The appearance and popularity of the idea of separation (actually
various ideas of separation) are a direct result of both the
violence of the past two years and the general belief that there is
no chance for negotiations in the foreseeable future. It is
probably safe to say that most Israelis have despaired of
negotiations because they believe "there is no partner" for talks,
at least where Arafat and the present Palestinian leadership are
concerned. Yet even if Arafat and the entire Palestinian Authority
were to disappear, and an alternative, legitimate Palestinian
leadership were to emerge that had a mandate to negotiate with
Israel, it is hard to conceive of Sharon negotiating a final peace
accord. Thus, whatever the source (Sharon or Arafat) for the
present pessimism over the possibility of negotiations, the public
fear and psychological longing for an end to terror attacks has led
to the interest in unilateral action, in particular some form of
separation.
The various proposals and types of separation are described
elsewhere in this issue, but virtually none present a real element
of hope. There would be some positive effect were the separation
line actually to be along the Green Line (the 1967 borders), but
few if any of the plans appear to propose this. Arbitrarily placing
a border somewhere between the two peoples, without consulting the
Palestinians or negotiating land exchanges would solve little, and
create further problematic facts on the ground. More importantly,
any form of separation that left the IDF and large numbers of
settlers in the Occupied Territories would merely deepen the
occupation, creating still more motivation for attacks against
Israelis, strengthening the myth of "no partner" and weakening
still further the possibility of a future peace accord to end the
conflict.
Not With the Likud in Power
The only "separation" that would hold some promise would be a total
withdrawal to the 1967 lines, though of course it would be even
better to withdraw in the context of an agreement, with all the
necessary territorial adjustments, security arrangements, refugee
and holy sites agreements, water and economic accords, etc. But
this is not going to happen with a Likud government in power in
Israel.
Therefore, we strive to replace the government in Israel with one
that better reflects the public's willingness for a two-state
solution, and we continue to struggle to restrain the Sharon
government's abusive use of force, and press for the dismantling of
settlements, Israeli withdrawal and the like. But we are also
compelled to find a way to provide security without deepening the
occupation or weakening the chance for a negotiated
settlement.
An International Observer Force
There are some possible international solutions, though from the
outset it must be said that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to realize them while Sharon is in power. The minimum
demand of the Palestinians, as well as the Mitchell Committee
Recommendations, the Tenet Plan, and the most recent Security
Council resolution (not vetoed by the US) is the withdrawal of the
IDF to the positions held before the outbreak of the intifada,
namely the lines of September 28, 2000. Since the IDF has
reoccupied most of the territories for "security" reasons, but also
destroyed the PA's own security capabilities, some force must be
placed in the territories to provide security - for both
populations. Thus a first step toward restoring stability would be
the introduction of an international observers force. Such a force
would have to be led by the US in order to have any chance of
acceptance by Israel, but composed of the quartet (US, EU, Russia,
UN) with its authority derived from the UN. It would probably be
wise to call it a "mission" rather than a force, given Israel's
sensitivities, but it would have to have at least some security
function. However this function were defined, the very presence of
such a force, so long demanded by the Palestinians themselves,
would provide an incentive for the cessation of violence, if not an
actual barrier to continued violence.
The Mission's Purpose
Initially the mission's purpose would be to restore stability,
namely the prevention of terror attacks and the return of
Palestinian life to a degree of normalcy, with the political goal
of creating a situation in which negotiations could be resumed. At
the very minimum, the mission would have the function of providing
the necessary environment for Palestinian elections to take place,
assuming that Sharon would continue to demand Palestinian
democratization as another precondition for negotiations. (Of
course, Sharon's definition of Palestinian democratization may not
coincide with the Palestinians' wish for free elections, that is,
the right to elect whomever they want.) Certainly it can be argued
that democratization does include elections (Bush has demanded as
much), and elections cannot, at least by US standards, be conducted
in the presence of the army. Moreover, US standards of democracy
demand freedom of movement and association for the purpose of
electioneering. And it would clearly help the moderate elements of
the Palestinian body politic to gain support against the radical
Islamists were daily life in the territories to return to a
semblance of social and economic order. The withdrawal of the IDF
to the September 28 lines and the prospect of resumed negotiations
would certainly be helpful in this regard. Indeed, it has been
suggested by one senior US official that a US-led permanent mission
be entrusted not only with security tasks but also with political,
economic and social matters in order to restore both stability and
hope to the population.
All this could be achieved without an international force, were
Israel willing to withdraw to the September 28 lines. But it is
Israel that demands security guarantees - security guarantees that
the PA cannot provide on its own, if at all. Thus minimally an
international observer force could be introduced in the areas
evacuated by the IDF to the pre-intifada lines for the purpose of
the elections. Following such a step, which would constitute a
mini-separation, this force or mission could be expanded and take
up positions in additional areas from which the IDF were to
withdraw in the course of negotiations (assuming some of the
promised withdrawals from the Oslo era, including those promised by
Netanyahu, were implemented).
An International Trusteeship
With the expansion of the evacuated areas, another possibility
arises for international intervention. There has been talk in the
US and in some circles in Israel about a mandate or trusteeship for
the Occupied Territories. In other words, instead of the gradual or
partial approach outlined above for an observers mission or force,
the territories would be under the authority not of Israel or the
Palestinians but some international body. This international party
would be responsible for both the administration and the security
of all the inhabitants of the territories. Under such an
arrangement, those settlers who wished would presumably remain
until the final status of the territories were negotiated.
(Theoretically, the government should assist those who prefer to
leave, having assisted them to go there in the first place.) But
the IDF would be replaced by an international force or
internationally supervised force (which might consist of Israelis
and Palestinians).
Popular Demand for Separation
One may assume that the Palestinians would agree to such an
arrangement only if it carried a very limited timetable leading to
their full independence. It is far more difficult to assume that
Israel would agree to such an arrangement at all. Yet, there are a
number of factors that point to such a solution. There is the
popular demand for separation. There is the failure of the
reoccupation to restore security for Israelis. There is, possibly,
the reluctance on the part of some senior IDF officers to have
Israel responsible for security in all of the Occupied Territories.
There is the economic as well as political problem of maintaining
the reoccupation. Indeed, there are all the reasons provided
elsewhere in this issue in favor of separation, without, however,
the negative aspects of maintaining the occupation and foregoing
negotiations.
There are undoubtedly many questions that must be answered
regarding a trusteeship or even a more limited international
force/mission. The matter of East Jerusalem and exact locations for
international observers, the legal aspects and limits of their
authority, their security capabilities, and numerous other more
technical matters must be addressed. But these ideas probably raise
no more questions than those raised with regard to unilateral
separation. Indeed, the international element need not conflict
with the idea of separation, provided the type of separation
intended is one that removes the IDF and opens the way for
negotiations without prejudicing the outcome or deepening the
occupation. Inconceivable that the Sharon government would agree to
such proposals even in the case of an US president willing to press
it to agree? Probably no more inconceivable than the Sharon
government agreeing to unilaterally disband settlements and
separate at the Green Line.