It was in 1968 with a series of airplane hijackings that
Palestinian insurgent groups began employing terrorism against
Israel. During the thirty years that have since elapsed, there have
been numerous terrorist attacks and hundreds of innocent people
have died. In 1972, for example, eight masked gunmen raided the
pavilion of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich, killing the
athletes and their coaches. Two years later, three members of the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine took over a school
in Ma'alot, an Israeli town located near the Lebanese border. When
the negotiations broke down and the Israeli troops stormed the
dormitory, the terrorists machine-gunned the children, killing 27
and wounding an additional 70. More recently, suicide bombers have
replaced machine-guns. Between 1993 and 1996, almost 200 Israelis
were killed when members of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad exploded
themselves in commuter buses, markets and other public
places.
While most people would not dispute that such acts fall under the
term terrorism, there is, nonetheless, an ongoing debate concerning
terrorism's very definition. Two questions that repeatedly come up
in this debate have to do with the identity of the actors involved
and the constitution of the terrorist act. As we will see, the way
these questions are addressed often reflects political alliances
and have concrete political implications.
Controlling Words
The concept of terrorism emerged in the aftermath of the French
Revolution when it was used to describe the violent suppression of
the population by the state; terrorism was the instrument the state
wielded against its own citizens. By 1937, the League of Nations
had turned around the word's meaning, defining terrorism as
"criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated
to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or
the general public." Formulated by states, this definition implies
that terrorism can be perpetrated solely by non-state actors. Why,
one might ask, was the definition altered?
George Orwell suggests that the modification of language is not a
result of "natural growth," but, rather, language is an instrument
which is constantly changed in order to advance political
objectives. In his novel 1984, he portrays a chilling political
world where Newspeak, the official language introduced by the
government, facilitates the manipulation of Oceania's population.
In big letters on the outer wall of the Ministry of Truth, the
Party's three slogans are inscribed for all to see: "War is Peace,
Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength." Although 1984 depicts a
fictional totalitarian regime, its account of how language is
employed as a political tool also rings true with respect to modern
democracies.
The importance of controlling the meaning of words in public
language was initiated by Thomas Hobbes already in the mid-17th
century. From his assumption that the lack of an overarching power
entails anarchy, Hobbes infers that, in order to attain peace,
humans must transfer most of their rights to a sovereign so that
the predominant source of power will be in the hands of one
authority. Hobbes, I believe, is also referring to the transfer of
epistemological rights where the people confer on the sovereign the
right to interpret most matters of fact. He realized that
interpretive dissent may lead to political conflict and strife and
concluded that the sovereign should be granted the power to
determine the meaning of words in public language. In the context
of the word "terrorism," the sovereign may attribute the act to the
other, to those who aim to undermine the system of government or a
specific policy promoted by the government. Accordingly, the
powerful phrase "decade of terror" (1968-78) coined by analysts in
the late 1970s, refers to acts perpetrated by Basque Separatists,
Tupac Amaru, Palestinians, etc., and not to violence practiced by
the state.
Exploring the Definition
Let us examine the United States Department of State's current
definition of terrorism as it appears in its publication Patterns
of Global Terrorism (1997). The definition is divided into three
clauses, the first of which reads: "The term 'terrorism' means
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,
usually intended to influence an audience."
Exploring this definition through the lens of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict proves revealing. One immediately
notices that Palestinian terrorism corresponds with this part of
the definition as it is violent, premeditated, and usually
perpetrated against noncombatant targets. In addition, the
terrorist acts were politically motivated. Interestingly, though,
this clause of the definition also includes the identity of the
actor: insofar as only "subnational groups or clandestine agents"
are the perpetrators of terrorism, a state, as such, cannot
practice terrorism. Identifying the actor circumscribes the
extension of terrorism's meaning so that within the context of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, only Palestinians, as stateless
people, can be perpetrators of terrorism.
Although circumscribing terrorism's definition in this way may
appear to be neutral - as it corresponds directly with an objective
reality - I would argue that the demarcation reflects particular
power relations. In other words, the language that is used informs
us about the underlying forces at work in our society. For
instance, a Hobbesian could claim that terrorism is ascribed to
non-state actors because currently the state is the predominant
power in both the national and international arena. Competing
producers of terror are a risk to the existing order and to its
authority and, therefore, need to be eliminated, or, at least,
contained. This process is not merely limited to the employment of
brute force, but also to the manipulation of language, which, in
turn, helps shape public opinion and foreign policy. While the
government might also be producing terror, this terror is not
conceived as a threat to the existing status quo, but rather as a
sustaining force. Utilizing their epistemological power,
governments distinguish between two forms of terror. The form of
terror which is the guardian of the status quo and/or the existing
political order is given a different name (e.g., "maintaining
order" or even "upholding democracy"); while the form of terror
that challenges the existing political order and which is
considered by the government as a threat, is named terror.
This kind of analysis goes beyond the wording of the State
Department's definition, since it suggests that it is not so much
the type of actor (state vs. non-state) that determines whether the
act is to be considered terrorism, but rather what the actor's
specific relation to the existing system is. Such analysis
insinuates that once the actor's identity, and not solely the act
itself, determines whether it falls under the term terrorism, then
at least theoretically, terrorism can always be attributed to the
state's official enemies and never to the state itself or its
allies. This leaves one to ponder whether the fact that Israel has
never been accused of practicing terrorism really indicates that a
qualitative difference exists between its actions and those
perpetrated by Palestinian insurgent groups.
A Different Definition
Examining Israel's actions through a different definition of
political terrorism enables us to treat Israel and the
Palestinians, at least initially, as having an equal capacity to
employ terrorism. University of Notre Dame political scientist
George Lopez defines terrorism in the following manner:
Terrorism is a form of political violence that by design violates
some of the society's accepted moral and legal codes, is often
ruthlessly destructive, and is somewhat unpredictable in who will
be its instrumental targets. Terrorism hardly constitutes mindless
violence. Instead, it reflects a detailed strategy that uses
horrific violence to make people feel weak and vulnerable, often
disproportionate to either the terrorist acts or to the terrorists'
long-term power. This fear seeks to promote concrete political
objectives.
This definition captures all the incidents of Palestinian terrorism
described above. Yet it does not identify the perpetrator of the
act and, therefore, does not determine in advance that non-state
actors are the sole agents of terrorism. Once the actor is
considered to be an insignificant variable, it becomes easier to
judge the act itself.
Scrutiny of Israel's actions in Lebanon indicates that it has often
used methods of terror. Notable examples are two fairly recent
operations: Accountability (July 1993) and Grapes of Wrath (April
1996). Israel's stated political objective in these operations was
to foment a refugee flow from southern Lebanon to the north in
order to put pressure on the Lebanese government, so that it, in
turn, would curb guerrilla actions perpetrated by Hizbullah. In a
report on Operation Accountability, Human Rights Watch (HRW)
asserts:
While Israel has claimed that broadcast warnings to the civilian
population in southern Lebanon were made with a view to protecting
civilians from collateral injury in attacks on strictly military
objectives, a number of factors make it reasonable to assume that
the intention was in fact to sow terror among the civilian
population... as the pattern of physical damage showed, the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) and its mercenary South Lebanese Army
subjected entire villages to area bombardment. The threats and the
nature of the attacks make it clear that in significant areas in
southern Lebanon whole populations - indeed anyone who failed to
flee by a certain time - were targeted as if they were
combatants.
HRW estimates that some 120 civilians were killed and close to 50
injured during the operation. In addition, the bombing led to the
immediate displacement of an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 people.
Less than three years later, Israel launched a similar attack, this
time calling it Grapes of Wrath. According to Israel's quality
paper Ha'aretz (April 21, 1996), the military command of the
northern border's internal report indicate that, in the first few
days of the operation, Israeli air force planes bombed 300 sites in
Lebanon, resulting in the displacement of approximately 400,000
civilians and the demolition of over 200 houses. Moreover, some 198
civilians were killed, including the 97 refugees in the village of
Qana.
These operations appear to correspond with the definition of
terrorism, for they violate some of society's accepted moral and
legal codes, they are ruthlessly destructive, and unpredictable in
who will be targeted. The Israeli generals who planned the action
knew in advance that innocent people would surely die as a result
of the bombing and, in line with the definition, these generals
contrived a detailed strategy that used horrific violence in order
to make people feel weak and vulnerable. The resulting fear sought
to promote concrete political objectives exceeding the violent act,
since, as mentioned, Israel terrorized the population of southern
Lebanon, so that it, in turn, would pressure the Lebanese
government to clamp down on Hizbullah.
Israel, one should note, has practiced terrorism in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip as well. During the Intifada, Israeli undercover
units (called Mistarvim, which in Hebrew means to disguise oneself
as a Palestinian) penetrated Palestinian settlements, killing
Palestinians by means of summary executions: the unit located the
victim, and without attempting to arrest him, shot in order to
kill. According to HRW, the Mistarvim killed more than 110
Palestinians from the beginning of the Intifada until November
1992. The actions and methods used by the undercover units and the
objectives Israel wanted to achieve by these killings conform to
the definition of terrorism used here.
Thus, in contrast to the first clause of the State Department's
definition of terrorism, Lopez's definition reveals that states
utilize methods of terror against their enemies in order to
accomplish a particular premeditated political goal. The character
of the perpetrator does not determine the nature of the act, or
conversely, the character of one act does not necessarily predict
the type of perpetrator. Accordingly, the means applied can vary: a
plane bombing in southern Lebanon or a suicide bomber can achieve
similar results.
Lopez's definition of terrorism may differ from the State
Department's due to the different context in which the term is
defined - academy vs. government - and because in each context the
term terrorism has a different function. In the lethal language
game pertaining to terrorism, we notice that the first clause of
the State Department's definition favors the U.S. and its allies in
unequivocal terms. Regarding U.S.-Israel relations, if the State
Department were to adopt Lopez's definition of terrorism, it would
have had to indict Israel as a terrorist state. Then, according to
U.S. law, Israel would no longer be able to trade with the U.S.,
nor would Israel be eligible for the $3billion annual aid. In
addition, the Pentagon would not be allowed to provide weapons to
the Israeli army. Other allies, such as Indonesia, would also have
trouble receiving indulgent treatment.
Terrorist States
Turning to the second clause of the State Department's definition,
we read "the term 'international terrorism' means terrorism
involving citizens or the territory of more than one country." This
clause is straightforward and is based on what appears to be a
tautological idea: the difference between terrorism and
international terrorism is the international dimension. The term
"international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the
territory of more than one country. In other words, two categories
are introduced - citizenship and territory - in order to affirm the
international component: any terrorist act that involves a
plurality of at least one of these categories is considered to be
international.
The third and final clause intends to capture not only the term
"terrorist group," but the notion of state-sponsored terrorism
which was officially introduced by the State Department in 1979.
The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has
significant subgroups that practice international terrorism. This
clause is complex because it attempts to corroborate the notion
that only non-state actors can practice terrorism while
simultaneously granting a role to the state. By distinguishing
between a group that actually practices terrorism and a group that
does not employ terrorism, but has "significant subgroups that
practice terrorism," the State Department makes room for the idea
of state-sponsored terrorism without having to entertain the notion
that states are actually perpetrators of terrorism.
The neologism "state-sponsored terrorism" demonstrates in a more
specific way how language can be modified in order to support U.S.
foreign policy. During the same period that the "state-sponsored
terrorism" category was introduced, the term "terrorist state"
began to appear in State Department literature. "Terrorist state,"
however, refers only to countries that sponsor terrorist groups and
does not denote the actual use of terrorism by the state. In other
words, it is a corollary of "state-sponsored terrorism." This point
is crucial because, as mentioned, U.S. law imposes trade and other
restrictions on terrorist states. Thus, reinstating the original
meaning to the term "terrorist state" - the one used in the
aftermath of the French Revolution - would have endangered trade
relations with countries like Indonesia and China whose profitable
markets are sought by U.S. corporations.
Why, one may ask, did the State Department introduce such terms as
"state-sponsored terrorism" and "terrorist state" at all? One
answer could be that these terms were employed as a result of some
kind of reality check where the State Department suddenly realized
that states sponsor terrorism. Since some of the Palestinian
terrorist acts depicted above were sponsored by states, it would be
hard to argue that state sponsorship is not an important aspect of
terrorism. Nonetheless, following Noam Chomsky, I believe that it
was not solely a reality check that led to the introduction of
"state-sponsored terrorism"; other issues were involved as
well.
Among other things, the concerted effort to justify the vast
federal expenditure on the military comes to mind. Particularly
after the demise of the Cold War, the Pentagon, backed by the
corporations on which it confers billion-dollar contracts, needed
to explain why the U.S. must continue to sustain a massive military
apparatus. Tupac Amaru or Hamas could not do the job; they were too
small, too far away. An imminent threat was needed, one that could
raise enough fear to justify a bloated military budget. The
capacity to manipulate the meaning of words was utilized and the
term "terrorist state" was introduced with the hope that state
sponsors of terrorism, like Libya, Iran and Syria, could be used to
generate the necessary anxiety.
Currents in U.S. Policy
We notice that thought corrupts language, but as George Orwell
suggests, "language can also corrupt thought." The State
Department's ability to corrupt thought becomes apparent once one
considers that within the U.S., the public perceives Libya and
Syria to be among the most menacing countries, while Indonesia,
which has killed over 200,000 East Timorese out of a total
population of 700,000, is not considered to be threatening. It is
also no coincidence that the majority of the U.S. population
believe that Palestinians employ terrorism and Israel does
not.
By revealing the function of the State Department's definition of
terrorism, this essay has exposed some of the underlying currents
in U.S. foreign policy and a number of mechanisms by which language
becomes a political tool. But an examination of terrorism's
definition lays bare only a limited aspect of the relation between
language and politics. Indeed, perhaps the most striking aspect of
the State Department's definition is that it is self-indicting.
Chomsky has pointed out that even according to the definitions
employed by the State Department, the CIA and the FBI, the U.S. has
been the biggest supporter of international terrorism since the end
of the Second World War. The fact that this amoral character of
U.S. policies is, generally speaking, absent from the public's eye
and mind indicates that control of the meaning of words is not the
only way by which language facilitates manipulation; a variety of
other variables are involved, not least of which is the role of the
media.
Recommended Reading
Alexander, Yonah and Joshua Sinai (1989). Terrorism: The PLO
Connection. York: Crane Russak.
Chomsky, Noam (1988). The Culture of Terrorism. Boston: South End
Press.
Foucault, Michel (1993). The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York:
Barnes and Noble.
Hobbes, Thomas (1992). Leviathan. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press.
Hooks, Bell (1990). Yearning, Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics.
Boston: South End Press.
Human Rights Watch (1993). A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover
Operations Against "Wanted" and Masked Palestinians. Washington,
D.C.: Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch (1996). Civilian Pawns: Laws of War Violations
and the Use of Weapons on the Israel-Lebanon Border. Washington,
D.C.: Human Rights Watch.
Lopez, George A. (1995). "Terrorism and Peace Studies." Peace
Review, 7:3 pp. 261-266.
Nasr, Kamel B. (1997). Arab and Israeli Terrorism. Jefferson, North
Carolina: McFarland & Company.
Orwell, George (1953). "Politics and the English Language." A
Collection of Essays by George Orwell. San Diego: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
Orwell, George (1977). 1984. San Diego: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
Schmid, Alex and Albert J. Jongman (1988). Political Terrorism: A
New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and
Literature. New York: Transaction Books.
Williams, Michael C. (1996). "Hobbes and International Relations: A
Reconsideration." International Organization, 50, 2:213-236.
United States Department of State (1998). Patterns of Global
Terrorism 1997. Department of State Publication, 10321.