At the crux of this article lies the claim that, in the past,
Israeli society, since it was in the throes of an intractable
conflict with the Arab peoples, devel¬oped an appropriate
psychological infrastructure. This consisted mainly of societal
beliefs which helped Israeli society to exist in such conditions
and to cope successfully with the conflict. However, with the
progress made in the peace process between Israel and the Arab
states and the Palestinians, the question arises - is this
psychological infrastructure suitable for the advancing conditions
of peace; and what changes will take place in it in order to adapt
it to the new reality hopefully taking shape now?
Intractable conflicts are defined as those which are protracted,
irrecon¬cilable, violent, of zero-sum nature and central. The
parties have an inter¬est in their continuation. Such
conflicts are demanding, stressful, painful, exhausting and costly,
both in human and material terms. They therefore demand from
members of the society the development of conditions which enable
it to successfully come to grips with the situation.
One important aspect of the conditions is a psychological
infrastruc¬ture consisting, to name some examples, of devotion
to society and country, high motivation to contribute, persistent
readiness for personal sacrifice, unity, solidarity, determination,
courage and endurance. This psychological infrastructure enables a
society which is coping with an intractable conflict to adapt to
the conflict situation, survive the stressful period and struggle
successfully with the enemy.
Societal beliefs are defined here as shared cognitions by society
mem¬bers on topics and issues that are of special concern to a
particular society and contribute to the sense of uniqueness of the
society's members. Such beliefs play an important part in shaping
the psychological conditions which enable a society to cope with
intractable conflicts.
Eight societal beliefs have been suggested to fulfill the role
described above, and thus serve as a sort of conflict
ideology.
Societal beliefs on the justness of one's own goals: These deal
with the reasons, justifications and rationales of those goals
which lead to the con¬flict. Above all, these societal beliefs
recognize the crucial importance of these goals, thus motivating
the society members to struggle and fight for them. This makes the
intractable conflict and its cost bearable in terms of sacrifice,
losses and stresses.
Societal beliefs about security stress the importance of personal
safety and national survival and outline the conditions for their
achievement. Special significance is attributed to beliefs about
military conditions facil¬itating the maintenance of security,
including heroism on the part of sol¬diers. This is essential
for a society engaged in a conflict which involves violence,
hostile acts and wars. These beliefs give high priority to security
as a value, serve as a rationale for personal and societal
decisions and actions, mobilize the society for active
participation in the conflict and steer them to live in stressful
conditions.
Societal beliefs about self-image concern the ethnocentric tendency
to attribute positive traits, values and behavior to our own
society, fostering moral strength and a sense of our own
superiority. The characteristics propagated are related on the one
hand to courage, heroism or endurance, and on the other, to traits
like humaneness, morality, fairness, trustwor¬thiness and
progress. A clear differentiation is presented here between the
society members and the "enemy."
Societal beliefs of our own victimization concern self-presentation
as a victim. They focus on the unjust harm, evil and atrocities
perpetrated against us by the enemy, providing us with the moral
strength to fight our opponent and to mobilize the moral, political
and material support of the international community for our just
cause.
Societal beliefs on delegitimization of the opponent concern the
beliefs which deny the enemy's humanity. Through extreme negative
trait char¬acteristics, outcasting, the use of negative
political labels and group comparisons, a society puts the opponent
into a particular social category: he is excluded from human groups
considered as acting within limits of accepted norms and/ or
values. These beliefs explain the causes of the out¬break of
the conflict, its continuation, and the violence of the opponent;
and they justify our own hostile acts.
Societal beliefs of patriotism impart attachment to the country and
society, propagating loyalty, love, care and sacrifice. This
fosters unity and dedication, facilitating mobilization for the
conflict and the endurance of hardship.
Social beliefs of unity refer to the importance of abandoning
internal con¬flicts and disagreements during intractable
conflict, in order to unite in the face of external threat. This
strengthens the society internally, develops a sense of consensus
and of belonging to the whole group, bolsters solidarity and
facili¬tates the direction of forces and energy to the task of
coping with the enemy.
Finally, societal beliefs in peace refer to peace as the ultimate
desire of the society, and to society members as peace loving. The
role of these beliefs is to provide hope and optimism. They also
strengthen the self-¬image and contribute to an empathic
self-presentation to the outside world.
It is assumed that these societal beliefs can be found in societies
engaged in intractable conflict, especially in those coping with it
successfully. However, they are far from being adequate to win a
conflict. For that, other conditions of a military, political and
economic nature are also required.
Israeli society is one of the salient examples of 20th century
societies involved in intractable conflict. In the hundred-year
Israeli-Arab conflict, the particularly violent years since the
late 1940s had all the characteristics of intractable conflict. So
as to cope with it in those violent years, the relevant societal
beliefs mentioned above were propagated in Israeli society. The
efforts to impart them were implemented directly and indirectly
through var¬ious societal channels of communication and via
political, social, educational and cultural institutions. They were
repeated and emphasized, norms were based upon them and they were
transformed into primary values and goals.
Eventually, these societal beliefs were incorporated into the
Israeli ethos, and language, symbols, myths and collective memories
were constructed on their basis. They were also drawn into the
ideologies of political parties and of social and cultural
organizations. Over and above these prevalent social beliefs, there
developed politically, religiously or socially oriented ideologies
which shaped an overall conception based on these beliefs. These
ideologies facilitate the vindication of the present
situ¬ation and propose an overall future solution.
Yet this reality of conflict is now undergoing a process of change
after a period when it constituted a vital factor in enabling
Israeli society to hold out in such conditions. The Middle East has
already changed dramatically. There is no longer total and
inevitable conflict with all the Arab peoples, accompanied by the
sense that "there is nobody to talk to" on the other side. Instead,
there are clearly differential relations with the various Arab
states and a political process which can achieve peace in our
region: fully peace¬ful relations with Egypt and Jordan,
peaceful relations involving different levels of cooperation with
Arab states in the Persian Gulf and North Africa, negotiations with
Syria, and far-reaching negotiations with the Palestinians.
There is indeed no doubt that the societal beliefs which developed
against the background of the conflict have undergone changes of no
small measure in the wake of internal social processes, changes in
the geopolitical situation of Israel, changes in the Arab states
and among the Palestinians and naturally, as a result of the peace
process. Nevertheless, in conditions totally different from those
of total conflict, the dominant ethos is still one of conflict,
even when at least part of the societal beliefs which we have
described are no longer functional.
Changes of Societal Beliefs
It can be assumed that the societal beliefs which developed in the
period of intractable conflict and were necessary in that context,
will change now that the peace process is shaping a new Middle
Eastern reality. The new beliefs will surely reflect a new reality
developing in the region and influ¬encing society in the State
of Israel. One must of course differentiate, rather than relate to
the beliefs of the conflict period as a totality. Thus, for
example, while the beliefs in delegitimization of the Arabs is
contrary to the peace process, those relating to a positive
self-image, to the value of security or of patriotism and unity,
still have importance for the very exis¬tence of a society in
peace.
It is possible to assume that in the course of time, peace beliefs
will change. The peace process will illuminate and clarify the
essence of peace. Beliefs about peace will descend from a general
and amorphous utopian level to a practical and concrete one. It
will become clear that making peace involves not only negotiating
with the enemy, but also mutual concessions.
Moreover, it will be understood that there is not only one kind of
peace¬ful relations but different sorts, with different levels
of closeness, friendship and cooperation. The State of Israel will
apparently have differ- ent forms of peaceful relations with
different Arab states and the perception of peace will differ
accordingly. One can expect conflicts as an inseparable part of
peaceful relations because of the natural development of
conflicting interests, competition and misunderstandings. Israeli
society will come to learn, in connection with the pattern of
relations with the Arab states, that disputes are solved by
institutionalized means of recognized rules and mechanisms of
negotiations instead of force. Peace will accordingly not be a mere
striving, prayer or dream, but a reality in which it is deeds that
count. Peace will be perceived as the people of Israel's supreme
interest.
The belief in the delegitimization of the Arabs will change with
the peace process. First, a differentiation will be made between
various patterns of relations developing with each Arab nation. For
example, perceptions of the Syrians and the Iraqis will differ from
those of the Palestinians, and there will be quite different
perceptions of the Jordanians, the Moroccans and the Tunisians.
Moreover, the term" Arab" will no longer be wholly negative, and
will include various elements, some positive and some negative. It
can be assumed that our general beliefs toward the Arabs, and
toward each of the Arab peoples, will be more complex, more human,
more balanced. To no small extent, they will also reflect the
quality of Israeli experience of var¬ious encounters and
meetings which they will hold with Arabs. In time, Israeli
self-perception as the victim will be reduced. The less the
hostility on the part of the Arab states, the less will be the
perceived threat of destroying Israel; and the fuller the peaceful
relations developing in the region, the less will the siege
mentality be felt in Israel. Not only will Israelis become less
critical, but the sense of "a people dwelling alone" and of other
peoples naturally conspiring against Jews, will weaken. There will
be a growing sense of empathy toward foreign peoples, and a
readiness to learn and understand their positions.
Security will, as far as one can assess, remain a central value for
many years to come. Its centrality will depend on how relations
will develop with the Arab peoples. The perception of the Arabs'
intentions to destroy Israel will lose its importance with fully
peaceful relations. Other beliefs stemming from the perception of
this threat will also have to be examined. The less the threat, the
less will be the need for unity. Presumably, peace will strengthen
the legitimization of pluralism and tolerance in Israeli society
toward the "others." It will be a positive development if our
soci¬ety can succeed in finding new challenges and goals in
order to preserve that social solidarity which constitutes an
essential need.
It is hard, on the other hand, to forecast what will become of our
pos¬itive self-image. Openness and contact with the Arab
peoples can strengthen ethnocentric tendencies, but they might also
weaken them. However, there is no doubt that peaceful relations
will strengthen a criti¬cal approach in Israeli society and
develop a more critical self-image. Such relations may well also
facilitate a more balanced and critical look at past events,
revealing a more complex self-portrait.
Finally, it should be noted that changing the societal beliefs
which were functional in times of intractable conflict is a
prolonged process. It mainly depends on changes in the reality -
that is, in the quality of relations developing with the Arab
peoples, and the position of the State of Israel in the world.
However, various internal factors can also
hold back or promote the changes. There is a role in changing the
social ethos for the educationa1 system, the mass media, cultural
prod¬ucts, and political lead¬ership. If these free
them-selves from past concepts and reflect the peace process, then
Jewish-Israeli society will, over the years, develop societal
beliefs that will be functional for maintaining the peace.
As this issue went to print, Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal put the last
touches to his three-year research on the "ethos of conflict" in
Israeli school textbooks. The following is an abstract.
Since the late seventies the Israeli-Arab conflict has been
gradually changing and losing its intractable characteristics. In
the last years, the Middle East has changed even more, beyond
recognition. The research attempted to find out whether the changes
in the nature of the Israeli-Arab relations are followed by
complementary changes in the ethos of the conflict in Israeli
society as reflected in school textbooks.
One-hundred-and-twenty-four textbooks, in five disciplines, were
content-analyzed: Hebrew language and literature (readers),
history, geography and civic studies (on the elementary,
junior¬ high, and high school levels, in the secular and
religious sectors). The research only examined books that were
formally approved by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport
in March 1994. Such approval is mandatory before textbooks can be
used by Israeli schools.
The analysis examined the extent to which the textbooks
pre¬sented societal beliefs reflecting ethos of conflict:
societal beliefs of security, positive self-image, victimization,
delegitimization of the opponent, unity and peace. The findings do
not reveal a uniform picture. Books, subject matters, level of
schools and sectors differ in their emphasis on the investigated
societal beliefs. The analysis shows that societal beliefs of
security received most emphasis, fol¬lowed by the societal
beliefs of positive self-image and victimiza¬tion of Jews.
Societal beliefs of unity and of peace appeared infre¬quently.
Finally, a very rare delegitimization of Arabs is seen, but the
majority of books stereotype Arabs negatively. These findings are
discussed in the framework of the required changes in the societal
ethos that have to accompany the peace process, which has
dramatically altered the nature of Israeli-Arab relations.