Things could be worse. The Aqsa mosque has not been blown up. The
Western Wall is still standing. The supreme Palestinian symbol,
Yasser Arafat, has not (at time of writing) been assassinated. The
wider region has not exploded into open warfare. Chemical,
biological or nuclear attacks have not happened. The abyss is deep
and if the free fall is not checked soon even the current grim
reality may one day be viewed with a certain nostalgia.
It is not too late to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -
based on two viable states - but time is on no one's side. The
realistic alternative is not the alluring fantasy of one state -
concealing a mass of ill thought out contradictions - but, more
likely, perpetual conflict. If this is our destiny, we can at least
be certain of near-universal agreement on one point - it was all
the fault of someone else.
Imagine we were suddenly struck by a previously unknown virus that
disabled our capacity to blame others. No matter how hard we tried
to point the finger elsewhere, this strange bug would stubbornly
force us to reflect on our own deficiencies and misconceptions and
on how to overcome them.
No More Blaming Others
Take the myth of Barak's "generous offer" (Camp David, 2000) and
the paralytic effect that the mantra "we offered them everything
and they rejected everything" had on the peace process and in
particular on Israeli peace activists who, without irony, blamed
the occupied Palestinians for having let them down. Imagine, as the
infection took hold, that it dawned on the Israeli people that it
was they who in fact had looked the gift-horse in the mouth - that
their leaders had scorned the very "generous offer" for which the
nation had been yearning for decades: a Palestinian pledge to
recognize the Jewish state within the 1967 borders with agreed,
equitable territorial adjustments; an offer for Israel to keep all
post-1967 Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem plus a few others
elsewhere in the West Bank; for it to assume sovereignty over the
Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter in the context of an open city
of Jerusalem, to be recognized as the capital of both states; and,
to top it off, for the Palestinian state to act implicitly as the
principal vehicle for Israel's integration into the wider region,
which previously had isolated and boycotted it.
Then imagine the impact on the mood in the region of a public
Israeli declaration affirming a readiness to negotiate on the above
basis, in principle to withdraw from the vast bulk of the
territories captured in 1967 in favor of a genuinely independent,
properly contiguous Palestinian state and to dismantle all
settlements in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip not included in
the equitable land swap. As they would not be starting from scratch
- we know by now the contours of a final agreement - negotiations
could proceed to a conclusion quite quickly.
The Clinton parameters (2000), refined at Taba (2001), pointed the
way. The Nusseibeh-Ayalon joint statement (2002) has summarized the
key principles and the unofficial Geneva accord (2003), led by the
Taba negotiators Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo, has elaborated
what a final peace treaty between the two parties might look like.
At the regional level, the Saudi Initiative, endorsed at the Arab
League Beirut Summit (2002), with Palestinian blessing, has held
out the prospect of comprehensive peace and normalization of
relations in exchange for comprehensive withdrawal.
What then is holding up peace now? On the Israeli side, primarily
an ideologically driven government that still clings to the
illusion that it can enjoy the fruits of peace while hanging on to
the spoils of war. We should not be fooled by Sharon's recent Gaza
"disengagement" plan into fantasizing that he (or maybe later
Netanyahu) is poised to do a "De Gaulle." Even assuming it
proceeds, his principal purpose - as ever - is to consolidate
Israel's hold over the greater prize of the West Bank, just as it
was a key consideration for his Likud predecessor Menachem Begin
some 25 years earlier when he agreed to a full withdrawal from
Sinai as part of the peace deal with Egypt.
There is no avoiding the conclusion that without "regime change" in
Israel - or decisive international intervention (or both) - there
will be no serious progress, certainly beyond the limited moves in
Gaza. So either we must pray that the Israeli electorate does us
all a favor when the time comes or hope that the international
community finally faces up to the full weight of its
responsibilities.
The Palestinians Too
I shall return to this last point. Meanwhile, imagine that the
Palestinian leadership was forced by the same curious bug to
critically examine its strategy and indeed to question whether it
really had a coherent strategy at all. Was one even possible, it
might ask itself, while it held - or appeared to hold - to the
plainly incompatible policy goals of two states for two peoples and
the full exercise of the Palestinian right of return to what became
Israel? What basic message did it hope to convey to the rest of the
world: that the Palestinian people were predominantly dispossessed
refugees yearning to return to their (mostly extinct) original
homes and villages (1948 UN General Assembly Resolution 194 / 1967
Security Council Resolution 242) or that they were a
nation-in-waiting seeking self-determination and statehood within
its traditional homeland (1988 PNC Algiers Congress / 2002 Security
Council Resolution 1397)? What did the Palestinian refugees
themselves - often left out in the cold - feel about all
this?
These may be complex questions without simple answers, but for as
long as the apparent policy ambiguities are not fully and
explicitly resolved, they surely will be fodder to an Israeli
government dedicated to projecting the true Palestinian goal as
Israel's liquidation. The official aim of the PLO and PA
(Palestinian Authority) is indeed two sovereign states living
harmoniously side by side, but why has this message failed to come
across convincingly, even to would-be sympathizers in the dormant
Israeli peace camp - a vital prospective partner ready to be
re-mobilized and potentially to make common cause with an
essentially nonviolent campaign of civil resistance to the
occupation? Despite its very difficult circumstances, might not a
self-critical Palestinian leadership conclude that it was time to
embark on an energetic campaign to persuade Israeli - and
international - public opinion of the sincerity of Palestinian
intentions and seek actively to recruit it to its cause?
Imagine next that Hamas was suddenly confronted with its own
contradictions. What, its leaders might ask themselves, has a
strategy of indiscriminate violence actually achieved in the face
of a militarily far stronger enemy with the means and resolve to
deliver powerful retribution? Even if the "martyr operations" had
helped persuade many Israelis that the occupation must end, haven't
they simultaneously exacerbated their security anxieties and made a
genuine withdrawal less likely? What effect have these actions had
on Palestinian cohesion and popular participation in resistance
activities, compared with the essentially non-violent first
intifada? How, furthermore, may the claim that the battle is with
Zionists and not Jews be reconciled with a charter that bristles
with classical anti-Semitic imagery of the crudest type? Battered
and bruised from recent assassinations, and bereft of international
sympathy, the organization - and the Islamic Jihad group - might
conclude that, if ever it wanted to be considered a player in
future peace moves, there were plenty of practical options for it
to contemplate other than sending in further suicidal "suicide
bombers."
Regional Responsibility
At the regional level, imagine that the Arab states that endorsed
the Saudi Initiative more than two years ago, reflected on whether
it was essentially a public relations exercise or a serious peace
move. If the latter, why has the declaration not been followed up
with a concerted effort to convince international opinion of the
earnestness of the peace and normalization pledges? Why has there
been no sustained campaign pitched at the Israeli government and,
more importantly, over its head at the Israeli people - as Sadat
had controversially but successfully done in the past to
demonstrate the authenticity of his peace proposal? Why, instead,
the continuing official rhetoric and propaganda hostile to Jews as
a people, to Judaism as a religion and to Israel per se? Why still
the muddle and deception of ambivalence?
Imagine that civil society in Arab countries reassessed whether
shunning all contact with Israeli civil society was the most
productive way of delivering support for the Palestinian cause and
peace in the region.
World Jewry and other Passionate Devotees
Imagine that Jewish community leaders and activists around the
world woke up to the realization that the Israel they cherished as
a needy charitable cause and as a proud nation reborn from the
ashes of the Nazi Holocaust had metamorphosed into a militarily
powerful state that for nearly four decades has been oppressively
occupying the land and lives of another degraded people whose
original felony was to be in the way of the Zionist enterprise.
Instead of knee-jerk solidarity with every Israeli policy and
action, however outrageous, imagine they applied the same rational
and human rights standards to Israeli conduct as they often prided
themselves as favoring elsewhere and imagine that they consistently
used their influence with Israeli governments to these ends.
Imagine, too, that other passionate devotees around the world to
the Israeli or Palestinian causes rose above their partisan
tendencies to see the bigger picture and campaign within their own
countries, separately or together, for a fair and equitable
solution to the conflict based on two viable states.
In sum, imagine the mysterious virus worked its magic - and no one
was making excuses. It would be a great advance, not to be
underestimated. But it would not be enough to break the deadlock on
the ground. For this, we need a coherent plan that is conceptually
sound, addresses the major issues head on, draws on the
negotiations of recent years, reflects the resultant international
consensus and - most importantly - learns from the failings and
does not repeat the mistakes of previous peace plans from the Oslo
Accords to the Quartet's Road Map.
Three Key Lessons
One key lesson to be drawn from these experiences is that, if ever
it were true, the parties today are unable - or unwilling - to
solve the problems themselves and that progress depends crucially
on decisive international intervention. A second is that
"incremental progress" in this context is a contradiction in terms
as it is an open invitation to militant factions on both sides to
sabotage a process and an outcome they vehemently oppose. A third -
vital - conclusion is that leaving the termination of the Israeli
occupation to the end of the process, while attempting to deal with
other problems first, is a logical fallacy, as it is the occupation
that is the root of most of the problems. The key is to find a way
of terminating the occupation toward the beginning of the process.
Otherwise, the plan will be sure to come apart once more, with
fingers of blame being pointed all around.
This presents two major challenges. One is to reconcile a swift and
authentic end to the Israeli occupation - a basic demand not just
of the Palestinians but also supported by a clear majority of
Israelis - with the visceral Israeli fear of relinquishing the
territories to the Palestinians themselves, particularly to Arafat
or Hamas. The other major challenge is to build a stable
Palestinian state able to meet the needs of its people and willing
to resolve outstanding problems with its Israeli neighbor.
A Temporary International Protectorate: The Only Realistic
Way
The only logical way of meeting these diverse needs is for the
territories to be handed over to a third party as a transitional
measure. What is proposed is that a temporary international
protectorate, under Security Council authority, assumes formal
legal jurisdiction over the whole of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
from the Israeli occupation authority. Mindful of the Iraq
experience, this would preferably be at the invitation of the
Palestinian Authority (ideally, it would be at the invitation of
the Israeli government too!). If the aim is to defuse and then end
the conflict, this is a more fitting option by far than an
unsightly and oppressive separation barrier snaking through the
West Bank, even if the latter provides a degree of short-term
protection to some Israelis.
On pragmatic grounds and on an interim basis, it is envisaged that
the protectorate would in effect delegate back, in part or in full,
de facto authority over designated areas of territory or program to
either the Israeli occupation authority or the PA, pending
final-status negotiations. In practical terms, this would entail a
prompt end to the Israeli occupation in the bulk of the
territories, with phased withdrawals in remaining areas according
to an agreed timetable but without prejudice to the final
territorial arrangement.
The most urgent task of the protectorate, in conjunction with local
forces, would be its peace enforcement role - acting vigorously
against further mutual slaughter and other acts of violence or
terror. The more vital longer-term task would be in the political
arena, where it would have a time-limited political mandate (maybe
three to five years), at the end of which it would give way to an
independent, democratic Palestinian state in the context of a peace
agreement.
To this end, the protectorate would assist the Palestinians in
restoring basic services, reviving civil society and rebuilding
national institutions. It would help train security and civil
personnel, monitor elections, facilitate and mediate final-status
negotiations, initiate and supervise the rehabilitation of incoming
willing refugees to the nascent Palestinian state, and generally
coordinate an array of internationally sponsored projects that the
drive toward independence is likely to generate.
Three Tiers
The protectorate would rest on three tiers. The upper tier would
confer international legitimacy and legality on the protectorate
and its scope of authority through a UN Security Council
resolution, which, based on the negotiations of recent years, would
chart the broad parameters of a projected final settlement. The
resolution would designate, as the second tier, a "mandate
authority" to oversee the work of the protectorate. A likely
candidate would be the "Quartet" of the U.S., EU, Russia and the
UN, possibly expanded to include other appropriate powers.
The third tier, the protectorate administration, would be divided
between the civil and security tasks. Responsibility for security
could fall to a "coalition of the willing and acceptable" -
requiring the assent of both the Palestinians and the Israelis -
which may include troops from the U.S., the U.K., Canada,
Australia, possibly Turkey, Egypt, Jordan or others. It is hard to
imagine this working without the U.S. playing a prominent role
although - in light of its current over-stretched and controversial
commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere - this could be
confined largely to the command levels. One proponent, the New York
Times columnist Thomas Friedman, has suggested designating the
security task to NATO.
It may be expected that this proposal would meet vehement
opposition from the current Israeli government and that
considerable international pressure would be needed to win its
compliance. But this would be true for any serious proposal. What
matters is that the focus of any pressure relates to the endgame,
not to side issues or procedural questions.
Implications for Israelis and Palestinians
The repercussions for Israeli society of an end to a 37-year
occupation of the land and lives of a neighboring people and the
return to Israel of large numbers of settlers, some of them
militant and bitter, would inevitably be mixed and profound.
Naturally, there would be dislocations. But the continuation of the
occupation is causing severe internal rifts and intense economic
distress. Of course, these would be a lot worse without the current
huge U.S. annual subventions - something not to be taken for
granted for the future.
In some Palestinian circles, the proposal may be regarded initially
as yet another device for delaying independence. But in reality,
far from statehood lurking around the corner, the drift is in the
opposite direction. The Palestinians of the Occupied Territories
today are a nation incarcerated. The virtual end of the Israeli
occupation and the dismantling of the entire paraphernalia of
repression, coupled with a robust international security presence
and the active participation of the Palestinians in building their
future state are all reasons to suppose there would be a
progressive reduction in the level of violence. The Palestinians
would at last have a tangible stake and a restored hope in the
future. It would mean a new start, commencing the day the
protectorate takes over.
The George Bush Factor
A major drawback is that George Bush has neither the vision of an
Eisenhower nor the grasp of a Clinton. Again, hope may be pinned on
the future good sense of an electorate to return a more cerebral
administration at the appointed hour. For its part, the EU -
Israel's biggest trading partner and the largest non-Arab provider
of direct aid to the PA - could be considerably more assertive,
along with other powers, in laying the political and practical
groundwork. It is a matter of intelligent self-interest and
determined political will.
In sum, there is a solution, waiting to be grasped. But time is
precious. We cannot rely on governments to act wisely
spontaneously, so it is important that a constituency of support be
built among ordinary citizens around the world to agitate
nationally and globally in favor of a decisive international role
along the lines outlined here to end this pernicious conflict
before it becomes irresolvable.
Or we could imagine that none of the above happens. The abyss
beckons.
That doesn't bear imagining.