The war in Iraq has triggered several developments in the Middle
East, the most obvious of which has been the enhanced strategic and
political position of the US in the region. Even before the war,
the US was the main external power in the Middle East, and its
quick military victory in Iraq reinforced this. America is now able
to strongly influence inter-state relations and has the potential
to structure what might be termed a semi-Pax Americana in the
Middle East. It should be emphasized, however, that there is a
difference between domestic regime developments within states and
inter-state relations. These are two different contexts and the
notion of Pax Americana is relevant only to the second.
The desire of the neo-conservatives in the US administration to
bring about major transformation within societies and states in the
Middle East (which served as a central motivation for the War), has
recently been presented and defined as "the Greater Middle East
Initiative," presupposing a much more ambitious Pax Americana.
However, this appears to be an immeasurably more difficult task to
achieve than the creation of a more stable order between states.
This is not to imply that President Bush's vision of
democratization and economic development in the Middle East is not
a desirable goal. It is. However, it cannot be accomplished in a
short period of time, if at all, and certainly not through outside
imposition. It might come only after decades of internal
development.
Indeed, imposed from the outside, attempts at democratization might
even cause a strong negative reaction, strengthening extreme
Islamic radicalism. Such a reaction may destabilize some of the
currently stable regimes in the Middle East. Some of them, for
example Egypt and Jordan, are not liberal democracies but are still
enlightened authoritarian regimes which enjoy political
legitimization from their people and are essential to a stable
state system in the region.
Furthermore, since the grand vision articulated by the US
administration may only be accomplished in the very distant future,
there are no American if plans for the short to medium term. This
is unfortunate. The US could contribute to a more stable
inter-state system in the Middle East, based on the current
regimes, rather than by attempt to change the regimes. Two recent
demonstrations of American (with European cooperation) success in
the region were direct results of the war: the limitations on
potentially dangerous developments in Iran and Libya concerning
weapons of mass destruction. These are examples of the potential
the US has for establishing a stable regional security system.
Indeed, a regional security system could eventually emerge but it
would require several preconditions: First, the critical role of
the US; second, better political relations among the regional
states; and finally, a realization by all the parties that such a
system could contribute to their vital security and political
interests.
Bilateral, Multilateral, Tacit and Formal Security
Regimes
Basically, one should distinguish between three categories of
security systems. The first is a set of tacit arrangements between
pairs of states. The second comprises formal bilateral agreements.
The third would be formal bilateral agreements and, in addition,
formal multilateral agreements and mechanisms for regulation of
strategic and military relationships. The potential for the
evolution of a tacit or informal regime is relatively more likely,
even in the absence of some of the political preconditions. The
emergence of a more formal, institutionalized multilateral system
would require much more solid political preconditions.
An additional distinction should be made between what I call a
"cooperative security regime", such as the current situation in
Western Europe, and a "common" or "normal" security regime, which
assumes differences between the parties' security perceptions (and
even potential adversarial relationships), and also between their
domestic regimes. In the European context, the security regime is
predicated on identical or very similar approaches to security, and
on similar regimes, social structures, belief systems etc. All of
these are necessary to create a cooperative security regime. There
is no need for such similarities for the creation of a "normal"
security regime. What is required is the understanding of all the
parties that they need to regulate their security relationships in
such a way as to limit the danger or threat or major crises, of
wars, and other types of violence.
A further distinction should be drawn between a security regime and
a defense alliance. A defense alliance between states is aimed
against an external threat. A security regime on the other hand has
to do with the relations between the states within the regime:
Creation of joint mechanisms designed to deal in a cooperative
manner with security issues which might threaten from within the
relations of the parties. Thus the OSCE is a security regime. NATO
serves as both a defense alliance against external threats, but in
addition it created, though this was not its purpose, a security
regime for its members. No one can imagine a war between France and
Germany, or France and Spain within the context of NATO or the EU.
While the EU is primarily economic and political, it also plays a
certain role as a security regime.
As far as Arab-Israeli security relationships are concerned, there
have already been, over the past fifty years, a relatively large
number of tacit and formal sets of security agreements, many of
which ultimately collapsed. Some succeeded however, to stabilize
security relationships. At present formal agreements cover part of
the Egyptian-Israeli and Israeli-Jordanian security relationships.
These are part of the peace treaties between the countries. There
used to be formal and some informal agreements between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority, but these broke down with the outbreak
of the second Intifada.
While some of the important elements of a regional multilateral
security regime could evolve before the resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it appears unlikely that a full scale
security system could be agreed upon in the absence of at least
some management of this conflict. For example, partial Israeli
withdrawals from the territories coupled with limited intermediate
agreements between Israel and the PA, etc.
The Geography of a Middle Eastern Security Regime
Another important issue is the geographic delimitation of such a
regime. It is possible that different kinds of regimes, or parts of
regimes, will apply to different parts of the region. Should Iran
be included in such a future security regime? This depends on
several factors. For example, the extent to which Iran would
continue to be strategically involved in the region and its
willingness to become part of regional security regime; the type of
security threat Iran poses towards other regional states and its
perception of security threats directed at her. Similarly, in
practical political and strategic terms, the Maghreb (North African
Arab states) lies outside the boundaries of such a security regime.
The Maghreb countries have their own internal issues and security
concerns, and, in addition, a special relationship with Europe and
the Mediterranean concept. Because of this, their inclusion might
overburden and complicate the gradual creation of such a regime and
by the same token not serve their own security needs. On the other
hand, a lot depends on their willingness, or lack thereof, to join
a Middle Eastern regime.
The External Powers
A future security regime will be a regional one, but external
powers will also play an important role, first and foremost the US.
It is already a dominant power (and in some respects a hegemonic
one) in the region and it has much more influence on regional
inter-state relations than any other external power. For example,
efforts to curb the nuclear developments in Iran and the
development of weapons of mass destruction in Libya were carried
out primarily on the back of the war in Iraq and American
projection of power. France, Germany and the UK also played an
important role in bringing about the change in Iran's nuclear
stance, demonstrating their importance. The UK played a central
role in the negotiations with Libya. These two examples serve to
show how the European powers could play a constructive role
alongside the US (as the leading external power) in the creation of
a regional security regime.
Objectives and Possibilities
As mentioned before, many bilateral security arrangements have been
agreed over the years between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Some
of them contributed to stability, and some collapsed. At present
formal limited security regimes exist between Egypt and Israel and
between Jordan and Israel. Within the context of the Madrid
process, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) committee
was formed, and this operated until 1995. A revival of this body,
or a similar one, could serve as a platform for negotiations about
the eventual creation of a regional security regime. It is
noteworthy that the Road Map provides for reactivation of ACRS.
This indicates the understanding that such a body is important for
the future stability of the region, and it could ultimately provide
part of the system of guarantees for a possible Israeli-Palestinian
agreement.
A regional security regime should ultimately combine the different
sets of bilateral security arrangements that exist, as well as
mechanisms for regional crisis management and arms control. Steps
towards that had already been discussed and partly agreed upon in
ACRS, but these negotiations should be revived and further
advanced.
Within the context of arms control, one of the obvious issues would
be the question of restrictions on WMD. Clearly there are deep
differences on this question between Israel and some of the Arab
states, primarily Egypt. Though the issue has already been
extensively discussed, it appears that further elaboration of the
subject, and especially in view of the regional changes following
the war in Iraq, is called for.
Needless to say, the exact avenues such a regime might take and the
content of its various dimensions should be the subject of long,
detailed and continuous discussions, learning and debate. Permanent
forums should be created to discuss these questions. One might also
add that possibly (though by no means necessarily) the very
existence of such forums and the emergence of the regime could
serve as an important input into advancing political relations
among the parties.
Additional Possibilities
The eventual creation of a Middle East security regime should not
preclude formal security relationships between regional states and
external powers. Similarly, it is possible that over time, a
regional regime could form formal security connections with other
multilateral security structures. It is possible that the Middle
East security regime could establish a formal relationship in some
matters with NATO or (though this would be less significant) with
the OSCE.
Finally, what is important to reemphasize is that the more secure
the regional environment is perceived to be by the regional powers,
the greater the likelihood that their policies will move towards
mutual confidence, eventual compromise and possibly even political
cooperation. Such confidence depends, in the first place, on each
state's defense capabilities. A regional security regime serves as
an additional, and important, building bloc in the self-confidence
of all parties.