For thousands of years, places with a topographical advantage were
of the utmost importance for security. Elevated points were easier
to defend, enabling a greater visual range to confront a potential
enemy. Attacking armies made special efforts to go around
topographical obstacles: in 1940, the Germans bypassed the Maginot
Line and attacked France via the Ardennes. In 1967, the IDF
attacked the Golan Heights via the easier topographical route of
Givat Em-Kfar Szold. In the distant past, there were difficult
battles in Masada, Gamla and Jerusalem and, more recently, at Kalat
Nimrod and Bufort.
Height is not the only topographical obstacle. Seas, lakes,
deserts, thick forests and swamps are also obstacles to the
movement of armies, and thus were traditionally chosen as "natural"
boundaries between states (Brawer 1988; Gilbert, A. 2000). The
strength of a state and its ability to defend itself has been
measured, among other things, by the size of its territory. The
desire to control broad expanses of land has been around since the
dawn of history, and little has changed in this matter, even today.
Territory means real or presumed strength, and the larger it is,
the more powerful and important a leader feels himself to be. Human
history is marked by territorial conquests: the conquest of Canaan;
the wars of Israel; the conquests of the Egyptian, Babylonian,
Assyrian and Persian empires; and later, the conquests of Alexander
the Great, the Roman, Byzantine and Mongolian empires, the
Crusades, the Ottoman and British empires; the Nazis, the Russians,
the Americans, etc. The conquered territories attracted the
conquerors because of their holiness or because of their natural
resources, whose importance varied according to circumstances -
forest wood, coal, oil, water, wheat, salt, iron, spices and slaves
(the latter have always been in high demand, currently under the
guise of pretty words like "globalization"). The broader the
territory, the easier it is to prepare passageways by land, sea or
air and the more the ruler (king, kaiser, sultan, leader,
government) feels secure and protected.
To these reasons must be added a system of frequently illogical
emotional drives. No leadership has ever willingly given up on a
piece of land under its control, no matter how large that county
may be. (Russia and Chechnya, for example). This drive for
territory also holds true at the individual and municipal level
(struggles over real estate or constant demands by communities to
expand).
During the modern age, we are witnessing dramatic changes in the
goals and tools of war, and these changes appear to eliminate the
importance of topographical, territorial advantages. Planes,
satellites, missiles and electronic communications easily pass over
seas, swamps, mountains, rivers, deserts or forests. Wars fought in
the last decade of the twentieth century (in Iraq, the Balkans and
the area of the Palestinian Authority) demonstrate, supposedly,
that it is possible today to wage and win a war just from the air.
Plus, the relationships and economic arrangements created between
nations appear to eliminate the importance of territory.
In light of these changes, it is natural to ask: at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, as we march towards local, regional
and global peace agreements, does territory still have any meaning?
In the age of the global village, is there still any value to a
square kilometer on this or that side of a border? Is there any
objective justification today to insist on retaining land with
topographical advantages? Doesn't Japan gain via the yen what it
tried to gain through the use of force?
The Importance of Topography to the Security of States
In an analysis of the importance of topography for the security of
states, we should examine the types of weapons and intelligence in
use at present and for the foreseeable future. All modern
intelligence and communications tools need a direct-line connection
from station to station, a fact that grants a great advantage to
mountains and hills. If these are lacking, high towers have to be
built for this purpose. In Israel, military installations have been
built on every bit of high ground - on Mt Bental, Safed, Mt.
Chatzor, Mitzpeh Ramon, Jerusalem, Mt Carmel, and tens of other
locations. In the IDF Compound in Tel Aviv, a tower was built to
compensate for the lack of a high topographical location.
A round-the-world trip will reveal that many mountain peaks are
filled with civilian or military communications and listening
installations. In places that lack high ground, balloons or planes
are used to gain a height advantage. The latter are less effective,
more expensive and more vulnerable than permanent installations.
Satellites can photograph and eavesdrop on sites far from the home
country, while intelligence planes deal with regional tasks and
data. Towers on mountain peaks and individual scouts on high
locations gather data at a more local level.
Topography has advantages not only for communications and
intelligence, but also as means of defense against attack. Despite
the availability of helicopters, planes and missiles, the ability
to deploy large quantities of soldiers and equipment on the ground
remains of decisive importance. During wartime, such transportation
is done primarily over land, and a mountainous topography restricts
this. In the Gulf War, although most of the Iraqi army was defeated
from the air, it was necessary for large quantities of armored and
infantry soldiers to enter Iraq, via Kuwait, to achieve the final
victory. Because Iraq is flat, desert land, it was unable to create
an effective line of defense.
When modern wars in Iraq, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan receive
massive media coverage, it gives the impression that this is the
style of contemporary warfare. This impression is reinforced by
professional and commercial journals, which emphasize the
futuristic tools of war. However, most contemporary wars are
conventional, both in their characteristics and their weaponry.
Most of the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 was fought
conventionally, taking place in difficult mountainous conditions,
where satellites and planes were frequently of no use (as was the
case in Tora-Bora). Individual scouts therefore had a decisive
impact. In Kosovo, a conventional war took place in a primarily
mountainous area. The war between Israel and Lebanon, and between
Israel and the Palestinians, has also been primarily conventional.
Despite the fact that Russia is a nuclear power, it has been
fighting a land war in Chechnya against local partisans for the
past decade. There are tens of small and medium-size wars raging
between states, and between tribes within states and, in all of
them, the topographical conditions dictate the character and
duration of the conflict.
In this respect, there are few differences between past and
present. If we assume there will continue to be disputes based upon
social, ethnic, religious or national differences, there will
continue to be a need for intelligence, modern cellular
communication and defense.
The Importance of Territory for the Security of States
Even in the twenty-first century, territory retains it security
importance. Most of the international disputes today, which are
being resolved either through violence or negotiations, relate to
territorial demands. This is the case between Spain and the
Basques, India and Pakistan, China and Tibet, Eritrea and Ethiopia,
Mauritania and Senegal, Peru and Ecuador, Morocco and Spanish
Sahara and how it was in Yugoslavia (Smith, 1997). Even when there
is the potential to use missiles, the distance between the delivery
installation of missiles and the target destination is important,
and there is an inverse relationship between distance and accuracy.
Distance also has an impact on the ability and effectiveness of air
attacks, with a distant target requiring refueling, a greater
number of supportive planes, etc. In a period characterized by
threats of non-conventional warfare, states with a large to medium
amount of territory, such as China, Canada, Russia, Argentina or
Germany, have a better chance of survival, compared to small states
such as Chechnya, Belgium, Switzerland or Israel. Small states are
more vulnerable to both conventional and non-conventional
attacks.
The history of the twentieth century shows that direct conquest is
not the only way to increase territorial depth. One alternative is
the creation of buffer zones via protectorate states. The USSR, for
example, created a large buffer zone to confront NATO, via
protectorate states (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Romania and Bulgaria). In the Middle East, it provided assistance
to protectorates (Egypt, Syria, Libya and Iraq), while Mongolia
served as a buffer zone opposite China. In the 80s, it also tried
to convert Afghanistan into a protectorate. NATO is carrying out
similar actions today to remove dangers from the East. It is
holding expansion discussions to include Hungary, Poland, the Czech
Republic, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The US is no different in
this respect, as the alliances with Canada and Mexico, ongoing
attempts to eliminate communism from Cuba, constant intervention in
Latin American affairs or economic intervention in the other
states, will testify.
Another aspect of the importance of territory is the question of
infrastructure. A modern society requires large areas for transport
(roads, bypasses, airports, seaports), for energy needs (power
stations, energy storage, energy transport systems) for water and
sewerage installations, for commercial centers, and for the
expansion of suburbs resulting from inner city density. All these
needs require substantial amounts of territory, a lack of which can
cause strong and efficient states to deteriorate into weak, Third
World states. This can have a fateful significance for their
security and national strength.
The Case of Israel
Israel is a small country, one of the most densely populated in the
world, and part of the Western world. It has characteristics of a
developed country (including one of the most modern armies in the
world), alongside characteristics of the developing world.
Alongside Israel lives the Palestinian nation, an evolving
political entity that, according to all criteria, belongs to the
group of developing nations. The nature of the violent dispute
between Israel and the Palestinians is a mixture of guerilla
warfare, terrorism, and modern warfare. The Palestinians have a
prominent topographical advantage in the mountains of Judea and
Samaria/the West Bank. Israel needs high topography for
intelligence and communications purposes. The "Alon Way" in the
eastern West Bank provides a vantage point over the Jordan Valley
and the Kingdom of Jordan, and serves as defensive area for
Israel's eastern front. The rocky mountain cliffs of the
Afro-Syrian Rift from the Gilboa north to the Golan Heights, and
particularly Mt. Hermon, are strategically important sites, all of
which have army and security installations. Both in war and in
peacetime, planes and satellites would not be able to fulfill their
strategic roles without these sites.
Israel needs mountain peaks as strategic locations, even if
important ecological and historical values are damaged in the
process. High topographical control is vital today for surveillance
against terrorism or guerilla warfare, and also as an obstacle to a
military attack. The Jordan River has no value as an obstacle on
the Eastern Front, but the "Alon Way" has a great value in any
defensive battle against an invasion from the East, particularly in
the area of the Gilad, Moab and Edom mountains in the Kingdom of
Jordan, which have a topographical advantage over the lower Jordan
Rift area.
Territory is also important to the Palestinians, and not only for
symbolic, religious and national reasons. To be able to run a
Palestinian entity under reasonable conditions it is important to
have territorial continuity between Judea and Samaria, and between
both and the Gaza Strip. The demand for control over the Jordan
Rift area as a major agricultural center for the future of the
entity (and future state) is of equal importance.
Here, we can pose the question: wouldn't an honest, fair peace
agreement make all the aforementioned considerations irrelevant?
The answer is that every state, and Israel in particular, cannot
agree to territorial concessions, nor concede defensible borders,
based on the assumption that the other side is sincere in its
commitment to peace. The history of humankind and inter-state
relations is a tale of agreements and their repeated abrogation. In
the Israeli case, the fear of the abrogation of treaties is even
greater, given the strange configuration of the Green Line (and
possibly an even more complex dividing line), the tremendous human
density, which will be even greater in the future, the dimensions
of poverty and the expectations for the future given the rate of
population increase in hostile states in the region. To the degree
possible, it is necessary to determine the borders in accordance
with the most pessimistic scenario of relationships between
states.
Territory is particularly important to the two parties in conflict
over the Land of Israel due to the small size of the land, the
large size of the population, and the forecast for a doubling of
the population within 30 to 40 years.
Israel already lacks the land necessary to build physical
infrastructures in the populated area north of the desert line
(Be'er Sheva). The devouring of green areas in the heart of the
country threatens to turn Israel into a black and white desert of
stone and asphalt highways. The clogging of the transportation
infrastructure in the heart of the country creates unhealthy urban
processes, such as the breakup of major business centers and a
general deterioration in all the important parameters of a
developed country, which is gradually converting it into a Third
World country (Sofer, 2001). Because of real estate pressures, army
camps are being pushed to the periphery, and some are being
transferred to sensitive security areas. The lack of land,
particularly in the narrowest part of the state, causes strategic
roads to be within the range of Palestinian small-arms fire.
Israel's dimensions create a situation almost unprecedented around
the world, in which the centre of the country is also its security
border. The heart of the state - the area from Tel Aviv to Petach
Tikva-Rosh Ha'ayin-Cochav Ya'ir - is just a few meters from the
borderline. The centers of Israeli power (the population centers,
water, infrastructure, industry and army) are between 50 meters and
15 kilometers from the Green Line. This is a first-rate
strategic-security weakness, and it would not be an exaggeration to
argue that it is an existential threat (Steinetz, 1998).
And yet it is possible to see an alternative, based on an
assumption of full peace as in the Franco-German model. Under such
circumstances, would strong topographical and territorial demands
remain? Using the European precedent, which includes the reduction
of economic gaps and the cultivation of mutual trust, will there
still be any importance for territory? And in Israel's case, we
must remember it is not only a question of trust between Israelis
and Palestinians, but also between Israel and the rest of the Arab
states. When mountain peaks are only used for civilian
communications, will territory still matter?
Because of rapid population increases (which may stabilize by 2020)
and the rapid increase in standards of living, there will be
increased pressures for territory even in peacetime. However,
assuming there will be open borders and good neighborly relations,
we can assume the Egyptians will agree to accept the population
overflow from the Gaza Strip into Northern Sinai through the
framework of joint economic ventures established with international
and Israeli assistance, while the Kingdom of Jordan will accept the
population overflow from the West Bank. In circumstances of full
peace, there will be no justification for Israel to retain parts of
the Jordan Rift area (which are necessary today to isolate the West
Bank from the Arab world in the eventuality of a war), and those
areas will be the basis for economic projects for the Palestinian
population. Israel will be able to allocate significant financial
resources (freed from security needs) for a more correct dispersal
of population, i.e., an emphasis on attracting population, projects
and infrastructure to the south of the country, or towards the sea
(in the form of landfill projects or the construction of artificial
islands for airports, power stations, fuel storage, enterprises
which involve dangerous materials, etc). A full peace will also
dramatically reduce the size of the IDF. Areas which are currently
taken for security needs (40 percent of the territory of the State
of Israel) will be freed for civilian uses. This will provide
territorial solutions for all of Israel's needs for the next 20 to
40 years.
Conclusion
A full peace will eliminate the demand for topographical advantages
and territorial needs that existed in the 20th century. But this
will only be true under conditions of full peace between Israel and
all its neighboring states, including a Palestinian state.
Meanwhile, an examination of the wars being waged today and those
we can foresee in the near future indicates that the geographical
element retains an importance, for both traditional and new
reasons. Intelligence, communications and defense authorities will
continue to seek a topographical advantage.
As long as Israel faces threats of terrorism and guerilla warfare,
as well as conventional and non-conventional attacks, it will
require topographical advantages to ensure its security. Only under
conditions of full peace, with open borders in accordance with the
European model, can we assume that the importance of topographical
advantages will be considerably reduced in Israel.
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