
The resultant "ethnic gap" between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim in
educational attainment, occupational status, income distribution
and political power has persisted, and in some respects has even
widened. Mizrahim, by and large, are concentrated today in the
working and lower middle classes, while Ashkenazim largely comprise
the upper and upper middle classes of Israeli society.
For decades, Mizrahim had not been able to find an effective
political voice in which to express their grievances and to
challenge the dominant Zionist identity that had relegated them to
the margins of Jewish Israeli society. Repeated efforts to form
Mizrahi political parties or social movements had failed, and most
Mizrahim had been voting for Labor, on whom they were dependent,
and then, since the mid -1970s, for Likud. Only in 1984, with the
appearance of Shas, a Mizrahi religiously Orthodox social movement
and political party, has a distinct Mizrahi notion of Jewish
Israeli identity appeared on the scene and has become the major
challenge to the dominant, Ashkenazi identity.
Shas's electoral power has risen from 63,600 votes and four Knesset
seats in 1984 to 480,000 votes and seventeen Knesset seats in 1999
(to Likud's nineteen seats and Labor's twenty-four). The party
utilizes this political power in order to promote a new version of
Zionism and a new conception of Israeli Jewish identity. While Shas
clearly appeals to a particular social sector, lower class
Mizrahim, the identity it seeks to promote is not a Mizrahi
identity but rather Jewish identity. Its key argument is that the
modern and "pioneering" aspects of the dominant identity, which had
been used to marginalize the Mizrahim, should be replaced by
Orthodox religious Jewish identity, which would accord all Jews
(and only Jews) the same rights and standing in society. By
stressing Jewish, as opposed to Mizrahi identity as its political
formula, Shas has wisely avoided the charge of separatism that had
been leveled against all previous attempts to organize the Mizrahim
politically. Its call for "Returning the Crown [of JudaismJ to its
Ancient Glory" has resonated well among lower-class Mizrahim
precisely because they do not consider it a separatist slogan, and
because of the privileged status Orthodox Jewish religion already
enjoyed in Israeli public life (Peled 1998; Peled 2001).
The Privileged Orthodox Jews
Israel's constitutional definition as a Jewish state precluded the
possibility of adopting one of the key identifying features of the
modern state: the separation of state and religion. Instead, Jewish
religion, or more accurately Orthodox Jewish religion, is
guaranteed an official role in the country's public life. This
manifests itself primarily in four important areas: (1) the almost
exclusive jurisdiction granted Orthodox religious courts over
matters of family law; (2) legal sanctioning of the observance of
the Sabbath and of Jewish holidays in the public sphere; (3) state
support of religious educational institutions that are largely
autonomous of the general educational system; and (4) various
privileges granted Orthodox individuals, most importantly exemption
from military service granted Orthodox women and Orthodox Yeshiva
(religious seminary) students. Non-orthodox pluralistic religious
streams have received no official recognition.
Students of Zionist and Israeli politics have been puzzled, over
the years, by the accommodating (even subservient) attitude
displayed by the Zionist movement and by the Israeli state towards
Orthodox Jews, many of them non- and even anti-Zionist. Zionism,
after all, has always proclaimed itself a secular national movement
in the tradition of the Enlightenment. It intended, in the famous
words of Herzl, the founder of political Zionism in 1897, to keep
the rabbis in their synagogues and the soldiers in their barracks.
Furthermore, Orthodox Jews have constituted a relatively small
minority in the Yishuv and in Israel (currently they comprise about
25 percent of the Jewish population), and their political influence
has been vastly disproportionate to their electoral strength.
The usual explanation for the privileges enjoyed by Orthodox Jews
has been that Israel's system of proportional representation has
enabled Orthodox political parties to hold the balance needed for
forming coalition governments. As "one issue" movements, so the
argument goes, these political parties can be satisfied with
budgetary allocations and with concessions in matters relating to
the role of religion in the public sphere. Thus, gaining their
parliamentary support does not require (or, at least, did not
require in the past) of the major political parties to pay any
price in more important policy areas: social, economic, military
and foreign policy.
While this explanation may be able to account for tactical
decisions made by the major parties at particular historical
moments, it cannot account for the depth and breadth of the role
Orthodox J udaism has been able to play in Israeli public life. The
real explanation for that is more profound, and has to do with the
nature of Zionism as a national movement. Of all the political
movements spawned by the crisis of Eastern European Jewry in the
second half of the 19th century, Zionism alone claimed to speak on
behalf of a world-wide Jewish nation. The only cultural attribute
holding this Jewish nation together, however, was the common
religion to which the vast majority of Jews still held. Claiming to
speak in the name of world Jewry, both internally and externally,
Zionism needed at least the tacit approval of those universally
recognized as the Jewish spokesmen: Orthodox rabbis.
Zionism was not unique among national movements in its efforts to
coopt the bearers and symbols of tradition. All national movements
have had to rely on "primordial" cultural elements in order to
mobilize their target populations for essentially modernizing aims.
For Zionism, however, the need to rely on such factors for
legitimation and mobilization was particularly acute, as there was
no modern culture common to all Jews. This reality dictated,
firstly, the choice of the movement's target territory - Palestine
(in dispute until Herzl's death in 1904), and then the use of a
whole array of religious Jewish symbols and other cultural
constructs. Traditional Jewish themes abound in Israeli lore, from
the dubbing of immigration to Palestine aliyah (ascent or
pilgrimage), through the choice of the Star of David and the
seven-branch candelabrum (Menorah) as the official emblems of the
state, to the celebration of Jewish religious holidays as national
holidays.
What accounts for the forthcoming attitude displayed by the state
and by non-observant Israeli Jews towards Jewish religion, then, is
primarily the need for religious affirmation of their collective,
ethno-national identity. Because their identity symbolizes Jewish
unity and the continuity of Jewish history, Orthodox Jews have
provided the Zionist project with the ideological resources it
required for legitimating its claim to act on behalf of a
world-wide Jewish nation that possesses an historically
substantiated right to the Land of Israel.
Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union
The privileged status of Jews and of Orthodox Judaism in Israel
makes the question "Who is a Jew?" an important political issue. In
1970, the official definition of "Jew" for the purpose of the Law
of Return was made identical with the Orthodox definition - anyone
born of a Jewish mother who has not converted to another religion,
as well as converts to Judaism. This restricted definition came
into conflict, however, with the demographic aim of Zionism, to
produce, maintain and enhance the Jewish majority in Israel. As a
result, the Law of Return was amended, so that one Jewish
grandparent became sufficient to entitle a person and her/his
spouse and minor children to the privileges provided by the law.
Thus, it is estimated that up to 20 percent of the immigrants from
the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and fully 60 percent by
the mid-1990s, have not been Jews by the Orthodox definition. (The
Jewishness of Ethiopian immigrants is also questioned by the
Orthodox rabbinic establishment, but in their case the questions do
not refer to individuals but rather to the community as a whole.)
Since marriage, divorce, and burial are all under the exclusive
jurisdiction of religious authorities, these non-Jews or doubtful
Jews run into problems when they come to need these services,
unless they undergo an orthodox conversion to Judaism. One
paradoxical result of the amended Law of Return, then, is the
development of a new non-Jewish, non-Palestinian Israeli ethnic
identity. This ethnic identity is further augmented by the influx
of lab or migrants from foreign countries of labor migrants into
Israel that began with the first Intifada (1987-1993) and was
greatly accelerated after the Oslo accords.
In spite of the high rate of non-Jews among them (about 25
percent), the million or so immigrants from the former Soviet Union
who arrived during the 1990s consider Jewishness to be a major
component of their identity. But they see their Jewishness
primarily as a national rather than a religious identity. Thus,
most of them are opposed to religious legislation and favor the
institution of civil marriage and divorce. At the same time, they
strongly support nationalist positions on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Because of their experience in the Soviet Union, most of
these immigrants hold liberal economic views, but they still feel
that the state has not done enough in order to facilitate their own
absorption in Israel.
Most distinctively, immigrants from the former Soviet Union have a
sense of cultural superiority in relation to the rest of Israeli
society. They have established a whole network of institutions, a
vibrant press, high¬quality schools, a theater, innumerable
bookstores, libraries and other facilities in order to preserve
their Russian cultural heritage. On the margins of this cultural
activity, the demand to include Russian as a third official
language in Israel, in addition to Hebrew and Arabic, is already
being heard.
Unlike the Mizrahim, Soviet immigrants were able to quickly
organize one political party, and then a second one, within a very
few years of their arrival. These two parties, expressing the
particular repertoire of political views held by the immigrants,
and helping in their efforts at cultural preservation, received
over 50 percent of Soviet immigrant vote in the general elections
of 1999, and currently have ten seats in the Knesset.
The Challenge of Liberalization
Over the years, Israel's economic development, largely funded by
external sources, has weakened both state and Histadrut control
over the economy in favor of private business interests. This
sectoral shift has manifested itself in policy changes that began
as early as the late 1960s, allowing market forces to play a
greater role in the economy and providing foreign goods and
investments easier access to the Israeli market.
The liberal economic policy and other changes inaugurated in 1985
have enabled the Israeli economy to take advantage of the
globalization processes started in the 1980s. Such economic changes
have affected the personal fortunes of the younger members of the
veteran Ashkenazi elite. If the second generation of leaders of the
Labor Zionist movement (such as yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres)
made their careers in the various public bureaucracies or in the
military, the third generation, those who came of age after 1967,
were drawn to the private sector. These young members of the elite
have been the principal champions of economic liberalization and of
the integration of Israel's economy within the world market. They
have also come to see the institutional edifice created by the
Labor movement around the Histadrut as an obstacle to economic
rationality and to their own economic wellbeing. Since they feel
confident enough to compete in the open market, their concern is no
longer to be protected within this market but rather to expand it
as much as possible.
The liberal economic values of this emergent business community are
naturally more consonant with a liberal worldview than with the
collectivist pioneering identity forged by their grandparents.
Moreover, the continuing conflict with the Palestinians has had a
negative impact on Israel's ability to gain from the process of
globalization. Israeli businesses faced many obstacles in trying to
operate in the Third World, and Western businesses were reluctant
to invest in Israel because of the Arab boycott and their fear of
political instability. Thus, operating through organizations such
as Peace Now, it was primarily the younger members of the Ashkenazi
elite who provided the main opposition to Likud's efforts to
legitimate the de¬facto annexation of the occupied territories
and the 1982 adventure in Lebanon. They were also the group that
was most supportive of the Oslo peace process.
Electorally, this economic elite has had a major base in the Labor
party, whose economic policies had reflected the elite's interests,
at least since 1985. But its views have been expressed even more
clearly by two political parties standing at the two opposite
flanks of Labor: the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) and
Meretz. The DMC appeared on the scene on the eve of the 1977
general elections with a platform calling for increased efficiency
and honesty in government and for relaxation of state control over
the economy and other areas of public life, such as culture and
mass communications. In the 1977 elections, this party drew 15
Knesset seats away from Labor, thus enabling Likud to take power.
By 1981, the DMC had disintegrated and most of its voters either
returned to Labor or joined the more liberal-dovish Meretz
party.
Together with some neo-liberal groups within the Labor party,
Meretz has become the main champion of privatization and economic
liberalization, as well as of the peace process with the
Palestinians. In the Histadrut general elections of May 1994, a
peace and privatization block, headed by Ch aim Ramon of Labor and
including Meretz and Shas, won nearly 50 percent of the vote. Thus
the Histadrut was captured by those who were formerly its bitterest
enemies, receiving the coup de grace with the nationalization of
its health care system, a move that eliminated the dependence upon
it of a broad sector of the population. Since the "pioneering"
labor economic sector centered on the Histadrut had provided the
material infrastructure for the old "pioneering" identity, that
identity too has suffered a major loss of status.
Conclusion
The decline in the traditional identity of "pioneering" Labor
Zionism has left the field open to a fierce conflict between two
alternative conceptions of Israeli Jewish identity: a neo-Zionist
religio-ethno-national identity advocated by the Orthodox-Mizrahi
alliance exemplified by Shas and a post-Zionist liberal national
identity promoted most clearly by Meretz. The great instability
exhibited by Israel's political system over the last decade, as
seen most dramatically and tragically in the assassination of
Yitzhak Rabin, is an expression of this confrontation. The twists
and turns in the peace process are other consequences, since each
one of these identities has its own conception not only of Israeli
society but also of Israel's place in the world and, most
importantly, in the Middle East.
While the post-Zionist identity probably enjoys a slight majority
in the Israeli population as a whole, the neo-Zionist one is
clearly preferred by the majority of Israeli Jews. In order to
prevail politically, therefore, the post-Zionist camp must be able
to forge a genuine alliance with Israel's Palestinian citizens. Its
failure to do that resulted in the killing of 13 Palestinian
citizens by police in October 2000 and in massive abstention by
Palestinians in the prime ministerial elections of February 2001,
enabling Ariel Sharon to win in a "landslide." This failure does
not augur well for the prospects of the post-Zionist identity or
for the peace process.
References
Peled, Yoav. ed. 2001. Shas: The Challenge of Israeliness (in
Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot.
_________, 1998. "Towards a Redefinition of Jewish Nationalism in
Israel? The Enigma of Shas." Ethnic and Racial Studies
21:703-27.
Shafir, Gershon. 1989. Land, Labor and the Origins of the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Shafir, Gershon and Yoav Peled. 2002. Being Israeli: The Dynamics
of Multiple Citizenship. Cambridge:Cambridge UP.