To understand the origins, definitions and texture of the
people-to-people (P2P) phenomenon in the 1990s, it must be
contextualized within the larger conflict resolution effort
represented by the Oslo Accords. The century-long
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been widely analyzed as having
characteristics of a "protracted conflict." Such conflicts usually
occur within states between communities or ethnic groups, and are
long, violent, costly and "resolution resistant." They involve
deep-rooted identity issues (national, religious, ethnic or any
combination of the three), are central to the lives and myths of
the peoples involved and are perceived as being "zero-sum."
In theoretical literature, several models have been developed for
resolution of protracted conflicts. The widely accepted view is
that due to their length, costliness and centrality, protracted
conflicts cannot be resolved simply by signing political agreements
that address their formal aspects. Therefore, while such formal,
"transactional" negotiations are key in addressing disputed
technical and political aspects in such conflicts, there is an
equally important need for a parallel "transformational" process to
address deeper ontological (i.e. identity-based and
identity-driven) components of the conflict and, in the process, to
legitimize the "other side" as a partner.1
Thus many researchers who analyze resolution of protracted
conflicts emphasize the need to address their psycho-social
elements. These include the prejudice, fear, and dehumanization and
delegitimization of the other, contrasted with each side's own
positive image and feeling of victimhood.2 Together, these social
beliefs create the negative psychological conflict repertoire3
that, while helping societies cope with the conflict, also make it
that much harder to resolve.
"Transactional" negotiations, which focus on resolving practical,
legal and technical aspects of the conflict, are contingent
primarily on political will and sociopolitical constellations and,
as such, can move forward relatively rapidly. However, societies on
both sides can find themselves "left behind" such progress while
holding on to historical grievances, long-held beliefs and mutual
recriminations. Transformational efforts aim to solidify and
sustain transactional diplomacy by promoting Daniel Bar-Tal's and
Yona Teichman's four processes of change:
* Legitimization: the belief that the other group has the same
right to exist as "our group";
* Equalization: treating the rival as an equal partner contrary, to
previous belief in the superiority of "our side";
* Differentiation: acknowledging the heterogeneity and "many faces"
of the other group; and
* Personalization: viewing the other side "not as a depersonalized
entity, but as made up of individuals with ordinary human
characteristics."4
Optimally, strategic processes to resolve protracted conflicts
contain both transactional and transformational elements in order
not just to resolve the conflict, but to mitigate the inherently
asymmetrical relationships it includes and exacerbates. While
governments are primarily responsible for the "transactional"
formal negotiations, they have an additional responsibility to "act
transformationally" so as to alter the disabling environment
created by the conflict. Civil society can, and should, also
contribute to the process by promoting "bottom-up" transformative
efforts. P2P can be viewed as one element of such efforts.
The 1993 Oslo Accords were the first formal Israeli-Palestinian
effort to engage directly in the resolution of this protracted
conflict. P2P's fate in the 1990s was, therefore, contingent upon
the strategy and implementation of Oslo's overarching
framework.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict originated at least a century ago,
long before Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Israel's victory in the 1967 war created an additional layer
in the win-lose "negative interdependence" of Israeli and
Palestinian identities5-that of the occupier/occupied relationship.
As a result of the occupation, the interface between the two sides
intensified, and daily friction became more acute.
Over the course of the conflict, Israeli and Palestinian societies
developed an array of societal beliefs and parallel "conflict
repertoires" that helped each cope with the ongoing harshness and
everyday difficulties resulting from the conflict. At the same
time, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, internal and
international processes moved the two societies gradually towards
greater pragmatism, a grudging mutual acceptance and a tentative
recognition of the need to negotiate. Although this gradual
movement was greatly facilitated by back-channel dialogue and
various encounters between key members of both societies, the
September 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP) and subsequent
formal peace process came as a shock and historical breakthrough
for both societies.
Oslo challenged long-held perceptions, beliefs and identities. For
the negotiators, the mutual recognition accompanying the DOP was
intended to replace the deep-rooted, mutual negation and negative
interdependence of the two sides. In addition, it put forward a
process for resolving the occupier/occupied relations.
Pre-Oslo Interactions
Interaction among Israeli and Palestinian civil-society members and
organizations is not a post-Oslo phenomenon. Informal meetings and
dialogue occurred in a variety of ways and by different bodies
throughout the 1970s and 1980s - often at the risk of the
participants' positions, reputations and very lives. In hindsight,
these contacts are recognized as the vanguard that paved the way to
the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the (first unofficial and then
official) Oslo talks in 1993.6
Initially, Israeli-Palestinian dialogue was proscribed by a mutual
taboo. On the Israeli side there was a restriction (which was
legislated into an official ban on contacts between 1986-1992)
against "speaking with terrorist organizations"; while on the
Palestinian side, speaking to representatives of the "Zionist
entity" was considered treason.
Nevertheless, by the 1980s, the sheer proximity of Israel and the
Palestinian population made direct dialogue more common. Once the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formally adopted a
two-state platform in 1988, growing circles within the Israeli
political establishment responded.
While in the 1990s P2P was clearly an extension of such previous
dialogues, it was also new because of the different framework
created by the Oslo process. For the first time, Oslo created
formal legitimacy for mutual recognition and the framework of a
peace process.
What Is P2P?
In a sense, the people-to-people field defies definition. There is
no single definition accepted by all stakeholders - politicians,
activists, donors, participants and researchers. There was no one
actor that "created" or "led" the P2P phenomenon; rather, actors
involved in doing it, analyzing it or funding it developed their
own respective understandings and definitions. These varied
according to the scope of activities they include, the time span
they cover and the interests and agendas of the actors.
The actual term "people-to-people" was first mentioned in Article 8
of Annex VI of the September 1995 Interim Agreement (known as Oslo
II).7 Article 8 created the only formalized P2P program, backed by
Norwegian sponsorship and including the participation of Israeli
government and Palestinian Authority actors. Subsequently, the term
P2P became the "code" name for all Israeli-Palestinian
civil-society cooperation efforts. In this sense, P2P is indeed a
phenomenon of the "Oslo years."
We define "people-to-people" as any and all post-Oslo (i.e. 1993)
Israeli-Palestinian civil-society cooperation and dialogue efforts
that were not primarily business (for-profit) or humanitarian (aid)
in nature. In our analysis, the basic premise of P2P encounters is
the logic of mutual recognition. While the specific goals as well
as methodologies of these encounters varied widely, what made P2P a
unique peace-building activity was its primary methodology of
bringing Israelis and Palestinians together in direct contact,
dialogue and cooperation. Theoretically, these efforts can be seen
as trying to promote Bar-Tal's and Teichman's four processes of
legitimization, equalization, differentiation and
personalization.8
To better understand the scope of P2P activities, they can be
viewed from two perspectives: The first analyzes the "technical"
aspect, including methodologies and activities promoted under the
P2P heading. The second, more complex perspective illuminates the
motivations and agendas of the various players and participants
involved.
The 'P2P Matrix'
From a technical perspective, the P2P field can be seen as a
multidimensional matrix within which activities and projects
fall:
a) Who:
i. Types of organizations involved included professional (health,
education, sports, environment etc.), humanitarian and
political/peace organizations. The latter were usually specifically
aimed at dialogue, while the former included dialogue as one
component among their other activities. Generally, the planners and
coordinators were either a pair - an Israeli and a Palestinian
organization - or a joint Israeli-Palestinian organization.
ii. Populations involved included youth, professionals, women,
traditional peace supporters, religious people, refugees, security
personnel, bereaved families, etc. Sometimes a project was
specifically aimed at one population (e.g., training of physicians
or dialogue among teachers), while at other times, populations were
mixed in projects with a wider focus (e.g., political
action).
iii. Social strata of cooperating populations varied. Some projects
specifically targeted policy-makers or opinion leaders
(politicians, intellectuals or journalists) who could have a
"ripple effect" over broader circles. Other projects specifically
targeted the grass-roots level.
b) What:
i. Organizational focus: In their 1999 analysis, Lee Perlman and
Raviv Schwartz divided Israeli organizations involved in P2P into
three categories according to the focus of their activities -
policy development, service provision and classical peace groups -
but stressed that these were not mutually exclusive definitions.9
This seems to be true for Palestinian organizations as well. In
addition, while some organizations focused on a specific type of
activity (e.g., dialogue, protest activities, professional
cooperation), others incorporated a wide variety of
activities.
ii. Spheres/content of activity: The content of P2P activities
could be divided in various ways. For example, in their paper
analyzing P2P activities, a research team of the Israel-Palestine
Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) used the following
criteria: track two activities, professional meetings, professional
training, formal education activities, cultural activities,
capacity- building, institution-building and service provision,
environmental cooperation, women's issues, shared identity issues,
grass-roots dialogue groups, political struggle, solidarity and
advocacy.10
c) How:
i. Methodologies: A wide variety of methodologies was employed. P2P
included short- and long-term projects, large conferences and
intimate meetings and seminars, one-day events, seminars lasting a
few days and projects lasting years, training sessions, round-table
dialogues, field activities (e.g., demonstrations), etc.
ii. Public relations: Projects varied from strictly
behind-the-scenes, discreet projects (especially but not only track
two activities), to widely publicized cooperation among journalists
or mass media events aimed at broad outreach into both
communities.
d) How many: The number of participants in any given project varied
from a couple of scientists collaborating on research, through
seminars involving a few people, to conferences and political
solidarity events involving hundreds of participants.
Each activity can thus be located according to the various elements
of the matrix - the type of organizations involved, the type of
constituencies targeted, the focus of activity, the kinds of
methodologies selected and so forth.
Agendas for P2P
P2P programs were motivated by different agendas. It is commonly
assumed that a dissonance existed mainly between Israeli and
Palestinian agendas, but a more nuanced analysis demonstrates that
agendas also differed among organizations on either side, and that
they also changed over time.
In general, three agendas can be distinguished:
1. Joint political activities: This logic viewed dialogue as a
strictly political tool for work against the occupation and
promotion of the peace process, for protest against specific issues
(e.g., settlements, house demolitions) and in general, for
mobilization of the two populations around a political agenda.
Track two activities to support and advance formal negotiations
also fall under this heading.
2. Professional cooperation activities: This logic viewed dialogue
as a capacity-building and network-creating tool that could reduce
asymmetry between the sides, support Palestinian state-building
efforts and create professional links for the future.
3. Dialogue as part of a peace/reconciliation process: This logic
included longer-term work towards peace and reconciliation via
identity dialogue and interfaith dialogue encounters. Projects
under this heading dealt with history, identity, trauma, tolerance,
non-violence etc.
Obviously, these agendas were not mutually exclusive and many P2P
activities reflected a combination thereof. However, these agendas
also clashed on several levels. The basic clash was over the
fundamental legitimacy of post-Oslo Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.
The question was this: Was dialogue still legitimate only as part
of the anti-occupation struggle for Palestinian liberation (in line
with the "traditional" PLO "dialogue offensive" that saw dialogue
as a tool for convincing the Israeli public and decision-makers of
the legitimacy of Palestinian rights)? Or, post-Oslo, should the
definition of "legitimate dialogue" be widened to include other
issues such as state-building, democracy, non-violence or even
reconciliation?
Those supporting the first position criticized post-Oslo dialogue
that was "apolitical-", "identity-" and "reconciliation-" oriented
as "normalization" that legitimized Israel and provided a fig leaf
for the continuation of the occupation. Those advocating the second
position claimed that dialogue should be neither contingent on
political agreement between the sides nor held hostage to the peace
process; i.e., that dialogue couldn't be deferred until such time
as the occupation ended. Having said this, it's also clear that
while Palestinians involved in P2P were motivated largely by the
more political and collectivist agenda, Israelis were motivated
largely by a more individualistic, "post-conflict" and "apolitical"
agenda.
All in all, the P2P phenomenon bloomed during the Oslo years
(between September 1993 and October 2000). Compared with previous
years, an impressive number of projects was initiated and
implemented (about 500 such projects involving over 100
organizations, according to a partial database compiled by the
authors). An estimated total equaling U.S .$20-30 million was
donated for such activities by numerous governmental actors,
foundations and private donors and tens of thousands of Israelis
and Palestinians met, dialogued and cooperated. At the same time,
the limited P2P activities that did take place were a fraction of
what needed to happen if the reality of conflict and relations
between the two societies were to be substantially
challenged.11
1 Aaron David Miller, former U.S. State Department official
and later president of Seeds of Peace, used these notions of
"transactional" vs. "transformational" aspects in an interview with
us, in March 2004. See discussion of resolving protracted
conflicts, for example in Whittaker, David J. Conflict and
Reconciliation in the Contemporary World, London & New York:
Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 1999; Kelman, Herbert.
"Reconciliation As Identity Change: A Social-Psychological
Perspective," in Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaakov (ed.), From Conflict
Resolution to Reconciliation, New York, Oxford University Press,
2004; Schwerin, Edward W. Mediation, Citizen Empowerment, and
Transformational Politics. Westport, Connecticut and London,
Praeger Publishers, 1995.
2 Josef Montville, for example, claims that a central component of
protracted conflicts is a feeling of "victimhood" on both sides,
which includes "a history of loss, violence and trauma… a
feeling that violence was unjustifiable… and …fear that
the aggressor might attack again." Montville, Josef V., "The
Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution," in Sandole,
Dennis J., and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Conflict Resolution
Theory and Practice. Manchester and New York: Manchester University
Press, 1993, p. 115.
3 As defined and discussed at length by Bar-Tal, Daniel and Yona
Teichman in Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 61-67.
4 Ibid., pp. 391-393
5 As defined by Herbert Kelman who claims that in the
Israeli-Palestinian case, the definition of each side's national
identity is based on the negation of the national identity of the
other. See Kelman Herbert C., "The Interdependence of Israeli and
Palestinian National Identities: The Role of the Other in
Existential Conflicts." Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 55, No. 3,
fall 1999, pp. 581-680.
6 Ashrawi refers to these various dialogue efforts that took place
around the world in workshops, seminars and conferences "rehearsal
negotiations" and writes: "…We met, debated, agreed and
argued how to untie and resolve the Gordian knot of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. We approached it from different
angles and with a variety of tools, knowing full well that we were
the advance team carrying out preliminary explorations and trial
runs in preparations for the real event." in Ashrawi, Hanan. This
Side of Peace. New York: Touchstone,1995, p. 62. For in-depth
analyses of pre-Oslo Israeli-Palestinian contacts, see for example
Abbas, Mahmoud (Abu Mazen). Through Secret Channels. UK: Garnet
Publishing Ltd., 1995, Chapters 2-5; Herman, Tamar. "The Sour Taste
of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement 1967-1998" in Gidron,
Benjamin, Stanley N. Katz & Yehezkel Hasenfeld. Mobilizing for
Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine
and South Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.
97-104; Agha, Hussein, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev
Schiff. Track II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East. The
Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003, Chapter 2; Hirschfeld,
Yair. Oslo: A Formula for Peace- From Negotiations to
Implementation. Tel Aviv: Yitzhak Rabin Center for Israel Studies
and Am Oved, 2000 (Hebrew), chapter 1; Beilin, Yossi, Touching
Peace. Yedioth Ahronoth, Chemed Books, Tel Aviv, 1997 (Hebrew),
chapter 1. In an interesting publication by the Palestinian
Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
called "Notes on Palestinian-Israeli Meetings in the Occupied
Territories (1967-1987)," Mahdi Abdul Hadi summarized: "The
meetings began as a small, unknown vehicle standing before a long
dark tunnel. Some twenty years later, however, they have become a
recognized bus running regularly along a fixed route and in all
directions." PASSIA, 1987.
7 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, Annex VI "Protocol Concerning Israeli-Palestinian
Cooperation Programs", Article 8 "The People-to-People
Program."
8 Importantly, from our point of view, the term P2P applies also to
Israeli-Palestinian civil society interactions among those critical
of the Oslo process and to groups that were critical of the
so-called "Oslo peace industry" and thus tried to distance
themselves from this terminology. We use P2P as a neutral
analytical term.
9 Perlman, Lee & Raviv Schwartz, "Preliminary Stocktaking of
Israeli Organizations Engaged in Palestinian-Israeli
People-to-People Activity," paper prepared for the Helsinki
Workshop, November 1999, Appendix B, p. 13
10 "YES PM - Years of Experience in Strategies for Peace-Making:
Looking at Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Activities,"
1993-2002, Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information
(IPCRI), December 2002, pp. 15-17.
11 See discussion of "the legitimization strategy that did not
happen and the P2P that did," in Herzog, Shira and Avivit Hai. The
Power of Possibility: The Role of P2P in the Current
Israeli-Palestinian Reality. Tel-Aviv: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung and
the Economic Cooperation Foundation, 2005.