The role of the news media in violent conflicts is a major concern
in the field of political communication. One also finds an
increasing awareness of the importance of this topic among
journalists, commentators and the general public. The massive
amount of attention devoted to the role of the media in the recent
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq provides a graphic demonstration of
this interest. The goal of this essay is to apply some of the
knowledge that has been gained from previous research in order to
better understand the role of the media in the second Intifada (see
Wolfsfeld 2001).
Lesson 1: Adapting to the Needs of the Media
The first lesson has to do with the increasingly powerful belief on
both sides of this conflict that the struggle over the news media
can be just as important as the battle on the ground. Israelis and
Palestinians are both very aware that they are playing to an
international audience and, as always, there is a major struggle
over who should be cast as aggressor and who as victim.
The dependence on the international news media is especially strong
for the Palestinians. As the weaker side, the media is one of the
only means they have of convincing other countries to intervene.
One of the most powerful roles the news media can play in such
conflicts is when they become "equalizers" by allowing the weaker
party to enlist the support of third parties. This was certainly
what happened in the first Intifada in which the Palestinians were
extremely successful at placing their plight on the international
agenda (Wolfsfeld 1997). Israel's major goal on the other hand, is
mostly damage control. Media images of Palestinian dead and wounded
are a direct threat to Israel's relations with the US, Europe, and
the rest of the Arab world. The goal for Israel is to convince the
world that the Palestinians are using terrorism to obtain what they
could not achieve at the bargaining table. Because most Israelis
believe that the international press is against them, conventional
wisdom holds that no news is good news.
This mutual concern about the news media manifests itself in a
number of ways. Perhaps the most macabre is the ongoing contest for
visual supremacy in the presentation and promotion of pain and
suffering. The early stages of the second Intifada produced two
very powerful images in this realm. The first was the dramatic
pictures of Mohammad al-Durrah being shot and killed as he and his
father attempted to shield themselves from the crossfire. The
second were the scenes of Israeli reserve soldiers being lynched by
an angry Palestinian mob in the city of Ramallah. Each of these
scenes became powerful icons for the two societies; leaders from
both sides attempted to exploit these images in an effort to
demonstrate the enemy's brutality.
The Israelis and the Palestinians have set up structures to
increase their chances of winning the battle over the news media.
The Palestinian Authority brought the always-eloquent Hanan Ashrawi
back as a major spokesperson to the Western news media. The
Palestinian opposition movements - especially Hamas and Islamic
Jihad - adopted media tactics employed by Hizbullah in Southern
Lebanon. Filmed interviews with suicide bombers and dramatic
footage of attacks on Israel are sent to many journalists soon
after the incidents. Revealingly, the Israeli news media also
sometimes broadcasts these tapes despite the chilling effect these
images have on the audience.
Israel has also invested considerable time and resources in finding
better ways to win the battle over world opinion. One of the most
interesting developments has been the decision to set up a new
combat unit composed of "fighting cameramen". These soldiers carry
video cameras into the field with them with the explicit purpose of
providing visual evidence to support Israeli claims. Efforts are
also being made to ensure that soldiers going into territories are
given special training in dealing with the news media. These
sessions place a special emphasis on the enormous damage that can
be done to Israel's image if acts of brutality are captured on
film.
There is also good evidence about the increasing importance
attributed to media considerations in planning Israeli military
operations. Indeed, such efforts have produced a new term in
military parlance; "low signature" operations. The term originates
in the field of radar, but has now come to refer to actions that
will not be easily captured by the press. Thus, one of the fears of
using helicopters against Palestinian positions is that they can
lead to extremely damaging pictures that will be shown on
international television news broadcasts. Camera crews however are
much less likely to capture the moment when individual terrorist
leaders are killed.
Another important indicator of this tendency is the growing
discussion about the importance of "news cycles". In the early
stages of the second Intifada an increasing number of public
figures in Israel were arguing against any immediate military
reaction to terrorist attacks. The logic was that the armed
response quickly dominates international news coverage and Israel
then loses any international sympathy linked to the initial act of
terrorism. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this strategy was
the government's surprising lack of military response to the
suicide bombing at the Dolphinarium Discotheque in which over
twenty young Israelis were killed. It was reported that concerns
about conflicting news images were one of the major reasons for the
decision to show restraint at that time. Many people in Israel
believe this incident was one of the few occasions when Israel did
indeed receive a certain amount of sympathy in the international
press.
Lesson 2: Demonizing the Enemy
The second major lesson is that in both democracies and
dictatorships, the news media remain powerful tools for the
demonization of the enemy. One of the most significant news
routines is that our deaths are tragic while their deaths are
either meaningless statistics or even causes for celebration. Our
deaths are considered front-page news, while the circumstances of
"their" deaths are of no real interest at all.
A joint study carried out with Mohamad Dajani (Wolfsfeld &
Dajani, 2003) examined some of the journalistic routines used by
the news media in the two cultures that serve to reinforce hatred
towards the other side. There are a number of routines that can be
directly linked to the assumption that our own victims are a
terrible tragedy while the other side's victims are not. Perhaps
the most powerful of these is the tendency to provide a tremendous
amount of coverage of one's own victims and relatively little to
those from the other side. A related routine has to do with the
personalization of one's own victims. When one's own people die
they have names and faces, they have grieving families; they have
lives. The media also provides a tremendous amount of detail about
how one's own victims were killed. Victims from the other side
remain, for the most part, anonymous statistics. The use of
dramatic language and visuals further reinforces hatred towards the
enemy. The other side is much more likely to die off-camera.
While our study focused on newspaper coverage, television is by far
the most powerful tool of demonization. Bloody images of the dead
and wounded on television are accompanied by the constant screaming
of those left behind. Some of the worst images and sounds are shown
repeatedly, as well as the cries for revenge. A raw and instinctive
anger inevitably rises up in even the most tolerant of
viewers.
The power of these routines comes from the fact that they go
unnoticed and unquestioned. It is perfectly natural to grieve over
one's own victims and to lack any empathy for the enemy. These
graphic stories provide compelling "proof" of our innocence and the
enemy's evilness. The outrage and anger expressed by leaders across
the internal political spectrum reinforces the certainty among both
populations that they are victims of brutal aggression. These
emotional news stories serve as a central catalyst for intensifying
and perpetuating the cycle of hatred and violence. It is true that
neither Israelis nor Palestinians are completely isolated from
external news sources. Many Palestinians are exposed to news on
Israeli television and radio, and some Israelis occasionally tune
in to foreign news stations such as CNN. However, given local
prejudices, most people conclude that such broadcasts are biased
against them.
There are both similarities and differences in the ways in which
the Israeli and Palestinian press demonize the enemy. On the one
hand, the gap between a free and controlled press tends to narrow
during time of crisis. When journalists in democratic countries
"rally round the flag" to confront the enemy, they voluntarily
surrender their ability to serve as effective watchdogs (Liebes,
1997). Nevertheless, the coverage of the violence in the
Palestinian press is much more graphic, horrifying, and
ideological. The media within the Palestinian Authority is fully
mobilized for the cause. In the Israeli media one can find
alternative voices. A few Israeli journalists have made a point of
presenting the Palestinian perspective. In addition, Palestinians
spokespeople are regularly interviewed on Israeli news programs.
Such sessions are often confrontational, but they do provide some
Palestinians with an opportunity to make their points.
Lesson 3: Media and Peace as Awkward Bedfellows
The third lesson comes from taking a longer-term view of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the news media make an
extremely important contribution to the cause of war, they
contribute almost nothing to the establishment of peace (Galtung,
1998; Manoff, 1998). A central component of the Oslo process was
the assumption that trust was best built in stages. Compromises
that appeared impossible in 1993, when the first accords were
signed, were supposed to become easier after the parties had spent
years cooperating with each other. It certainly did not work that
way and at least part of the reason for this unfortunate outcome
can be attributed to the Israeli and Palestinian news media
(Wolfsfeld, in press).
It is ironic that most news about a peace process focuses on the
ongoing conflict between the two sides. One of the most important
reasons for this has to do with the media's unwavering need for
drama. A peace process is, for the most part, a fairly boring
affair. Ongoing negotiations rarely make for riveting news stories.
When progress is being made both sides have an interest in keeping
the details secret. When talks break down, on the other hand,
antagonists are all too eager to turn to the news media to blame
the other side. This is just one of many media routines that ensure
that the public is almost always more likely to hear bad news about
a peace process (Wolfsfeld, in press). The Oslo process was also
plagued with violence, and these events provided journalists with
ample opportunity to return to more traditional modes of reporting.
The media's emphasis on drama provided important strategic
advantages to peace opponents on both sides. Even a relatively
small number of deaths can bring about a major wave of anger
against the enemy and increasing calls for revenge. The news media
do not initiate violence, but they can often play an important role
in intensifying it.
There is only one area in which one could argue that the media's
emphasis on drama worked in favor of the Oslo peace process. The
extensive media coverage of the signing ceremonies provided
Palestinians and Israelis with real hope that the conflict might be
coming to an end. These occasions were carefully orchestrated media
events that were designed to provide thrust to the ongoing efforts
to bring peace. But they were few and far between and almost
immediately replaced with new crises.
The inability of the news media to contribute to peace was also
demonstrated during periods of calm. Before the outbreak of the
second Intifada, for example, Israel enjoyed almost two years of
relative quiet with virtually no violence whatsoever. Ongoing
cooperation between the two security forces prevented almost all
terrorist attacks. There were no banner headlines announcing such
successes, no major news stories talking about the many benefits
the calm had brought to the area. There were also no in-depth news
stories about the "other side", nothing that could have led to
greater understanding or empathy. News about peace is in many ways
almost as ethnocentric as news about war.
Can the Role of the News Media Change?
The role of the news media in violent conflicts can perhaps best be
understood by remembering Plato's allegory of the cave. In his
classic work The Republic, the Greek philosopher talks about the
consequences of having captives tied up in front of a wall for as
long as they can remember. Images are then projected off the wall
and the people have no other contact with the outside world. The
shadows become reality for they are the only reference point the
captives have. We too spend a good part of our lives looking at
images designed by political and military leaders that are then
projected onto an electronic wall by journalists. Many of these
shadows represent extremely frightening portrayals of the other
side and the natural reactions are fear and the desire to strike
back. The danger is that despite the advent of the so-called
"global village", most of us remain captives in our own national
caves.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the role of the
news media in such conflicts can never change. A rather hopeful
example can be found by looking at the case of Northern Ireland. In
direct contrast to what has happened with respect to the Oslo peace
process, the news media in Ireland and the UK played a much more
constructive role in supporting peace efforts (Wolfsfeld, in
press). There were at least three major reasons for this
difference. First, and perhaps most importantly, there was a high
level of political consensus among both Protestants and Catholics
in support of the Good Friday agreement. In these situations, the
news media not only reflect the consensus, they help solidify it.
The second reason was that a good deal of the news media in
Northern Ireland are "shared media", in that both Protestants and
Catholics receive a good deal of their news from the same sources.
An important consequence of this is that these media have a
commercial interest in bridging the gaps between the two sides.
Unlike in the Middle East, citizens are not forced to spend their
whole lives in separate caves. A final difference is that the press
in Northern Ireland is much less sensationalist. This lowers the
level of emotion in the news that can be so destructive in such
conflicts.
This comparison tells us something about the circumstances under
which the news media might also play a more positive role in the
Israel-Palestinian conflict. If a broad consensus should emerge in
both societies in support of a peace process, the news media could
become important agents for reconciliation. Editors could invite
journalists from the other side to contribute both news and
editorials. This would certainly provide a wider dialogue between
the two societies. Finally, an editorial decision to lower the
level of sensationalist coverage in both societies would also make
a positive impact by creating a calmer political environment.
Sadly, there is very little reason to believe that any of these
changes are likely to take place in the near future. The news media
on both sides will probably continue to play their usual role of
fanning the flames of hatred.
References
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People and Media. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex.
Galtung, J. (1998). High Road, Low Road: Charting the Course for
Peace Journalism. Track Two 7: 7-10.
Liebes, T. (1997). Reporting the Arab Israeli conflict : How
Hegemony Works, London: Routledge.
Livingston, S. (1997). "Beyond the CNN Effect: The Media-Foreign
Policy Dynamic", In P. Norris (Ed.), The News Media and Their
Influences, Boulder, Co.: Lynn Rienner Publishers.
Manoff, R. (1998). Role plays: potential media roles in conflict
prevention and management. Track Two 7: 11-16.
Strobel, W. (1997). Late-breaking foreign policy: The news media's
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Peace.
Wolfsfeld, G. (in press). Media and the Path to Peace. Cambridge,
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Wolfsfeld, G. (1997). Media and Political Conflict: News from the
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