The Arab Peace Initiative was presented at an Arab League summit in
Beirut in March of 2002 and was revived at an Arab League summit in
Riyadh in March 2007. The plan offers Israel full peace and
normalization in return for full withdrawal from the occupied
Palestinian territories. To observers, this provided an exceptional
opportunity to settle the century-old Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Initiative was all but ignored by both the American
administration and the Israeli government. First, it did not
coincide with their immediate regional plans, which were not
focused on the Israeli-Palestinian track. Second, neither country
welcomed a unified Arab position invoking a reference to
international law and United Nations resolutions. On the one hand,
the United States: 1) was deeply involved in Iraq, or, more
correctly, mired there; 2) was facing a continuous challenge from
al-Qaeda and other political Islamist factions active in the
region; and 3) did not accept a framework of international
legitimacy (e.g., the UN) for its war against terrorism and rogue
states - a reminder of President George W. Bush's doctrine that
there is no middle ground: "You are either with us or against
us."
Israel, on the other hand, was in no position to seriously engage
in a comprehensive peace settlement at the time, and found many
points of contention with the Initiative: 1) the proposed return to
the 1967 borders; 2) the inclusion of Arab East Jerusalem in the
future Palestinian state; and 3) the right of return for
Palestinian refugees, as stated in UN General Assembly Resolution
194. Most importantly, the Initiative was conditional, that is, it
offered Israel peace and normalization only if Israel agreed to
withdraw from the Palestinian territories it occupied in 1967. This
condition was promptly rejected by both Israel and the U.S., and
the whole endeavor was in danger of going the way of all other
peace initiatives: shelved and forgotten.
However, the reaffirmation of the Initiative at the Arab League
summit in Saudi Arabia represented a renewed and, perhaps, last
push for peace and for putting an end to the protracted
Arab-Israeli conflict. This was the standpoint of many political
leaders and observers in the region.
The Arab Quartet
Following the re-activation of the Arab Peace Initiative in Riyadh,
an Arab Quartet was created, consisting of Egypt and Jordan, which
have diplomatic ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), better known as the United Arab
Emirates. The Arab Quartet was supposed to be an Arab version of
the international Quartet that has been mediating and overseeing
the so-called peace process. It was to promote the Initiative,
rally international and regional support for it and contribute to
the conclusion of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. This
was the first time an Arab League committee had intervened in
Palestinian affairs without the inclusion of Palestine, also a full
member of the Arab League. This move is ostensibly an attempt on
the part of the Arab League to portray the Arab Quartet as a
neutral mediating body, just like the international Quartet. Other
reasons could be attributed to internal discord within the Arab
League.
The moderate Arab states forming the Quartet have much in common in
terms of interests, challenges and alliances. They all have strong
political and economic ties with the U.S. and the West. They
certainly face significant internal challenges posed by the rise of
political Islam. Indeed, they form a quasi-alliance with the U.S.
and the West, which was further enhanced following the 9/11 attacks
and the Iraq war. The 2006 Israeli attack on Lebanon further
highlighted the schism between the moderate Arabs, and the more
radical regimes and movements such as Syria, Hizbullah, Islamic
Jihad and Hamas.
Political Shiism and a Two-Level Game Perspective
From a games theory perspective, reviving the Arab Peace Initiative
can be viewed as a two-level game, in which states conduct
negotiations simultaneously on two levels - external (in this case
between the Arab states and Israel and key international players)
and internal (within the Arab League). While the Initiative was
directed primarily at Israel and the key international players in
the region, it was also meant to address a separate concern that
troubled the Arab League members: their capacity to garner a
unified Arab position regarding the current challenges in the
region. In addition to the continued instability caused by the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Arab states are facing another
threat from the East. The growing influence of Shiite Iran has
disrupted the status quo in the region, creating a new phenomenon
dubbed "political Shiism" and promoting a "counter-hegemony"
through political and cultural resistance against what is perceived
to be an alliance between the U.S., Israel and moderate Sunni Arab
states. Therefore, the most important objective of the Arab League
summit was for Arab diplomacy to maintain a unified Arab position
that can meet the pressing demands of the key regional and
international players.
Indeed, had it not been for the Initiative being reaffirmed, many
moderate Arab states were on the verge of establishing bilateral
economic and political relations with Israel. Such an outcome would
have deepened the rift between the states and marred the
façade of unity provided by the Arab League.
I do not share the view that the Arab Peace Initiative can be taken
literally - simply an initiative for peace - without a simultaneous
consideration of the other criteria as well, namely, the need to
maintain a unified Arab position on the international stage. That
calculation would have drastically altered the expectations and we
would not have been wondering why the Initiative had not met with
success. In fact, given the challenges that the Arab states were
facing both internally and externally, the Arab Peace Initiative
was a rare success.
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