Objectives and Assumptions of the Working Group

Objectives

The Objective of the Working Group is to explore options with a view to establishing a trilateral security regime involving Israel, Jordan and Palestine.
1. Security throughout the Middle East and globally is indivisible. However, it is essential to focus on specific sub-units and to build security incrementally. Jordan, Israel and Palestine constitute a specific geostrategic sub-unit, and have interlocking security interests. Jordan, Israel and Palestine also constitute a potential nucleus for a wider Middle East security regime. The Working Group will therefore focus on trilateral security arrangements.
2. Security comprises military, economic, environmental and demographic aspects. The Working Group will focus initially on military security.
3. The end product will be an outline of a trilateral security regime, based on a set of agreed assumptions and principles.

Assumptions

The trilateral security regime, which the working group seeks to define, is based on the existence of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, which comprises mutual security constraints, together with the following assumptions:
1. Palestinian-Israeli negotiations have been concluded to the satisfaction of both parties.
2. The three states, Israel, Jordan and Palestine, have mutually recognized borders, each with the other.
3. Palestine is constrained from a security standpoint based on its agreement with Israel.
These assumptions, accepted by all participants in the Working Group, provided an indispensable conceptual framework for dialogue about a trilateral security regime. The assumptions also established a standard by which distinctions could be made between relevant trilateral issues on the one hand, and important but - in this context - irrelevant bilateral issues on the other.
All participants agreed that, for the purposes of the discussion, there is already a Palestinian state and it has a joint border with Jordan, but it is also subject to certain security constraints. Only if there are mutually recognized borders among all partners is there a rationale for discussing trilateral security. Put differently, in the absence of a Jordan-Palestine border, i.e., if a Palestinian state were to emerge that was completely surrounded by Israeli territory, there would be no relevant Jordanian-Palestinian security issues to qualify for a trilateral regime. But the territorial length and location of the Jordan-Palestine border - obviously, either in all of the Jordan Valley as the Palestinians want, or in a larger or smaller section of the valley in accordance with diverse Israeli views - were not a topic of discussions; these issues will presumably be resolved bilaterally between Israel and the PLO in final status talks. By agreeing to leave them out of discussions, the Working Group was able to involve a broader range of participants, particularly on the Israeli side, than might otherwise have been possible.
The detailed fabric of security constraints imposed upon Palestine by the Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement was also not spelled out in our assumptions - again, because it is a bilateral issue. Some security constraints became topics for discussion and at times disagreement in the Working Group discussions; others were not discussed. This disparity was an inevitable consequence of the technique employed for facilitating discussions. After having assumed the existence of a Palestinian state for the purposes of discussions, one key objective was to provide each of the three parties with ideas and better understanding regarding the security issues that must be dealt with in the course of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over the creation of such a state - a matter of vital interest to Jordan as well.
The methodology adopted for discussion dealt first with those trilateral security issues that appeared to engender broad agreement among the participants. Then, as a degree of mutual confidence was built up regarding the feasibility of the goal of a trilateral security regime, the Working Group increasingly tackled conflicting interests, and in some cases was able to describe areas of limited agreement here as well.
Nevertheless, as Working Group members suspected from the start, at the conclusion of discussions there remained a number of very important core security issues upon which the three parties were not able to agree. The elucidation of the nature and content of disagreement over these issues is at least as important for relevant policy makers and negotiators as the agreed issues. It is the disputed topics that are certain to be at the center of Israeli-Palestinian final status security talks.

General Security Interests and Threat Perceptions within the Jordan-Israel-Palestine Region

Palestine
Palestine's security requires removal of the existential threat posed by Israeli occupation and the denial of the right to self-determination. Additional security interests require:
1. Removing settlers who are armed and hostile and pose an internal threat to the security of the Palestinian state.
2. Ensuring a self-defense capability that poses no threat to others. Self defense is not defined in normal military terms but in the ability to prevent domestic subversion, stop cross border infiltration attempts, maintain law and order, etc. Palestine's security requires Israel be a moderate, non-expansionist state offering no hostile subversion.
3. Maintaining domestic stability and preventing internal conflict. Due to the existence of an armed and ideologically motivated opposition, there is a need to ensure that the peace agreement is perceived as fair and supported by the majority of the population.
4. Resolving the problem of the Palestinian refugees, the Right of Return and displaced persons, while protecting the civil-political rights of the refugees in host countries until the issue is resolved.
5. Palestine must not be deprived of access to regional water resources.
6. The maintenance of regional stability requires Palestinian participation in arms control efforts, including the declaration of the region as a nuclear-free zone and the absence of any regional military alliance that endangers Palestine.

Jordan
Jordan is strategically located in the center of the Middle East and provides strategic depth for both Israel and Palestine. Jordan's security and stability are therefore essential for Israel and Palestine. Any prolonged stagnation in the peace process might result in violence and instability within the Jordan-Israel-Palestine triangle. Of course, stability cannot evolve in a region wracked by conflict. It is in Jordan's interest to see progress on the Syrian/Lebanese-Israeli track as well.
There is a need for genuine cooperation to counter terrorism and violence. The issue of personal/community security will always have a great impact on attitudes towards reconciliation. Jordan has a vital interest in resolving the issues of 1948 refugees and 1967 displaced persons. Two additional refugee migrations (from the Gulf in 1991 and from Lebanon in 1975-1985) have left a negative impact on Jordan's demography and economy. Poverty and unemployment are sources of instability and frustration and fuel fundamentalism. Jordan is therefore interested in addressing the root causes of difficult social conditions through economic cooperation and eventual integration.
For Jordanians, Jordan, Palestine and Israel share a number of security interests and threat perceptions, including existential threats, agreement violation, demographic issues, terrorism and violent anti-peace opposition groups. Jordan believes all three countries will need to cooperate in - confronting terrorism, refraining from the threat or use of force, maintaining one another's territorial integrity, exchanging information on issues relating to security, establishing CSBMs and demilitarized zones, and establishing joint security training for personnel.
Jordan believes that a trilateral security regime could serve as a nucleus for a broader security regime. On the other hand, failure within the triangle would have serious negative regional implications.
Conflicting security interests within the triangle include conventional and non-conventional military asymmetries, border control issues, attitudes toward use of violence and terrorism, Israeli settlement policies, refugees and displaced persons, water, and movement of people and goods across borders.

Threat perceptions
These Jordanian general security interests reflect risks that could develop into threats to national security if not addressed effectively. Jordan is surrounded by four states that enjoy abundant resources, larger standing armed forces and a qualitative edge over Jordan's inventory of weapons systems. Accordingly Jordan, as a small state, has realized its security interests by creating simultaneous relationships with different states or blocs, depending on the circumstances. Due to the uncertainties of the future, Jordan must always bear in mind this geostrategic reality. A trilateral security regime is a step in the right direction. If it is ever to alter this reality of shifting alliances, it must be a permanent security regime.
Jordan has serious concerns regarding the spread of NBC weapons and their delivery systems. Accordingly it will continue to work towards creating a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction that are not conducive to regional security and stability. In addition, Jordan will explore every avenue that might lead to disarmament, arms control and arms reductions.

Israel
Security Interests
1. Regional stability
2. Inviolability of Israeli-Arab peace treaties.
3. No regional military alliances that endanger Israel, such as an eastern front.
4. Jordan and Palestine are moderate, democratic and pro-Western.
5. Existing Israeli water resources remain inviolable.
6. No armed militias or terrorist groups hostile towards Israel shelter in neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Palestine.
7. Jordan remains under Hashemite rule; its territorial and demographic integrity is maintained.
8. Palestine does not project any military or irredentist threat to Israel or Jordan.
9. The Israeli Arab minority is integrated into the Israeli national and social fabric.
10. Security arrangements comprise, inter alia, demilitarization of offensive weapons systems, Israeli control over the airspace west of the Jordan, Israeli-Jordanian coordination of air space management and regional air defense, Israeli control over the Palestinian Mediterranean coastline. Palestine or Jordan holds no non-conventional weaponry.

Threat Perceptions
1. Violation of peace and security treaty arrangements.
2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems in the region.
3. Hostile military forces in the region.
4. Air and/or missile strikes.
5. Terrorism of any sort, anywhere, against Israel or Jewish targets.
6. Diversion or drying up of Israeli water resources.
7. Palestinian armed forces in proximity to vital targets in Israel.
8. Palestinian irredentism vis-à-vis Israel or Hashemite Jordan.
9. Hostile fundamentalism or other subversion in Palestine and/or Jordan; regime instability instigated by hostile elements.

Security Interests that Generated Broad Agreement

The Working Group's discussion of agreed security interests moved from the regional/general, through the state specific, to operational areas.

Regional

There are broad components of Middle East regional security that extend geographically beyond a trilateral security regime. These are not conditions for the concluding of a trilateral security regime, but rather the regional conditions under which a trilateral security regime could prosper and eventually expand, and to which its emergence would contribute.
Middle East regional stability will include, first and foremost, the achievement of comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, as well as the conclusion of additional regional disputes. In parallel, a successful regional arms control regime is envisioned, characterized by a system of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and encompassing conventional as well as non-conventional weapons, and leading to the creation of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The emergence of regional stability will contribute to the prevention of surprise and/or external attack against any of the trilateral regime parties, will enable regional states to limit or cope with the influence of violent groups and regimes, and will facilitate the non-violent resolution of all regional conflicts and disputes.
In this context, the trilateral security regime could copy the provision regarding a commitment to non-conventional disarmament that is incorporated into the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Article 5, paragraph 7 reads:
7. The Parties undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible in the context of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly, towards the following:
a. the creation in the Middle East of a region free from hostile alliances and coalitions;
b. the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace, characterized by the renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation and goodwill.

State-specific, bilateral and trilateral

As a security bloc, the trilateral security regime will provide strategic depth for each of its members. Each of the partner states, too, will have an interest in maintaining the domestic stability of the others: reducing threats of destabilization or violent subversion, encouraging democracy, open polity and pluralism, and demonstrating sensitivity to the implications of its own domestic policies or activities for the domestic stability of its partners.
The regime will take priority in its members' bilateral relations. Thus, in the event of contradiction between the provisions of the trilateral security regime and previously existing bilateral agreements among its members, the previous agreements will be made compatible with the regime. Further, while the three parties will also maintain bilateral security agreements among them, they will refrain in future from joining bilateral or multilateral security agreements that contradict or jeopardize the security regime. Moreover, trilateral consultation will guide the formulation of new bilateral security arrangements within the regime, as well as of new multilateral security arrangements. And internal political changes within any regime member state will not release that state from its regime treaty obligations.
Under the trilateral security regime, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the partners will be maintained. This comprises secure and mutually recognized borders; prevention of violence and subversion against one another; prohibition of incitement to delegitimize or alter the borders of fellow regime states [the precise definition of incitement in this context requires further elucidation; see Terrorism, below]; and non-interference by each party in the internal affairs of the others. The parties will also refrain from using security as a pretext to hinder or abuse the free movement of people and goods.

Terrorism

The parties to the trilateral security regime agree to the following premise: the threat or act of violence by an individual or group, possibly sponsored by an organization or state, aimed at destabilizing or delegitimizing the security regime, or aimed at one of the regime states, as well as the advocacy, encouragement or incitement of such acts, will elicit counter-terrorism cooperation. This will be directed primarily against armed groups, the accumulating of illegal weapons and the training of terrorists.
This premise requires a number of qualifying remarks. First of all, it clearly avoids inclusion of internal terrorism originating in and taking place in a single state. Thus, for example, an attack by an extremist Palestinian organization on an Israeli military vehicle inside Israel, inside Palestine, or by weapons fire across the Jordan River, would be considered terrorism because the motive is to destabilize the security regime. But such an attack on a Palestinian police vehicle inside Palestine would constitute terrorism under the regime's criteria only if its motive was to destabilize trilateral security arrangements; otherwise it would be considered a purely domestic Palestinian incident. By the same token, a violent attack by a Jewish extremist organization within Israel against an Israeli target would be considered an internal issue, unless its aim was to destabilize security regime arrangements.
Secondly, the definition clearly requires further elucidation in several sections. For example, the problematic nature of a definition of incitement was alluded to above. How does one prevent the reciting of holy verses from the Koran or the Bible that are deemed by some to be inciteful? Thus the rhetorical issues are problematic: the "advocacy, encouragement or incitement" of acts of terrorism might be interpreted differently, and dealt with differently, by different states in which large minorities may subscribe to an ideology or religion deemed inciteful by others. So, too, the nature of the destabilization or delegitimization of the trilateral security regime, i.e., the alteration of the political-security status quo, must be pinpointed.
The three partners will undertake certain unambiguous counter-terrorism steps, such as the outlawing of terrorist movements, groups and organizations and their activities, including fundraising, arrests, cooperation in extradition, etc. The banning of certain organizations might be more problematic: Israeli-Palestinian peace is liable to be opposed at the political level by Hamas as well as by some Israeli groups. These should be able to use a political forum to advocate change; but the point at which they are seen to be inciting to violence requires further discussion.
The three security regime partners should therefore commit to developing a joint education strategy, and subscribe to a joint curriculum based on using the same texts to teach youth to shun violence and prefer coexistence, tolerance, and the primacy of agreements and the ethics of peace. In parallel, the regime could create a voluntary non-binding tripartite body composed of senior judges, educators and the like, to discuss protests by any side regarding incitement, and to make non-binding but morally forceful recommendations.
Finally, at the military operational level, cooperation would range from exchange of intelligence information, through a joint staff dedicated to planning, coordination and training, all the way to a tripartite anti-terrorist unit comprising contingents from all three sides. The parties were not, however, able to agree on the deployment and operation of this unit (see Anti-terrorist operations in Chapter 5, Security Interests that Generated Partial Agreement, below).

Fourth party forces

The model for agreement regarding the entry and movement of fourth party armed forces within the trilateral security regime states is the relevant clause-Article 4, paragraph 4-in the Israel-Jordan peace treaty:
4. Consistent with the era of peace and with the efforts to build regional security and to avoid and prevent aggression and violence, the Parties further agree to refrain from the following:
a. joining or in any way assisting, promoting or cooperating with any coalition, organization or alliance with a military or security character with a third party, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or other acts of military hostility against the other Party, in contravention of the provisions of the present Treaty;
b. allowing the entry, stationing and operating on their territory, or through it, of military forces, personnel or materiel of a third party, in circumstances which may adversely prejudice the security of the other Party.
The trilateral security regime would prohibit the inviting or deploying of fourth party armies and/or military advisers, unless agreed by all three members.

Verification

Existing verification arrangements involving one or more of the regime states are quite diverse. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), for example, is extremely intrusive. Jordan has signed and ratified it; Israel has signed but not yet ratified. Thus Palestinian adherence and Israeli ratification would commit all trilateral security regime parties to this intrusive regime-but only in the chemical sphere. In any case, non-conventional arms control is a regional and international issue that goes beyond the realm of the trilateral security regime (see Regional, above).
Israel is involved in two regimes using third party verification: UNDOF verifies Israeli-Syrian compliance on the Golan, and the MFO verifies the Sinai regime. Both involve demilitarized zones, force reduction and weapons limitations. In the case of Sinai, under the Egypt-Israel peace treaty the two parties themselves help finance the regime. Egypt and Israel also cooperate bilaterally at the tactical level regarding drug smuggling, border infiltration, etc. In contrast, Israel and Syria enjoy excellent supervision by UNDOF even though they have no relations. Finally, the UNIFIL (multilateral) regime in South Lebanon has a mixed record, while the five-country committee verifying the Grapes of Wrath understandings in Lebanon appears to be a step forward insofar as it entails direct Israeli-Syrian contact.
The Israel-Jordan peace treaty does not include any verification arrangements, third party or otherwise. Arrangements are based on cooperation, coordination, common interest and mutual trust.
In the case of a trilateral security regime, there is a wide variety of arrangements to be verified, ranging from demilitarization to force deployment and counter-terrorism measures (note: verification of arrangements provided by the Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement is not discussed here but will likely be related). Since a trilateral security regime-unlike existing Israel-Arab arrangements-involves very asymmetrical force limitations, it calls for asymmetrical verification, and this is problematic. Hence a fourth party might help ensure objectivity and partially right the asymmetries, and might be necessary at least in the early stages.
One possibility would be to approach the US, which already exercises a verification and intelligence role between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. At a minimum, the US would probably be needed in an umbrella role, for moral-political support, to deter or convince other regional actors who may initially erroneously view the trilateral security regime as some sort of hostile alliance, and for financial and technical assistance, arbitration, and leadership of joint committees.

Security Interests that Generated partial Agreement

Military emergencies and early warning

The disputed security interests are best introduced by means of the Joint Working Group's discussion of military emergencies. Here, as in the case of terrorism, above, a generally acceptable premise or definition was reached. Accordingly, a strategic military emergency for the trilateral security regime involves one or more of the following (in order of declining importance or relevancy):
1. the entrance of foreign forces, or the threat thereof, into any of the three states, under any of the following circumstances:
a) land invasion
b) expeditionary force without prior coordination
c) invasion of air space and/or territorial waters
d) missile launch.
2. armed conflict, or the threat thereof, involving Israel, Jordan or Palestine, across their borders with non-regime states, i.e. in the Sinai, the Golan, South Lebanon, and with Jordan's neighbors.
3. armed conflict, or the threat thereof, somewhere in the Middle East but not directly involving the regime states.
4. finally, tactical emergencies are defined as those involving terrorism, as treated above.
These definitions should not imply that the trilateral security regime is an alliance. At a minimum it would consult regarding the above external emergencies. It would not be realistic to discuss any sort of Israel-Arab alliance until there is comprehensive peace. The trilateral security regime should not contradict Arab-Arab relations, but rather complement a wider Middle East security regime.
Thus far the parties agree. But there is no clear agreement regarding the ramifications for one party of an external conflict involving another, particularly with regard to transit of one another's territory. From the Palestinian standpoint, a great deal depends on the formal status of Israel's relations with possible aggressor states beyond the trilateral security regime. To cite but one current example, from the Palestinian perspective, assuming conditions approximating the status quo, an Israeli air strike in Lebanon, or an attack from the sea against Israel, should not impose costs on the Palestinians.
A number of scenarios appear to illustrate the difficulty of agreeing in advance on collective measures to be invoked in the event of emergency, particularly with regard to air and land transit rights.

Scenario 1: The dilemma of an Israel-Syria war on the Golan
In the event of aggression against Israel by Syria (or for that matter, any other state) after that state has signed a peace treaty with Israel, a number of measures could be agreed whereby the two other security regime states would support Israel. These would apply equally to aggression against Jordan by one of its Arab neighbors. But if, on the other hand, Israel still occupies the Golan and has no peace agreement with Syria, then Jordan and Palestine would argue that they have no obligation to cooperate with Israel in the event of war with Syria. Nonetheless, Israel's security regime partners would be obliged to address the question of accommodation of Israel's military needs.
Were Israeli aircraft to overfly the West Bank on their way to an Israeli-Syrian front (or for that matter on their way into Jordanian airspace), Palestine would protest diplomatically this violation of its sovereignty. But because it possesses no anti-aircraft capabililty (as part of its demilitarized status), it presumably would not present Israel with a military dilemma. Even assuming this tacit set of circumstances is acceptable to Palestine, it would not be to Israel, which would argue that there must be agreed arrangements for overflight, or for that matter, land passage, in times of emergency.

Scenario 2: Israeli overflights in Jordan
Jordan would perceive considerable danger in any Israeli attempt to traverse Jordan's skies in order to deal with a threat from the east. At a minimum, Israeli use of Jordanian airspace has to be coordinated bilaterally, with close intelligence coordination based on Israeli advanced early-warning capabilities. But Jordan would not join forces with Israel against Jordan's neighbors. A parallel case is an Israeli-Arab missile war in which Israeli Arrow anti-missile missiles intercept Iraqi or Iranian missiles in the skies above Jordan, with the warhead exploding or dispersing in Jordan. In the Israeli view, enhanced bilateral cooperation and/or technological innovation might obviate this scenario. Thus, Israel could deploy its Arrow batteries in east Jordan; that way the intercept phase would take place over Iraq. Alternatively, the successful deployment of boost-phase interception might enable interception to take place over Iraq.

Scenario 3: Israel seeks to reinforce the Jordan Valley against an eastern front
In this event, Israel would presumably need to send land forces across Palestinian territory. Assuming that Israel has signed peace agreements with the eastern front aggressor states and/or that the gathering eastern front constitutes an act of aggression against Jordan or is perceived as a threat to Palestine (e.g. an Iranian-led Islamist coalition), then Palestine would presumably support Israel's logistics effort to move forces across the West Bank into the Jordan Valley (where, according to the Palestinian vision of Jordan Valley security provisions, it would merely be reinforcing a larger joint force).
However if this scenario unravels in circumstances approximating the Israel-Arab status quo, i.e., the eastern front aggressor states have never signed peace agreements with Israel, then from the Palestinian standpoint the situation would be similar to that broached earlier regarding Israeli emergency military overflights of the West Bank on the way to a Golan warfront. Since Palestine would already have consented to the complete demilitarization of the roads that Israel might use to reach the Jordan Valley, its reaction to an Israeli decision to send its military convoys along these routes would likely not exceed a diplomatic protest. Here again, Israel would deem this tacit set of circumstances to be inadequate, and would argue for a more comprehensive consultation mechanism regarding entry by one regime partner into the territory of another.

Scenario 4: A Palestinian or Jordanian domestic insurgency
This sort of 'internal' scenario does not raise the question of whether a state of peace or war prevails between Israel and additional neighbors. In the Palestinians scenario, Palestine requires reinforcements in Gaza to deal with an internal threat or an invasion from the sea. It wants Israel to agree to the arrival by land or air of Jordanian or Egyptian troops. Here Israel would likely be conscious of Palestinian sensitivities (preferring Arab rather than Israeli help). In the Jordanian scenario, an uprising by radical or extremist groups erupts in Gaza, the West Bank and Jordan simultaneously. Here again, Palestine would request that Jordanian or Egyptian forces come to its aid.
Several of the above scenarios generated disagreement regarding Israel's need for early warning facilities. In one Arab view, Israel's use of satellites, coupled with Jordan's function as strategic depth for Israel, might render unnecessary Israeli early warning stations on the West Bank. Another Arab position holds that Palestine could take over Israeli radars on the West Bank, and that all three states could link-up their early warning radars, with Israel relying on Jordanian and Palestinian ground radar capabilities, and with Israeli airborne early warning capabilities covering Jordan and linked to both Jordan and Palestine. An additional Arab suggestion posits that the three partners could exchange radar controllers as a confidence-building measure, with Israeli and Palestinian controllers stationed on Jordan's eastern border and Jordanian controllers in Israel. The Israeli response is that reliance on Jordanian radar is not certain enough, insofar as it depends on Jordan's remaining a friendly regime; as for Palestine, it should have no radar capabilities. And Israeli electronic early-warning capabilities on the West Bank would be manned exclusively by Israelis.
These disagreements could conceivably be at least partially mitigated through phasing. Israel might agree to remove its early-warning stations from Palestine once it is satisfied that trilateral regime cooperation works and the threat from the east has been diminished. The Palestinian interest in accelerating the creation of a tripartite early-warning network is precisely to diminish the strategic importance for Israel of the West Bank, and to defuse the Israeli argument for keeping its forces there.
This discussion of emergency scenarios points to a number of key areas of disagreement, primarily between Palestine and Israel, that require further discussion and elaboration, based on an understanding of the two parties' diverse viewpoints. As for Jordan, in general it will endorse whatever measures the two parties agree upon, and will be available to participate in agreed joint forces west of the Jordan.

Transit rights and deployment in the Jordan Valley

The Israeli viewpoint
Israelis want to maintain bases, early warning stations and military forces in or overlooking the Jordan Valley to deal with strategic and tactical (anti-terrorist) emergencies. Among Israelis there is some disagreement as to the size and mission of these forces, with the maximalist approach calling for a force with warfighting capabilities deployed in a larger expanse of Jordan Valley territory west of the River, and the minimalists calling for a tripwire force that could quickly be reinforced without interference by Palestinians. But all Israelis agree that the independence of this force, and its eventual termination, be subject solely to Israeli considerations. An Israeli minimalist position argues that this force would be stationed mainly on Palestinian territory in the Jordan Valley, which would be extensive; Israeli maximalists hold that it would be deployed mainly on extensive Israeli-held territory in the Jordan Valley. It could be at least partially integrated into a joint, trilateral force for the purpose of patrolling against terrorism; this could involve Jordanian as well as Palestinian units in the western Jordan Valley, as well as exchange of liaison officers.
Israel could conceivably pay Palestine for the use of its territory. There are possible precedents in the region. The US leases Incerlik from Turkey, the British lease bases in Cyprus, and the US maintains bases in Germany. In all but the Cyprus case, the parties involved are part of a military alliance. In Germany and Cyprus, a foreign military presence was ended on condition that the bases be leased; the sovereignty of the host country remains limited inside the base areas.
Regarding the reinforcement of this force, or the movement of Israeli forces across West Bank territory toward the Golan, Israel wishes to maintain a clearly defined right to transfer its forces in a totally unfettered manner, by agreement, in the event of a predefined emergency. Israel should be aware of Palestinian sensitivities, and strive to avoid approaching these deployment areas via Palestinian population concentrations, instead using Bet She'an and/or approaching form the south/southwest.

The Palestinian viewpoint
A successful Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement must recognize Palestinians' sovereignty over their territory. As long as Israel maintains unilateral jurisdiction over forces in the Palestinian Jordan Valley, there can be no final status agreement. Thus Israeli forces could only be deployed in the Jordan Valley, or anywhere else on Palestinian territory, within the framework of a tactical trilateral force designed essentially to deal with terrorism, and anchored in a relationship of reciprocity.
Under peace, Israel does not need a strategic military presence in the Jordan Valley; it could suffice with access to the Jordan Valley, coupled with the strategic depth provided by Jordan, and Israel's command of the air. If Israel wishes to lease land for bases from Palestine, it should first end the occupation and recognize Palestinian sovereignty. Then it might be possible to negotiate an Israeli presence, but even then, only within the framework of a mixed Palestinian-Israeli force. The evolution of a Jordan-Palestine confederation could encourage Jordanian participation, too.
As for Israeli emergency access to the Jordan, assuming the purpose is to oppose a threat recognized by the trilateral security regime (e.g. a radical onslaught on Jordan), then access would be unfettered. In circumstances disputed by the Palestinians, demilitarization provisions might oblige Palestine to limit its protest to the diplomatic sphere regarding Israeli transit of Palestinian air space or territory.

The Jordanian viewpoint
Jordan would support any mutually acceptable agreement between Israel and Palestine on these issues. If invited, Jordan would participate in a trilateral tactical force in the Jordan Valley (west of the Jordan River only) dealing with border security. As for the Israeli strategic military presence, Jordan would advocate planning a phased approach for its eventual removal, or alternatively for the emergence of a joint Israeli-Palestinian defense network.

Anti-terrorist operations

The parties of the Working Group agreed (Chapter 4, Security Interests that Generated Broad Agreement) on ways to define terrorism, and on a number of aspects of operational cooperation, including a tripartite anti-terrorist unit. But they were unable to agree on the deployment details regarding this unit and its operations.

The Palestinian viewpoint
According to one Palestinian approach, trilateral joint patrols would operate along all the bilateral borders of the security regime, i.e. not only in the Jordan Valley, but along the Israeli-Jordanian borders in Bet She'an and the Arava and the Israeli-Palestinian borders around Gaza and the West Bank. They would deal with infiltration and smuggling, and their overall mission would be to protect the joint security regime. In this role they could conceivably even patrol the Jordan-Syria and Israel-Egypt borders. This approach is based on the notion that all three security regime participants envision security as being mutual, egalitarian and collective. Accordingly, beyond demilitarization there should be no uneven measures that impose greater security burdens on the Palestinians than on others.
A more minimalistic Palestinian approach toward the joint patrol idea argues that the security regime would require a Palestinian component within a trilateral patrol only along the West Bank-Jordan border. It would also require a Jordanian component on the West Bank side, to diffuse Israeli-Palestinian tensions. This would in effect constitute a step toward the gradual phasing-out of IDF occupation. The tripartite anti-terrorist unit, too, would deal with cross-border terrorism in this region. But current security issues along the other security regime borders would be handled bilaterally by the countries involved, i.e. the Palestinians need not insist on a parallel Palestinian presence in, say, the Arava, or a Jordanian presence between Tul Karm and Netanya. The Jordan Valley joint patrol would involve units from all three countries deployed on the West Bank of the Jordan. A DCO office at each end of the Jordan Valley would be manned trilaterally. Its primary area of reference would be the Jordan Valley, but on the Israel-Jordan borders each side, on its own, would report to the DCOs. The entire joint operation could be phased out only on the basis of a consensus.
Another Palestinian idea concerned a joint operational unit, with rotating command, to deal with terrorist threats that are not necessarily located along borders. In one Palestinian variation, the force would be an observer unit; actual combat would involve only local national units. An Israeli variation held that, while it is too early to define the geographic deployment and functions of such a unit, in theory at least it could operate anywhere within the security regime, for example against aircraft hijackers at one of the airports.

The Israeli viewpoint
The Israeli approach to the Jordan Valley joint anti-terrorist patrol calls for a mixed Israeli-Palestinian force on the western side of the Jordan Valley; on the eastern, or Jordanian side, the force would be strictly Jordanian. This proposal also raises the possibility of attaching a Palestinian liaison officer to the structure of Israeli-Jordanian joint security efforts in the Arava or the Bet She'an area, but emphasizes that only the Jordan Valley constitutes a special case for a joint patrol. These arrangements, like other security arrangements that involve Israeli forces on the West Bank, could eventually be phased out, but only on the basis of a genuine improvement in the security situation that minimizes the threat from terrorism. Another aspect of phasing might be to expand the use of a joint force geographically: once it proved its viability in a limited region, its jurisdiction could be broadened to include additional sectors.

The Jordanian viewpoint
Jordan believes that there may be no need for joint patrols, or that they could be phased out in due time, consistent with advancement in peacebuilding operations, normalization of relations and enhancement of trust among the parties.

Management of shared borders

The Israeli viewpoint
Whether there would be a very short, shared Palestinian-Jordanian border at Jericho, with the rest of the Jordan Valley held by Israel for strategic reasons, or a longer Palestinian-Jordanian border in the Jordan Valley (this a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian issue), Israel would retain overall security control and supervision at the crossings with regard to the entry of terrorist elements and material, and possible abuse of the entry into Palestine of Palestine refugees. These provisions could eventually be phased out, based upon the satisfaction of objective criteria, but at least in first phase Israel would have jurisdiction, veto power, right of inspection, etc.

The Palestinian viewpoint
Palestine will have complete control over its international borders, including the bridges on the Jordan River. Each of the three parties will have full control and responsibility over its side of the border with the others. The trilateral security regime countries will cooperate and coordinate their efforts to fight terrorism at border crossing points.

A shared viewpoint
Regarding the smuggling of prohibited material, all three parties argue that this is essentially a verification issue, as the nature of the prohibited material would be agreed upon (see Demilitarization and military doctrine, below). Further, it was suggested that CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) challenge rules could here be applied to the security regime, expanding them to include suspect material and dual-use items imported into Palestine; a tripartite verification team could be introduced.

Security-related control over air space

The Palestinian viewpoint
Palestine would insist that any disarmament provisions and/or Israel Air Force (IAF) presence in its air space be negotiated in final status talks, thereby recognizing and respecting the principle of Palestinian equality in terms of sovereignty of airspace. Any agreed IAF presence in Palestinian air space would have to be paid for.
In the Palestinian view, Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement will impose constraints on the Israeli presence in the air and on the ground in the West Bank. Palestinians oppose Israeli control over early warning sites in the West Bank, and dispute Israeli freedom to overfly the region for training purposes. The early warning sites, Palestinians suggest, should either be under joint Palestinian-Israeli control or be manned by a multilateral force, as in Sinai.

The Israeli viewpoint
According to the Israeli concept, regional military cooperation in the air will involve only Israel and Jordan. Ground-based early warning will require ongoing Israeli control over a few specific sites in the West Bank, in coordination with Jordanian early warning east of the Jordan. The IAF will carry out training and exercises over the West Bank, respecting the same limitations as in Israeli-populated areas regarding low flying and air-to-ground training, and respecting agreed civil air corridors - over which the IAF can take control in emergencies (though the definition of emergencies is not agreed - see Military emergencies and early warning, above). While Israel rejects Palestinian demands for additional constraints, it could indeed pay Palestine for the use of its airspace - balancing these payments with Palestinian transit payments for Palestinian aircraft that cross Israel.

A shared viewpoint
While the parties could not agree on joint military cooperation in the air, they concur broadly on arrangements for civil aviation. Israel, Jordan and Palestine will decide on air corridors on a trilateral basis, with the cooperation, where required, of additional parties (e.g. the air corridor to Gaza International Airport via Egypt). These will be subject to Israeli and Jordanian flight information regions (FIRs). Technically, it would be impractical to establish a separate FIR for Palestine. In all other ways Palestine will operate in a sovereign manner in the realm of civil aviation. Palestinian international airports will have the same air control status as Ben Gurion and Queen Alia International. Palestinian aircraft will enter local Palestinian air control (5-7 nautical miles around the airport center) of a Palestinian airport via the Israeli and Jordanian (and Egyptian) FIRs.

Ground and naval forces demilitarization and military doctrine

The Israeli viewpoint
There will be a general prohibition on Palestinian acquisition or deployment of heavy weaponry: armor, artillery, missiles, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry, mines, and non-conventional weapons. Palestinian security forces would have light arms unless otherwise specified. There would also be a ceiling on the number of persons under arms. Production of weapons would be prohibited. From a doctrinal standpoint, the mission of the Palestinian force would be public order and internal security; accordingly, there would no company or battalion level training, with the possible exception of anti-terrorism forces. On the Mediterranean Sea (and, according to one Israeli viewpoint, the Dead Sea as well), Palestine would need a coast guard to maintain public order and prevent smuggling and naval-based terrorism.

The Palestinian viewpoint
Palestinians reject any attempt by Israel to unduly limit Palestinian capabilities. Understandably, Palestine will not have the capability to defend itself against an Israeli or Jordanian attack. But it should be capable of deterring small scale cross-border attacks by gangs and marauders. At present Palestinians are permitted (under the Oslo agreements) up to 15 light, unarmed riot vehicles in the West Bank and up to 45 wheeled armored vehicles in the Gaza Strip, and a total of up to 15,000 light personal weapons and up to 240 machine guns of 0.3" or 0.5" caliber. They will need more, as well as anit -tank weapons capable of destroying vehicles. They will also need a coast guard to patrol the Palestinian shore of the Dead Sea. Palestinian forces should be able to deploy anywhere in Palestine except designated areas where joint patrols take place. Thus from a doctrinal standpoint, Palestine will have no warmaking capability, but it will have a limited deterrent capability vis-à-vis terrorists, smugglers and other criminal elements.